influence in the Macedonian state. We know that Alexander rejected this
advice, no doubt because he did not wish to offend the powerful adviser
whose daughter he would have to consider less worthy of marriage. For
the time being the young king preferred to keep rival parties at his court
parties in balance.36
36 Diod., 17.16; Arr., An. , 1.11.1. Baynham 1994, p. 334; Baynham 1998; Weber
2009, p. 87.
CHAPTER IV:
FROM ABYDOS TO ALEXANDRIA
1. Granicus – the first victory
If we take into consideration the differences in human and material
resources as well as the differences in territorial size between Macedonia
and the Persian Empire, then Alexander’s expedition must be the most
remarkable military feat in world history. It should also be remembered
that in its 3,000-year history Iran has only been successfully attacked and
conquered from the west twice: in the mid 7th century AD by the Arabs, at
a time when Persia was severely weakened by total defeat in a war against
the Eastern Roman Empire, and by Alexander, at a time when the
Achaemenid Empire was actually experiencing a territorial and military
revival. An ocean of ink has been spilled on a generally futile debate over
Alexander’s real motives for taking on such an immensely powerful
neighbour.1 As is usually the case, the state of the sources is to blame.
Only Arrian writes about Alexander being driven by an overwhelming
urge ( pothos). It is probable that Arrian had derived this notion from a
source citing the exact words uttered by Alexander at key moments in his
career. Therefore even if we do not accept the romantic image of
Alexander constantly trying to achieve the seemingly impossible, we
cannot entirely reject pothos as a factor. It was indeed a part of
Macedonian culture to identify oneself with heroes from the past as well as
the need to prove one’s worth in the eyes of one’s companions ( hetairoi)
through feats that others had failed to achieve. Therefore this
overwhelming urge to cross ever newer boundaries served to confirm that
Alexander reigned supreme over everyone else in terms of areté
(manliness/virtue). As the descendent of Heracles and Achilles, who in
Antiquity were unquestioningly considered to be historic figures, and also
as an avid reader of Homer, the young king was wont to measure his
achievements on a heroic scale. That is why more than once in his career
he tried not only to equal or outdo his contemporaries but also the deeds of
1 Discussion related in Seibert 1998.
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Chapter IV
mythological figures.2 Of course modern historiography desires to find
more rational motives for an undertaking as great as the conquest of the
Achaemenid Empire, whose success, apart from the young king’s personal
valour and ingenious army manoeuvres in the battlefield, would have
required effective intelligence gathering and hard-headed logistical
planning on a quite unprecedented scale.
Meanwhile the sources tell us nothing about Alexander’s objectives
and plans. We do not even know if at the start of the campaign he merely
intended to realise his father’s limited aims, or whether from the outset he
planned to conquer the entire Persian Empire. The fact that the sources are
silent on these issues does not necessarily mean they are defective or
written too long after the events they describe. Conversely, they could just
as well be reflecting the actual situation, i.e. the lack of consideration of
such matters in Alexander’s circle. Perhaps it is as W.W. Tarn put it that
Alexander decided to conquer Persia because he never thought of not
doing it. Decades before these events Plato had written3 that the natural
state of politics was war. And indeed in the Greek world a state could
always expect to be at war with its neighbours unless they were bound by
a peace treaty, whereas such treaties were anyhow usually only valid for a
limited period. If that was how the Greeks thought, then war would have
been even more natural to the king of Macedonia, who was traditionally
above all a tribal leader and only later a legislator, judge or administrator.
Moreover, one cannot forget that Alexander had to do something with the
immensely powerful and efficient but equally expensive war machine he
had inherited from Philip II. The Macedonian king’s permanent revenues
from the exploitation of forests, mines, including gold mines, customs
duties and taxes were not enough to cover the cost of maintaining such an
army. Besides, Philip II had left his son a legacy of glorious victories but
an empty treasury. Even the booty taken from Illyria, Thrace and Thebes
was soon spent. According to the sources, by the spring of 334 Alexander
had only enough provisions to last his army for 30 days and 70 talents,
which would have sufficed for no more than two weeks of his army’s pay.4
Therefore if neither Macedonia’s permanent revenues nor her traditional
2 Ehrenberg 1938, pp. 52-61; Brunt 1965; Goukowsky 1975, pp. 325-326; O’Brien
1992, p. 50; Stewart 1993, pp. 78-88; Austin 2003, pp. 121-123.
3 Tarn 1948, p. 8; Pl., Lg. , 625e.
4 Duris and Phylarchus after Chares, Aristobulus and Onesicritus – all quoted in:
Plu., Alex. , 15.2; Plu., mor. , 327d-e, 342d. Badian 1985, p. 423; Ashley 1998, pp.
187-189; Hamilton 1999, pp. 36-37; Le Rider 2003, pp. 39-40; Nawotka 2003, pp.
