The peace enabled haudenosaunee refugees to return home from over-
crowded camps around niagara, but their dispersal revived old geographic
and political divisions. While other senecas founded a major new commu-
nity at Buffalo creek, and kept close ties to the British, the people of corn-
planter and guyasuta returned to the upper allegheny and cultivated
american patrons at pittsburgh. cornplanter quickly gained credibility
among army officers and prominent colonists. When he visited Fort pitt,
leading citizens fed his delegation at their own expense, signaling eagerness
to befriend their erstwhile enemies. in 1786, when the senecas faced dire
food shortages, Fort pitt’s commander readily supplied them, deeming “it for
the interest of the United states not to send them away empty.” When heart
received orders to build a new fort at Venango, 150 miles upstream, he ini-
tial y planned to travel secretly, but wiser men persuaded him he could suc-
ceed only with seneca aid.35
The soldiers’ arrival at French creek deepened this mutual reliance. The
senecas provided the garrison with guides, venison, and information, and in
turn they looked to their new neighbors for grain and medical care. When
smal pox struck the senecas and other Ohio indian towns, the uninfected
fled for safety and the sick turned to heart, who deemed that “humanity
compel s me to give them some assistance,” even at the risk of infecting his
own men. The following winter, when a six- foot snowfall kept the senecas
from their usual hunting territory, they instead hunted near heart’s fort,
where they knew they could find support. heart also recommended— likely
at cornplanter’s urging— that connecticut grant indians large tracts for
hunting and town building in the state’s new western reserve. he also sharply
condemned the likes of Benjamin logan for “continual y killing & plunder-
ing” their indian neighbors. heart’s tact and benevolence won him praise.
his superior, Josiah harmar, boasted that “no officer . . . manages the indians
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167
better.” in 1789, when heart was reassigned elsewhere, some senecas worried
that his departure heralded war.36
But however much heart despised Virginian thuggery and promoted in-
tercultural cooperation, his own ambitions— like those of Butler, clark, har-
mar, and countless others— hinged on indian dispossession. he privately
hoped to become a “proprietor in lands,” but his poverty forced him to do so
through patronage: cultivating well- placed sponsors, aiding them with his
knowledge and services, and exploiting their favor to gain legal title. heart
drew exceptional y accurate maps, and during his military service he had
learned a great deal about the region’s resources. in 1786, for example, he and
his men escorted the first official surveyors west of the Ohio. he promptly
offered to share the knowledge he had gained with his “Friends.” soon after
arriving at French creek, he boasted that he had “sufficient influence with
the indians here to procure some very trusty young men” to help such friends
locate desirable tracts. if they lobbied for favorable land policies, he hinted,
his expertise and connections could make them rich. he relied in particular
on congressional treaty commissioner samuel parsons, a fellow connecticut
native and continental army veteran, who eagerly accepted heart’s sugges-
tions. late in 1789, the two undertook a canoe journey from pittsburgh
toward lake erie, aiming to find desirable land, identify the best water routes,
and negotiate with nearby indians. On the return trip parsons capsized and
drowned in the Beaver river. Bereft of his patron, heart spent the following
months hawking the information they had gleaned, while completing sur-
veys for several other well- placed new englanders.37
in guiding heart and his men to Venango, and supporting the fort they
built there, guyasuta and cornplanter inserted themselves into this patron-
age network, with ties to army officers, pittsburgh merchants, members of
congress, and an array of eastern speculators. These coalition partners
shared a common preoccupation: getting a step ahead in the coming Ohio
land rush. here the senecas saw an opportunity, just as guyasuta had in 1770
when he re- befriended the land- hungry Washington. speculators like heart
and parsons eagerly sought native allies to share their expertise and bolster
their claims. By col aborating with such patrons, the senecas pursued
decades- long objectives: physical security, beneficial terms of trade, and rec-
ognition of their nation’s sovereignty. after watching their homes and crops
burn in 1779, and enduring years of deprivation at niagara, such goals seemed
worth the sacrifice of land.
