commanded by Alexander of Lyncestis; they may have still believed King
Alexander of Macedonia had been killed by barbarians. The following day
all became clear when a huge Macedonian army of 30,000 infantry and
3,000 cavalry personally commanded by Alexander started pitching camp
outside the walls of Thebes. The Macedonian monarch was hoping that the
mere show of strength would incline the Thebans to start negotiations for
capitulation. Despite verbal support from various states, above all Athens,
the Thebans were alone and able to deploy no more than 7,000 hoplites
from among the citizens plus some armed metoikoi and liberated slaves.
And as if this situation was not bad enough, the Macedonians were joined
by the mortal enemies of Thebes, Phocians, Plataeans, Thespians and
Orchomenians, all eager to avenge the destruction of their towns and other
wrongs inflicted upon them by Thebans in the past. Their and Thessalian
presence at Thebes gave Alexander’s intervention semblance of a just war
waged by the united Greeks against those who breached the Panhellenic
29 Din., 1.18-21; Diod., 17.8.2-9.1; Plu., Dem. , 23.1-2; Arr., An. , 1.7.4, 1.10.1, 2.15.2; Fron., Str. , 2.11.4; Just., 11.3.9. Bosworth 1980, pp. 233-234; Bosworth
1988, pp. 194-195; Heckel 1997, pp. 191-192; Habicht 1999, pp. 14-15; Faraguna
2003, p. 103.
The New King
103
treaty of Corinth. Units of Theban cavalry and light infantry first launched
an attack on the encamped Macedonians which after the initial shock was
repulsed with ease. Alexander chose to delay his attack and give time for
the besieged to think. However, among the gathered Thebans voices to
continue the armed struggle prevailed. Alexander still tried to weaken their
resolve by announcing that any Theban went over to his side would fully
benefit from the Greek universal peace. In response the Thebans declared
that anyone from the enemy camp who wished to fight for Greek freedom
together with the Thebans and the Great King could come over to their
side. Plutarch adds that the Thebans replied to Alexander’s demand for the
handing over of their anti-Macedonian politicians by proposing that in
return for peace the Macedonians should hand over their highest ranking
officers Antipater and Philotas.30
In the war of words the Thebans triumphed. The well aimed ridicule,
their spiteful mockery of the universal peace and the long preparations for
the anti-Persian campaign of united Greek states under the Macedonian
king’s command in defence of Greek freedom touched a raw nerve.
Alexander was livid but that now also meant that the fate of Thebes was
sealed. Three days after the exchange of words the preparations for
storming the city were finished and the fighting began. Basically two
extant sources relate what followed: the rhetorical and pro-Theban account
of Diodorus and Arrian’s very concise description based on the account of
Ptolemy, who was very seriously wounded in the fighting and therefore
unable to witness the entire battle. It is indeed the brevity of
Arrian/Ptolemy’s report that arise suspicion, especially when it is
compared with Arrian’s extensive descriptions of Alexander’s army’s
much less important manoeuvres during the war in the north a few pages
earlier. By being so laconic in his description of the battle, Ptolemy gives
the impression of not wishing to expose all its aspects. For instance, unlike
other sources, it does not mention the heroism of the Thebans defending
their homeland against an enemy numerically many times superior. It is
certain that the most intensive fighting was at the palisade cutting the
Cadmea off from the main Macedonian forces and that the Theban
hoplites confronted their enemy outside those walls. Thanks to their
numerical superiority the Macedonians were able to fight the Thebans in
the field and simultaneously attack the palisade. The first attack on the
palisade by a detachment of Ptolemy’s phalangites, archers and Agrianians
was repulsed, while the numerically inferior but extremely well trained
30 Diod., 17.9.1-5, 17.11.2; Plu., Alex. , 11.6-8; Arr., An. , 1.7.4-11; Just., 11.3.
Bosworth 1988, p. 32; Hammond 1996, pp. 58-60; Hamilton 1999, p. 30; Poddighe
2009, pp. 107-108.
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Chapter III
Theban hoplites were for a long time able to hold off the Macedonian
phalanx. Then Alexander ordered a reserve detachment commanded either
by Perdiccas (according to Diodorus) or Antipater (Polyaenus) to launch a
direct assault on a part of the city’s fortifications that were left unmanned.
Bearing in mind the concentration of Theban soldiers around the palisade,
there would have most certainly been more than one unmanned section of
the city’s walls, while numerical superiority made it easy for Alexander to
deploy troops in another section of the front. News of the city’s wall being
breached was immediately spread by the Macedonians, which provoked
panic in Theban ranks at the Cadmea. Making use of this confusion the
trapped Macedonian unit broke out of their garrison and attacked the
Thebans from behind. The Macedonians gave chase to the Theban soldiers
now fleeing in disarray to their city. The battle for the city was over and
instead began the indiscriminate slaughter of defenders and unarmed
civilians. The only Thebans not to be massacred were the cavalry, which
had not taken part in the fighting and now managed to escape from the
captured city.31
Apart from the Macedonians, Phocians and soldiers from smaller
Boeotian cities hostile to Thebes participated in the slaughter. 6,000
Thebans were massacred, but this was a costly victory for the Macedonian
army, which lost 500 men – much more than had been killed during the
entire north Balkan campaign. A large difference in losses between the
defeated and victorious side was typical in ancient warfare for when one
side fell into disarray the other side could and would kill many with
impunity. Therefore the relatively large numbers of Macedonians killed
seems to confirm Diodorus’s version of a lengthy and heroic resistance put
up by the Thebans. Along with the slaughter, there was looting and rapes.