36, 91; Austin 2003, pp. 122-124; Thomas 2007, pp. 59-61, 141-142 on
Macedonian monarchy.
From Abydus to Alexandria
111
plundering zones in the Balkans were enough to maintain such a huge
army, Alexander was left with the options of either demobilising this army
or invading Asia. As has been soberly noted by Seibert, although the first
option could have theoretically refilled the royal coffers within one or two
years, it is highly unlikely that this would have been a practical solution if
only on account of the fact that since his ascension to the throne Alexander
had had to fight for his political existence and was only victorious thanks
to the very army he had inherited from Philip.5 From the ideological point
of view, Alexander’s plans were supported by the mission of the follower
of Plato, Delios of Ephesus, who had been sent by some Greeks of Asia
Minor to urge for a war of liberation against their Persian oppressors.6
The decision to wage war was made and in the early spring of 334,
most probably in March, the Macedonian army began its trek to the East.
The soldiers were personally commanded by Alexander. The administration
of Macedonia and control of Greece and the Balkans was handed over to
the tried and trusted Antipater, who was also left with 12,000 infantry and
1,500 cavalry. The sources give various figures for Alexander’s army at
the start of the expedition. Citing after Callisthenes, Polybius states that
Alexander landed in Asia with 40,000 infantry and 4,500 cavalry. Arrian
claims there were 30,000 infantry and over 5,000 cavalry, whereas Justin
states there were 32,000 infantry and 4,500 cavalry. The most detailed
information regarding Alexander’s army is provided by Diodorus. He
mentions 32,000 infantry, 12,000 of whom were Macedonians, 7,000 allies
(Corinthian League), 5,000 mercenaries, 7,000 soldiers from Odrysian,
Triballian and Illyrian tribes as well as 1,000 Agrianians and archers. The
cavalry was to include 5,100 horsemen: 1,800 Macedonians, 1,800
Thessalians, 600 from the League of Corinth and 900 riders from Thrace
and Paionia. Plutarch, known as having examined the largest number of no
longer extant sources, does not give a detailed breakdown of the numbers
of troops included but does state that the lowest figure for Alexander’s
army was 30,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry, whereas the highest figure
was 43,000 infantry and 5,000 cavalry. Both these assessments came from
authors who were Alexander’s contemporaries – Ptolemy and Anaximenes
of Lampsacus. None of these figures is so great as to be rejected as a
rhetorical exaggeration, which ancient authors indeed frequently used
when relating the size of armies or of battle losses. Only the much later
Itinerarium Alexandri stands out by stating that there were 5,000 cavalry
and only 10,000 infantry, though even here the infantry figure is given
only in reference to Alexander’s ‘own soldiers’ and therefore in all
5 Seibert 1998, p. 55; but see Wirth 1971, pp. 139-142.
6 Plu., mor. , 1126d; see above n. 43 to chapter II.
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Chapter IV
probability Macedonians. Perhaps the different numbers given for
Alexander’s army arises from the particular moment the sources relate
them. The lower number could refer to the size of Alexander’s army that
left Macedonia, whereas the higher number could refer to Alexander’s
army after the expeditionary corps of 336 joined it at Abydos. If that was
the case, we can estimate the overall number of Alexander’s most essential
infantry, i.e. the phalanx, to be c. 15,000. Wishing to illustrate Alexander’s
heroic and generous nature, Plutarch relates the following anecdote: on
leaving Macedonia the young king reportedly distributed among his
friends all his royal possessions, and when asked what he would keep for
himself, he replied ‘hope’. Despite its romanticism, this story seems to be
at least partly confirmed in an inscription at Calindoea in Mygdonia in the
north of the Chalcidice Peninsula stating that Alexander had granted
individual Macedonians land there. Of course this does not imply that he
gave away all his property for in Macedonia’s later history royal lands
certainly existed. It is, however, very plausible that he simply left some of
his property as a deposit against loans he had acquired for the military
campaign; Alexander had apparently raise 800 talents that way.7
Alexander was accompanied on his expedition to Asia by Thracian
princes. They were invited to do so in order to give the impression that this
was a privilege, but in reality they were also hostages ensuring that there
subjects and fellow tribesmen would not dare to rise. Historians believe
that this was also the purpose of taking the League of Corinth contingent.
This contingent was small, especially if we consider that Justin claims the
League of Corinth was able to muster 200,000 infantry and 15,000 cavalry,
but that does not appear to have mattered to Alexander. We do not see him
using this contingent in any important actions in battles, more often than
not the king entrusted it garrison duties – a necessary task but one of
secondary importance. Some scholars presume that the Greek states
dispatched only such soldiers they were glad to see the back of. Regardless
of that, it would be difficult to see great cohesion and military value in a
contingent of 7,000 hoplites from dozens of different poleis who had never
been on the same battlefield before, at least not on the same side.
