lookouts and reported to their brethren. After his surprise attack was exposed,
the Nabataeans offered to become the friends of both he and his father. Hostages
and gifts were given, and Demetrius retreated from Nabataea (Diod. 19.96–98.1;
Plut. Demetr. 7.1). For this agreement he was rebuked by his father, who stated that these actions made the Nabataeans more independent than before. A following
military operation also failed (Diod. 19.100.1–2). News from the east soon had
Antigonus more concerned with his eastern holdings than with the recalcitrant
Nabataeans.
After the victory at Gaza, Seleucus requested that his benefactor the Egyptian
satrap give him forces for the reconquest of Babylonia (Diod. 19.86.5). Ptolemy
outfitted him with a small force of 800 infantry and 200 cavalry. Despite the small numbers and the apprehension of his supporters, Seleucus was convinced of
his eventual success. He had been popular in Babylonia before his flight and he
assumed he would be so on his return (Diod. 19.90). His confidence may have
been strengthened by Antigonus’ often heavy-handed approach to dealing with
the eastern provinces. While the evidence is not abundant, there are certain indications of his bad behavior. Antigonus did not approve of governors who were
popular with the local population. The most obvious case involves his replacement of the popular Peucestas in Persis (Diod. 19.48.5). Peucestas had not done anything disloyal after his surrender to Antigonus at the conclusion of the Battle of Gabene, and, in fact, remained a faithful supporter of Antigonus and the latter’s son
Demetrius throughout his subsequent career (see Heckel 2006: 205). When the
removal of Peucestas was vigorously protested, one of the leading dissenters,
a prominent Persian, was executed (Diod. 19.48.5). Also suggestive of possible
earlier actions by Antigonus is his behavior in Babylonia during his later campaign there from 310 to 308. He had apparently adopted a scorched earth policy ( BCHP
3, Rev. 24–7). The loyalty of those in the east to Seleucus may also have been
a reflection on his Iranian wife, Apama (Arr. Anab. 7.4.6; Plut. Demetr. 31.5).
Seleucus had married her during Alexander the Great’s grand marriage ceremony
in 324, when the king arranged for himself and approximately eighty of his com-
panions ( hetairoi) to marry Persian aristocratic women (Arr. Anab. 7.4.4–7; Plut.
Alex. 70.3; Just. 12.10.9; Diod. 17.107.6; Curt. 10.3.11–12). While there is no hard evidence, it is likely that most of the bridegrooms repudiated their Persian brides after Alexander’s death (e.g., Green 1990: 319; Brosius 2003: 176–8; but note
Meeus 2009a: 236),23 thus making Seleucus’ marriage to a Persian princess more
significant in the eyes of his Asian subjects. Apama’s ethnicity was likely seen
by the indigenous peoples in the east as a sign of empathy with them.24 There is
evidence, however, of some local hostility toward Seleucus. The Persian priests,
the “Magians,” when asked by Seleucus to indicate the propitious day and hour
for beginning the construction of the city Seleucia-on-the-Tigris, reported the
wrong hour “because they did not want to have such a stronghold built against
themselves” (App. Syr. 58). However, their opposition may have been simply to
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having a potential economic rival in their midst. Seleucus, also at a later time, did pil age the Temple of Anahita in Ecbatana (Polyb. 10.27). In spite of such
incidents, Seleucus was clearly preferable to his rival Antigonus in the eyes of the local people (Diod. 19.91.3–4).
While traveling through Mesopotamia early in 311, Seleucus acquired those
Macedonians settled in the area of Carrhae, who were likely soldiers discharged
by Antigonus in 315 on his way back to Asia Minor (Billows 1990: 301–3) and
settled in this area (Diod. 19.91.1). When he entered Babylonia in the spring of
311, he was enthusiastical y greeted by the inhabitants, who remembered him as
Babylonia by Antigonus, also went over to Seleucus, along with the 1000 soldiers
under his command. Those troops still loyal to Antigonus joined with Diphilus,
the commander of one of the citadels in Babylon, to resist both Seleucus and
the inhabitants of the city. Seleucus stormed the citadel and, with its capture, he secured his former satrapal capital ( BCHP 3, Rev. 6–8; Diod. 19.91.3–4). Nicanor, Antigonus’ “general” of the east, gathered a force from both Media and Persis,
totaling 10,000 infantry and 7000 cavalry, mostly Persian, to confront Seleucus.
