removal of Rebel offi
ceholders to be replaced by loyal men (who were generally
Republicans), and infl uenced the freedmen to vote “for their friends” (i.e., the
Republican party). Field agents fully understood their infl uence with the freed-
men, and rarely hesitated to use it. Th
ey worked (on a few occasions campaigned)
hard “in order to secure the vote of the colored” for the Republican party. Th
eir
political work, however, was oft en done covertly. Superiors warned subordi-
nates about public, partisan acts and prohibited them from actively seeking
political offi
ce while serving the agency. Th
ey understood a strong Republican
party in Texas was a way to protect the emancipated post- Freedmen’s Bureau.
Subassistant commissioners in Texas were politically active and assisted the
Republicans because it benefi ted the emancipated, helped them, and assisted
the organization’s overall mission in the state.
With the passage of the Texas Black Code, the protection aff orded became all
the more important. With this code, state lawmakers hoped to circumscribe the
former slave’s freedom, especially through restrictive labor and apprentice laws.
SACs were ordered to disregard the labor law but enforce apprentice contracts if
local offi
cials applied it impartially. So long as counties refused to care for their
black indigents, so long as indigent and orphaned freed children existed, and so
long as some freed parents remained unable or unwilling to care for their chil-
dren, apprenticing would be necessary. Historians would later indict apprentice-
ship. For the time, it was an accepted alternative to starvation and dependency
for nineteenth- century America. Alex B. Coggeshall was “fully satisfi ed that in
some cases [apprenticing] would be for the interest of the minor.” Agents in
Texas did not uphold the institution under all circumstances. Th
ey never hesi-
tated to break the contract if they determined it illegal, unjust, or not in the
child’s best interests. In order to determine this, they used their “best judg-
ment” regarding the “child’s best interest.” A few, of course, were excessive.
Th
ey abrogated all regardless of legality. Still even fewer abused their author-
ity to help former masters obtain labor. Not all parties were satisfi ed, and on
occasion Bureau agents certainly erred. Nonetheless, they acted in what they
believed to be in the child’s best interest. In some cases that meant upholding a
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Conclusion: The Subassistant Commissioners in Texas
171
legal apprentice contract and in others it meant voiding it. In the words of
historian Mary Farmer- Kaiser, Bureau men could be “both freedwomen’s ally
and adversary.” Th
ey enforced some apprentice contracts, but Bureau agents
did not enforce apprentice contracts “in the spirit in which” the planters
desired. Since it relied so heavily on an agent’s judgment, the agency’s appren-
tice policy was never uniform. It was determined by fi eld personnel on a case-
by- case basis.
In protecting the sanctity of marriage, these men, the foot soldiers in a
“bureaucratic juridical apparatus,” regulated and taught the freedpeople about
what it meant to be husband and wife. Each understood their responsibility to
educate and tried to approach infi delity and “cohabitation” with sympathy,
off ering counsel and advice instead of indiff erence. Th
eir personal preference
and philosophy greatly infl uenced their approach. Similar to apprenticeship, an
agent’s judgment was the Bureau’s policy. Th
rough compassion and advice and,
at times, punishment, they attempted to correct generations of ignorance and
behavior contrary to societal values and help the former slaves learn the ways of
citizens.
Moved by prevailing social attitudes, Bureau men made the freedman head
of his family, bestowing upon him the mantle of provider and protector of his
family. Freedwomen were relegated to a subordinate position, since the “hus-
band controls the wife.” Nevertheless, agents generally protected women within
their marriages. Guided by their judgment, they based decisions, once again, on
common sense or their sense of fairness. Freedwomen were neither allowed to
be cheated out of their property by their husbands nor left defenseless against
an abusive or neglectful man. By establishing freedmen as heads of households,
agents held them to a higher standard. Rarely did they hesitate to intervene
when freedmen abandoned their “manly duties.” According to legal historian
Katherine M. Franke, freedpeople “in the immediate postbellum period were
not born, but could become, citizens.” Whether adjudicating apprentice con-
tracts, custody battles, or marital disputes, agents, in the words of John Dix, “I
did only what I thought was right and just in the matter. ”
Most Bureau agents’ time was consumed by their mandated duties. A good
portion also dealt with trivial matters, mere annoyances, strange happenings,
or comical events. Since the offi
ce work for the Bureau agent at Galveston
required clerical assistance, William H. Sinclair hired a clerk to assist. Quickly,
however, the relationship soured and Sinclair fi red him. Samuel Dodge, the
clerk, complained to headquarters. He claimed Sinclair had unjustly fi red him
to hire his (Sinclair’s) brother- in- law, an accusation Sinclair vehemently denied.
