• ing to be drawn. Turkish mounted archers assailed the Franks and on occa-
sion the Latin knights fought back. The intense heat of the day also took its
toll and William of Tyre noted that many died that day from heatstroke,
including the Canon of the Sepulchre, who was carrying the Holy Cross.
Denied tactical success, Saladin withdrew. Credit must go to Baldwin who,
despite his illness, demonstrated considerable willpower, tenacity, discipline
and courage, for it was clear he understood the terms of engagement and
refiised to take the Muslim bait. Saladin then turned his attention to the city
of Beirut, which he knew was the weakest point in the Frankish control of
the Syrian coast. While he was in Egypt he had built up a fleet of between
30 and 40 war galleys,^® and he now launched a sea and land attack on
the city. At the same time he ordered his brother, al-Adil, to launch raids
around Darum and Gaza. This appeared to be a serious and well-co-
ordinated attack^' and when Baldwin heard of these developments he had
to make a difficult choice: either to divide his army to confront the two
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9: SALADIN A N D T H E L E P E R K I N G
challenges or to remain united and defend Beirut. Calculating that the loss
of Beirut would be a far greater blow to Franldsh moral, he chose the latter
option. For three days Saladin launched an intense bombardment on Beirut,
with the arrows - in the words of William of Tyre - filling the air like hail.
In the meantime Baldwin ordered ships from Acre and Tyre to sail to relieve
Beirut. Although the capture of the city would have been a spectacular suc-
cess for Saladin, his withdrawal after only three days of siege was a sign that
he recognised that even had it fallen, he would not have been able to hold
it. In any case at this stage the Franks were not his main or immediate con-
cern.^" Although he now moved north, the Franks were unsettled because,
contrary to normal practice, he deliberately chose not to make a truce.
Having called off the attack on Beirut, Saladin marched to Baalbek,
which he reached around the middle of August 1182. The pace of the
march was deliberately slow and it took him 40 days to reach the Euphrates.
The aim was to gather support along the way and thereby to gain momen-
tum, and he wrote that the amirs of the land were sending him envoys and
support. Near Aleppo he was joined by Muzaffar al-Din Keukburi, who held
the town and citadel of Harran, and who had fought against Saladin at the
battie of Tell al-Sultan. Now he informed Saladin that he was prepared to
change sides and urged him to cross the Euphrates and claim the lands
that lay east of the river. 'These lands are yours', he assured him. Keukburi's
change of sides was cemented by his marriage to Saladin's sister: a for-
midable ally had been gained. Keukburi's words tempted Saladin, for he
knew that Aleppo would put up a strong resistance and any siege would
have to endure the harsh winter months. By contrast, a campaign east of the
Euphrates held opportunities. Although he would leave his rear exposed to
an Aleppan attack, he remained confident that any attacks would not cause
him too many problems. In late September 1182 he reached al-Bira, which
was one of the crossing points on the Euphrates, where he was welcomed
by Shihab al-Din Mahmud. He handed Saladin the keys of his citadel, which
Saladin returned to him. Saladin wrote to al-Adil asking him to send him
money, which he urgentiy needed to win over the cities which lay ahead, for
liberality was the key to success. Having crossed the Euphrates, Saladin
marched to al-Ruha, which was held by none other than Fakhr al-Din al-
Zafarani, who had once entered Saladin's service but had left in anger when
Homs had not been given to him. Although Izz al-Din sent some troops
from Mosul to come to al-Ruha's aid, they arrived too late and al-Ruha fell
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peacefully to Saladin. In the meantime in Aleppo Imad al-Din Zengi took
advantage of Saladin's crossing of the Euphrates and attacked Manbij. He
even crossed the Euphrates and raided Saruj, but Saladin did not turn back
since the Aleppans were not strong enough to trap him. In fact he was not
march on Damascus - that his motives were psychological, that is to turn a
military expedition into a triumphal progress.^^ And so as he moved east-
wards, he received the submission of Harran and al-Raqqa - which was held
by Qutb al-Din Inal, who had once threatened Saladin with his sword but
who was now won over by his purse. By 10 November Saladin was camped
outside Mosul: Imad al-Din al-Isfahani commented that within one year he
had watered his horse in the Nile, the Euphrates and the Tigris.
Saladin had also written to Farruldi-Shah requesting money but he did
not receive a reply, for Farruldi-Shah had fallen ill and died. An accom-
plished poet with a great fondness for the poetiy of al-Mutanabbi, Farrukh-
Shah left behind a reputation for valour and bravery on the battlefield.