Against this considerable force, Seleucus had but 3000 infantry and 400 cavalry.
But while Nicanor was encamped and maintaining an inadequate guard, Seleucus
fell upon his army at night and routed them (Diod. 19.92.1–4). Most of the Persian troops deserted to Seleucus, in part “because they were offended by the previous
conduct of Antigonus” (Diod. 19.92.4; cf. Diod. 19.48.5). Nicanor after his defeat sent an urgent message to Antigonus informing him of what had occurred, and
then attempted to organize new forces. When Antigonus received the letter some-
time after the conclusion of the Nabataean campaign (Diod. 19.100.3), he sent
Demetrius in the late summer or fall of 311, with an army of 5000 Macedonian
infantry, 10,000 mercenary foot soldiers, and 4000 cavalry. But, before Demetrius arrived, and before Nicanor could assemble a sufficient army, Seleucus invaded
Media and defeated these forces, killing their commander (Diod. 19.100.3; App.
Syr. 55, 57). With the final defeat and death of Nicanor, Seleucus secured control of Media and Susiane (Diod. 19.92.5).
When news of Demetrius’ arrival reached Patrocles, the commander left in
Babylonia while Seleucus was in the eastern provinces, he abandoned the city
of Babylon after having urged the civilian population also to flee. Demetrius
therefore entered a virtual y deserted city except for its two citadels. The first was captured without difficulty; the second resisted with greater persistence.
Demetrius therefore left Archelaus, “one of his friends,” to continue the siege with 5000 infantry and 1000 cavalry, while he returned hurriedly to the west. Antigonus had ordered his son to return quickly so that they could proceed together into
winter quarters near the Mediterranean (Diod. 19.100.4, 7).
During this winter (311/10), four of the antagonists in the war reached a
settlement, with Antigonus, Cassander, Ptolemy, and Lysimachus, basical y recog-
nizing the boundaries that existed between them at the start of the conflict. An
agreement had been made, perhaps as early as the late summer, between Antigonus,
“War, both the King and Father of Al ”
149
Cassander, and Lysimachus, but only with Ptolemy in the winter. A letter from
Antigonus to the city of Scepsis (Bagnall and Derow [ OGIS 5] 1981: 11–12) makes it clear that an agreement had first been made with the Europeans ( OGIS 5, lines 25, 35), and only subsequently with Ptolemy (lines 30, 35). The earlier peace created a serious dilemma for the ruler of Egypt. With both Cassander and
Lysimachus out of the war, Ptolemy would have stood alone against Antigonus in
the west (Billows 1990: 113–14). Seleucus and Polyperchon were now the odd
men out (Mehl 1986: 120–4; Billows 1990: 132).
This war may seem to have ended in a draw, but that was in reality not the
case. While Cassander retained Macedoni
a, at least official y until Alexander IV
should come of age; Lysimachus, Thrace; and Ptolemy, Egypt, Arabia, and Libya,
Antigonus was recognized as the “leader” of, or the “first” in, all Asia. (Diod.
19.105.1). All parties agreed to respect Greek “freedom and autonomy” (Bagnall
and Derow [ OGIS 5, lines 54–5] 1981: 12; Diod. 20.19.3), which had long been part of Antigonus’ policy. The peace, even though the Greek cities were not directly involved in the negotiations, strengthened Antigonus’ claim to be protecting
their interests. Ptolemy had relinquished his demand for the eastern coast of the Mediterranean from Egypt to northern Syria, and had abandoned his al y Seleucus.
In western Asia, Antigonus now controlled Caria and with his alliances with the
independent dynasts on the Black Sea, he had secured control of Asia Minor.
