cers, but in no criminal case have they
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164
The Freedmen’s Bureau’s End
been executed, and in my opinion no such writs will be executed . . . until the
people are taught a severer lesson than they have yet received.” Although fi eld
personnel thought some headquarters’ policies too weak and confusing, and
impotent regarding situations on the ground, this opinion, by no means, was
universal. One of the best to serve in Texas, William H. Rock at Richmond, in
fact, found General Orders No. 4 provided “ample protection. ”
As the Bureau’s end neared, offi
cials in Austin still expected professionalism
from subordinates. One requirement in Reynolds’s General Orders No. 4 was
vigorous inspection tours to measure their performances. Reynolds refused to
countenance ineff ectiveness and corruption. Subordinates would remain pro-
fessional, in no way disparaging the Bureau in its waning days. In Huntsville,
William H. Stewart failed to meet such standards. Stewart, although commit-
ted and zealous, was considered by one inspector to be “mentally incompetent,”
with “no education hardly” and barely able to read or write. He kept little record
of his duties, and what “he has is perfectly shocking to look at.” Moreover, the
inspector noted, he was profl igate and unprofessional. “I think it very unfortu-
nate that he was appointed,” the inspector lamented, “as he is in no way fi tted
for the offi
ce and is so sadly lacking in education that I am ashamed that he has
ever written and sent a line out of the offi
ce.” Stewart, realizing his limitations,
issued a terse letter of resignation. Reynolds quickly accepted.
White Unionists accused A. F. N. Rolfe at Columbia of being “continually
intoxicated” and associating with the “bitterest of rebels.” Reynolds investigated
the charges. “His associates have been the vilest of rebels and the vilest of men—
barroom loafers and common drunkards,” inspector William H. Sinclair con-
cluded, and he had performed his duties “from the barroom . . . to the disgrace
of the government he represents.” He forged a signature to run up a thirteen-
dollar whiskey bill. Rolfe also “had not the least conception” of his duties, with
not a single contract approved for 1868. Sinclair dismissed him from service
immediately, a move Reynolds wholly supported. A. H. M. Taylor, the acting
assistant adjutant general at district headquarters who recommended Rolfe for
service, apologized for his brother- in- law’s behavior. “I am sorry he ever came
to Texas,” he wrote Reynolds, “for I feel he has disgraced himself and everyone
connected with him.” Otto F. Steinberg, the SAC at Gonzales, had previously
served the agency in Alabama. A veteran of the war, Steinberg had been dis-
missed from service in Alabama for embezzlement and later court martialed.
He was convicted and detained until the two- thousand- dollar fi ne was paid. F.
Otto Steinberg (the name he went by in Alabama), however, was mistakenly
mustered out and relieved “before the fi ndings of the court and the sentence
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The J. J. Reynolds Era, Sept. 1867–Dec. 1868
165
were promulgated.” Aft er being apprised of Steinberg’s past, Reynolds immedi-
ately dismissed him.
As the Bureau wound down its operations, SACs were ordered to headquar-
ters with all their papers and to transfer all copies of contracts on fi le to the
county clerks. But a number of men implored superiors to reconsider. Th
ey
wanted to continue their work and feared for the emancipated under civilian
“protection.” Nesbit Jenkins at Wharton feared leaving “the helpless and igno-
rant colored race to the cold pity of a hostile world.” He urged superiors to have
“greater caution . . . in appointing of all civil offi
cers and the greatest watchful-
ness exercised over them. . . .” At Bastrop, David S. Beath concurred with Jen-
kins’s sentiment. “I believe if the civil offi
cers were removed and others
appointed,” he proposed, it “would be a great consolation to the Freedmen and
Bureau’s infl uence “should at once be directed towards inducing such changes
in the civil laws of the state as will render the decision of labor claims and col-
lection of debts an easy matter in the offi
ce of Justice of the Peace or ordinary
courts.” He wanted a “thorough and rigid examination or inspection” of all
justices of the peace to determine their competency and loyalty. Once achieved,
Gillette believed, then and only then should the agency redirect its operations.
“It is true that by turning over all the complaints and cases for trial . . . to the
civil authority much labor would be saved,” Edward C. Henshaw admitted from
Marshall, “but in so doing much injustice and great expenses would attach to
these poor creatures . . . I would be defeating the very object for which this
Bureau was instituted.”
