the agency much beyond his headquarters in Galveston. When he did extend its
infl uence into the interior, he had to rely on civilians, many of whom proved
rather troublesome. His subordinates were plagued with supply shortages and
confusion about their most basic authority. Certainly some of this was due to
bureaucratic delays, the dislocation of war, and the problems inherent in any
organization’s beginning. But Gregory shoulders some of the responsibility.
His successor, Joseph B. Kiddoo, believed conditions in Texas were little dif-
ferent from those that existed when the Bureau entered the state in late summer
of 1865. Major problems, some caused by his predecessor, plagued the labor
system in Texas, especially enticement. Kiddoo, a strong free labor proponent,
viewed the agency as the “guardian of the freedman. . . .” Contrary to Gregory,
he believed the agency should also consider the interests of the planters, holding
workers to their contracts. Th
is approach, naturally, endeared him to white
Texans in a way Gregory could not have been. Besides labor, Kiddoo focused a
great deal of subordinates’ attention on the freedpeoples’ moral and educational
uplift . No other AC in Texas took such an interest in their education as Kiddoo.
He understood their need for guidance. His view was doubtless paternalistic
and quite diff erent from Gregory’s in that Kiddoo’s opinion of the freedpeople
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176
Conclusion: The Subassistant Commissioners in Texas
was more pragmatic and realistic. For the foreseeable future, the freedpeople’s
future would be in the fi elds and open to governmental intrusion.
Kiddoo’s policies caused problems for his fi eld personnel. Whites saw in Kid-
doo, mistakenly of course, someone who shared their aspirations for the freed
community. As they moved to circumscribe the freedpeople’s freedom in mid-
1866, the power struggle and confl ict between the Bureau, planters, and state
offi
cials began. At the very time this struggle commenced, the military was
decreasing its numbers. Th
is made it diffi
cult for Kiddoo to protect the freed-
men and his subordinates. All this spelled doom for him. Superiors blamed him
for the problems throughout the state. Whether because of his attitude, his
drinking, or his pragmatism (which many thought a little too favorable to the
president’s Reconstruction plan), Kiddoo was removed as the agency’s head in
Texas. He was an able leader and was more a victim of circumstance than his
personal shortcomings and faults might suggest.
Succeeding Kiddoo was Charles Griffi
n. A proponent of the Radical plan of
Reconstruction, Griffi
n revamped the Bureau to an organizational level not
matched during any other’s. He specifi ed subdistrict boundaries, attempted to
strike a proper balance by transferring some responsibilities to civil authorities
at the same time strengthening subordinate’s authority, streamlined the com-
mands of the military and Bureau in the state, and extended the agency’s infl u-
ence throughout the state. “[M]y force is not large enough to spread over the
state, and by overawing the people, compel the enforcement of the laws,” Griffi
n
admitted. “I merely lessened the power of the Sub Asst Commrs [to protect] the
freedmen in the most eff ective manner. . . .” During his tenure, the agency
reached its zenith in personnel and subdistricts. Similar to Kiddoo, Griffi
n
focused much attention on the labor system, particularly securing the freed-
people’s wages. But his policies, such as the no- lien law and “monopoly order,”
although with good intentions, created problems for planters, hands, and sub-
assistant commissioners, who complained about the confusion it caused and
the problems of enforcement.
Griffi
n not only protected the freedpeople’s economic interests but their
rights as voters. He judged that the best protection for them would be their
political power. He used agents as foot soldiers for the Republican cause and,
offi
ceholders. Th
is more forceful approach created, for a brief time in early 1867,
rather quiet conditions around the state. Th
e future looked promising and pos-
sible “success” within reach. It was fl eeting, however, because Griffi
n misjudged
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Conclusion: The Subassistant Commissioners in Texas
177
whites’ resistance to freedmen voting and to the Freedmen’s Bureau’s political
activities in general.
Th
e last head of the agency in Texas was Joseph J. Reynolds. He was to wind
down the agency, delegating to civil authorities and making the new citizens as
self- suffi
cient as possible. During Reynolds’s term, fi eld agents’ main objective
was still to protect their charges. But as they provided “all the protection pos-
sible with the means at [their] disposal,” they were also to “leave them free to act
for themselves in all things pertaining to their material welfare.” Under Reyn-
olds, subassistant commissioners served more as advisors than protectors.
