3 [Why?] Recognizing ‘this is [all] in a dream’ one does not labor to
[give away one’s] monetary inheritance to the dream-son. [Similarly,
why would one bother to teach one’s students when they are merely
products of one’s own imagination?]
4 But, unaware of being in a dream, he may labor [in this way] in the
dream itself.
5 Given that many [people] are seen [and they all might be dreaming],
it is not possible to have a firm conviction as to whose dream it is.
6 But in dream[s,] it is certain [that] after awaking, [only] one [person,
namely the dreamer,] remains.
7 Here, [in this case,] it is not possible [to be certain about who is the
dreamer and who is being dreamed].
8 It is also impossible that reality is to be conceived of as imaginary by
each [individual jîva]. These alternatives cannot arise [as possibilities]
[One can only conclude that] there would be no imagination in reality.
124
Saüvâda , Discussion and Debate
111
9 Moreover, there is no pramâõa, means for valid knowledge,
[showing] that it [that is, reality] is to be conceived [of as imagination by
each and every jîva].
10 [If] the imagination [derives from] the ignorance of the student,
then when [the student] becomes a teacher, he himself [becomes the
product of] imagination! Learning properly [from] the books [that is,
sacred texts] would be disastrous!
11 No one would be able to attain mokùa. When one learns the texts,
then one [becomes a teacher and] suffers [becoming the product] of the
student’s imagination!
12 If one jîva was a bhedavâdin, one who follows the view [that
there is a] difference [between the jîva and brahman], then there is a confirmation of it [that is, difference]. There is never an elimination of
difference and, [therefore,] no one would attain mokùa.
13 By this [reasoning], whatever is imagined [by this one jîva], that is
[reality]. When those following ekajîvavâda, the view that there is only
one [ jîva], are imagined to be in eternal Hell, then this would be so!
14 [From these arguments, it follows that] there is no proof
whatsoever that everything is a [product] of the imagination of one jîva.
Other debates
The arguments found in these texts are a fraction of a vast corpus of
texts. Most are only available in Sanskrit but there are a few that
have been translated into English and are readily available. These
include Gerow’s translation of Viùõudâsâcarya’s Vâdaratnâvalî, Betty’s
translation of Vâdirâja’s Nyâyaratnâvalî and Sarma’s translation of
portions of Vyâsatîrtha’s Tâtparyacandrikâ.
125
APPENDIX A
Pramâõas, tattva and anitya – tables
126
nitya
Vedas
ùads
âgama
Upani
çti
Atharva
tvak
sm
Anu
sparúa
nityânitya
õyakas
anumâna
otra
Sûtras
Sâma
ra
úr
úabda
ùa
ùus
Brahma
Yajur
pratyak
cak
rûpa
þmanas
Brâ
gè
rasana
rasa
õa
Vedas
õas
ghrâ
gandha
Mânava-dharma-úâstra
Pramâ
manas
õas
ùî
Purâ
sâk
õa
Râmâya
ayogi
ayogins
yogi
Mahâbhârata
tattvika
õas
ùmî
Pramâ
Kevala
Lak
çju
Tantras
A.1
Îúa
Table
127
ayt
â
i
d
n
a
a
s
itçka
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p
am
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a
v
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2.
m
A
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sa
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aT
128
î
a
v
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ht
â
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m
p
harb
al
–
s
aj
a
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t
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ü
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p
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v
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n
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k
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ar
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3.