Plutarch relates an anecdote about a woman called Timoclea who was
raped by a captain of the Thracian mercenaries but later managed to kill
her oppressor. Alexander, who had always had a good understanding for
what we would today call public relations, ordered the woman to be set
free, all the more so when it turned out that she was the sister of
Theagenes, the commander of the Sacred Band who had fallen at
Chaeronea. Similar mercy was not shown to other Thebans. Alexander did
not wish to personally pass sentence on this city and left the decision – as
both Arrian and Diodorus claim – to his Greek allies. On account of the
lack of available time it is doubtful that he summoned the synedrion of the
League of Corinth; instead a council was probably held at the Macedonian
31 Diod., 17.11-12; Arr., An. , 1.8; Plu., Alex. , 11.4-5; Polyaen., 4.3.12. Lane Fox 1973, p. 87; Bosworth 1980, pp. 79-84; Bosworth 198
8, pp. 32-33; Flower 2000, p.
96.
The New King
105
camp outside Thebes, comprising representatives of neighbouring anti-
Theban states. The defeated were reminded of their earlier offences,
especially their collaboration with Persia during the great war of 480-479,
for which at the time the city was already condemned to be demolished.
Added to this were additional charges regarding the destruction by Thebes
of other Greek cities and its current contacts with the Great King. There is
no doubt that Alexander could have rejected the extreme demands of the
city’s Phocian and Boeotian enemies just as Sparta had rejected the
demands of her allies to destroy Athens after the Peloponnesian War.
However, he chose to accept the decision, as Polybius says, in order to
strike fear into the hearts of Greeks before his departure for Asia. Formally
only carrying out the resolution of his allies, Alexander ordered the
destruction of the whole of Thebes with the exception of the temples, the
poet Pindar’s house and the Cadmea citadel, where a Macedonian garrison
remained. With the exception of the priests, people bound by ritualised
friendship ( xenia) with Macedonians and Macedonia’s political supporters,
the approximately 30,000 Thebans who survived the slaughter were sold
as slaves. The sale of such a vast number of slaves could only lower their
unit price, but for Alexander, who was beset with financial problems, the
440 talents he in this way received was of great use and perhaps helped
reduce the debt he had inherited after his father. The rural territories
belonging to Thebes were divided up among Boeotian poleis allied to
Alexander. The Macedonian king also had the cities of Orchomenos and
Plataea, which had been destroyed by Thebes, rebuilt and surrounded with
defensive walls because these cities were in particular considered to be
Macedonia’s mainstay in Boeotia.32
The ruthless destruction of Thebes deeply shocked Greece. The orators
lamented and Cassander’s proclamation to rebuild Thebes in 316 gained
him a lot of popularity. Despite a prohibition that was imposed on all allies
the same day as the sentence on Thebes was passed, Athens and Akraiphia
accepted refugees from that city. To Greeks the destruction of Thebes was
a terrible act but one, according to contemporary rules of war, which was
quite legal and even just. This is demonstrated by the fact that in 334 a
bronze chandelier looted from Thebes was accepted as an offering from
Alexander to the temple of Apollo at Cyme. Aeschines argued that the
destruction of Thebes was just at the Athenian court of law, which would
32 Clitarch., ap. Ath., 4.148d-f (= FGrH, 137 F1); Plb., 38.2.13; Diod., 17.13.5-
14.4; Plu., Alex. , 11.10-12.6; Plu., mor. , 259d-260d, 1090c; Arr., An. , 1.8-9; D.
Chr., 2.33; Ael., VH, 13.7; Plin., Nat., 7.109; Just., 11.3-4. Wilcken 1967, pp. 73-74; Lane Fox 1973, pp. 87-88; Bosworth 1980, pp. 84-91; Bosworth 1988, pp.
195-196; Hamilton 1999, pp. 30-32; Le Rider 2003, pp. 41-42.
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Chapter III
indicate that even there many were of this opinion. Rejoicing at Thebe’s
destruction of the personified Mt. Kithairon in Alexander Romance echoes
the same opinion albeit shrouded in mythological garb. Besides, there
were many hypocrites among the Greeks. For instance, for all his
lamenting over the fate of Thebes, the orator and Alexander’s political
opponent Hypereides was not discouraged from purchasing a Theban
female captive for 20 minas, one who later became his mistress.33
As a political move the destruction of Thebes was a success for
although it certainly did not earn Alexander the love of the Greeks, it did
force them to respect him. Just like Philip’s destruction of Olynthus, so too
Alexander’s destruction of Thebes served as a fierce reminder to the
Greeks, ensuring peace and pro-Macedonian order during his Asian
campaign. Meanwhile a hasty delegation of noted pro-Macedonian
politicians from Athens instantly arrived to congratulate Alexander on his
victories over the Triballi and Illyrians as well as his quelling of the
Theban uprising, even though Athens had actually actively encouraged it.