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172
Conclusion: The Subassistant Commissioners in Texas
“I concluded,” wrote Sinclair, “that he was not a fi t man for the place. . . .” He
continued:
I did not think him competent to perform the work in the manner I required
it done. Moreover, he was a prolifi c spitter of Tobacco juice over the fl oor and
made my offi
ce look more like a Barroom than anything else, a habit I could
not correct even aft er a spittoon was procured. [When asked why he fi red
and replaced Dodge, Sinclair stated that] I employed [John] Scott, an ex-
Military offi
cer, because he was a good penman, is thoroughly conversant
with the duties of the offi
ce having been for a long [time] a Sub Asst Coms,
understands the Reports thoroughly, and does not chew Tobacco.
Samuel A. Craig recalled in his “Memoirs” a “day I had a call to come . . .
some 15 miles away to address [them] upon their duties as citizens. . . .” Craig
further stated:
Th
e way seemed to be very lonely, so I watched loosely the thick patches of
woods and the sharp turn of the road. Soon I heard a loud racket, so unac-
countable that I became quite nervous. Th
ere was swearing, loud scolding
tones, loud talk noises like striking. It sou
nded very strange in the dense
forest, usually so quiet. As I rode on it grew louder and louder, until at a turn
I discovered a poor old raw boned mule and a horse team, a little old man,
rather ragged, with shaggy long hair and beard, sitting among a few bundles
in the bottom of an old wagon. He was yelling at the top of his voice at that
old horse and mule and pounding vigorously with a stick, [yelling] “You Bill;
Jim, glang; Geland (bang) hep; hep; there (bang) you lazy good for nothing
critters, you git up, git up there, (bang) damn you, don’t you hear? (bang)
Get away; damn [you] (bang).” He sat still, swung his arms vigorously and
jerked the lines with the other, spitting over his shoulder at times, but keep-
ing up his yelling and pounding . . . I watched him for a few minutes wonder-
ing at such energy, whether drunk or merely his usual habit.
Th
e day- to- day operations of fi eld personnel were never- ending: they trav-
eled many miles, adjudicated many disputes, approved many contracts, and
met many who needed their assistance. Th
ey had set offi
ce hours. In reality, they
were never off duty. Th
ey performed duties all throughout the day. Superiors
mandated work be documented, which created an immense amount of paper-
work and longer work hours. Although a product of the nineteenth century, the
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Conclusion: The Subassistant Commissioners in Texas
173
Freedmen’s Bureau had all the trappings of a modern- day bureaucracy, with
nearly everything being documented for, reported to, or approved by head-
quarters. Th
e position was anything but a sinecure, for these men were “always
on duty.”
Th
eir duties consumed a great deal of time and required endless paperwork.
Th
is paperwork probably created more frustration and confl ict between superi-
ors and subordinates than any other aspect. If it was late or incorrect, many,
particularly the civilians who were usually ignorant about military record
keeping, received what they deemed off ensive reprimands and condescending
letters from superiors. Men like A. H. Mayer, William H. Rock, Anthony M.
Bryant, Fred W. Reinhard, David L. Montgomery, Charles E. Culver, and John
Dix, among others, most of whom were among the most respected agents to
serve in Texas, drew the ire of headquarters for improper, incomplete, or “hur-
ried and careless” paperwork. Superiors’ demand to detail was understandable
since it was used to develop policy, to weed out corruption, and to account for
expenditures. Many, however, believed the insistence on perfect paperwork
was, at best, impractical and, at worst, obsessive and insulting. Or it was “calcu-
lated to cut.” Bureau men in Texas acknowledged their faults and ignorance. Yet
many believed headquarters’ approach was condescending and petty. Such
beliefs contributed to the frustration and suspicion of fi eld personnel toward
those at headquarters. It only reinforced their belief that those at headquarters
were ignorant to the rigors and demands of their duties in Texas.
Many performed their duties without the necessary equipment. Th
ey oft en
lacked tables, chairs, pens, ink, and forage for their horses, among many other
things. Superiors did not provide the basic offi
ce furniture and offi
ce supplies.
