his grip on Syria. A more aggressive policy needed to be adopted to tiy to
break him urgently before it was too late. The key remained Egypt, which
the Franks recognised as the hub of Saladin's p o w e r s o in pursuance of his
father's policy Baldwin planned a full-scale attack. Indeed one of Baldwin's
first acts was to renew the grant of land in Egypt to the Knights of
St John and promise their master Jobert an additional 30,000 bezants of
revenue for his support. Any assault on Egypt naturally required naval
support, and for that Baldwin turned to the Byzantines. He dispatched
Reynald to Constantinople, where it was agreed on a joint attack. In return
the Byzantine protectorate over the Latin Kingdom would be recognised
and the orthodox patriarch of Jerusalem would be restored. The emperor
Manuel was particularly receptive to the Franks' approach, as he sought to
avenge the calamitous defeat at the hands of Kilij Arslan at Miriokephalon,
a battie in which Reynald's son had been among those Idlled. In addition,
part of Manuel's interest in Egypt was his desire to prevent the Sicilians
gaining a foothold there and so controlling the Egyptian ports - and
thereby offering attractive terms to Italian merchants.
It was during this period that the appeals of the Franks to Western
Europe appeared to have produced a result, with the arrival of Philip of
Flanders to the Holy Land. The son of Count Thierry and Sybilla of
Anjou, Philip came from an excellent crusading pedigree, for his father had
gone on four crusades and his mother was the daughter of King Fulk of
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Jerusalem. So it was natural that hopes were raised that the arrival of
Philip would lead to a new burst of campaigning. The reception that Philip
received must have surprised him; he had set out on crusade in the expec-
tation of undertaldng some military operation which would make the
Christian position more secure and increase his own prestige. Instead, he
found himself greeted as the solution to the Idngdom's problems.' Despite
his illness, Baldwin, carried in a litter, travelled to greet his cousin and
offered Philip the regency. Philip, however, turned down the offer, as the
situation in Flanders did not allow him to absent himself for a lengthy time.
He then made it clear that he was prepared to lead an attack on Egypt, but
was not prepared to take the blame if it went wrong or, in the case of a suc-
cessful campaign, to hand over the conquests to Jerusalem and Byzantium
before returning home.^ Searching for excuses for not joining the campaign,
he first argued that the autumn season made the Nile floods a perilous
time to invade Egypt, then declared his intention to join in any campaign
elsewhere, though clearly the Byzantine fleet was redundant anywhere else.
Philip's prevarication put the Franks in an awlcward position, since they felt
obliged to honour the agreement with Constantinople. Yet when they
declared their intention to embark on the campaign without Philip, he
refused to accept this since it would be a taint on his honour to remain in
Jerusalem in winter while the army attacked Egypt. He himself only had a
small army and he needed support from the local Franks to engage in any
campaign. The problem was that if any of those local Franks participated
with him, they would have been unable to join in the Egypt expedition.
With frustration mounting on both sides, the Byzantines broke off negoti-
ations and returned to Constantinople while the sea-lanes were still open
before winter set in. Wlien pressed for the purpose of his visit, Philip finally
admitted that it was not war that was on his mind but marriage; to be
precise the marriage of his two cousins, for whom he sought suitable
suitors. This admission provoked an angry reaction: 'We thought you had
come to fight for the Cross' cried Baldwin of Ibelin. 'Instead you talk of
marriages.'
Eventually, in late summer 1177 when the opportunity to attack Egypt
had passed, Philip departed to campaign in northern Syria and marched
with Raymond on the city of Hama. The delays had paralysed any attack
on Egypt and the Franks failed to seize the best opportunity they were ever
to have of breaking Saladin's power.® Although success was by no means
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guaranteed, there is no doubt that the combination of the Byzantine fleet,
the crusader states and Philip of Flanders' army would have caused Saladin
serious concerns in Egypt and would, at the very least, have prevented him
from acting in Syria while Egypt was threatened. Certainly it would have
alleviated the pressure on Aleppo. What in fact occurred was that Byzantium
was alienated and Saladin strengthened without having to fight. Philip's
crusade to the Holy Land also gives us an opportunity to remark at how dif-
ferent the Christians from Europe had become from those who lived in the
Holy Land. Those crusaders who continued to travel to Outremer, the crusader
states, in the twelfth century found in the east a people whom they barely
recognised. Admittedly they spoke the same language but they barely even
shared the same culture any more. For example, when Usama Ibn Munqidh
was invited to eat at a Christian house, his host reassured him that no pork
was ever served at his table. Another incident with Usama reveals the extent
of the difference: 'When I was in Jerusalem', he wrote, 'I used to go to the
al-Aqsa mosque . . . which was in the hands of the Templars who were
friends of mine.' Usama continues to say that the Templars would arrange
for him to do his prayers in a corner. 'One day I had gone in, said the Allahu
Alcbar and risen to begin my prayers, when a Frank threw himself at me from
behind, lifted me up so that I was facing east. "That's the way to pray!" he insisted.' Some Templars then intervened and took the man away and Usama
resumed his prayers, only for the man to reappear and to force Usama to
tlirn east again. Again the Templars took him away and apologised to
Usama, and their words show us how different they had become from those
who travelled from Europe: 'He is a foreigner who has just arrived today'.
