via the Greek seaports.22
The next phase of the war was against the Triballi, who lived on the
river Lyginos (perhaps Rositsa). The king of the Triballi, surrounded by
women and children, took shelter on an island called Peuke on the Danube.
22 Arr., An. , 1.1-2.1; Polyaen., 4.3.11; Diod., 17.8.1-2; It. Alex. , 16. Bosworth 1988, pp. 28-29; Bloedow 1996; Heckel 1997, pp. 189-191; Ashley 1998, pp. 166-169.
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On account of Arrian’s description of an island with steep banks and fast
flowing waters, it is unlikely to have been the Peuke Island, known from
other sources, which is situated where the Danube flows into the Black
Sea. Perhaps it is as Illiescu presumes an island further west, nearer the
Iron Gate Gorge. The Triballian army avoided the Macedonians, not
daring to fight them in the open, and instead returned to areas the
Macedonians had vacated. Alexander, who always had good reconnaissance,
realised the Triballian tactic and launched a surprise attack on the enemy
as it pitched camp in a wooded valley. First the Macedonian archers
started firing arrows. In response to this the Triballi left the forest to attack
the archers, but instead they found themselves in a trap. The Macedonian
cavalry was positioned on both wings of the Macedonian phalanx as well
as in the centre. The Macedonians fired missiles at the barbarians and then
moved in for the final kill. The fleeing barbarians lost some 3,000 men,
whereas the Macedonians reportedly lost only 11 horsemen and 40
infantrymen. Alexander next marched to the Danube, which he reached
three days later. There he met up with ships he had ordered to sail to the
Danube from Byzantium via the Black Sea. This flotilla, however, turned
out to be too weak to force a landing on the steep banks of the island
occupied by the barbarians. To make matters worse, in the meantime a
Getae army of 4,000 horsemen and over 10,000 infantry assembled on the
opposite bank of the Danube. Alexander would not have been himself if he
had not interpreted this situation as a challenge to be taken up. It is in
relating these events that Arrian speaks for the first time of Alexander’s
uncontrollable longing ( pothos) to cross real and imagined barriers, which
in this case told him to cross to the other side the Danube despite the facts
that an enemy army had gathered on the bank and that the Macedonian
lacked enough vessels to take them there. The latter problem was soon
dealt with by the confiscation of all local boats and construction of rafts
out of leather tents stuffed with hay. During the night time crossing,
perhaps somewhere between today’s town of Svishtov on the south bank
and Zimnicea on the north side, the Macedonians managed to transport
1,500 cavalry and 4,000 infantry. The following day Alexander led his
army against the Getae, who were surprised not only by the achievement
of the Macedonian engineers but also by the quantity and quality of the
Macedonian phalanx. The Getae did not withstand the impact of the
Macedonian cavalry, personally commanded by Alexander, and fled to
their weakly defended fort situated 5.5 kilometres from the Danube.
However, when the Macedonians caught up with them, they abandoned
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their positions and fled into the steppe. Alexander’s army captured their
city, razed it to the ground and returned to the southern bank.23
One cannot accept the late Roman Itinerarium Alexandri claim that
Alexander continued his northern campaign from the Danube along the
Black Sea coast all the way to the Sea of Azov and on the way back also
defeated the Dacians, Getae and Maedi.24 There is no trace of this in other
sources and besides, in the very eventful spring of 335 there would have
been no time for such a long campaign. Instead there followed a short lull
in the fighting whilst Alexander concentrated on diplomacy. After
Alexander’s impressive display of military might in two victorious battles
the Triballian king sent envoys, no doubt to establish conditions for
capitulation. These conditions must have included the supplying of
among detachments of Odrysians and Illyrians in a 7,000-strong North
Balkan corps in his army that invaded the Persian Empire in 334. News of
the Macedonian victories spread far and wide enough for Alexander’s
camp on the Lower Danube to be also visited by envoys from other
peoples that had not yet been conquered, including Celts from the North
Adriatic region. Not knowing the Macedonian king’s future plans but
seeing the speed and effectiveness of his actions, the Celts preferred to
diplomatically demonstrate their peaceful disposition and thus avert a
possible invasion. There is no evidence to suggest that Alexander was
actually planning such a campaign at the time, so there probably was no
need for serious negotiations with the Celtic envoys. Alexander must have
nevertheless been very pleased with himself after such a successful
campaign for he asked the Celts what they feared most; expecting of
course that they would say it was him. However, instead they said they
feared one day the sky would fall on their heads. Despite his obvious
disappointment with this answer, he nonetheless agreed to an alliance and
probably did not impose on them the same obligations as on the defeated
Thracians or Triballi.25
In the early summer of 335 Alexander’s army left the Danube region
and marched south to Macedonia. On the way Alexander stopped in the
land of the Agrianians, ruled by his ally, King Langarus. Return to the
homeland was temporarily made impossible for news had arrived from
territories to the northwest of Macedonia of hostile actions by the Illyrian
ruler Cleitus, the son of Bardylis, whom Philip had defeated in 359.