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having gambled their future on the patronage of the United states, corn-
planter and his people could ill afford to retaliate for american abuses. Their
patrons in congress and the army offered them little protection against
nearby colonists, who repeatedly insulted, robbed, and even killed them. nor
were they protected against deceitful intermediaries. in negotiations with
veteran diplomats John gibson and richard Butler, cornplanter agreed to
sell pennsylvania a triangle of land along lake erie. in exchange, the senecas
reserved half the lake chautauqua fishery, as well as hunting and fishing
rights throughout the ceded territory, and were promised “one thousand dol-
lars in fine prime goods,” to be distributed in pittsburgh. The senecas under-
took a grueling midwinter journey, enduring colonial attacks and thievery as
well as the cold, only to receive one hundred blankets that “were all moth
eaton and good fornot’g.” cornplanter accused gibson of fraud and de-
manded compensation. some pittsburghers supported their claim, but penn-
sylvania ignored it. in late 1790, cornplanter led a seneca delegation to
philadelphia and won limited concessions. Though both federal and state
governments refused to reconsider their legal y dubious land grabs, pennsyl-
vania now compensated the senecas for earlier stolen payments and reserved
a tract of land on the allegheny to cornplanter personal y. cornplanter also
won a generous annual pension, as well as federal promises to protect re-
maining haudenosaunee lands against state governments and speculators.
These terms fell far short of satisfying his nation’s demands, but they seemed
more promising than renewed hostilities. soon after, senecas sent eighty
young men to support U.s. forces, supplied intelligence to american com-
manders, and urged other western nations to avoid war.38
as cornplanter haggled, congress rushed to survey and sell land north of
the Ohio. it delegated the task to the geographer Thomas hutchins, who
pressed ahead despite threats of indian attack and spotty military support.
like heart, hutchins lacked personal wealth but sought to leverage his
knowledge to win the friendship and assistance of more prosperous inves-
tors. as his men drew a rectangular grid over eastern Ohio, congres
s hur-
riedly sold large tracts to private land companies, which established new
colonies at the mouths of the muskingum and miami rivers. in January 1789,
arthur st. clair, the territory’s newly appointed governor, held a council with
nearly six hundred western indians, hoping to reconcile them to a colonial
project already well under way. like his predecessors, st. clair flatly refused
to negotiate. pipe and others signed the treaty, but many others refused or
declined to attend at al .39
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169
meanwhile, the philadelphia convention drafted a new constitution, cre-
ating a stronger federal government with authority to levy taxes, maintain an
army, and manage relations with “the indian tribes.” a few months after st.
clair’s inconclusive treaty, Washington became the first president of the
United states. he and other american officials hoped that the new system
would enable them to more efficiently sell lands, negotiate with spain, and
strengthen federal authority over colonists and indians. pennsylvania soon
adopted a new constitution of its own, similarly centralizing power in the
hands of a governor, strengthening state courts, and weakening the legisla-
ture. in 1792, the Kentucky gentry effected an amicable separation from Vir-
ginia, consolidating their control over the region’s rapidly growing population.
at the same time, a wave of bankruptcies deepened economic inequality,
driving many into tenancy or wage labor. neighbors sometimes banded to-
gether to defend property from confiscation, but policy changes, and the new
state and federal constitutions, systematical y undercut local independence.
These changes weakened western colonists’ ability to resist state demands,
but they did not submit quietly. in 1791, congress enacted an excise tax on
whiskey that fell disproportionately on the Ohio Valley’s small- scale distill-
ers, threatening the livelihood of countless farmers. not surprisingly, when
federal tax collectors appeared, colonists greeted them with harassment, defi-
ance, and sometimes tar and feathers.40
as americans surveyed and colonized, a multiethnic town cluster known
as “the glaize” became a center of anticolonial organizing. as in the past,
militants drew on both widespread resentment of colonization and a long
tradition of nativist spirituality, but their appeal still hinged on hopes for
British support. Veteran intermediaries like Joseph Brant and alexander
mcKee— both of whom now received British salaries— urged indians to defy
congress’s territorial demands and called on imperial officials to support
them. The officials waffled but repeatedly handed out weapons and supplies
at the great lakes forts of niagara, detroit, and michilimackinac. in 1790,
the growing militant alliance turned back an american expedition sent to
level their towns. The following year, st. clair led a still larger army into Ohio.
