and had invited Saladin into Syria. Clearly the resolution of this matter
needed careful diplomacy. Saladin could not say no to his brother, for he
ultimately depended on his family's support to build his dynasty. On the
other hand, Ibn al-Muqaddam had proven to be a loyal supporter and there
was no reason why he should cede his territory. Saladin now wrote to the
caliph informing him that he was moving his army to Baalbek and justifying
his act by stating that he had to guard the crops from the raids of the Franks.
This was typical of the cautious Saladin; he prepared every move with a
letter to the caliph - drafted more often than not by Imad al-Din al-Isfahani
- in which he sought legitimacy for his action. Indeed, such was the volume
of the correspondence sent to Baghdad that al-Qadi al-Fadil at one point
urged him to ease off, in case Baghdad felt that he protested too much. At
the end of 1178, with snow already falling, Saladin marched his army to
Baalbek. According to Imad al-Din this was nothing more than a show
of force with no intention of fighting, for Saladin spent most of the time
hunting in a land that he knew well from his childhood. In reality both
sides needed this charade of power; Saladin to make a public display of his
strength, and Ibn al-Muqaddam to demonstrate that he would not give up
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his possession easily. The truth was that, in Imad al-Din's words, 'Saladin
flattered Ibn ai-Muqaddam for all his age like a baby', and a generous agree-
ment was reached which saw Ibn al-Muqaddam well rewarded elsewhere in
return for his loyalty. This was Saladin par excellence: a letter to the caliph to justify his actions, a show of force to assert his leadership, kind words to
resolve the issue and a generous settiement to ensure loyalty.
Meanwhile Baldwin IV spent 1178 strengthening the defences of his
Idngdom. The walls of Jerusalem were restored, and in the Upper Galilee
Humphrey of Toron rebuilt the fortress of Chastelneuf, which had been
abandoned. Then in the autumn of 1178 a major project was undertaken,
which was the building of the castle of Le Chastellet at Jacob's Ford - also
known as Bait al-Alizan. This was a massive fortification and was considered
of such importance - for it lay on one of the main routes to Damascus and
was only a day's journey from that city - that Baldwin and his army
remained there to protect the workforce. Once the fortress was completed,
in April 1179, it was entrasted to the Templars, and 80 knights remained in
the garrison with a total force of about 1,000 men. Saladin made no attempt
to prevent the fortress being constructed; when told that it was nearing
completion, his response was a composed one: 'When they have finished it,
we shall go there and destroy it'. Despite his sangfroid, the castle's close
proximity to Damascus effectively meant that he had to keep back a con-
siderable force, otherwise the garrison would be able to raid his lands at will.
In addition, the protracted affair of Baalbek had occurred at the same time
as Bait al-Ahzan was being constructed. By March 1179 al-Qadi al-Fadil was
beginning to get concerned, and he wrote to Imad al-Din about his fear
that Saladin was becoming distracted from the holy war. There was no
doubt that 1178 had been a good year for Baldwin and the Latin Kingdom.
In the spring of 1179 news reached Saladin that the Franks were plan-
ning a raid in the vicinity of Damascus. Led by Baldwin, the army was not
expecting any resistance, but was surprised by Saladin's nephew Farrukh-
Shah, who routed them. At first Saladin, who had been summoned from
Damascus by carrier pigeon, did not know the extent of his victory and had
assumed it had been a sldrmish. It quickly transpired that Farruk-Shah
had gained a considerable victory and that among the Frankish knights who
had been slain was Humphrey of Toron, a knight with whom Saladin had
crossed paths before during the siege of Alexandria and who, legend tells us,
was so impressed by the valour that Saladin showed during the siege that he
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knighted him. His death, in the words of Runciman, was a terrible blow to
Even the Muslim chroniclers noted the knight's valour: Ibn al-Athir com-
mented that he was 'a man whose name was a proverb for braveiy and skill
in war'. A couple of months later, in June 1179, Saladin gained a second
victory over Baldwin at Marj Uyun, when the Franldsh army was scattered
and Baldwin had to be rescued by one of his sei-vants. Over 270 knights
were paraded before Saladin's tent, among them the Templar Odo, who
refused to be exchanged for an amir who was imprisoned in a Jerusalem jail,
since he was outraged that Saladin should think that a Muslim amir was his
equal. So he was dispatched to a prison in Damascus, where he died one
year later. Baldwin's losses were, however, made good by the arrival of re-
inforcements from Europe, headed by Henry of Champagne.
