Instead, they are activities that are followed by those who have obtained
Viùõu- prasâda, aparokùa-jñâna and mokùa and who wish to increase their ânanda, bliss. Activity is thus a matter of choice and not duty. Jîvas are not bound to anything in mokùa or do they incur any pâpa when they choose not to act. 84
Having been granted mokùa, the jîvas are able to bask in the glory and supremacy of Viùõu, fully aware of their location in the hierarchical
universe.
81 ... . caivottamottamâþ | nityânande ca bhoge ca jñanaiúvaryaguõeùu ca | sarve úataguõodriktâþ pûrvasmâduttarottaram | pûjyante câvaraiste tu sarvapûjyaúcaturmukhaþ |
BSB 4.4.19.
82 na câsamatvena virodho bhavati | brahmadhîtvâddoùâbhâvasâmyâduttamebhyo
‘nyeùâü bhâvâc ca | BSB 3.3.34.
83 sa tatra paryeti jakùan krîóan ramamâõaþ strîbhirvâ yânairvâ jñâtibhirvâ ajñâtibhirvâ | VTV. etat sâmagâyannâste | çcâü tvaþ poùamâste pupuùvân | gâyatraü tvo gayati úakvarîùu | VTV.
84 svecchyaivetyaõgîkartavyam | muktasya tîrõatvât | BSB 3.3.28 svecchyâ kurvanti na vâ | bandhapratyavâyayorabhâvât | BSB 3.3.29.
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CHAPTER FIVE
Saüvâda, discussion and debate
Mâdhvas are well known for polemics against their rivals. In fact
debate and argument with other schools is an integral part of being
and becoming a proper citizen of the Mâdhva world, preparing for
Viùõu- prasâda and eventually being graced with mokùa. In his AV,
Madhvâcârya describes the activities of the ideal devotee: ‘Therefore,
devotees who cherish the Lord, whose understanding [is] pure, [and]
who understand the âgamas, they would always [strive to] destroy the
darkness [of ignorance].’1
Madhvâcârya, of course, was not the first to propose that discussion
and debate was so important. Such an instruction is found in the Brahma
Sûtras in the section known as Samayavirodha, The Contradictions [In Other] Doctrines. It contains arguments against the Nyâya, Vaiúeùika,
Sâükhya, Yoga, Cârvâka, Buddhist, Jaina, Úaiva and the Úâkta schools.
But why did Vyâsa include such materials in his BS anyway?
Madhvâcârya explains: ‘Then, [Vyâsa, who is] the Lord of knowledge,
composed refutations of [rival] doctrines for [his] own devotees in order
to sharpen their intellect.’2 Sharpening the intellect helps devotees not only to learn their own tradition but also to defend it against others.
Debate, then, is not an activity solely of the Mâdhva traditions. It also
does not occur in a vacuum, but is the primary mode of interaction
between scholars and adherents of the different schools of South Asian
philosophy. In fact, Mâdhva disputations are part of a much larger
institution that has its origins in the development of Buddhism and
Jainism, the first traditions considered heretical by Hindus. What are
these debates like?
Inter-religious and intra-religious debates were formal events
occurring in the presence or under the auspices of royalty. Such events
were also governed by a sabhâpati, judge (lit. ‘Lord of the meeting’),
who would objectively determine the validity or success of arguments.
Madhvâcârya characterizes these prâúnikas, arbitrators of the dispute,
as wise, all-knowing and with neither hate nor anger.3 The prâúnika’s
1 tathâpi úuddhabuddhînâm îúânugrahayoginâm | suyuktayas tamo hanyur âgamânugatâþ sadâ | AV 2.2.8 . tamaþ ajñânam | Jayatîrtha, Nyâya Sudhâ, 2.2.8.
2 iti vidyâpatiþ samyaksamayânâü nirâkçtim | cakâra nijabhaktânâü buddhiúâõatvasiddhaye | AV 2.2.9.
3 râgadveùavihînâstu sarvavidyâviúâradâþ | prâúnikâ iti ... | KL 5.
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knowledge would include the âgamas and tarka-doùas such as the ones described earlier in Chapter 2. When one participant was unable to respond to a criticism, then loss might be declared by the prâúnika.
Defeat has several outcomes including censure and even conversion!
Many of the South Asian traditions grew when rivals lost in debate and
had to convert.
Consequently, much time and effort was involved in constructing
arguments against rival traditions and preparing students to partake in
debates, between students in the confines of the mañha and eventually
with other experts. Mañhas of each of the schools of Vedânta are still
places where debating is encouraged and formal and informal debates
take place. Viúveùa Tîrtha, the svâmiji of the Pejâvara mañha, for
example, allocates some of his time to lively arguments with students
they did in medieval South Asia.