He also had made serious inroads in Greece, where he had many allies. However,
he had lost substantial territories in the east, where Seleucus was later to emerge as a major player in what continued to be the ongoing struggle for power among
the Diadochs. There was also one final indirect result of this war: the end of the Argead dynasty that had ruled Macedonia since the eighth century. In the treaty,
Cassander had been recognized as “general in Europe” until Alexander IV, who
was then 13, came of age. To avoid the eventuality of the young man either himself demanding his kingdom or the demand coming from the Macedonians, Cassander
had both Alexander and his mother Roxane secretly murdered by their jailor,
probably sometime in the spring of 310, although the murders did not become
known until the summer (Diod. 19.105.2; Just. 15.2.5; Trog. 15; [ Heidelberg
Epitome] FGrH 155 F-2.3; Paus. 9.7.2). There is no evidence of protestations from the other Diadochs. There is, however, evidence of some confusion in the minds
of the Successors as to how they were to proceed. In Babylon, for example, some
records continued to be dated with reference to the regnal years of Alexander IV
down to 306/5 (Boiy 2000: 121). Most of the Diadochs for the next few years simply retained their former titles. Diodorus (19.105.3), however, records that all felt a great sense of relief. Yet if this were true, it is surprising that none immediately stepped forward to proclaim their own kingship (Gruen 1985: 254). Alexander’s
remaining son, the illegitimate Heracles, in 309, suffered a similar fate at the hands of Polyperchon, but only after the former regent first attempted to use the young man in a bid to return to power in Macedonia (Diod. 20.28.1–3).
With the peace of 311/10, often referred to as the “Peace of the Dynasts,” our
major source, Diodorus, apparently began to lose interest in the continuous yet
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inconclusive warfare taking place among the Diadochs, and began to concentrate
more on the history of his native Sicily and the exploits of the Syracusan tyrant Agathocles. Symptomatic of this changing emphasis is the complete omission
from Diodorus’ narrative of the year 310 of the expedition that Antigonus
led to the east against Seleucus.25 Demetrius’ campaign had not produced
any lasting results, and Antigonus was forced to attempt to regain his former
holdings himself. The only clear evidence for this expedition survives in the
cuneiform tablet, the Babylonian Chronicle of the Diadochs ( BCHP 3, Rev.
14–41; cf. Polyaen. 4.9.1). Fighting between Antigonus and Seleucus began in
earnest in the summer of 310, and continued in some fashion until at least
August 309, followed by Antigonus’ return to the west in 308. During his
absence his western holdings were left in the charge of his sons Philip and
Demetrius (Wheatley 2002: 31–3). In the war in the east, Seleucus was able to
more than hold his own, perhaps even winning a direct confrontation with
Antigonus, although this is unclear in our fragmentary source, so that in the end, after having devastated Babylonia ( BCHP 3, Rev. 25–31), Antigonus was unable to secure the region and returned to Asia Minor. After the departure of this antagonist, Seleucus proceeded to consolidate his holdings and to acquire Bactria,
Carmania, Areia, and Drangiana, even campaigning in India against the Indian
prince Chandragupta (App. Syr. 53, 55; Just. 15.4.11–12; 41.4.3; Plut. Demetr. 7.2; Pliny NH 6.21.63). He subsequently made peace with the latter, surrendering his claimed Indian possessions for 500 war elephants (Str. 15.2.9; 16.2.10; App. Syr.
55; Plut. Alex. 62.4).26
In addition to the ongoing war in the east with Seleucus, despite the peace,
sporadic conflict continued in Greece, in Asia Minor, and in the Aegean. But, the peace did hold off war on a large scale in the west until 307. Polyperchon remained in the Peloponnesus, mostly inert but continual y plotting his return to Macedonia.