Two fortuitous but decisive victories had followed each other and
Saladin now took advantage of the Franldsh disarray and turned his atten-
tion to the Bait al-Ahzan fortress and laid siege to it. In the last week of
August 1179 the fortress fell and 700 Franks were taken captive. That day
little mercy was shown; Saladin ordered the killing of all the Templars and
crossbowmen, who were feared by the Muslims and regarded as dangerous
foes. The casde was then destroyed, stone by stone, with Saladin standing
by his men and helping pull the foundation stones with his own hands. But
he would pay a heavy price, for the stench of the dead caused illnesses to
spread, and both his nephew Taqi ul-Din and his cousin Nasr al-Din, son
of Shirkuh, fell ill. Although both recovered, ten of Saladin's amirs fatally
succumbed to the infections and this loss would amount to a greater loss,
in human terms, than Saladin had suffered in batde up to date. Although
the loss of the fortress was a blow to Franldsh morale, no great damage had
been done, and by die winter of 1179 it could be argued that the future of
the Latin Kingdom was looldng more assured than it had done since the
death of King Amalric.^® The reality was that this security was illusory. On
the eve of its greatest trial, the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem stood alone.
A truce was agreed upon and both sides welcomed it. Saladin wanted a
truce to afford him time to turn his attention north to check the threat of
Aleppo and Mosul. In addition the death of the Abbasid caliph al-Mustadi
meant there was no harm in entering a truce, which would enable Saladin
to see the lie of the land in Baghdad. As for Baldwin, his deteriorating
health had led to deep divisions in the Idngdom over who would marry
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Baldwin's sister and thereby inherit the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem. In
addition, a severe drought had gripped Syria for several years and neither
side could afford to fluther damage any grazing land, so both sides agreed
to the truce unconditionally - a truce which was to last two years. William
of Tyre, however, did not fail to pick up a point which others missed; this
was the first instance in which the Franks had been obliged to make a truce
without laying down at least some conditions. In his estimation, the balance
of power had changed.
In June 1180 news reached Saladin of the death of Nur al-Din's nephew
Saif al-Din of Mosul, whose rule over that city had been successful - at least
in the negative sense in that he had not lost more territory to Saladin.^® Saif
al-Din had wanted to leave Mosul to his 12-year-old son Sanjar Shah, but
wise heads dictated that his brother Izz al-Din Masud, whom Saladin had
once defeated easily in battle, succeed him. For Saladin, Saif al-Din's death
meant that the treaty that had been reached after he had defeated the
Mosuli and Aleppan forces had terminated, and he wrote to the caliph
claiming the towns of al-Ruha, Saruj and Harran, which had belonged to
Nur al-Din but which Saif al-Din had taken in 1174. Strategically the three
towns were very important, for if Saladin succeeded in gaining them he
would effectively have cut Mosul off from Aleppo. Baghdad, however,
turned a deaf ear to his appeal. Another death followed that of Saif al-Din,
but this time on a very personal level, for it was while on campaign that
Saladin heard that his brother Turan Shah had died and the news struck him
hard. Turan Shah had not made Saladin's life easy; his dissipation and
frivolity led to debts and political instability, but when Saladin had faced his
greatest danger in Egypt it was Turan Shah who had stood firm by his side.
Imad al-Din recorded that when the news was broken to him, Saladin asked
for books of hadith be brought and to be left alone for the day.
In the meantime the Latin Kingdom was enduring its own internal tor-
ments when, worried about the deteriorating health of the king, Raymond
of Tripoli and Bohemond of Antioch advanced on Jerusalem to force
Baldwin to marry his sister to Baldwin of Ibelin. Baldwin IV quickly coun-
tered their move by arranging that Sibyl marry Guy of Lusignan, thereby
presenting the rebels with a fa-it accompli. The choice of Guy was unpopu-
lar but clearly thought out; Guy came from Poitou, which formed part
of the domains of Henry II of England, who was the only realistic ruler
who could help the Latin Kingdom, since the French king had died in 1180
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leaving a young son - which effectively meant there vi^as no hope of a French
crusade for several years. At the same time Baldwin did not want to alienate
Byzantine support and he dispatched Joscelin of Edessa to Constantinople.
However, Joscelin's arrival in the city coincided with the emperor Manuel's
death. As a result, he remained for the winter while he completed the nego-
tiations with the new government of Alexius II, who was 11 years old, and
his mother Maiy of Antioch, who acted as his regent.