Unlike his predecessors, particularly Kiddoo and Griffi
n, Reynolds appeared
to waver in his support to protect subordinates as the date neared to cease
operations. On several occasions, he refused (or was very dilatory) to involve
himself on their behalf. Many of their letters went unanswered. Fred W. Rein-
hard at Crockett, for example, who served almost thirty months, faced many
accusations by whites in his district. Upon discovering the sheriff had accepted
bribes from freedpeople, Reinhard fi ned him and requested his removal for a
more capable and honest man. Reynolds ordered the fi ne to be repaid and did
not replace the sheriff until the spring of 1869. In other cases, like that of Wil-
liam H. Howard, who had problems with a former SAC, Reynolds refused to get
involved, ignoring his pleas for help. Perhaps his time was preoccupied with
politics, or perhaps with General Winfi eld Scott Hancock and his G. O. No. 40,
or on the business of closing down the agency. Whatever the case, Reynolds
seemed more willing to “ride out” the remaining days than zealously fulfi ll his
obligations to those under him.
With such a monumental task assigned to the Bureau, its agents certainly
did not achieve perfection, leaving much incomplete. When the agency ended
in Texas, the former slaves did not entirely enjoy the fruits of emancipation, and
throughout the next generation, their freedom would be even more circum-
scribed. By late 1868, though, they enjoyed unprecedented freedom for a people
only recently emancipated: they could choose their employer
, were compen-
sated for their labor, were enfranchised, and for the fi rst time in Texas (and the
South for that matter) they became (with the aid of SACs) a political force.
Bureau men, despite some complaints about their racial beliefs, their antiquated
views by today’s standards, and the organization’s “bureaucratic mismanage-
ment,” worked hard to achieve this progress for the freedpeople.
Th
e Bureau was temporary, its demise being “preordained at its conception.”
Developed to deal with emancipation’s and the war’s eff ects, it did not have
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178
Conclusion: The Subassistant Commissioners in Texas
specifi c long- range goals. Its eff ort in Texas was founded on faith, faith that
whites had learned their lesson, faith that they were contrite, and faith that they
would cooperate to help the freedpeople. Bureau offi
cials, guided by a strong
belief in states’ rights, misjudged the willingness to aid in this process. Agents,
aft er their experiences with civil offi
cers, were frustrated they had to rely so
heavily upon them. Leaders failed to anticipate the extent of white resistance to
Reconstruction. “It is impossible for me to [support] any measure which makes
the negro the equal of the white man,” wrote Robert W. Loughery, the fi re-
eating editor of the Marshall Texas Republican, who expressed the beliefs of
many white Texans “that the negro can never become the political equal of the
white man. . . .” Th
e Dallas Herald editor believed God intended blacks to be
subordinate to whites and defi antly stated whites “should forbid that the negro
should ever be entrusted with the exercise of any political rights, or . . . make
him politically and socially equal of the whites.” Bureau offi
cials, ignorant of
the depths of these beliefs, failed to understand whites would never “voluntarily
participate” in their “own degradation.”
If superiors misjudged white intransigence, many SACs were soon privy to
it. Th
ey quickly understood all Confederate army surrenders, all the constitu-
tional amendments, and all Congressional reform could not erase two hundred
years of social beliefs and attitudes, attitudes that moved white Texans to
attempt to destroy the Union. Confederates agreed to surrender their arms, not
their beliefs. By the agency’s end in 1868, many agents realized their limitations
and understood what was really needed for the freedpeople to fully enjoy their
freedom and for the whites to be reconstructed. “I am of the opinion,” William
G. Kirkman concluded, “that reconstruction that will be lasting will have to
begin at the Heart of those who are now so biased and warped in their views . . .