Mâdhva Vedânta and its rivals
As already mentioned, Madhvâcârya accounts for the existence of
mohaúâstras, confusing texts, by attributing them to Viùõu. Madhvâcârya
explains that, at Viùõu’s request, Rudra created them to ‘guide the
asuras, demons, to Hell.’4 Madhvâcârya first states reasons as to why these doctrines exist:
Those adhering to the belief that the world is false, [do so] out of
ignorance, because of their lack of understanding, because of the
abundance of those having little knowledge, [and] because of their
ceaseless hatred for the Highest Reality [that is, Viùõu] and for the
knowledge of the real [nature of things].5
He next locates the upholders of these rival doctrines in his jîva-
traividhya, three-fold classification of jîvas: ‘The doctrines are
maintained as a result of the endless vâsanâs, karmic impressions, of many asuras due to their being caught [in the cycle of] foolishness.’6
4 asurâõâü tamogataþ | yasmât kçtâni tânîha viùõunoktyaþ úivâdibhiþ | eùâü yan na virodhi syât tatroktaü tan na vâryate | MBhTN 1.34.
5 daurlabhyâc cchuddhabudhînâm bâhulyâd alpavedinâm | AV 2.2.5. tâmasatvâc ca lokasya mithyâjñânaprasaktitaþ | vidveùâtprame tattve tattvavediùu câniúam | AV
2.2.6.
6 anâdivâsanâyogâdasurâõâü bahutvataþ | durâgrahagçhîtatvâd vartante samayâþ sadâ | AV 2.2.7.
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The doctrines are kept alive by those who are predestined to keep them
alive and whose vâsanâs, mental impressions formed by previous
activities, dictate their behavior. Their existence as well as the effort of
devotees to show their incoherence are both essential parts of the
Mâdhva universe.
Texts
Madhvâcârya’s corpus is filled with polemics against rival schools.
Before plunging directly into the arguments, I first examine
Madhvâcârya’s Kathâlakùaõa, a handbook on rhetoric and the three
kinds of debate. Though there are no arguments against other schools
in this text, it offers an excellent description of the way that debates
should be conducted. I then turn to three sets of arguments presented
by Madhvâcârya in his dasaprakaraõa; the Upâdhikhaõóana,
The Refutation of the Upâdhi Position, the Mâyâvâdakhaõóana, The Refutation of the Mâyâ Position, and the Viùõutattva(vi)nirõaya, The Complete Ascertainment of the Nature of Viùõu.
Kathâlakùaõa , The Characterization of Dispute
&nbs
p; The Kathâlakùaõa, also known as the Vâdalakùaõa, is a brief text
of thirty-five anuùñubhs in which Madhvâcârya defines the types of
debates and the context within which they take place.7 Such manuals on rhetoric were not uncommon among the schools of South Asian
philosophy and Mâdhva Vedânta is no exception. This treatise on
polemics is useful as a dialectical handbook for adherents who wish to
debate and wish to learn about the type of arguments that one can use.
Madhvâcârya holds that there are three kinds of debate vâda, jalpa
and vitaõóâ. Vâda is a debate whose purpose is the pursuit of truth.
Jalpa is a debate whose purpose is to bring fame and glory to the
competitive victor. The third kind of debate, vitaõóâ, is when one
participant seeks only to destroy the position of the other, yet does not
reveal any position whatsoever. This form of debate is a kind of reductio
ad absurdum when victory is achieved only by showing the incoherence
of the position of one’s opponent and neither presenting nor exposing
one’s own position for judgment.
What follows are directions on how to proceed in a debate. The
debates that are described here are not about abstract philosophical
7 An anuùñubh is a class of meter consisting of thirty-two syllables.
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issues. Instead, debate is rooted entirely in the âgamas and concerns
interpretations of particular passages. Debating means criticizing the
interpretation or the evidence offered by one’s opponent and then
offering one’s own interpretation or even better evidence. Each of the
texts translated in this chapter, aside from the VTV, has a maïgala-úloka
at the beginning and end. Not only are Madhvâcârya’s texts about the
âgamas, but they are all in service of Viùõu.
1 After bowing to Nçsiüha, who is [like] the warm sun which
[removes] all of the darkness of ignorance, I accurately explain the
definition of dispute.
2–3 There are three varieties [of] scholarly dispute: vâda, jalpa and vitaõóâ. Vâda, is the discussion [between] the teacher and the student and also with other good people who only [seek to] ascertain the truth
completely. Or [it is for] the benefit of a [public] assembly. It is said that
jalpa, wrangling, is also a discussion with good people [who seek] fame
and the like or [desire] competition.
4 Vitaõóâ, captious objection, is with good people and others [who are
not good]. [When the debate is] among these others [who are not good],
then one’s own truth is hidden. In vâda one should decide the truth on
one’s own or by means of a prâùnika, arbitrator.
5 The prâúnikas, arbitrators [of the dispute], are said to be skilled in all systems of thought and to be without biases. There can be one [ prâúnika]
or just an uneven number.
6 If there is only one prâúnika, arbitrator, then he should be known as a
remover of all doubts, should be without doubts [himself], noble minded
and free of all the doùas, imperfections.
7 Whether the arbitrator is [just] one or [there are] many he should
always be engaged in the devotion of Viùõu. For the chief characteristic
of all [people] whose qualities are good is devotion to Viùõu.