His current plan was to use Heracles, Alexander the Great’s bastard son, who was
then 17 years of age,27 as his entrée back to power.28 He convinced the young man and his mother, the Persian Barsine, to come to him from Pergamon, a Greek
city in western Anatolia, with his promise to place this son of Alexander on the
Macedonian throne. They likely arrived in the fall of 310. After their arrival,
the former regent began a campaign encouraging all of those who had a grievance
with Cassander to help in the restoration of the “rightful king” to his throne. The Aetolian League joined in the undertaking, as did many others. By the late fall of the year there had assembled an army of 20,000 infantry and at least 1000 cavalry (Diod. 20.20.3–4). Over the winter the former regent raised money for the
campaign and sent agents into Macedonia to subvert the people from their loyalty
to Cassander (Diod. 20.20.4). Since his propaganda achieved great success, it is
clear Alexander IV’s death was already known. Polyperchon brought his forces
into Epirus where, soon after, Cassander also arrived with his army. Since the
Macedonians were not opposed to Heracles, Cassander, fearing that his troops
might desert him, opened negotiations with the former regent. Cassander argued
that, if Polyperchon’s plan succeeded, the young king would be controlled by
“War, both the King and Father of Al ”
151
others, but, if Polyperchon would murder the young man, he would become general
of the Peloponnesus and a “partner in everything in Cassander’s realm.” His estates in Macedonia would be restored, and Cassander would give him 4000 Macedonian
infantrymen and 500 Thessalian cavalry. Polyperchon agreed to the alliance, and
murdered the last of Alexander’s heirs (Diod. 20.28.1–3; [Parian Marble] FGrH
239 B 18). Of the other contenders in the European theater, Lysimachus’ siege of
Cal antia was apparently concluded successful y in this year (cf. Diod. 20.25.1–2, 112.2), or perhaps in the previous year (Rathmann 2005a: 458).
Elsewhere in Greece, in the spring or early summer of 309, Polemaeus,
Antigonus’ nephew and overall commander of his forces in Greece, rebelled and
formed an alliance with Cassander, claiming that his uncle had not honored him
sufficiently (Diod. 20.19.2). This desertion likely resulted from Antigonus’
preference for his two sons, Philip and Demetrius, over this very talented nephew.
While the evidence is circumstantial it would appear that he left his sons in overall charge of his possessions when he launched his attack on Seleucus (cf. Diod.
20.19.3–5). The loss of Polemaeus was significant both because of his position in Greece and as a result of his previous operations in Asia. Many of those in c
harge in Asia Minor from Cappadocia west were individuals who had been placed in
their positions by this commander. The satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, Phoenix,
was one of his “friends,” to whom Polemaeus now sent additional soldiers with
which to garrison the cities (Diod. 20.19.2). Ptolemy, noting that garrisons were now being inserted into these Greek communities, and even though this was the
result of Polemaeus’ rebellion, charged Antigonus with breaking the treaty, and
sent an army north which captured cities in western Cilicia that had been allied
with Antigonus. In the summer of 309, Ptolemy left Egypt for Lycia, where he
captured the cities of Phaselis and Xanthus, then, sailing on to Caria, he captured the city of Caunus. After these successes, he sailed to the island of Cos, where he summoned Polemaeus to a meeting. Antigonus’ rebellious nephew left Chalcis
to meet the ruler of Egypt. This potential alliance, however, col apsed when
Polemaeus attempted to subvert Ptolemy’s commanders with gifts, and was forced
to drink hemlock. Ptolemy proceeded to win over the forces previously loyal to
their now dead commander and these were distributed throughout his ranks
(Diod. 20.27). He then spent the winter of 309/8 in Caria (cf. Diod. 20.37.1). Much of this activity by Ptolemy was conditioned by Antigonus’ absence in the east.
Ptolemy also attempted to renew his former alliance with Lysimachus and
Cassander. Antigonus’ younger son Philip proceeded with an army to the
Hellespont to deal with Phoenix, and Demetrius with another force entered
Cilicia. Both areas were soon back comfortably in the Antigonid alliance (Diod.
20.19.3–5; Plut. Demetr. 7.4). Ptolemy’s actions were the result of his dissatisfaction with the peace. Deserted by his allies and not yet knowing of Seleucus’ successes in the east, he believed he had no choice but to end hostilities. Now, however, with Seleucus prospering and Antigonus absent, he was ready to take up where the last
war had left off. Ptolemy himself sailed with a force to Cyprus, where he succeeded in ensuring that the entire island was completely under his authority ([Parian