[since] I know of no practicable suggestions . . . to overcome the feelings the
southern people have against northern citizens. Th
e feeling they have and
always have had I think it has got to be forever done away with before there will
be peace. ”
Some students of Reconstruction have claimed that a greater show of force
could have brought about the peace referenced by Kirkman. If the U.S. govern-
ment had only supported its activities with tens of thousands of additional sol-
diers, these critics claim, Reconstruction might have succeeded. For example,
according to historian William L. Richter, offi
cials had the necessary troops,
particularly cavalry, to keep violence in check. He indicts the federal govern-
ment’s eff orts in Texas, criticizing its infl exible and ineffi
cient command struc-
ture as well as its lack of commitment to counter violence. Federal offi
cials,
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Conclusion: The Subassistant Commissioners in Texas
179
Richter concludes, fi nally employed the correct policy in October 1868, two
months before Bureau operations ceased in the state. Reynolds, apparently tired
of the chaos in certain portions of Texas, ordered a squadron from the 6th Cav-
alry to northeast Texas, arguably the most notorious region in the state. Th
is
unit was under the command of former Bureau agents Th
omas M. Tolman and
Adna R. Chaff ee and was charged with neutralizing the “unreconstructed” in
the area. As they swept through, they worried little about civility and less about
taking prisoners. Adna and Chaff ee euphemistically reported outlaws “lost in
the swamp” or “shot while trying to escape.” Th
ose not reported “missing” were
sometimes abused (hanged by the thumbs), including any citizen who misled
the soldiers with false information. Th
ese methods were doubtless quite unsa-
vory and were criticized by many whites as despotic. Nonetheless, the column
cleansed the area of much of the outlaw element that had threatened and killed
Bureau agents and terrorized the freedpeople. Richter sees this as evidence of
what might have been.
“Chaff ee’s Guerrillas” (its nickname by locals) worked in isolation, especially
toward outlaws who respected no authority. But, in reality, it would have been
unsustainable or impracticable as a long- range policy at the time. Th
e public
would not have tolerated placing thousands of troops for decades in Texas, let
alone the entire former Confederacy. Not only would this mean immense
expenditures, contradict Americans’ dislike of martial solutions to civil prob-
lems, expand the size of the federal government at a time when Americans
preferred the opposite, and require a large peacetime army (an anathema to
nineteenth- century Americans), but the course’s overall eff ectiveness and prac-
ticality are doubtful. Such tactics worked in the short term, but for the long
term would have probably proved counterproductive in achieving Reconstruc-
tion’s main goals: to reform former Confederates to be loyal citizens, to respect
the federal government and its laws, and to accord equality to the freedpeople.
William Blair, a student of the military’s role during Reconstruction, proposed
such an alternative. He asked: “What could have been done to ensure the black
people enjoyed a better chance at receiving long- term justice and the protection
due them as citizens?” He examined the possibility of a greater “military posture
. . . for a longer duration.” Blair off ered a counterfactual that included maintain-
ing current troop levels at twenty thousand for the rest of the century. For that
duration, they would take on the role of law enforcers, ensuring freedpeople’s
rights and privileges. Th
e “military intervention through the turn of the century
had virtually no chance for implementation,” Blair ultimately concludes. “Commit-
ting 10,000 to 20,000 troops to long- term occupation of the South was unthinkable
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180
Conclusion: The Subassistant Commissioners in Texas
for practical, economic, and political- ideological reasons.” A litany of examples
exists in history of populations being forced to accept another’s authority. And in
each case, the occupier’s desired eff ect failed to take root. Little evidence exists to
suggest white Texans would have been any diff erent. Reform rarely comes at the
point of a bayonet.
In 2005, Civil War History had an entire issue examining the “what ifs” of
Reconstruction. In a series of short articles, historians proposed counterfactu-
als on how a diff erent course would have fi nally fulfi lled the nation’s promissory
note, to pirate a famous ancestor of the freedmen’s resonating words, to freed-
people. In this attempt to “reconstruct Reconstruction,” these authors put forth
a myriad of alternatives. Th
ey proposed land redistribution to the emancipated,
a “Marshal Plan” for the South, less vague and expansive 13th, 14th, and 15th
Amendments, a greater use of military in the former Confederacy, the con-
struction of a bureaucracy “to enforce obedience to the law,” or a more savvy
and astute black leadership. Had such things only happened, the North might
have continued Reconstruction eff orts until the South really was reconstructed.
Th
ousands of words later, each author ultimately admits Reconstruction’s out-
come, the one so criticized by the academy for its conservatism, shortsighted-
ness, and oppression, was really the only outcome. Even before Reconstruction
commenced, there existed forces that already determined its outcome. An out-
come that left the white Southerner, imbued with ideas of racial superiority, still
in control of the South’s political and economic apparatuses as well as the
freedpeople. “Th
ese historians who are critical of the performance [of the coun-
try] for not achieving more for black Americans,” historian Brooks Simpson
writes, “fi nd it rather diffi
cult to off er a historically viable alternative that
improves markedly on what happened, even with the immense advantages
off ered by hindsight.”
All the bayonets, soldiers, congressional measures, and Bureau men in the