of Aleppo, than he began to gather his forces. Baldwin's health meanwhile
had deteriorated to the extent where he was confined to bed, though
when news reached him that Saladin had mustered his army to the south
of Damascus, he urgendy summoned all the senior members: Raymond
of Tripoli, Reynald of Chatillon, Baldwin of Ibelin. And of course Guy of
Lusignan, who was the heir apparent, having married Baldwin's sister
and whom Baldwin designated as regent and commander-in-chief, even
though he was deeply unpopular among the barons. Such was the perceived
danger from Saladin that help was called from the Genoese and Pisan
colonies on the coast, who responded by sending troops. Even the pilgrims
were summoned, and all able-bodied men were prepared for combat. On
29 September Saladin crossed the Jordan and attacked Baisan, which he
found deserted. For the next eight days the two armies watched each
other. The Muslims continued to harass and provoke the Christian army
• 157 •
SALADIN
into charging, but Guy kept a tight rein on his forces and they would not
be provoked. The Muslims were limited to archery assaults, while the Franks
kept their cavaliy screened by their infantry in order to protect their horses
from Muslim arrows. Patiently Saladin probed and waited for his opponents
to make a mistake and to charge; Imad al-Din al-Isfahani noted 'everyday we
expected them to charge, rushing into battle as was their custom', but the
Franks stubbornly refused to take the bait and maintained their discipline.
When after a week of sldrmishing Saladin's amirs approached him and told
him that provisions were running low, Saladin ended the campaign.
At first sight it appears that litde that was substantial had occurred, but
in fact a precedent had been set which would have profound and ultimately
disastrous repercussions for the Latin Kingdom. With Baldwin incapacit-
ated, Guy had led the army - the largest army, as William of Tyre noted,
that the Franks had ever gathered — and he had remained on the defensive
and allowed Saladin to devastate the Christian territory with impunity. This
strategy of containment provoked criticism from some of the Franks, who
accused him of cowardice and who insisted that he should have launched
an attack. However, these accusations were driven by jealousy and not
sound military judgement. To his critics, Guy was a handsome but arrogant
fool and a debauchee,^ but the truth was that Guy had acted competentiy.
For the fact was that a huge Muslim army had invaded Christian territory
but had made no territorial gains, while the Franks had suffered no losses.
Guy's problem was that he could not count on the support of the other
lords, who were prepared to see him fail because they feared that any
success would strengthen his position. Admittedly there had been severe
logistic problems which had nearly left the army starving, but on the whole
Guy had conducted a text-book campaign, pursuing a successful defensive
strategy with minimum risk.^ For Guy to win, all he had to do was to remain
disciplined. Even Saladin accepted that the Franks had adopted a successful
military strategy, which he had been unable to break down. And had the
same defensive strategy been adopted four years later, then the devastating
defeat of Hattin would have been avoided.
Having crossed back over the Jordan, Saladin returned to Damascus,
where he instructed al-Adil to leave Egypt and take command of Aleppo,
while he sent Taqi ul-Din to assume his position in Egypt. In the meantime
Baldwin had recovered slightly and returned to Jerusalem, where he dis-
missed Guy as regent and resumed his position in authority. Although Guy
• 158 •
10: S A I L I N G C L O S E T O D I S A S T E R ; S A L A D I N ' S I L L N E S S AT H A R R A N
had been criticised for his military campaign, the dispute between him and
tlie long was unrelated to this matter. No matter, the dismissal and humiliation
of Guy by Baldwin was deliberate and public, and the Idng now installed his
nephew, the young Baldwin V, as heir. Raymond of Tripoli - who was vehe-
mently opposed to Guy - was appointed as regent. The relations between
Guy and Baldwin continued to deteriorate, until Baldwin tried to annul his
sister's marriage to him. Several times Baldwin summoned Guy as his vassal to
attend him in Jerusalem and each time Guy excused himself on the grounds
of ill health. In accordance therefore with Jerusalem custom, the ailing Idng
was carried in his litter to Ascalon to ask for Guy's attendance,^ only to find
the city gates closed against him. Baldwin was forced to be carried to the
gates himself and Icnock and demand admission, but Guy defied him and the
gates remained bolted. A furious Baldwin now sought to dispossess Guy,
since such a public defiance could not be tolerated, but it appears he took
no further action and Guy remained undisturbed in his possession of Ascalon.
At the end of October 1183, Saladin left Damascus. This time his desti-
nation was Kerak, for it was there that the wedding of Humphrey IV of
Toron and Baldwin IV's half-sister was being held. Saladin was certainly
aware of this, and his attack on the stronghold of Kerak was planned to
coincide with the festivities. Together with Shaubak, which lay about
100 Idlometres (60 miles) to the south, Kerak - the stronghold of Reynald
of Chatillon - made the crossing between Syria and Egypt hazardous unless
accompanied by a strong military escort. Soon Saladin had surrounded
the castle and seven mangonels kept up a day and night bombardment.
