viùaya and prayojana. If one were to make either of the others
irrelevant then there would be no saübandha.
In his MVK, Madhvâcârya shows that each of these prerequisites cannot
be satisfied if one adheres to the Advaita position. To do so he attacks
their position that there is an aikyam identity, between the brahman
and the jîva, using it as the starting point. Madhvâcârya’s contentions
are in service of a proper understanding of the úâstras and do not
stand independently of that goal. For this reason, the MVK is a superb
example of Mâdhva polemics.
1 Narasiüha, who, [as] the sun [destroys] darkness, [destroys] the
opinions [deriving from ignorance], who is the boundless ocean,
unsurpassed bliss and [His] immeasurable power, [He] is pre-eminent.
8 See Granoff’s Philosophy and Argument in Late Vedânta which is a translation of the Khaõóanakhaõóakhâdya for more.
9 I am indebted to Professors Prahlâdâcârya and Bhat for their lucid introductions to this text. See Prahladcharya, iv–xv and Bhat, Khaõóana Trayam.
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2 That dubious [ úâstra] need not be studied for it imparts false
[knowledge about the universe]. Whatever [gives false knowledge] in
this manner, is [like] that [and should not be studied]. Similarly, [the
úâstra] assented to [by the Advaita school that proclaims the identity of
the brahman and the jîva imparts false knowledge and should not be studied].
3 [According to the Advaita school,] the aikyam, identity [between]
brahman [and the jîva] is definitely not real. [If it were real, then there would be a] difference [of the aikyam, identity from brahman’s] own
nature [and there would be more than one entity that was real. Both
aikyam and brahman would be real]. [This would lead to] the
abandoning of the advaita, non-dualism [position since there would be
two real entities, namely brahman and aikyam, identity].
4 [If aikyam, identity,] is not different [from brahman but is its very]
nature, then [since brahman] is self-luminous, [ aikyam would also be self-luminous]. [Therefore aikyam would already] possess the means for
establishing itself [and would not require úâstra to be known. Therefore,
the úâstras would be superfluous].
5 [Being without difference,] the âtman [that is, brahman] has no
characteristics. [Since] the characteristics are [already] known [then
there is no need to study the úâstras to learn more about brahman].
6 [If] the nature [of brahman] is [already] known and there are no
characteristics [of brahman to be known, then] ignorance conceals
[nothing and studying úâstra, which is known to destroy ignorance,
would have no viùaya and would be superfluous].
7 It is known [that the Advaita school and the Bhâñña School of
Mîmâüsâ hold that] pramâõa, the means of valid knowledge, is that
which leads to a meaning that was not already known. [From this, it
follows that, for the Advaita School, úâstra would not be a pramâõa
since brahman would already be known.]
8 Given that [ brahman and jîva are identical and that brahman has no ignorance] it is impossible [that the jîva is] ignorant and it follows
that the entirety of their [that is, the Advaita School’s] theories are
malicious.
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9 If the aikyam, identity, [between brahman and the jîva] is false, then the âgamas [that is, the úâstras which the Advaita school believes to prove this purported identity] would be proclaiming fallacies [and
would not buttress the Advaita position.]
10 And, [if the Advaita position of aikyam, identity, between brahman
and the jîva is false, then] the difference [between the two] is true.
11 [If aikyam, identity, were true] then mokùa would already be
established [for the jîva, given its] nature [as identical with brahman].
There would [then] be a destruction of the utility [of the úâstras which,
according to the Advaita school, is a prerequisite for mokùa.]
12 As ignorance is impossible [and the Advaita position untenable,
then], the fourth category [neither real, or asat, unreal] is [also] absent.
[If there is no fourth category, then] there is a destruction of the fifth
category [ anirvacanîya, indescribability].
13 Since there is neither a viùaya [for úâstra] nor a prayojana, there is
[also] no adhikâri, one eligible for studying the úâstra. In light of these absences, there is also no saübandha, [between the viùaya, prayojana and the adhikâri].
14 [Consider these passages from the Bhagavad Gîtâ 15.16–20:]
‘There are two entities in the world, perishable and imperishable. All
beings are perishable. The one occupying the highest place [that is,
brahman] is called the imperishable. And the highest entity [that] is
different [from the perishable entities] is called the Supreme Self, who,
pervading the three worlds, supports them [that is, the three worlds].
Since I transcend the perishable and am higher than the imperishable, I
am in the world and in the Veda and am known as the Highest Among
Beings! Oh Descendent of Bharata [that is, Arjuna], he who knows Me
as the Highest Among Beings [and is] without delusion, he knows all
and worships Me with his entire being. Thus, this preeminently secret
úâstra is professed by Me. Oh Descendent of Bharata, having awakened
to this [secret], one should be enlightened, fulfilling all duties.’