The death of Nur al-Din's son and the struggle
for northern Syria
In December 1181 Saladin was in Cairo when he received the news that
changed the political picture in the most dramatic and unexpected manner:
Nur al-Din's son al-Salih had died in Aleppo. In some ways al-Salih's death
was the most fortunate of the series of timely deaths that marked the course
of Saladin's career.^^ Had al-Salih lived to maturity it is hard to see how
Saladin's career would have flourished. Admittedly Saladin would have
remained powerflil in Egypt, but his whole raison d'Hre of being in Syria
was that he was Nur al-Din's political and spiritual heir - and the simple fact
was that Nur al-Din already had an heir. Had al-Salih lived and demanded
that Saladin hand back Damascus, then it would be difficult to see how he
could have refused, without discrediting the moral platform which he had
so assiduously built, and thereby appearing as the illegitimate usurper that
the Zengids of Aleppo and Mosul claimed he was. But with al-Salih dead
the political map had been dramatically altered, and to the victor lay the
spoils. At once Saladin sent urgent instructions to Farruldr-Shah and Taqi
ul-Din to prevent the Mosuli forces from taking over Aleppo. At the same
time news had reached Jerusalem of al-Salih's death and the Franks also
understood the enormity of what had taken place, and so Baldwin imme-
diately acted to ensure that Aleppo did not fall into Saladin's hands. No
sooner therefore had Farrukh-Shah departed from Damascus, than Reynald
of Chatillon led a cavalry force towards Eilat. Farruldi-Shah had no choice
but to turn back and lead an attack on Trans-Jordan, and the news of
this caused Reynald to turn back. The result was what the Franks desired:
Farruldi-Shah was unable to prevent the Mosulis from taldng peaceful pos-
session of Aleppo. Reynald's attack on Eilat, it should be noted, occurred
while the truce was still in force, but the Franks understood how dangerous
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it would be for them if Aleppo fell to Saladin. In attacking Eilat, and in
brealdng the truce, they were driven by a motivation which was greater than
the desire of keeping the peace with Saladin - and that was the pixserving
the status of Aleppo as independent of Saladin. Amalric had once striven to
capture Egypt from Saladin; now Baldwin strove to ensure that Aleppo did
not fall to him. There can be no doubt that the Franks and the Mosulis were
in close contact, for no sooner had Reynald moved towards Eilat, thereby
distracting Farruldi-Shah, did Saif al-Din of Mosul cross the Euphrates and
reach Aleppo. There he married al-Salih's mother - to further legitimise his
claim - and he emptied the citadel of its armour. He also was quick to make
a rapprochement with the Shiites in the city, restoring their privileges to
them. The question of who would rule Aleppo for him was then resolved
when he met with his brother Imad al-Din of Sinjar and it was agreed that
Imad al-Din would swap Sinjar for Aleppo. In this way the nephews of Nur
al-Din and the house of Zengi had control over Aleppo and Mosul.
Meanwhile Saladin prepared his army. The evening prior to his depar-
ture from Cairo he sat with some companions reciting poetry. The weather
in the late spring was mild and he commented on how delightful the breeze
was which carried the scent of the flowers with it. To this comment one of
those gathered replied at once, without thinking, with a line of poetry:
'Enjoy while you can the perfume of the ox-eyed flowers of Nejd. After
tonight there will be no more flowers.' The words disturbed Saladin, who
took them for an omen. And to an extent they were, for he would never see
Egypt again, the land which he vowed never to return to but which he had
grown to love dearly. In May 1182 Saladin departed from Cairo, taldng
with him half his army and a large number of merchants and traders. When
news reached Jerusalem, Baldwin summoned an assembly to determine the
response. Reynald of Chatillon urged that the army march to Kerak in order
to block the Egy
ptian army, while Raymond of Tripoli was worried that this
would leave the Idngdom unprotected. Raymond's words were, however,
ignored, as it was considered unwise to divide the army. The fact was the
Franks were more concerned about protecting the harvest than engaging
the enemy. Nor was Saladin particularly concerned about fighting at this
stage. At the same time, blowing that the whole Franldsh army was gath-
ered in one place, he took advantage of maldng secondary attacks, which
caused damage to their harvest and laid waste to the cultivated countiyside.
And so he ordered Farrukh-Shah to invade Galilee, much to Raymond's
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consternation, and plunder Prankish land. By the time Saladin reached
Damascus news would have reached him of a coup in Constantinople,
which saw the coming to power of Andronicus Comnenus, who was notori-
ously anti-Latin. Andronicus was well-lcnown in the Latin East, for he had
caused a scandal not once but twice. First, he had seduced the Byzantine
empress's sister, Philippa of Antioch, and had as a result fled to Jerusalem,
where he had been given refuge by Amalric. There however he caused fur-
ther scandal when he eloped with Baldwin Ill's widow, Theodora, and this
time sought refuge in, of all places, Nur al-Din's court. What the austere
Nur al-Din made of this artful lothario is unknown, but Andronicus lived
with the Muslims for many years until he was reconciled with Manuel
and returned to Constantinople. Now he was in power, and Saladin felt
confident he would not come to the Latin Kingdom's aid if it was attacked.
In 1181 the Byzantine emperor Alexius Comnenus had dispatched an
embassy to Cairo and a treaty had been signed. This treaty and another one,
signed by Andronicus and Saladin in June 1185, effectively freed Saladin
from fear of Byzantine attack.
Within days Saladin was on the move again, and he invaded the
Kingdom of Jerusalem without delay. On 13 July a detachment of his army
laid siege to the castie of Baisan in southern Galilee and Baldwin marched
to its relief Although what took place has been termed a battie, it was more
an attempt by the Muslims to force an engagement with the Franks refus-