Surreally, inside the castle a wedding was taking place, and the castle was
full of minstrels and actors. The story goes that Humphrey of Toron's
mother sent out food from the wedding banquet to Saladin. Not to be out-
done in gallantry, Saladin asked where in the castle the wedding was taldng
place and then gave strict instructions that it should not be bombarded
so that the newly married couple would not be disturbed. In fact Saladin
did not press home his advantage and soon called off the siege. In any
case he was at Kerak for another reason, for he was waiting for a caravan
from Egypt led by al-Adil, who was on his way to assume his responsibil-
ities in Aleppo. However, Baldwin, who was too ill to ride and was carried
on a litter, immediately led his army from Jerusalem to relieve Kerak. By
then, however, Saladin had retreated to Damascus, which he reached in
December 1183.
• 159 •
SALADIN
By the spring of 1184 Saladin was once again on the offensive, and for
the first time we begin to see the benefits of his endless campaigning in the
north, for he was joined by the forces of Aleppo under al-Adil and also by
the Egyptian army under the command of Taqi ul-Din. He was also joined
by amirs from the east of the Euphrates, most notably another brother
of Izz al-Din of Mosul. Not to be outdone, Mardin and Sinjar also sent
forces. Saladin was clearly not in a hurry and it was not until the beginning
of July that he reached Franldsh territory, where he ravaged territory
until
the army finally gathered at Kerak in the middle of August 1184. Nine man-
gonels were ranged against the walls of the casde and they caused immense
damage. When news reached Jerusalem, an army was gathered and the
Idng, unable to ride, was carried in a litter. The approach of the Franks
forced Saladin to fift the siege of Kerak, and he then moved 65 kilometres
(40 miles) north to Hisban, where he had a commanding position to
block any Frankish advance. He then waited to see if the Franks were pre-
pared to engage him in batde, but when they showed no sign of doing
so, and knowing that all their forces were at Kerak, he knew that he could
plunder the Franldsh lands unchallenged. Nablus, Jenin and Sebastea were
raided in quick succession, with booty and prisoners being taken. Soon
aft:er, in mid-September 1184, Saladin returned to Damascus and dis-
banded his army.
t h e death of Baldwin IV
By the beginning of 1185 it was clear that Baldwin IV was dying. The suc-
cession had been arranged, for his nephew Baldwin V - laiown affection-
ately as Baudouinette - had been anointed co-king in the same year. On the
day he died, Baldwin IV gathered his vassals for the last time to bid them
adieu. By now, the illness had taken its terrible toll and he had become
blind, deformed and crippled. He was just 23 years old and had ruled for
11 years. On 16 May 1185, after enduring unimaginable pain, Baldwin IV
died, and was buried near his father in the chapel of the Latin Kings in the
Church of the Holy Sepulchre at the foot of Mount Calvary, the most holy
place of Christendom, which he had striven to defend throughout his
reign.'' Despite his terrible illness, Baldwin had conducted himself with
tremendous fortitude, and as long as he had lived he had kept Saladin in
check. Every Muslim attack had been met by a Christian army, and under
• 160 •
10: S A I L I N G C L O S E T O D I S A S T E R ; S A L A D I N ' S ILLNESS AT H A R R A N
his leadership the Franks had frustrated Saladin's attempts to encircle them.
Not only at the scene of his great victory at Mont Gisard but throughout
his brief and pain-ridden reign, Baldwin had proved himself to be a match
for the great Saladin. The regent chosen for the young Baldwin V was
Baymond of Tripoli, who at once sent a message to Saladin requesting a
truce. Somewhat surprisingly Saladin agreed, for he was anxious to cross the
Euphrates, where Izz al-Din of Mosul was up to his old tricks and had allied
with al-Pahlawan of Azerbaijan and the Shah Arman of Akhlat and was
threatening his recendy gained lands. In 1182 Saladin had crossed the
Euphrates without bothering with a truce, but this time caution prevailed
and a general truce was arranged. One of the reasons for his caution was that
he was aware that the patriarch Heraclius - a cleric who openly paraded his
mistress, laiown as the patriarchess® - had been sent from Jerusalem to the
West, urgendy seeking military help. In the spring of 1185 Saladin left
Damascus on a campaign expected to last a few weeks; he did not return
undl May 1186, during which time his life reached its nadir.
As mentioned above, a new embassy left Jerusalem to implore aid from
Europe. The envoys were of the highest order; apart from the patriarch
Heraclius of Jerusalem, the embassy also contained the masters of the
Templars and Hospitallers. The embassy travelled first to the Pope and then
on to France, where they offered Philip Augustus the keys of the city of
Jerusalem and the Holy Sepulchre. Philip quicldy refused this offer, and as
soon as was diplomatically possible shipped them to England. Often por-
trayed as a figure of mockery, openly flaunting his mistress, Heraclius came
to England displaying much gold and silver and heavily perfumed - to the
English not signs of austerity. But he was not a fool. As soon as he landed
he performed the pilgrimage to the tomb of Thomas Becket. This was a
deliberate gesture meant to embarrass Henry, for 13 years had passed since
Becket's murder and what had Henry done for Jerusalem to atone for his
sins? Even in his opulent adornment Heraclius had a deliberate message.