15 [And this passage from the Kañha Upaniùad 3.10–11:] ‘Higher than
the indriyas, senses, are their objects. Higher than sense objects is the
manas, mind. Higher than the manas is the buddhi, intellect. Higher than the buddhi is the Highest Being. Higher than the Highest Being is the
unmanifest. Higher than the unmanifest is the puruùa, Person. Higher
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than the puruùa, Person, there is nothing at all. That is the goal, that is
the highest state.’10
16 [ Brahma Sûtra 3.3.59 indicates this:] Importance [is given to
meditation] on the Supreme Being as is the [centrality of] sacrifice. This
is shown [by the úâstra].
17 The superiority of Viùõu is declared by all of the úruti and by the
Lord and [that] alone is the purpose of the úâstra.
18 There is a destruction of the darkness of the entire mâyâ position
by the all-knowing sage [that is, Madhvâcârya] by means of [his] tattva-
vâda, position of reality. [And this is] to dispel the doubts of good men.
20 There is nothing equal to Nârâyaõa [that is, Viùõu/ brahman], nor
was there, nor will there be. With these true statements, I conclude [my
refutation of the mâyâ position].
Madhvâcârya’s Upâdhikhaõóanam , The Refutation of the [Concept of]
the Limiting Adjunct
This treatise, like the MVK, is an attack at the heart of the Advaita
position. Here, Madhvâcârya shows that there are problems with the
concept of upâdhi, limiting adjunct. The upâdhi creates differences that did not exist before. It is applied to brahman and the result is that what
is unity is incorrectly perceived as multiplici
ty. All that is perceived,
for example, is an upâdhi of brahman. The Advaita school contends
that bheda, difference, that is perceived is not real, that it is an upâdhi of brahman and that the only real entity is brahman. Madhvâcârya
questions the ontology of the upâdhi and then the locus of ajñâna,
ignorance. 11 Towards the end of the UK he employs a similar strategy as he did in the MVK and argues that, if one were to accept the Advaita
position, there will be problems with the adhikâri, viùaya, prayojana and with saübandha. He again shows that one can neither uphold úâstra
nor read it properly if one follows the Advaita position.
1 May [Lord] Nârâyaõa [Viùõu], whose form alone is permanent [and
filled with] countless qualities, who is free from all faults, [and] who is
the abode of Kamalâ [that is, Lakùmî], be pleased. [If the Advaita
10 I owe this translation in its entirety to Olivelle. Olivelle, 239.
11 For more see Ingalls’s ‘Saükara on the question: Whose Avidya?’.
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School is correct and brahman is identical with the jîva and the jîva is ignorant, then, it follows, that brahman must be ignorant! Attributing]
ignorance to the One Who Knows All is absolutely not proper.
2 If [you] hold that [this ignorance is] possible because of the
difference [caused by] the limiting adjunct, then either it [that is, the
upâdhi] is [part] of the self-nature [of brahman] or it is [caused by]
ignorance. If it is intrinsic [to brahman], then dualism is [established as]
true [since both brahman and upâdhi are real].
3 When the cause [of the limiting adjunct] is [held to be] ignorance,
then [there is the fallacy of] infinite regress [as the first limiting adjunct,
which I will call U1 will be caused by ignorance, which I will call I1.
This ignorance, I1, would itself require another upâdhi, namely U2,
which requires I2 and so forth.] Or [there is the fallacy of] reciprocal
dependence [as U1 requires I1 and vice versa]. Or [there is the] calamity
of circularity [as U1, I1, requires U2, I2, and these require U3, I3, and
this last set requires U1, I2]. And, [moreover,] how can difference [be
caused by] the limiting adjunct?
4 In all cases previously seen, [the limiting adjunct] is the indicator of
a difference [that already] exists. [It does not] create new [differences].
When it, [the limiting adjunct, differentiates] portions from other
portions it indicates a difference [that already] exists. [The limiting
adjunct] is [proposed merely] for the contemplation of those who are
stupid!
5 If not, then is there a relation of the limiting adjunct with one part
[of the space] or with the whole? [If it were the first], with one part,
then there would be an infinite regress [that is, if there are parts then
difference already exists. If difference already exists then it would
require an upâdhi ad infinitum]. [If it were the second], with the whole,
then there is no difference [that is created, and the upâdhi is useless].
6 And if one [ âtman] is identical [with another, then] there would be
no difference [between their individual] experience of pleasure and
pain. Despite the difference [caused by] the limiting adjunct such as the
hands, feet, etc. [they are not experienced as different from the one who
experiences them].
7 There is also the case of [accounts from the âgama about] the yogi
who investigates the experiences of different bodies. If [the bodies were]
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not [different from one another], then how can the yogi’s desire to
investigate the experiences [of different bodies be understood]?
8 [It may be argued that] possessing various bodies [is possible]
without the plan [to investigate the experiences of different bodies]. [If
so, then] how is the yogi [able to choose] particular [bodies]?