His loss was a considerable blow to Saladin, who now appointed Ibn
al-Muqaddam - proof that the dispute over Baalbek had been truly healed
- to the governership of Damascus. In the meantime, as they anxiously
watched Saladin's peaceful promenade across the cities of the Euphrates, Izz
al-Din of Mosul and his brother Imad al-Din of Aleppo approached the
Franks and made peace with Bohemond III of Antioch and Rupen III of
•Cilicia. A few months later, while Saladin was crossing the Euphrates, Izz al-
Din of Mosul sent envoys to Baldwin in Jerusalem and agreed an 11-year
truce, in return for which Mosul agreed to pay an annual subsidy of 10,000
dinars. In addition, Mosul agreed to release all Prankish prisoners. The
Mosuli-Frankish alliance seemed as firm as ever. The agreement setded,
Baldwin immediately launched into action with the aim of cutting Saladin's
lines of communication. He first raided Damascene territoiy. Ibn al-
Muqaddam, with too few men to risk combat, was unable to challenge him,
and Baldwin was free to burn the harvest. The leper king then threatened
to destroy the mosque at Darayya, but was told by a deputation of
Christians that if he did so he would needlessly antagonise the Muslim popu-
lation and that in return Ibn al-Muqaddam would inevitably wreak great
damage on the Christian churches in the province, and he desisted. Then he
led his forces to Bosra, which lay 145 kilometres (90 miles) to the south and
which was the first settiement on the desert road from Damascus to Egypt.
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9: SALADIN A N D T H E L E P E R K I N G
If the Franks could capture it then Saladin would have had no choice but to
turn back, but its inhabitants blocked all the wells outside the walls, maldng
it impossible to besiege. Knowing that Saladin was too far north and that
Ibn al-Muqaddam was unable to offer much resistance, Baldwin then
turned to the fortress of al-Habis Jaldak, which Farrukh-Shah had captured
a few months earlier. After a brief siege the for
tress fell to him. Prankish
control over eastern Galilee was thus restored.^^ Saladin was kept in touch
with what was happening, but was unconcerned and appeared dismissive:
'While they knock down villages we are taking cities'. There was reason for
his relaxed manner. He Icnew that lacking support from Byzantium, the
Franks could not attack Egypt, and that the raids launched by Baldwin were
insufficient in themselves to force him to turn back. He interpreted them as
being little more than diversionary tactics and he regarded them as symp-
toms of the impotent anger felt by the Franks because he had left Syria with-
out troubling to negotiate a truce.
One question still disturbed many - including al-Qadi al-Fadil - what
was Saladin doing.^ It was clear that the fall of Mosul would mean the fall of
Aleppo, but what was less clear was what Saladin was doing besieging
Mosul, or indeed how he could justify it. As far as Aleppo was concerned, a
case could be made, since with Nur al-Din's son al-Salih dead, Saladin had
the best claim. But no such claim could possibly apply to Mosul. This was
a point which the Mosulis were quick to make to the caliph, and Saladin
could not have been optimistic when he saw how well Izz al-Din had
fortified the city. When Taqi ul-Din suggested the use of mangonels,
Saladin replied, 'One does not set up mangonels against a city like this . . .
Even if we destroyed a tower . . . who could take the city when there are so
many people there?' The situation was a stalemate: the Mosulis could not
drive Saladin away and he could not take the city by assault. In addition, the
longer he besieged Mosul the weaker his position became in Syria. His solu-
tion was to turn from Mosul to Sinjar, which surrendered peacefully after a
15-day siege and which was given to Taqi ul-Din. The leading citizens came
out and were treated with the courtesy that had now become customary
with Saladin. He repaired the damage done during the siege and extracted
no advantage for himself from the capture, so boosting his reputation for
generosity even among those who previously had been sceptical. Although
he had been unable to capture Mosul - nor did he realistically expect to -
he had succeeded in cutting off the Zengids of Aleppo from those of Mosul.
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SALADIN
At the beginning of 1183, ai-Adil, and al-Qadi al-Fadil wrote to Saladin
with some alarming news: the Franks had made an audacious assault on the
heart of Islam. They were referring to the raid made by Reynald of Chatillon
on Ai-abia and the city of Medina, where the Prophet was buried. It was
truly an extraordinary adventure: Reynald had spent two years having ships
built in sections, which were then transported by camels - which had been
hired from the Bedouins - and brought down to the Gulf of Aqaba where
the ships were reconstructed. Reynald had then set sail down the Red Sea
and landed north of Jeddah. Whether Reynald was trying to establish a
Franldsh presence in the vicinity or was - as Muslims were convinced -
attempting to remove the Prophet's body and transport it to Franldsh
territory is unclear, but the flamboyant raid caused a seismic shock among
Muslims. It was al-Adil, who had been left in charge of Egypt, who orches-
trated the Muslim counter-attack. The Muslim fleet destroyed the Franldsh
ships and Bedouins were employed to track down those who had already
landed and were heading for Medina. For five days and nights the Muslim
army tracked down the raiding party, numbering around 170 men, and as
each day passed and Medina got closer, Muslim anxiety increased. Finally,
however, they were captured. A couple were sent to Mecca and the rest to
Medina and Alexandria, where Saladin ordered their execution. To his sur-
prise, however, al-Adil reftised to execute the prisoners and requested that
he first consult with the religious scholars. The reason for this was that in the
pursuit the Franks were promised quarter by the Muslims. However, Saladin
persisted in his demand that the men be put to the sword, arguing that
sacred territory had been attacked and that the men now loiew the route to
Medina and so they could not be allowed to live. Finally Saladin's orders
were carried out, but his insistence and his overriding of his brother's deci-
sion betrayed the anxiety he undoubtedly felt. How realistic the Prankish
attempt had been is unclear, but its daring nature caused Saladin great
embarrassment. It was his absence in northern Syria that had given Reynald
his opportunity, and his determination to settle the dispute with Aleppo and
Mosul opened him to charges that he was putting his own dynastic interests
before those of Islam.^® Saladin had sailed very close to disaster. Reynald's
raid into the heart of Islam, dramatic as it was, was also not without a stra-
tegic motive - which was to force Saladin to turn back from Mosul. The
Franks would thus be aiding their Zengid allies while protecting their own
interests by restraining the growth of Saladin's power in Syria.