Over the years Henry made very large payments to the Latin Kingdom
but it seems he did not permit anyone to spend it. Indeed he reserved
the right to recall all his money from the East at any time. By 1187 his
Eastern account was said to have reached 30,000 marks of silver. He kept
promising a crusade, he kept sending money, but it remained frozen - for
Henry's parsimony was as notorious as Saladin's generosity. By 1182, when
Henry made his will at Waltham, his Eastern account had grown to such a
• 161 •
SALADIN
magnitude that measures had to be taken to ensure its proper management.
In that sense Heraclius' adornment was calculated: 'We want a prince not
money', he railed, when his patience at Henry's prevarications finally
snapped. 'From everywhere we receive money, but no prince.' The failure
of Heraclius' mission came as a big blow to Jerusalem, but it had one salu-
tary effect: it had been final proof that Henry was not going to take up the
Cross. But what of the immense wealth which he had accumulated in
Jerusalem? And what was to be done with it?
In the meantime Saladin had crossed the Euphrates in another attempt to
subdue Mosul. He was initially encouraged by the death of the Shah Arman,
but as long as Mosul resisted and received support from al-Pahlawan of
Azerbaijan, Saladin was unable to break the stalemate. It was during this
period when we detect visible signs of a distancing between al-Qadi al-Fadil
and Saladin. It was clear that al-Qadi al-Fadil did not approve of Saladin
returning to besiege Mosul - he had once written to him praising the waters
of the Nile to that of the Euphrates, but Saladin had chosen to ignore his
words. In al-Qadi al-Fadil's mind, Saladin had allowed himself to become
distracted and had lost sight of the holy war. In one letter he wrote crypti-
cally to Imad al-Din al-Isfahani, 'There remains what I have not indicated
and what I cannot mention of the fact that the means fall short of the
desired end'. From Egypt he warned Saladin not to pester the caliph with
letters and appeals: 'The water in the spring must be allowed to fill up' - a
sign of his frustration and growing disillusionment. When he wrote saying
that he intended to go on pilgrimage and received a reply discouraging him,
he had even contemplated resigning and leaving Saladin's service. What
could have brought on al-Qadi al-Fadil's extraordinary decision? For over
15 years he had stood by Saladin and served him to the point where he had
become perhaps the second most important man in the land. 'I have not
conquered the lands with my sword, but with al-Qadi al-Fadil's pen',
Saladin had repeated on several occasions, and he listened carefiilly to al-
Qadi al-Fadil's advice not just on political and administrative matters but
on military ones as well. And yet disenchantment had set in on al-Qadi al-
Fadil's part and there can be no doub
t that Saladin's adventure in Mosul
was the cause.
• 162 •
10: S A I L I N G C L O S E T O DISASTER: S A L A D I N ' S I L L N E S S AT H A R R A N
What exactly was Saladin doing in Mosul? Even those closest to him
were uncertain. He himself continued to insist, in letters to the caliph, that
he needed the troops of Mosul in order to fight the holy war, but his words
did not convince. Personal and dynastic ambitions were certainly at play;
Saladin was carving out an empire for himself and for his family. His ter-
ritories already exceeded those conquered by Nur al-Din, and who Icnew
what lay behind Mosul - Georgia, Constantinople, Anatolia, even Baghdad?
At the same time he may have felt more comfortable in the confines of
Mosul; he was; after all, Kurdish and not Syrian or Egyptian. It is interest-
ing to note that the two men who insisted he pursue his ambitions towards
Mosul were Isa al-Hakkari and al-Mashtub, both of whom were Kurds from
the nearby Haldcari region. We simply do not know what was in Saladin's
mind, but we can be certain that for Saladin personal and family ambition
co-existed with moral and religious goals. In Egypt he had endeavoured to
establish the foundations of the Sunni Revival with great sincerity, and in
doing so had proven that he was a man of his age. Now, to the frustration
of the ulama, his ambitions east of the Euphrates were confirming that he
truly was a man of his age.
Saladin's illness
Then on 3 December 1185 Saladin fell ill and withdrew to Harran. As a
result the siege of Mosul had to be lifiied and his army disbanded. At first,
al-Qadi al-Fadil did not appreciate the seriousness of the matter and made
an excuse not to travel to see Saladin. But rapidly it became clear that the
illness was grave and shortly after there came a time when Saladin's life hung
in the balance. Al-Qadi al-Fadil now wrote urgently to Imad al-Din al-
Isfahani to move Saladin to Aleppo as soon as possible, for he feared the
unrest that would follow if he were to die. In January 1186 Saladin's wife,
Ismat al-Din, died and strict instructions were given to keep the news away
from him. Urgently physicians were despatched to Harran, but by February