Moreover, one has to remember that there were many Greek mercenaries
in the Persian ranks whom Corinthian League soldiers would not have
7 Callisth., FGrH, 124 F35 (= Plb., 12.19.1); Diod., 17.17.3-5; Arr., An. , 1.11, 7.9.6; Plu., Alex. , 15.1-6; Plu., mor. , 327d-e; Just., 11.6; It. Alex. , 17-18; Fron., Str. , 4.2.4. Milns 1966, p. 167; Hamilton 1974, p. 53; Hamilton 1999, pp. 36-37; Green
1974, pp. 155-156; Dąbrowa 1988, p. 33; Bosworth 1988, pp. 259-260; Le Rider
2003, pp. 46-47; Worthington 2004, p. 48. Inscription of Calindoea: SEG 36.626;
see Errington 1998, pp. 79-82.
From Abydus to Alexandria
113
been eager to fight. It is also characteristic that of the mighty Athenian
fleet said to comprise as many as 400 triremes, only 20 ships were sent to
Asia and there is no mention of their making any significant contribution
to the campaign. The above comments could most certainly not be said
about the Thessalian contingent. Their cavalry was in no way inferior to
that of the Macedonians and in battles it played an equally important role.8
The Macedonian army marched alongside Lake Kerkini, crossed the
River Strymon at Amphipolis and then marched to the south of the
Pangaion Mountains via Abdera and Maroneia, crossed the river Hebros
(Maritza), passed the city of Pactya and crossed the river Melas at the foot
Hellespont. Olympias escorted Alexander for the start of the journey up to
Amphipolis, where they parted company and she saw her son no more.
The whole route from Macedonia to the Hellespont was approximately
500 km long and it took Alexander’s army 20 days to cover. The choice of
route was no doubt simply dictated by the road condition and the terrain,
but it is also worth noting that it was with slogans of vengeance for
Persian sacrilege in Greece that the campaign was started and now
Alexander was retracing in the reverse order the route taken by the great
army of Xerxes in 480.9
As today, in ancient times the Hellespont was considered to be the
border between Europe and Asia. The symbolic significance of this strait
is presented in Book vii of Herodotus’s The Histories, where he describes
the great Persian army crossing the Hellespont on a pontoon bridge
straddling two continents as well as the speeches, sacrifices and prayers
that accompanied this momentous event. Regardless of the historical
veracity of this image, it did function in the collective memory of the
Greeks as a symbol of Persian might but also of something that displeased
the gods, namely Xerxes’ excessive pride or hubris in building a bridge
across two continents and thus overreaching the boundaries of what was
permissible to mere mortals. The Greeks knew that it was indeed his
hubris that sealed the ultimate fate of that entire expedition. Therefore it is
unsurprising that at the start of this campaign to avenge crimes committed
by Xerxes Alexander alluded not only to his expedition but also to the
very first pan-Hellenic campaign: the Trojan War, which in Alexander’s
time was not considered to be a mere work of fiction but a genuine
historical fact and actually the very beginning of Greek history. It was also
8 Fron., Str. , 2.11.3; Just., 9.5,
11.5. Bosworth 1988, pp. 264-266; Heckel 1997, p.
191.
9 Arr., An. , 1.11.5; It. Alex. , 18. Engels 1978, pp. 26-29; Bosworth 1988, p. 38; Brosius 2003a, p. 228.
114
Chapter IV
in association with the Trojan War that in 396 the Spartan king Agesilaus
began his expedition into Asia Minor to liberate Greek cities by offering
sacrifices at Aulis as Agamemnon had done before his expedition.
Therefore there was already an established symbolism associated with
political enterprises of the type that was undertaken in the early spring of
334. Before he crossed the Hellespont, Alexander headed for Elaius on the
southern end of Chersonese to offer sacrifices to Protesilaos, the first
Greek warrior of the Trojan expedition to set foot in Asia and be killed.
Arrian relates that the sacrifices were made with an intention that this
expedition would be more providential than that of Protesilaos. The visit to
this Greek warrior’s sanctuary linked the symbolism of the Trojan War
with the need to avenge the crimes committed by Xerxes. In 480 this was
the first Greek religious edifice in Europe to be destroyed by the Persians,
and indeed it was for the sacrilegious destruction of shrines that Alexander
was now intending to punish Persia. The emphasis on Panhellenic
symbolism was particularly important on account of the fact that
Macedonian leadership had so recently been questioned by Thebes. The
visit to Elaius and other religiously symbolic gestures cost the entire
expedition time. It has been estimated that the excursions to sanctuaries
Alexander made at the start of the expedition added 70 km to the route. In
other words, they must have delayed the army’s progress by several days
although speed was such a high priority for the Macedonian king. This
illustrates just how important it was for Alexander to gain the favour of the
gods in what was much more than merely a logistical and strategic
undertaking.10