Th
eir pleas for reconsideration were all for naught. On the last day of Decem-
ber, the Freedmen’s Bureau ceased operations. Its educational responsibilities
continued for another year, when the agency left the state altogether. For those
who served under Reynolds, their time as Bureau agents was marked by the
knowledge their work would end soon, and their remaining time was to prepare
the freedpeople for that day. Whether caused by Hancock’s General Orders No.
40, the increased white resistance, the perplexing and persistent problems with
the labor system, or the agents’ suspicion toward civil authorities, the transfer of
authority and winding down of operations was, at times, anything but smooth.
Many diffi
culties occurred in 1868, some of which existed prior to late 1865.
Although Hancock’s order was reversed, Bureau offi
cials in Texas noticed the
winds of change. His attitude toward federalism coincided with most Ameri-
cans. For most nineteenth- century Americans, what needed to be accomplished
already had been: the Union was preserved, slavery abolished, stability returned
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166
The Freedmen’s Bureau’s End
to the former Confederacy so that they could not wage war again, and citizen-
ship and a modicum of rights granted to the freedpeople. Further measures were
unnecessary and potentially even dangerous. By late 1868, Americans believed
that the agency had served its purpose, doing all that could (or should) be done.
Th
e freedpeople’s hopes and subassistant commissioners’ desires were ultimately
“all crushed down by the weight of public
opinion. . . . ”
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Conclusion
Th
e Subassistant
Commissioners in Texas
In March 1865, in the war’s waning days, Congress created the fi rst social-
welfare organization in American history. Th
e Freedmen’s Bureau, estab-
lished to help former slaves make the transition to freedom, had an
enormous task. Criticized for one reason or another, the nation still entrusted it
to reverse nearly three centuries of black (and for that matter, white) Southern
degradation. Although criticized for achieving only “a modicum” of what “was
owed,” agents, considering the condition of the emancipated at war’s end,
achieved what one historian called “near miracles.” By the time the agency
ceased operations, its personnel had established some order where only chaos
had existed, discouraged the South from resuming hostilities against the Union,
protected freedpeople against white violence as well as helped them begin their
education, and helped to establish them as self- reliant citizens with legal and
civil rights. Th
ey established the emancipated as something they had never
been in the slaveholding South: citizens.
Th
e average agent in Texas was generally mature and of Northern birth,
from the middle and upper middle class and with some military service during
the war. Offi
cials in Texas shied from appointing Southerners and those from
the Old South planter class. Some served because of patriotism. Others desired
the opportunity for revenge against former Confederate enemies. Still others
simply needed employment. Th
ose in the Veteran Reserve Corps wanted to
prove their worth and make their personal sacrifi ce mean something more than
the status quo antebellum.
Although they entered service for varied reasons, and their abilities diff ered
from the superb to the abysmal, from the upstanding to the corrupt, most
shared one characteristic: their commitment to the freedpeople. Th
ey under-
stood the freedpeople were their prime responsibility. William H. Heistand
certainly spoke for many when he defi ned his “duties [to] consist [of looking]
over the interest of the Freedpeople . . . as their adviser and protector.” Th
ey
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168
Conclusion: The Subassistant Commissioners in Texas
understood that between the two parties—freedpersons and whites—the for-
mer were the weaker. As a result, agents showed a slight bias in freedpeople’s
favor, guided “by equity—paying little attention to the technical violations of
contracts, as . . . the employer has a decided advantage over the employee, and
can with little diffi
culty get an abundance of evidence to prove his point.” In the
words of agent George C. Abbott, they believed “it only fair play . . . to look out
for the Negroe [sic], for . . . the white men [were] fully competent to look out for
themselves.” Whites, angered by this, were aware agents were “friend[s] to the
freedmen.” Freedpeople, however, appreciated and, despite any later misgiv-
ings to the contrary, showed confi dence in them. “Where a [SAC] does his
duty,” announced A. H. Cox, “the freedmen have confi dence in him and they
will obey all that he may say to them and they think it all wright [sic]. . . .”
Despite the occasional “bad apple” agent, the emancipated’s confi dence still
remained strong toward them.