his superiors, anxious to expedite land sales, forced him to take the field late
in the season, poorly supplied, with a force largely comprising untrained mi-
litia. The americans’ slow progress enabled the western alliance— led by lit-
tle turtle (miami), Blue Jacket (shawnee), Buckongahelas (delaware), and
others— to gather a large multiethnic army and plan a daring and well-
organized attack. in the wee hours of 4 november, the warriors routed the
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militia, overwhelmed and disabled the american artillery, and descended on
the army’s main camp. after a short fight, st. clair and his men fled in disar-
ray, echoing the 1755 rout of Braddock’s army on the monongahela. more
than six hundred soldiers and camp followers died, including Butler and
heart. The allies wounded or captured hundreds more. american indian
peoples have never inflicted a bloodier defeat upon the forces of the United
states.41
The overwhelming victory gave nonalliance members such as corn-
planter new leverage to win diplomatic concessions. anxious to avoid mak-
ing new enemies, federal officials now hastened to address haudenosaunee
grievances. in the spring of 1792, 160 senecas sheltered at the Venango fort,
receiving daily allowances of “bread & meat” while awaiting a shipment of
federal goods. The commandant fed them without authorization, reasoning
that doing so was good “policy.” army officers just as eagerly acceded to
cornplanter’s requests for european- style agricultural equipment, and men
to teach the senecas how to use it, as well as instruction in how to read and
write english. Then, in 1794, cornplanter and other haudenosaunee leaders
won unprecedented concessions at the treaty of canandaigua. The United
states’ chief negotiator, timothy pickering, refused to return the erie trian-
gle, but he recognized seneca claims to several major tracts along the niagara
river and the eastern end of lake erie, which the United states had bought
in the disputed 1784 treaty of Fort stanwix. This concession ensured the sur-
vival of seneca communities at cattaraugus and Buffalo creek.42
meanwhile, the Washington administration seized the west. a new com-
mander, anthony Wayne, led a larger, better- trained, and more regularly
supplied army into Ohio, building a series of forts from the miami to the
allies’ attacks. as they occupied ever more territory, and destroyed maumee
Valley towns and crops, the alliance began to splinter. Blue Jacket, with a di-
minished force, tried to halt the american advance at a place called Fallen
timbers, near the mouth of the maumee river, but Wayne’s disciplined
troops repelled the assault. Then, critical y, a British outpost on the maumee
refused to aid or open its doors to the retreating warriors. Facing no more
large- scale resistance, the americans torched the glaize. a new treaty with
Britain soon transferred the great lakes forts to the United states, just as a
treaty with spain promised the opening of the mississippi to american com-
merce. meanwhile, Washington dispatched a large army into western penn-
sylvania to crush the movement that his supporters derisively dubbed the
Failures, 1783–95
171
“whiskey rebellion.” The following year, Wayne concluded the treaty of
greenville with representatives of the western nations, including Buckonga-
helas, Blue Jacket, little turtle, and other erstwhile alliance leaders. With no
more hope of British support, they “acknowledge[d] themselves to be under
the protection of the said United states.”43
together, the events of 1794– 95 cemented the sovereignty claims of the
United states and, with them, systems of local government that fit federal
specifications. colonists southeast of the Ohio reconciled themselves to the
limited sovereignty of pennsylvania, Virginia, and Kentucky within the new
union. Those northwest of the river became subject to a federal y appointed
territorial government, with the promise of eventual statehood. For indians,
the treaties of canandaigua and greenville, among others, affirmed ind
ian
self- rule and promised to protect what remained of indian lands, just as Ohio
indians had demanded for decades. But the United states recognized that
sovereignty only in the form of ethnic nations— rejecting both long- standing
traditions of local autonomy and more recent pursuits of multiethnic
confederation— and acknowledged only indian leaders who acceded to fed-
eral supremacy. This new political framework, in which a federal union pre-
sided over limited sovereignties called “states,” “territories,” and “tribes,”
paved the way for future waves of dispossession and colonization. in 1797,
federal and state officials connived with new york speculators to seize the
bulk of the territory guaranteed to the six nations just three years before. On
the allegheny river, senecas retained less than 27,000 acres in new york, as
well as cornplanter’s tract in pennsylvania. in the twentieth century, when
the U.s. army corps of engineers built Kinzua dam, one- third of that land
sank beneath the rising waters.44
at first glance, the forceful imposition of federal authority stabilized the re-
gion. Where indians and colonists had once slaughtered one another, United
states officials could now preside over a process they called “settlement”: a
reassuring term that seemed to promise peace, order, and stability. to be
sure, “settlement” entailed dispossessing native peoples, but the new treaty
system aimed to do so with less bloodshed, and thus more cheaply. to twenty-
first- century eyes, the unruly frontier began to look more like part of a mod-
ern state. But the narrative of ungoverned mayhem yielding to state- managed
order turns historical causation on its head. rather than lawless impulse, col-
onization and bloodshed sprang from government initiatives, often depend-
ing directly on government- supplied resources. a tenuous postwar peace
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col apsed largely because of congress’s unwavering territorial demands. even
after the bloody raids of 1786, Ohio indians and Kentuckians continued to
pursue informal diplomacy to restore lost captives, an imperative that con-