8 In the beginning [of any debate], when questioned [by an opponent,]
the [relevant passage from the] âgama is to be cited in order to establish
what is to be proven. [This position is found in] the úruti [ Kañha
Upaniùad 2.9]: ‘This knowledge can neither be obtained nor destroyed
through tarka, argument.’ [In response], the opponent should offer
another interpretation of that âgama.
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9 The èg, Yajur, Sâma and Atharva Vedas, the [Mahâ]bhâratam, the Pañcarâtras and the Mûlarâmâyaõa are declared to be correct âgamas.
10 Texts that agree [with the correct âgamas] are [also] said to be
correct âgamas. Other [texts which conflict with the correct âgamas] are bad âgamas. [They are bad since] by them one cannot establish what is
to be proven.
11 The respondent should state his own view as well as the
[supporting passage from the] âgamas. In order to establish his own
position [and counter the opponent’s], the proponent should prove [that
there is] another interpretation of that [same passage from the âgamas].
12 The other interpretation of one’s own [ âgama] should be rejected in
light of a definitive [interpretation] of the âgama. Here is an opportunity
for reasoning to be admitted.
13 When the meaning of the âgama of the proponent is determined
then the [meaning of the âgama of the] opponent should be determined
later with friends. After that [is done] the determination [of the
respective meanings] will be complete.
14 When, in the question, the meaning is established by pratyakùa,
perception [such as via the eyes, ears, and the like], there is a need to
state a perceptual authority and a direct knowledge [such as the sâkùî].
One should not state an anumâna, inference, in the beginning [of the
debate].
15 If there are two people [each disputing] and both say something
that pleases [that is, satisfies] one another, that alone is known as the
âgama. Satisfaction for the opponent is the goal of that [debate].
16 Thus, in the vâda many people are occupied for a long time with
the conclusion. And in a jalpa it continues until there is a victory over
the opponent.
17 In vâda, opposition to the determination of the truth is a defect. In
the dialogue [when there is opposition] there should be praise and
respect given to the other [person] who won.
18 Or [in a vâda] when the argument comes to a conclusion then there
would be either censure or punishment of the loser. In the jalpa victory
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one would be conquered by contradiction, incongruity, omission of
evidence, superfluity and silence.
19 The rule [for determining the victor] in vitaõóâ, the captious
objection [type of a disputation], is said to be in the style of a jalpa.
When there is a discussion [of the jalpa and vitaõóâ variety] there should be no punishment, only defeat.
20 Or, otherwise there should be censure or punishment. In the jalpa,
the lack of restatement is not considered a fault.
21–22 If the vâdins, disputants, [show] the signs of having no
knowledge, there will be an immediate failure. There are no other
reasons for defeat other than the six [namely, contradiction, incongruity,
omission of evidence, superfluity, silence and having no knowledge].
There are no others [as all] are included in these [six]. In jalpa and
vitaõóâ the activity is preceded by an investigation of the knowledge [of
the disputants].
23 If there is only a stumbling then there is no defect. This is the
faultless characterization of the vâda, jalpa and vitaõóâ.
24 In accordance with the Brahma Tarka, the Kathâlakùaõa, The
Characterization of Disputation, by nandatîrtha is said to please Him,
who is the possessor of the Úârïga [that is, Viùõu’s bow].
25 Narasiüha, who is the most beloved [and] the Supreme Person,
who drives any of the heart’s darkness with the flow of knowledge
[which, like the sun,] is always arisen, let Him be pleased!
The Mâyâvâdakhaõóana: The Refutation of the Mâyâ Position
The MVK is part of Madhvâcârya’s Khaõóanatraya, A Trio of
Refutations, which includes the Upâdhikhaõóana, The Refutation of the Upâdhi Position, and the Prapañcamithyâtvânumânakhaõóana, The
Refutation of the Inference of the Illusoriness of Phenomenal Reality.
These three texts are pointed criticisms of positions that are essential
to Advaita epistemology. As already mentioned, the MVK is partly a
reaction to arguments found in the 12th-century ce Advaita scholar
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Úrîharùa’s Khaõóanakhaõóakhâdya. Given the scope of the present
work, it is not necessary to present a summary of Úrîharùa’s arguments.8
Not surprisingly, the arguments in the MVK cannot be removed
from the fundamental component of the schools of Vedânta, namely
the úâstra.9 Not only do arguments in Vedânta center around the interpretation of the âgamas but they are often attempts to show that the
opponent is not acknowledging the centrality of those texts. To address
this issue of centrality, the schools of Vedânta hold that úâstra has four
elements, each of which must exit and be satisfied. If one can show
that the position of the opponent does not include or excludes one of
these four, then victory is guaranteed. If a school of Vedânta does not
uphold the importance of the úâstra, then it is no longer a commentarial
tradition! For each school, then, it follows that:
1 adhikâri: there must be devotees who are eligible to study the úâstra
and have a desire to study them.
2 viùaya: there must be a defined subject matter of úâstra. Does úâstra teach that there is difference or identity? It cannot teach both and
must be consistent.
3 prayojana: there must be an aim or purpose for úâstra. It cannot
stand apart from the practical concern of being granted mokùa.
4 saübandha: there must be a relationship between the adhikâri,