kee war party brought thirteen scalps and four female prisoners to Wakatom-
ica. eighteen months before, Wolf had released his captured Virginian land
hunter at the same town. now, the townspeople ritual y tortured and killed
two of the captives, a mother and daughter.25 to many Kentuckians, reports
of their fate vindicated cal s for war.
in June 1786, Kentucky militia officers, led by Fort Finney commissioner
george rogers clark, proposed an expedition “to chastise” Wabash Valley
towns. They hoped to march in early august with 1,500 volunteers, “deter-
mined not to return without distroying their country or reducing them to
terms of our own.” The organizers faced large hurdles. persuading so many
men to join a long campaign, and raising the necessary supplies, would prove
difficult. even if they could raise the men, the organizers doubted their reli-
ability. during the revolutionary War, lack of experience and discipline had
plagued Kentucky’s defenses. in a 1782 battle at Blue licks, hugh mcgary
had led 170 militia into a deadly ambush, losing over a third of his men. The
officers hoped for regular army support, but Knox insisted that U.s. forces be
used only to defend against “unprovoked aggression.” Virginia governor pat-
rick henry, whose brother- in- law had recently died in battle with indians
north of the Ohio, called for “attacking the enemy in their towns,” but
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congress refused to endorse a plan that would likely lead to a long and ex-
pensive war.26 nonetheless, clark and his allies managed to mount not one
but two expeditions, totaling near two thousand men. They defied congress
by exploiting their standing as government officials. They creatively miscon-
strued official directives, connived with sympathetic army officers, and used
their formal authority to dragoon men. Their campaigns violated U.s. policy
but depended nonetheless on the local manifestations of state power.
Both military and civil authorities abetted the expedition planners. army
officer Walter Finney, who commanded a garrison near louisville, privately
scoffed at congress’s peace policy, arguing that money spent on treaties
would be better invested in war. in June, Finney proposed lending his garri-
son’s cannon to the expedition, citing his “conviction that arms must be used
against the indians.” general harmar balked at this scheme, but he ambigu-
ously advised Finney to “co- operate with the militia of Kentucky,” suggesting
acquiescence to militia leadership. Knox, sitting one thousand miles away,
howled in protest, with little effect. like Finney and harmar, governor
henry hesitated to countermand congress, but he noted that the articles of
confederation permitted militia to attack preemptively if they “received cer-
tain advice” of imminent invasion and lacked time to consult congress. The
Kentuckians lacked such “certain advice,” and congress had already rebuffed
them, but the governor implied that they could exploit the loophole to justify
their campaign. The expedition promoters needed little prodding. in a hastily
penned legal opinion, three Kentucky magistrates announced that the gover-
nor’s message empowered militia officers to draft men and impress supplies.
citing this document, the officers ordered up their companies and comman-
deered salt and livestock, threatening to kill any who resisted their demands.27
This interpretation of the governor’s message was dubious at best, but claim-
ing government sanction was essential to the expedition’s prospects. Without
the authority of the militia law, and the power to fine delinquents and im-
press supplies, the organizers could not have raised the men, grain, and live-
stock they needed.
many colonists opposed these demands, especial y in eastern Kentucky;
the expedition organizers countered with force. eli cleveland, an aged Fay-
ette county magistrate, publicly denied the plan’s legality, ridiculed its pro-
moters, and threatened to kill anyone who tried to impress his property.
Others, citing cleveland’s opinion, forcibly reclaimed requisitioned cattle. in
retaliation, militia commander levi todd ordered half a dozen men to seize
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resisted. When the militia reached the plantation, mary cleveland, eli’s wife,
blocked the farm gate, only to see the militia tear down the fence and drive
off her livestock, while one of todd’s men “presented a gun at her brest.” soon
thereafter, todd and his allies arrested eli, stripped him of his officer’s com-
mission, and petitioned the governor to annul his appointment as magistrate.
todd responded similarly even to minor interference, insisting that he “in-
tended to rule by an arbitrary power” until the expedition was over. When a
storeowner refused to hand over a third bushel of salt— having already sur-
rendered two— their militia smashed his store and seized both the salt and
the merchant himself, insisting that he join the expedition. a band of militia
broke into the home of phillip eastin, a revolutionary War veteran, tied him
by the wrists to a horse’s tail, and forced him to run after them until his shoes
were worn through. militia officers thus used the pretense of legal sanction,
together with a cohort of armed supporters, to assume dictatorial power.