To obtain them, fi eld agents routinely personally purchased them. Superiors
further failed to provide the mandated tools “for the proper and regular dis-
charge of their duties.” Th
ey were supposed to provide copies of all pertinent
orders, including congressional statutes and military and Bureau regulations to
guide subordinates in their duties. Of course, the defi ciency had an adverse
eff ect, placing agents “in a very unpleasant situation so far as their duties and
jurisdiction are concerned.” With four assistant commissioners in as many
years, all with diff erent policies and emphases, and many orders, some of which
confl icted and were vague, disseminating from Galveston, New Orleans, and
Washington, even the most capable man could become confused to agency
policy. Further contributing to the problem was the fear of reprimand. Th
rough-
out its operation in Texas, Bureau agents’ duties were too poorly defi ned and
their authority not fully understood.
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174
Conclusion: The Subassistant Commissioners in Texas
Even when in possession of the required guidance, confusion remained. Each
new AC in the state issued orders outlining their policies. Some were designed as
corollaries to already existing Bureau or military policy, but much of it was to
countermand what they believed to be the “fl awed” and “misguided” policies of
their predecessors. Th
is stream of new guidelines, when many of the previous
guidelines had yet to be fully understood, created a situation that left fi eld agents
swamped with information, much of it confusing and contradictory. Th
omas H.
Baker expressed the sentiments of many fellow agents by admitting “I have about
one hundred and eighty Circulars and Genl. Orders on my table. My time has
cial duties that I could not inform
myself relative to their contents.”
Much of the confusion stemmed from the decentralized manner of the
agency. Commissioner Howard believed most of the policy in each state “must
be left to the discretion of those engaged in [the footwork], as all such things
are.” He resisted “one minute system of rules.” Th
is allowed for a decentraliza-
tion, where SACs had latitude to use their best judgment or “to do as was right
and proper” when interpreting, implementing, and enforcing orders. Ironically,
the very thing that helped to cause confusion brought about a situation that
allowed for leeway and greater authority for those in the fi eld. What was a liber-
ating aspect, in the end, helped to inhibit some of its operations, as uncertainty
sometimes paralyzed agents from acting.
Th
e Bureau agents in Texas neither desired “social acceptance” from the
white community nor colluded with the planters. Th
ere defi nitely were a few
men who betrayed their oath to protect the freedpeople. In all cases, however,
once superiors discovered such improprieties, they promptly dismissed the
man. Men who were discovered to be “planter tools” were the exception, not the
rule. Most understood their responsibility to help, not hinder, the emancipated.
Any suggestions, slights, or accusations they had been derelict, corrupt, or inef-
fective was oft en answered with a vehement denial. Many learned to counte-
nance the criticisms and epithets from whites, dismissin
g them as mere
annoyances. Yet they rarely brushed aside any allegations that impugned their
character or reputations, particularly of collusion. Th
ey reacted in an even more
forceful manner when the accusations (or at times, insinuations) came from
superiors. Th
is frustrated and irritated them. Th
ey expected such sentiment
from former Rebels, not from superiors. Th
ey incurred great hardships to honor
their responsibilities, not only to the freedpeople but to the U.S. government.
Each man took an oath. Th
us, their word and reputations were at stake, some-
thing very important in the Victorian period.
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Conclusion: The Subassistant Commissioners in Texas
175
Th
e four men (there was a fi fth, but he oversaw only the educational respon-
sibilities in 1869) who served as assistant commissioner in Texas brought abili-
ties that aff ected, sometimes hindered, their performance and their subordinates’
performance. Edgar M. Gregory, the agency’s fi rst chief, was “the most upright
in his own conduct” and “the strongest in his feelings of sympathy” toward
freedpeople. He was the least realistic in his outlook toward white and black
citizens in Texas. His desire for justice for the freedpeople was greater than the
size, infl uence, and scope of the Bureau. Furthermore, he held contempt for the
former masters and admiration for the freedpeople (each to a fault). It thus hin-
dered his ability to lead the Bureau eff ectively. According to Gregory, the eman-
cipated were “docile, industrious, orderly, free from serious crime, and with all
the substance that goes to make the good citizen.” He was incapable of seeing
whites as anything but masters (“not one of whom has ever been punished, or
even tried”) and the emancipated as anything but victims lacking agency.
Gregory’s adversarial approach, infl uenced by his “abolitionist” leanings, made
him very unpopular with whites in the state. He lacked the “nature, education,
or prejudice for getting along harmoniously. ”
Gregory had the diffi
cult task of introducing the Bureau to Texas. Upon
entering the state, he faced a situation that required someone with organiza-
tional skills. Skills he lacked. For the eight months he served, he failed to expand