23 Arr., An. , 1.2-4; Plu., Alex. , 11.5-6. Iliescu 1990; Hammond 1996, pp. 47-49; Ashley 1998, pp. 169-170.
24 It. Alex. , 16.
25 Arr., An. , 1.4.6-8; Str., 7.3.8; Diod., 17.17.4. Alessandri 1997, pp. 131-148.
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Cleitus was supported by Glaucias, the king of the Illyrian Taulanti tribe
from the vicinity of Epidamnus, as well as by the Autariatae. This posed a
threat to Upper Macedonia, especially to Lyncestis. Alexander’s decision
to conduct a swift counterattack suggests he wished to show he was
particularly interested in maintaining security in this land, where
dissatisfaction must have been smouldering ever since less than a year
earlier he had two members of the country’s former royal family executed.
Langarus and part of the Agrianian army attacked the Autariatae, the
weakest tribe in the coalition, ransacked their land and made it impossible
for them to join Cleitus or Glaucias. Alexander crossed Paionia and
marched his army along the Erigon (Crna) to reach the Lyncestis fortress
of Pellion, which was held by Cleitus (the exact geographic location of
this fortress is unknown). After offering up human sacrifices the
barbarians went to confront the Macedonians, but soon they w
ere forced to
retreat to within the walls of their town. The following day the conducting
of the siege was hampered by the arrival of large detachments of Taulanti.
Alexander’s relatively small army now found itself between the forces of
Cleitus and Glaucias, who had been constantly trying hard to trap
Alexander in mountainous terrain. But able to rely on the excellent
training of his men the Macedonian king skilfully turned his army around
and marched it through the mountains occupied by the Taulanti. Surprised
by this unexpected military manoeuvre the Taulanti did not dare to attack
the Macedonians. The last element of Alexander’s manoeuvre was to cross
the river Eordaicus with Macedonian archers and catapults keeping the
barbarians at a safe distance. Arrian relates that during their retreat the
Macedonians did not lose a single soldier. In the war, however, Alexander
did allegedly suffer injuries after being hit by a stone and later receiving a
blow with a mace. Once Alexander’s army was on the other side of the
river, the armies of Cleitus and Glaucias were able to unite and form a
single camp. Convinced that the Macedonians happy to have escaped the
trap had headed for their homeland, the Illyrians felt so safe that they did
not bother to fortify their very large camp and even failed to put guards on
watch. This of course did not escape the notice of Macedonian scouts.
Alexander was thus aware of the enemy’s carelessness and on the third
day after his retreat he decided to attack the Illyrians. He personally
commanded the night time river crossing of the first detachments
comprising Agrianians, archers, hypaspists and some of his phalangites,
after whom the rest of the Macedonian army followed. Alexander did not
wait for all of his army to assemble and instead chose to make full use of
the element of surprise: he ordered the Agrianians and archers to attack the
enemy immediately. Suddenly aroused from sleep the Illyrians did not put
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up much resistance. Many were killed in the camp, whilst others fled for
their lives abandoning their weapons. Many of those who were not taken
as slaves were killed during a chase that lasted all the way to the
mountains where the Taulanti lived. After a short while Cleitus resolved
not to defend Pellion, so he had it torched and fled to the land of the
Taulanti.26 The victorious Illyrian campaign could not be continued on
account of extremely disturbing news from Greece, but this was not an
empty victory without any political consequences. After their defeat in 335
the Illyrians did not threaten Macedonia’s border for the rest of his reign.
There was an Illyrian contingent in the army that crossed the Hellespont
the following spring, therefore there is also reason to presume that
Alexander was able impose terms for peace on their rulers in a treaty that
has not been recorded in historiography. Finally, in the 335 campaign
Alexander had won a series of victories with very small losses and this
without a doubt earned him the trust of his army, which at the start of this
young ruler’s reign had been far from certain.27
3. The destruction of Thebes
During Alexander’s war with the Illyrians members of the anti-
Macedonian faction that had been expelled after the Battle of Chaeronea
secretly returned to Thebes. They were helped by allies within the city
who were also hoping to free their country from the imposed treaty with
Macedonia. Although the sources do not explicitly mention this, the first
thing the returned exiles and their allies at Thebes must have done was to
overthrow the city’s pro-Macedonian oligarchy. The exiles also managed
to lure two Macedonians out of their garrison at the Cadmea and kill them.