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9: SALADIN A N D T H E L E P E R K I N G
By May 1183 Saladin had turned back to lay siege to Aleppo. In the
city Nur al-Din's nephew, Imad al-Din Zengi, had lost his appetite for a
long fight. He had once ruled Sinjar and he now sought to return there. So
he was not opposed to opening secret negotiations with Saladin's camp,
during which he made it known that he would be prepared to exchange
Aleppo for Sinjar. And so to the astonishment of its people, on 12 June
1183, Aleppo opened its gates peacefully to Saladin. The Aleppans sent
two amirs to negotiate, one of whom was Izz al-Din Jurdik, who had once
been imprisoned by the Aleppans. An interesting point of the agreement
was Saladin's decision to replace the Hanafi qadi and Idiatib (preacher) with
Shafii ones. This was an uncommon act for Saladin, who normally never
interfered in such matters, and it may have had something to do with the
previous support given to the Shiites in the city. On the following day,
13 June, Imad al-Din Zengi finally came face to face with Saladin, who held
a splendid reception for him. During this reception news reached Saladin
that his brother Buri had died of a wound he had incurred during a skirmish
with an Aleppan force, but Saladin showed no expression and the reception
was not disrupted. He showed Imad al-Din his customary generosity and
allowed him to take with him all the citadel stores that he could remove.
One of the conditions, however, was that Imad al-Din would come with
his troops when Saladin was fighting the Franks. And it was Saladin's
generosity which won over the people of Aleppo and in particular Nur
al-Din's mamluks, who now joined his service. To Saladin, Aleppo was the
eye of Syria and - despite his lack of money, which forced him to make
urgent appeals to Egypt - he was content, for he had won Aleppo cheaply
and without any great loss, even though he mourned for the death of his
brother.
It had taken Saladin nearly nine years finally to capture Aleppo, a city
that he had once boasted he would milk. Th
e house of Zengi had resisted
the advances of that of Ayyub and twice they had dispatched assassins to Idll
him. But Aleppo could not resist the momentum and pressure that Saladin
had built up. He had spent money liberally to win over the amirs, and had
persistently written to the caliph, arguing that without Aleppo and Mosul
the holy war could not be effectively fought. Whether he truly believed this
to be the case or not is less important than the fact that he consistently
advocated it. And Aleppo had fallen peacefully - a testimony of Saladin's
diplomatic sldlls. This was a crucial point, for Saladin could neither aflford to
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SALADIN
be dragged into a long siege nor could he accept a bloody conflict where
Nur al-Din's lieutenants fell, for he needed these men. He was fortunate
that Aleppo was ruled by Imad al-Din Zengi, whose career had been one of
disappointment,^® and whose ambition in crossing west of the Euphrates
was never matched by his abilities in establishing himself there. The
Aleppans were outraged by Imad al-Din Zengi's betrayal of their city and a
popular chant of the day was about a donkey who had sold milk for sour
milk, but the Aleppans were traders and Saladin quickly soothed their anger
through the generous distribution of money and conciliatory behaviour,
though it is noteworthy that strict instructions were issued to the Shiites to
stop defaming the orthodox caliphs of Islam. Saladin had lost a brother to
win a city, but he was now in a very strong position, for the armies of
Aleppo, Damascus and Egypt were united behind him and the encirclement
of the Franks was nearly complete. The two horns of the Muslim crescent -
Egypt and North Syria - were firmly in the Saladin's grasp. Muslim unity
after nearly a century of disunity was now at hand, and the prospects for the
Franks boded ill.^®
• 156 •
Chapter 10
Sailing Close to Disaster:
Saladin's Illness at Harran
Affairs do not run a-ccordin^ to humcin desire, nor do we know how much
is left of our lives.
Salcidin
•<he summer of 1183 was a perilous time for the Latin Kingdom, for no
1 sooner had Saladin returned to Damascus after the successful surrender