Over 80 years had passed since Jerusalem had become Christian and the
generations which followed were not born in Europe. Most spoke Arabic
and for them the defence of Jerusalem was less a defence of a holy city and
more a defence of the only land which they had known - a situation not dis-
similar to that of the pieds noirs'm 1950s Algeria. By the second generation.
Christians from the West were foreigners, and not just to the Muslims.
Saladin's defeat at Mont Gisard
Saladin must have been forewarned about a possible attack on Egypt, for
he spent most of the winter of 1176 strengthening the fortifications of
Alexandria and Damietta. It is hard to know how he interpreted the actions
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of Philip, but clearly he must have been amazed by what seemed to be his
good fortune. Not only had the joint attack on Egypt been scuppered by
squabbl
ing, but he now discovered that a considerable number of the
Franldsh knights had gone with Philip to attack Hama, leaving the road to
Jerusalem open. At once he began to move his forces. The news greatly
alarmed the young Baldwin, who had no military experience. Normally he
would have relied on Humphrey of Toron, but he was gravely ill and indis-
posed, and as Baldwin marched to Ascalon to confront Saladin, accompa-
nied by the Bishop of Bethlehem who carried the Holy Cross, the situation
was so desperate that he issued the arriere ban, which obliged all able-
bodied men to serve. This was seldom invoked and only in the most critical
of circumstances.® Although he drew up his troops outside Ascalon, Baldwin
was advised not to engage Saladin. Consequently, after some sldrmishing,
he retreated within the shelter of the city walls. It was at this point that
Saladin made a serious error of judgement and allowed his troops to go off
plundering, for he did not think his main force would be seriously threat-
ened. But he had not accounted for tlie bravery of Baldwin - who was no
more than 15 years old. With the 'courage of despair','' the king marched
out of Ascalon, where he was joined by some Templars, and attacked
Saladin's forces at 'Mont Gisard' - probably Tell Gezer, which is about
40 kilometres (25 miles) from Ascalon. Saladin was caught unawares; his
troops, who had scattered, were even without weapons or armour. The
Muslim army tried to rally and Taqi ul-Din disdnguished himself that day
with his bravery. Taqi ul-Din's son, Ahmed, also fought bravely and charged
the Franks. He was then sent back on a second charge by his father, where
he was slain. As the fighting raged, the Franks pushed the Muslims back
until they scattered and were defeated. Saladin's own life was in danger, and
he had to be rescued by his guards when three Prankish horsemen charged
at him. He now retreated in short stages, hoping to rally his fleeing army,
and was relieved to hear that Baldwin was content with his victory and had
returned to Ascalon. For the next ten days Saladin found himself without
provisions and enduring a fraught retreat under the most inclement
weather, for the rain and cold did not cease. Upon reaching the desert his
army had to overcome the problem of a lack of water and the death of their
overworked horses. It was thanks to al-Qadi al-Fadil, who hired Bedouins
and himself went into the desert to find Saladin, that a safe return to Cairo
was negotiated. Others were less fortunate, for the Bedouin betrayed Isa
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al-Hakkari and his brother to the Franks, and the two were taken prisoners.
When the kingdom seemed about to be lost, the courage of the young leper
Idng had resulted in a great victory.
It was after his return from the defeat of Mont Gisard that Saladin went
to pay humble homage to al-Khabushani. However, spiritual matters had to
take second place, for the priority for Saladin was to re-equip his army and
to do so with utmost haste. At this stage a few words need to be said about
the Muslim armies. A basic factor in the military history of Syria during this
period was that any campaign that aimed at expelling the Franks was an
ambitious undertaldng, requiring a large composite army.® For routine
duties or limited raids a standing force (askar) of slaves and freedmen was
sufficient; but any ambitious campaign demanded the participation of the
provincial governors with their contingents. In addition, warfare was sea-
sonal. Once the winter rains had set in, the ground became unsuitable for
movement, and the winter months afforded the amirs an opportunity to
return to their lands. For these reasons armies that were large enough to
threaten the existence of the Latin states never remained in the field for
more than a campaign season and this was a factor of which the Franks were
obviously aware. There was no pressure on them to engage the enemy, so
for them a successftil campaign was one in which they avoided anything
more than sldrmishes until the Muslim forces broke up. A third factor
weighing heavily on a commander's mind was his men's desire for plunder.