Most probably the following day they appealed to the gathered Theban
populace to break their treaty with Macedonia. The mood in many Greek
states at the time was favourable to such ideas. Despite the adroitness with
which he had forced some and just persuaded others to renew their
commitment to the universal peace they had originally agreed with his
father, Alexander was still a new and as yet untried force in Greece.
Moreover, the mildness with which in the autumn of 336 he had treated
the states that had tried to renege the Macedonian treaty did not allow
those states to foresee the consequences if they attempted to go back on
their word again. In a society that valued age and experience Alexander’s
26 Arr., An. , 1.5-7; Diod., 17.8.1; Plu., mor. , 327a; It. Alex. , 16. Bosworth 1982, pp.
65-73; Hammond 1996, pp. 49-58; Pająkowski 2000, pp. 158-164.
27 Diod., 17.17.4. Bosworth 1988, p. 32; Hammond 1996, pp. 54-58; Ashley 1998,
pp. 174-175.
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youth was an opportunity for politicians like Demosthenes to win over
crowds by calling him a boy. Yet another factor were the covert activities
of Persian diplomacy. Orators mention vast sums which Demosthenes
received from Darius III – Demosthenes’ mortal enemy Aeschines
mentions 70 talents and Dinarchus speaks of as many as 300 talents. One
cannot assume these sums mentioned in political speeches against
Demosthenes to be accurate, but there can be no doubt that Persian money
was handed to anti-Macedonian politicians in order to make diversionary
actions in Persia’s favour. Allegedly after the capture of Sardis documents
got into Alexander’s hands listing the amounts of money given to Greek
politicians by the Persians. We know that some of the money that the
Persians gave to Demosthenes was passed on to Thebes. In all likelihood
Demosthenes also used this money to purchase weapons and armour, so
that all that city’s citizens, even those who did not belong to the hoplite
class, could fight. As one would expect in a society without mass media,
Greece most probably learned of events that occurred during North Balkan
campaign from the spring to the early autumn of 335 from rumours. And
the rumour was that Alexander, already absent from Macedonia for several
months, had been wounded or even killed by the Triballi. Demosthenes
was eager to spread such stories, though he himself would not have
invented them. From the legal point of view, childless Alexander’s death
would have automatically terminated the Treaty of Corinth and ended
Macedonian hegemony.28
It was in such an atmosphere that the words of the Theban exiles
would have been well received. Anti-Macedonian politicians in the city
council presented a plan to wage war on Macedonia to the assembly and it
was accepted. The first action of this war was to surround the Macedonian
garrison at the Cadmea citadel with a double palisade thus cutting it off
from the Macedonian army if and when it came. The Thebans were
preparing to destroy the garrison but they ran out of time. Meanwhile they
turned to Athens, Argos, Elis and the states of Arcadia for help. Influenced
by the anti-Macedonian party and its leader Demosthenes, the Athenians
resolved to send military reinforcements to Thebes. These troops, however,
&nbs
p; did not manage to set out from Attica to Boeotia before it was too late. It
was also probably then that emissaries were sent to Darius III who were
later captured by the Macedonians after the Battle of Issus. It seems the
Aetolian League and Sparta also considered opposing Alexander militarily.
28 Din., 1.10, 1.18; Aeschin., 3.239; Diod., 17.8.6; Plu., mor. , 327c-d, 847c; Plu.,
Dem. , 20.5, 23.1-2; Arr., An. , 1.7; Just., 11.2. Wilcken 1967, pp.70-71; Bosworth 1980, pp. 73-75; Bosworth 1988, pp. 194-195. Rumors in Greece: Lewis 1996, esp.
pp. 75-96.
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In Elis there was most probably a coup because of which Macedonia’s
supporters were forced to leave the state and it was only after Alexander’s
defeat that they could return. The Arcadian League sent its army to the
Isthmus and officially stayed neutral for this part of the war until more
became known. Thus the situation in Greece was developing in a way that
could lead to another Chaeronean Coalition and, what was worse, this time
financed by the Great King. Antipater’s diplomatic efforts did stop the
Peloponnesians from marching north to help the Thebans but Alexander’s
intervention now became essential.29
Cutting short his Illyrian campaign, Alexander marched his army
across the western lands of Upper Macedonia, Eordaia and Elimeia to
reach Thessaly within seven days. From Thessaly the Macedonians
marched south through the Thermopylae pass to reach Boeotia six days
later, in the second half of September 335. This, typically for Alexander,
very rapid advance generally surprised his enemies because at such a rate
contemporary communications could only forewarn them of the
approaching army by a matter of hours, not days. And this is what
happened this time as well. The Thebans had not only failed to block
Thermopylae pass, which would have enabled them to stop the invasion
until the reinforcements arrived, but also only learned of Alexander’s army
when it had already reached Onchestus in Boeotia. Initially the Thebans
deluded themselves this was Antipater’s corps or a Macedonian army