In response the Macedonian king demanded the handing over of prominent
anti-Macedonian politicians and generals on the charge of being
responsible for Chaeronea, hostility to Philip and himself as well as
inciting Thebes to rise. They were to be judged by the synedrion of the
League of Corinth. The sources give several versions of this list of
Macedonia’s enemies but all of them include the names of Demosthenes,
Lycurgus, Polyeuctus and the general Charidemus. The fate of Thebes
made it obvious that Alexander’s demands had to be treated with the
utmost seriousness and so a heated debate ensued in Athens. Phocion
advised those mentioned on the list to selflessly take their lives for the
sake of their motherland and so that the city of Athens could be spared.
Demosthenes, as could well be expected, was of the opposite opinion and
likened the idea to sheep handing over their sheepdogs to the wolves. But,
like Philip sometime before him, Alexander was not looking for a
showdown with Athens and his heavy demands should be regarded more
cost to Macedonia. To that, waging war on Athens would have undercut
the Panhellenic stance of Alexander on the eve of the expedition to Persia.
Thus ultimately the pro-Macedonian orator Demades, allegedly for five
33 Orators: Aeschin., 3.133; Din., 1, passim. Other reference to public opinion:
Diod., 19.54.2; Plin., Nat. , 34.14; Arr., An. , 1.9; Plu., Alex. , 13; Idomeneus, ap.
Ath., 13.58 (= FGrH, 338 F14); Plu., mor. , 849d ; Ps.-Callisth., 1.46a. Exiles: Diod., 17.14.3; Plu., Alex. , 13.1; Paus., 9.23.5. Bosworth 1988, p. 196; Heckel
1997, p. 193; Flower 2000, p. 97; Nawotka 2003a, p. 30; Faraguna 2003, pp. 103-
104; Poddighe 2009, p. 108.
The New King
107
talents given to him by politicians on Alexander’s list, helped negotiate a
compromise in which the accused would only be punished if their guilt
was proved according to Athenian law. Only Charidemus was forced to
leave Athens, and he headed for Darius III’s court. The whole incident
changed Athenian politics for a long time. Politicians of the anti-
Macedonian camp realised erstwhile efforts to start a military conflict with
a powerful Macedonia had been ill-conceived and could only result in a
catastrophic defeat. Thus while Alexander lived, Athens maintained a cold
peace with Macedonia. Instead the Athenians concentrated on building up
their finances and arming themselves for a confrontation with Macedonia
at a later stage.34
If Athens with her powerful fleet and legendary defensive walls was
suing for peace with Macedonia, smaller Greek states must have been
doing the same with even greater anxiety. Arcadia recalled its troops from
the Isthmus and threatened to punish with death anyone inciting actions
against Macedonia. Expelled supporters of Macedonia now returned t
o
Elis. Requests for forgiveness were also sent to Alexander by the Aetolian
tribes, which was tacit signal that the Aetolian League, disliked by
Macedonia, no longer existed.35
The situation in Greece was now under control and the Macedonian
army could return north. The Greek uprising had caused the campaign
against Persia to be delayed by another year, but at least Alexander’s
soldiers could return home in the autumn (October) in time for the Zeus of
Olympus feast, which was celebrated over nine days in Dion. Apart from
sacrifices, the festivities included dramas and competitions. Diodorus
describes a lavish banquet arranged by Alexander for friends, officers and
ambassadors which was held in a tent capable of fitting a hundred
banqueting couches. The army was rewarded with the meat of the
sacrificial beasts. It also must have been in the autumn of 335 that
Alexander reputedly received special advice from two of his most
important officers, Antipater and Parmenion. Both men suggested that
before his departure for Asia Alexander should marry and conceive an heir
to the throne. Bearing in mind that this king had the habit of personally
leading his army into battle and that after the purges of 336-335 their were
no other Argead claimants to the Macedonian throne, there is every reason
to accept that Alexander’s advisers were right to express such concern
34 Aeschin., 3.161; Diod., 17.15; Plu., Dem. , 23.3-5; Plu., Phoc. , 17; Arr., An. , 1.10; Just., 11.4; Suda, s.v. 'Ant∂patroj. Bosworth 1988, pp. 196-197; O’Brien 1992, p.
54; Rubinsohn 1997, pp. 117-118; Habicht 1999, pp. 15-18; Flower 2000, p. 97;
Brun 2000, pp. 74-77; Heckel 2009, p. 29.
35 Arr., An, , 1.10.1-2. Bosworth 1988, p. 196.
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Chapter III
over the state’s future. However, there is another aspect to this story in that
both Parmenion and Antipater had unmarried daughters – historians
believe there were five in all. If Alexander were to marry one of these
daughters, the bride’s father would naturally guarantee for himself great