One important responsibility was protecting freedpeople from white vio-
lence. Th
e “unreconstructed” could not accept the war’s outcome or the former
slaves’ new status. Agents, representing a painful reminder of what was lost,
were to ensure the emancipated were treated as free people. Violence was more
a problem for some than others. At certain times, particularly aft er the Recon-
struction Act of 1867 and before voter registration, those in the interior even
reported not needing soldiers. Some of the ablest and most respected agents in
the state made such reports. Charles F. Rand, Edward Miller, William H. Rock,
A. H. Mayer, and N. H. Randlett, among others, all served in districts that, at
one time or another, required no soldiers.
Other districts did require troops when white violence paralyzed operations.
In places where white Texans refused to accept the war’s outcome, their best
eff orts fell well short of perfection. Agents could do little more than document
outrages or hope the violence would abate. Evading punishment for crimes
because agents’ power was limited was frequent. Nineteenth- century Ameri-
cans’ hesitancy to use the military to solve what they believed a civil matter
constrained at times fi eld personnel’s effi
cacy. Even if headquarters had been
able to blanket Texas with SACs, equipped with all the troop protection some
later critics believed necessary, the freedpeople’s plight probably would not have
been signifi cantly diff erent. Simply put, “bayonets cannot reform hearts and
minds.” Americans’ preference for federalism and pecuniary concerns certainly
restricted the use of military power. Th
e inability of the former Confederates to
accept the emancipated as individuals, guaranteeing “life, liberty, and the pur-
suit of happiness,” was the major factor in what some historians call the “failure
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Conclusion: The Subassistant Commissioners in Texas
169
of Reconstruction”—a failure remedied only by another century of time, new
generations, and historical events.
With few troops available, SACs relied heavily on Bureau courts. With little
legal training, and with confusion about their authority, agents were guided by
common sense and a sense of fair play. Th
ey wanted to bring about a “mutual
and satisfactory understanding.” Although achieved with a fi ne or confi nement,
most preferred to resolve disputes with a warning, advice, or lecture. Th
e courts’
eff ectiveness relied heavily on the plaintiff ’s willingness to appear or to abide by
the ruling. Th
ey had to use persuasion and threats to increase the chances of
white compliance. Th
ey also had to be willing to compromise to obtain justice.
Agents, in the end, knew their judicial powers were limited in protecting the
freedpeople.
Beyond courts and troops, fi eld personnel had other means to protect their
charges. One was to educate the planters to the benefi ts of fair treatment. Prior
to Reconstruction, free labor proponents had tried to show Southerners the
“Yankee way of doing business.” SACs continued this idea that planters’ and
workers’ interests coincided. T
h
eir hopes focused on the employer’s “pecuniary
point of view.” “[F]reedmen are treated kindly by their employers,” concluded
DeWitt C. Brown, “not from feelings of kindliness or interest but . . . otherwise
their hands would give up in weeks.” Planters who were fair and honest had no
problem procuring labor, while those who were not experienced diffi
culties
procuring labor.
Not all planters, however, understood (or even cared) to deal honestly with
their hands. Th
ey oft en did things contrary to their fi nancial interests. In
some counties SACs noticed a greater proclivity for honesty toward the freed-
people. In others, however, they witnessed an unwillingness to do so. Th
us,
Bureau men searched for ways to help the freed community. Some encour-
aged shares (i.e., sharecropping), believing hands worked “harder when they
are interested in part of the crop,” and this made it easier to ensure their por-
tion of the crop. Others preferred monthly wages, realizing the dangers inher-
ent with sharecropping (bad weather, etc.). To them, wages limited violence
against freedpeople. Th
e role agents had in the rise of sharecropping in Texas
appears, at best, peripheral, for there was little consensus on which system of
contract to encourage. A particular agent’s preference dictated which system
he promoted. By the time superiors issued orders to encourage contracting for
a share of the crop, the system had already been in practice for some time.
Only aft er it started to become the preferred way of payment did Bureau offi
-
cials begin to encourage it. In Texas, sharecropping developed more out of the
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170
Conclusion: The Subassistant Commissioners in Texas
push and pull between workers and planters and very little from any govern-
mental policy.
Th
ey knew the day would come when the agency would no longer exist.
Freedpeople would have to “stand on their own.” Th
is, it was thought, could be
achieved through the ballot box. Agents not only protected their right to regis-
ter and vote, but actively worked for Republican victory. Th
ey encouraged (a few
even joined) the freedmen to organize Loyal Leagues, recommended the