a
h
h
d
a
A
a
du
õâ
el
m
b
rh
b
g
aT
129
APPENDIX B
Detailed outline of contents
Chapter One: Madhvâcârya and the Mâdhva tradition
Basic theological issues
Sources
Education
Political environment and patronage
Religious context
stika traditions: Vedânta
Two non-Vedânta traditions: Vîraúaivism and Jainism
Tribal and other indigenous traditions
The Mâdhva saüpradâya, community and institutions
The contemporary Mâdhva community
Madhvâcârya’s works: the Sarvamûlagranthâþ, Compendium of All the
Fundamentals
Other relevant Mâdhva works
Theory and practice
Chapter Two: Mâdhva epistemology
Pramâõa, the means of valid knowledge
Kevala-pramâõa, direct knowledge of an object as it is
Anu-pramâõa, indirect knowledge
Anu-pramâõas: pratyakùa, perception
Smçti, memory
The sâkùî
Anu-pramâõas: anumâna, defectless inference
The structure of the inference according to the Nyâya School
Madhvâcârya’s analysis of defectless inference
Tarka-doùas, logical errors
Anu-pramâõas: âgama, defectless sentences and/or texts
Apauruùeya-âgama, sentences and texts not having human
authorship
Pauruùeya-âgama, sentences and texts having human authorship
Mohaúâstra, the confusing texts
Pratyakùa vs. âgama vs. anumâna
116
130
Appendix B: Detailed Outline of Contents
117
Khyâti-vâdas, theories of false cognition
Anirvâcanîya-khyâti, the theory that the ontological status of the
object of a false cognition is indescribable
Anyathâ-khyâti, the theory that false cognition is k
nowing
[something] as otherwise
Madhvâcârya’s abhinava-anyathâ-khyâti, the new theory that false
cognition is knowing [something] as otherwise
Mâdhva realism
Chapter Three: Mâdhva ontology
Asvatantram, dependent entities
Abhâva, non-existent entities
Bhâva, existent entities
Cetanas, sentient beings
Acentanas, non-sentient entities
Svatantra, the only independent entity: Viùõu
Sadâgamaikavijñeyaü, one who can be known only via the true
âgamas
Viùõu is brahman, divinity
Viùõu is saguõa, having attributes
Viùõu’s vyûhas, emanations, and avatâras, incarnations
Madhvâcârya’s mitigated monotheism
Subject and attribute
Viúeùas, distinguishing properties
Bhedasâdhanam, establishing difference
Chapter Four: Mâdhva soteriology
The jîva, enduring self
Bandha, bondage
Bimba-pratimba-vâda, theory of reflection
Kartçtva, agency, svarûpatraividhya, predestination, and karma
Adhikâra, eligibility
The path to mokùa, liberation
Karma-yoga, the path via action and ritual
Jñâna-yoga, the path via knowledge
Bhakti-yoga, the path via devotion
Prasâda, grace
Guru-prasâda, grace of the teacher
131
118
An Introduction to Mâdhva Vedânta
Madhvâcârya-Vâyu as guru
Viùõu- prasâda, grace of Viùõu
Aparokùa-jñâna, unmediated knowledge, of Viùõu
Mokùa, liberation
Chapter Five: Saüvâda, discussion and debate
Mâdhva Vedânta and its rivals
Texts
Kathâlakùaõa, The Characterization of Dispute
The Mâyâvâdakhaõóana: The Refutation of the Mâyâ Position
Madhvâcârya’s Upâdhikhaõóanam, The Refutation of the [Concept
of] the Limiting Adjunct
Viùõutattva(vi)nirõaya, The Complete Ascertainment of the Nature of
Viùõu: ekajîvavâda, the view that there is only one [ jîva]
Other debates
132
APPENDIX C
Glossary
abhâva: non-existent entities, there are three types: prâg, pradhvaüsa and sadâ
abhavya: those jîvas, according to the Jains, lacking the capability to achieve nirvâõa
abheda: non-different, identical
abhinava-anyathâ-khyâti-vâda: Madhvâcârya’s new theory that false
cognition is knowing [something] as otherwise
âcârya: teacher
acetana: non-sentient entities, there are three types: nitya, anitya and nityânitya
adharma: against duty, the order and law of the universe, unlawful
activities
adhika: superfluity, a reason for defeat in a debate
adhikâra: eligibility
adhikâri: one who is eligible, a qualified aspirant
Advaita Vedânta: non-dualism, the name of a school of Vedânta founded
by Úaükarâcârya
âgama: scriptural authority and verbal testimony
agni: fire, one of the pañca-bhûtas
Agni: the god of fire
ahaükâra: ‘I’-ness, egotism, the organ that produces self-consciousness
ajñâna: ignorance
âkâúa: ether, one of the pañca-bhûtas
alaukika: super-normal sense relation intrinsic to Nyâya khyâti-vâda
aüúas: divisions
ânanda: bliss
ânanda-târatamya-vâda: Madhvâcârya’s view that there are degrees of
bliss in mokùa
Anatrikùa-loka: the Intermediate Region, a place in mokùa
anavasthâ: an infinite regress, a tarka-doùa
Andhatâmisro: [Place of] Complete Darkness, one of the Hells
aõgula: a measure that is the breadth of one finger
Aniruddha: son of Pradyumna and grandson of Kçùõa, one of the vyûhas