9 If it were argued that [the difference in limiting adjuncts] is due to
the difference in karma, then there would also be a difference in the
limiting adjuncts. And, if [this were the case], then [the limiting adjunct
will require a difference in karma and vice versa and] there would be
[the fallacy of] reciprocal dependence.
10 [There is] no fallacy [if there is] an intrinsic difference [between
each individual] âtman. And [the position that they are all identical] is
entirely inconsistent with perception and other [ pramâõas]. And this
position [that there is identity] is incontrovertibly false.
11 By [observing] the characteristic behavior of other bodies, one
concludes that [they each possess] an âtman. From this, [one concludes
that] the individual âtman are different [from one’s own âtman]. This is perceived by all.
12 [The qualities of the individual âtman such as] ignorance,
insignificant power, suffering and insignificant agency, are opposed to
the qualities [of brahman] such as omniscience and the like. [Everyone]
perceives [this except for those, such as the scholars of the Advaita
school, who hold that brahman is nirguõa].
13 Viùõu’s qualities such as omniscience etc. are established in úruti
[like èg Veda 8.3.4: ‘He, with his might enhanced by çùis thousand-fold, has spread out like an ocean.] His greatness is [praised as] true [at
solemn rites and his powers where holy singers rule]’ and others. From
[such] statements, [the aforementioned qualities ascribed to brahman]
14 There is no reliable authority [which holds that] there is a fallacy
in Vedic utterances. And even [if there were such an authority] it is not
authoritative. [If omniscient brahman were identical with all âtman
and] the identity theory [were held to be true], then there would be
no ignorance that arises and, [consequently] no [need for] adhikâra [to
study the Vedas].
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15 [If the identity theory were true] then the phrase ‘ignorance’ is not
[possible. That is, if brahman is identical with the jîvas and brahman is not ignorant, then the jîvas must also not be ignorant]. And [if this were
the case, then] there is no viùaya to be explained [by the Vedas] nor prayojana. From there being no emergence of ignorance, who [would
get the] fruit [of Vedic study]? The saübandha [between the viùaya to be explained, the prayojana and the adhikâra of the student would be sadâbhâva, like the self-contradiction] of the hare’s horn.
16 [If] the difficulty [in explaining the location of ignorance and the
limiting adjunct] is [to be considered intellectual] ornamentation then
the tman, [that is, brahman] would be ignorant! Complete darkness
[that is, ignorance] would be [His] ornamentation, [and] eternal
suffering [His] crest-jewel!
17 Therefore, [the position that brahman and âtman are different] is illustrated in úruti passages [such as èg Veda 7.99.1: ‘They are not able to reach your majesty when you expanded] beyond all limits.’ [And
brahman] is seen as different from the âtman by úruti passages [such as Muõóaka Upaniùad 3.1.2: ‘Stuck on the very same tree, one person
grieves, deluded by her who is not the
Lord. But when he sees] the other,
contented Lord [and his majesty, his grief disappears.]’ [And, in] úruti
passages [such as Muõóaka Upaniùad 3.1.3:] ‘When [the seer sees that
puruùa, Person, the gold-colored, the creator, the Lord, as the womb of
brahman. Then shaking off the good and the bad, the wise man becomes
spotless and attains the highest identity],’ the [mere] similarity [of the
individual âtman] to the tman [that is, brahman] always [indicates]
difference.
18 In order to eternally please the Lord of Úrî [that is, Lakùmî],
discerning reality [as it is], the sun of omniscience illuminated the
world, which is pervaded by the darkness of the position of illusion.
19. I bow to that Lord of Indirâ [that is, of Lakùmî], whose form is lovely
and who is [characterized by] abundant bliss and innate intelligence and
who grants the experience of eternal bliss [to his devotees].
Viùõutattva(vi)nirõaya , The Complete Ascertainment of the Nature of
Viùõu: ekajîvavâda , the view that there is only one [ jîva ]
The VTV contains a variety of refutations of Advaita positions.
Comprised of 540 granthas it is much longer than either the MVK or the
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UK. It is divided into three sections. The first section concerns the
epistemology of the âgamas while the second is centered on the proper
interpretation of select passages from the âgamas. The third section is
a reaction against the Advaita position that brahman is nirguõa and demonstrates that brahman is saguõa.
The passages below are from the first section of the VTV and are
refutations of ekajîvavâda, the Advaita position that all of reality is
the product of one jîva, namely brahman. Madhvâcârya correlates
ekajîvavâda with the belief that the universe is the product of one
person’s dream. Note that the argument is focused on the practical
implications of the Advaita position for the teacher, the students and for
the goal of Vedânta, namely to obtain mokùa.
1 Ekajîvavâda, the view that there is only one jîva [namely brahman]
is incoherent.
2 When the imagination is [produced] from only one [ jîva’s] ajñâna,
ignorance, then [that jîva,] knowing ‘everything is [merely] imagination’
cannot endeavor to enlighten [imaginary] students.