Noble appeals to fight the holy war may have attracted some, but the
prospect of booty was the more powerfial inducement. Saladin was defeated
at Mont Gisard precisely because his forces, attracted by the loot, lost any
cohesion. To bring together the disparate elements that formed a Muslim
army and to keep them in the field required a commander of exceptional
ability and unlimited patience. To the limitations mentioned above a
dilemma and paradox need to be added. The dilemma was that the defeat
of the Franks demanded a force larger than the one Syria could provide.
Saladin Icnew that the forces of Egypt and Damascus were in themselves not
enough to obtain victory; the manpower of Aleppo and Mesopotamia
needed to be added. The paradox was that the larger the army, the greater
the limitations. The more the number of amirs, the greater the chance of
disputes; the fiarther they had to travel meant the sooner they had to leave
to be home for winter; and the larger the number of fighters, the less the
proportion of booty.
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Nevertheless the speed with which Saladin re-equipped his army - by
Franks. Baldwin's victory at Mont Gisard had been decisive but it had also
been the exception. The Franks understood that the Muslims could never
be defeated completely and they appreciated that the rewards of victory
were not a sufficient inducement to risk a defeat that would be calamitous.
The Muslims, in short, could afford to suffer many defeats, but the Franks
Icnew that batdes were simply not worth fighting, for the consequences of
defeat could be immense.' Battle was best avoided, and for that to happen
the army needed to be disciplined and ignore provocations such as feigned
retreats, and attacks on flanks and rear. Above all the success of the Christian
army depended upon effective co-operation between cavalry and infantry.
It was incumbent on the infantry to maintain a human fortress from which
the cavalry could launch charges and into which the cavalry could then
withdraw.'® Failure to maintain discipline and protect the cavalry could
lead to disastrous consequences. As long as the Franks remained disciplined
and maintained a passive solidity,'' the Muslim armies could achieve litde
success, for the array of contingents which had been brought together
for the spring and summer campaigns dispersed with the winter months.
This was the cardinal lesson of warfare and it was one that the Franks could
not afford to forget. Saladin of course knew this, and he also Icnew that the
Franks needed their whole military strength to face his main army, so he
took advantage by launching other raids to cause damage in territories that
they were unable to defend. The aim of these attacks was always to destroy
food crops and the harvest, since Saladin was well aware that the Franks
regarded such activity as a prime cause of their own poverty and consequent
inability to organise sufficient military resistance.'
Philip of Flander's siege of Hama had been lifted when the Kurd al-
Mashtub, who had once vied for the vizierate of Egypt, had come to its
rescue, but in the meantime Saladin's uncle Shihab al-Din had passed away.
Philip and his forces then moved to besiege the castle of Harim, which lay
60 kilometres (37 miles) west of Aleppo and only 30 Idlometres (18 miles)
east of Antioch. The castie had been captured by Nur al-Din and its recap-
ture would prove to be a great boost to Antioch. Given its proximity to
Antioch, Harim should have fallen, but it resisted and the siege dragged on
through the winter. Saladin's move at the head of his reassembled army into
Syria altered the picture, for neither the Aleppans nor the Franks wanted
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SALADIN
him to seize Harim for himself, and consequently terms were arranged
by al-Salih in Aleppo and the Franks were bought off. Philip of Flanders
then visited Jerusalem as a pilgrim, before sailing back to Europe. He had
achieved nothing and his crusade was an anti-climax. But one cannot doubt
his sincerity, for he had brought an army to the Holy Land at great finan-
cial cost and in the laiowledge that he was neglecting his affairs at home.
Nor can one doubt his courage, for he returned to Palestine as part of the
Third Crusade, where he died during the siege of Acre.
Saladin arrived in Damascus from Egypt to discover rumblings of dis-
content over the conduct of Turan Shah, whom he had left as his deputy.
Turan Shah had proven to be an incompetent administrator and a spend-
thrift, and Saladin had no option but to remove him. Turan Shah was
the kind of soldier who came alive and stood firm in the heat of batde, but
in times of peace became dissolute and dissipated and he now exacerbated
Saladin's problems by insisting that he be given Baalbek, for he was not, in
the words of Humphreys, to accept docilely such an insult from his younger
brother. Saladin apparentiy felt unable to oppose him without a serious
conflict.^' The problem was that Baalbek was already in the hands of none
other than Ibn al-Muqaddam, the man who had served Nur al-Din loyally