They voiced deference to higher authorities but made clear they would ignore
any attempt to restrain them.28 state influence and state resources thus
launched an expedition that openly defied congressional policy.
But if eastern policymakers could not control frontier officers, neither
could the officers control the men they nominal y commanded. contrary to
their reputation as dogged indian fighters, most Kentuckians preferred not
to march hundreds of miles from home, leaving their families unguarded, to
attack towns that might or might not be home to troublesome raiders. more-
over, clark’s vaunted leadership proved less inspiring than advertised. he ex-
pected 1,500 to 2,000 men; only 1,100 showed up. after marching several
hundred miles in september heat, their bodies wore down and their food
spoiled. rumors swirled that a large army awaited them. as they camped a
few miles from the indian town at the mouth of the Vermillion river, some-
one reportedly cried out, “Who’s for home?” needing no more encourage-
ment, most of the men “turn’d back in Full disorder.” attempting to save face,
clark occupied the French town of Vincennes and offered to negotiate with
the Wabash nations. neither the indians nor the French were impressed.
clark’s rivals, meanwhile, eagerly denounced him to eastern officials. Within
months, he had lost both his military command and his post as congressional
indian commissioner.29
meanwhile, militia officer Benjamin logan mounted a second expedition
against the mad river shawnee towns, a less distant and more familiar foe. in
strategic terms, they were an odd target. some of their inhabitants, particu-
larly the mekoche division, ha
d labored persistently to keep the peace. But
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163
their towns were closer to Kentucky than any other indian communities,
making them easier to attack. Organizers expected clark’s men to serve
nearly two months; logan’s campaign lasted about fifteen days. as clark’s
undersized force headed for the Wabash, logan set about rounding up “all
the delinquents and deserters” as well as one- half of the militia not yet called
for duty. nearly eight hundred men signed on, many of them aiming to es-
cape the fines they faced for refusing to join clark. They faced little resis-
tance. many shawnee warriors had gone to the Wabash country to fight
clark, and a deserter from logan’s army warned the town’s inhabitants to flee
before the attack. Those who remained were mostly pro- treaty mekoches
who considered themselves at peace with the United states. The Kentuckians
pounced, killing ten men, including several elders, capturing thirty- two
women and children, and torching the towns. The stragglers included clark
and Butler’s al y nonhelema as well as the aged molunthy, who flew the
United states flag outside his cabin. in the middle of their now- smoldering
vil age, a crowd of Kentuckians surrounded the captives. One of the onlook-
ers, hugh mcgary, had led his men into the disastrous Blue licks ambush
four years before. now, he pressed to the front and demanded to know
whether molunthy had been in that battle. perhaps misunderstanding the
question, molunthy nodded. mcgary seized a nearby axe, knocked the old
man to the ground, split open his head, and removed his scalp. some of mc-
gary’s companions were outraged, but enough men supported him that
logan did nothing about it until after their return to Kentucky.30
logan’s triumph over a few dozen women, children, and old men did lit-
tle to discourage raids against Kentucky. Within months, warriors from the
Wabash towns resumed “plundering the inhabitants of their horses & occa-
sional y murdering them.” The attack on america’s closest shawnee allies
only intensified hostilities. as one army officer noted, “partial strokes on the
defenceless part of a nation serves only to irritate the Wariors, and unite
them more general y for War.” more shawnees raided Kentucky after logan’s
attack, he reported, than before. Ohio haudenosaunees and cherokees soon
captured nine Kentucky women and ritual y burned eight of them to death.
such scenes were becoming more common: one trader reported that “they
dont mean to Keep many prisoners now but Kill all before them.” in april
1788, one Kentucky leader reported that indians had killed nearly thirty col-
onists in the previous four months. even so, many western indians still hoped
for peace. at the time of logan’s attack, leaders from an array of western na-
tions were preparing to meet at the shawnee towns to discuss congress’s
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demands. With the intended council site reduced to ash, the council relo-
cated to the Wyandot towns near detroit, where the assembled leaders de-
manded that congress “keep back your people.” But they still focused
primarily on congress’s own hunger for land. They announced they would
“form a strict connection with the U.s.” only if the americans halted all sur-
veys and respected the old Ohio river boundary. as a veteran trader ex-
plained, if the United states insisted on taking Ohio, “war must be the end of
it.”31 congress’s unwavering territorial demands scuttled all efforts to halt the
bloodshed.
as congressional intransigence paved the way to war, logan and his allies
began trying to make peace. logan hoped to succeed where the treaty com-
missioners had failed, by offering his own prisoners in exchange for indians’
adopted captives. From the charred remains of the mad river towns, logan
wrote to shawnee leaders proposing to trade the thirty- two women and chil-
dren he had captured for “a proportionable number of our people.” he did so
with no guidance from congress, Virginia, or the nearby army garrison,
earning sharp condemnation from its commander. logan’s strategy cal s into
question the assumption that Ohio Valley militiamen sought primarily to
shed indian blood. to be sure, Kentucky colonists placed little value on in-
dian lives: while a court- martial ultimately convicted mcgary of killing mol-
unthy, it punished him with only a year’s suspension from duty. But logan’s
proposal signaled that he and his followers would just as readily negotiate
with their indian neighbors as fight them. shawnee leaders accepted his offer.
in may and again in august, shawnee delegations came to Kentucky and ex-
changed their adopted children for logan’s prisoners. The meetings featured
considerable ceremony, including messages of goodwil , haggling over ex-
actly how many captives would be handed over, and assurances on both sides
that remaining captives would be returned at future meetings. Once again,
the adoptees’ reluctance to leave their shawnee families complicated matters.
One teenaged girl who spoke no english was “a good deal surprised” on
being introduced to her biological father and “much more dejected when she
found she was to be taken from the indians, perhaps forever.” despite these
difficulties, within two years nearly all of the shawnee captives had been
redeemed.32
One of those captives, nonhelema, had sacrificed her own wealth to serve
the United states during the revolutionary War. after the war, when con-
gressional commissioners demanded her people’s land, she and her children
had aided them. she subsequently petitioned congress to compensate her for
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165
her service and losses by granting her part of her homeland. instead she
found herself a prisoner, though she was likely released in one of logan’s ex-
changes. her petition to congress, meanwhile, lay neglected for three years.
in 1788, a committee recommended granting her request, but there is no in-
dication that she ever took advantage of the United states’ belated gratitude.
it seems more likely that logan’s raid, molunthy’s murder, and her own sub-
sequent captivity crushed her hopes of peaceful coexistence in her old home-
land. she and her family may have migrated north or west with their fellow
shawnees. many resettled in the maumee Valley of northwest Ohio, an area
that would soon become the hub of resistance to congressional policy.33
The failure of nonhelema’s hopes for a peaceful postwar settlement re-
flected both the flimsiness and potency of the emerging anglo- american
state. in 1786, the United states could neither restrain nor punish either its
nominal citizens in Kentucky or its nominal allies in the shawnee towns. By
insisting on seizing and selling indian lands, congress effectively guaranteed
that attacks would continue. not surprisingly, the growing violence on the
frontier, and the growing indifference of both indians and Kentuckians to
congressional dictates, sparked fears that the new nation might lose its al-
ready
tenuous grip on the Ohio Valley. nonetheless, as violence escalated,
state resources continued to play a central role. clark and logan could mount
their expeditions only by using formal militia authority to coerce recalcitrant
colonists. similarly, Ohio indian leaders continued to appeal to congress and
Britain to respect and enforce their boundaries and help protect them from
rampaging Kentuckians. even with congressional influence at its nadir, few
influential leaders on either side of the frontier could imagine a peaceful fu-
ture without state patronage.
in the spring of 1787, thirty- four years after they first met, guyasuta and
george Washington embarked on new projects. The old warriors had been
allies, then enemies, then allies, and yet again enemies. now Washington sat
in philadelphia, presiding over a convention assembled to amend the articles
of confederation. The meetings brought forth a new federal republic, laying
the foundation for future relations between the United states and indian na-
tions. meanwhile, guyasuta repeated their 1753 journey up the allegheny,
this time escorting a detachment of american soldiers to Venango, an aban-
doned seneca town at the mouth of French creek. On that spot in 1763,
guyasuta’s warriors had destroyed a British fort and slaughtered its garrison.
in 1779, revolutionary forces, on Washington’s orders, had burned the
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senecas’ homes and crops, driving them to the swelling refugee camp at ni-
agara. despite this bloody history, both sides now overcame their lingering
animosities. The americans delivered the senecas fifty bushels of corn. in
return, some young senecas hunted and scouted for them. as they did so, the
soldiers built a new fort near whatever remained of the one that guyasuta
had burned. The american commander, Jonathan heart, assured his superi-
ors that the senecas showed “the strongest marks of friendship.”34
like pipe and dunquat, guyasuta and his nephew and successor, corn-
planter, had adjusted to the peace of 1783 by cultivating american patronage.