(Diod. 20.25.2).17 Lysimachus through this war not only secured his own satrapy,
but promoted himself in the eyes of his fellow Successors as a force with which
to be reckoned.
After his failure in the Hellespont against Lysimachus, Antigonus transferred
both his attention and his forces to Greece. Telesphorus (possibly another Antgonid nephew [Billows 1990: 435]), in the late spring or early summer of 312, was sent to the Peloponnesus with fifty ships and a force of infantry to “free the cities.” With the exception of Corinth and Sicyon, this commander proceeded to liberate all of
the cities that still adhered to Polyperchon (Diod. 19.74.1–2). Polemaeus, with a force of 5000 infantry, 500 cavalry, and 150 warships under the command of
Medius, was now sent from Asia by Antigonus to be in overall command of the
forces in Greece (Diod. 19.87.3). Landing in Boeotia, he fortified Salganeus, a
town which controlled the northern entrance to the Euripus Strait. From his
Boeotian allies, he added 2200 infantry and 1300 cavalry to his force, and with
this combined army proceeded to his ultimate goal, Chalcis, the only Euboean city still garrisoned by forces loyal to Cassander (Diod. 19.77.2–4). Cassander was also operating in Euboea, besieging the city of Oreus. An earlier attempt to relieve the siege by Telesphorus had been unsuccessful (Diod. 19.75.7–8), but with the assault on Chalcis by Polemaeus, Cassander gave up the attack on Oreus and moved his
forces to Chalcis (Diod. 19.77.5). Chalcis was strategical y vital, dominating the narrowest part of the Euripus channel and offering ready access to both Boeotia
and Attica. It later came to be regarded as one of “the Three Fetters of Greece”
(Polyb. 18.11.3–7), strongholds that the later Antigonid dynasty of Macedonia
regarded as essential to controlling the Greek peninsula. The other two were the
city of Corinth and its citadel the Acrocorinth, which controlled the Isthmus of
Corinth and hence access to and from the Peloponnesus, and Demetrias, founded
in 294/93 by Demetrius, the son of Antigonus Monophthalmus, on the northern
shore of the Gulf of Pagasae, which gave ready access to Thessaly.
During Cassander’s operations on Euboea, his general and younger brother,
Philip (cf. Paus. 1.11.4; Plut. Demetr. 2.1–2), had been actively engaging the Aetolians. While Philip was in the midst of plundering Aetolian territory, however, Aeacides, the former king of Epirus, returned to his kingdom and raised a large
army. Aeacides had become king in 331 on the death of his cousin Alexander I, but had been driven from the throne by his disgruntled subjects over his strong
support of his benefactor, Polyperchon, during the capture of Macedonia by
Cassander (see Chapter 3). Philip moved immediately against Aeacides to forestall his joining with the Aetolians. He defeated the force, but the Epirote king and the Epirote survivors succeeded in linking up with the Aetolians, though to no avail.
Philip followed up his first victory by subsequently defeating the combined army
of his enemies, killing a great many in battle, including the Epirote king. So terrified by their defeat were the Aetolians that they abandoned their cities and fled into the mountains (Diod. 19.74.3–6).
“War, both the King and Father of Al ”
143
With Cassander ful y engaged on Euboea, and another Macedonian army in
Aetolia, Antigonus saw an opportunity to seize Macedonia. He summoned Medius
from Greece back to Asia and immediately set off for the Hellespont. Cassander,
however, discovered the plan, and returned to Macedonia to counter any invasion,
leaving another brother (Paus. 1.15.1), Pleistarchus, in command of the garrison
in Chalcis. On his way north, he captured Oropus on the border between Boeotia
and Attica, renewed his friendship with the Thebans, and arranged a truce with
the other Boeotians. Arriving at the Propontis, Antigonus requested an alliance
with the Byzantines, who on the advice of Lysimachus decided to remain neutral
in the conflict. Lysimachus’ operations earlier in the year in western Thrace, where he had defeated both the Thracians and an Antigonid force, must have magnified
the Thracian satrap in the eyes of the Byzantines, who now abandoned their
previous alliance with Antigonus for this declared neutrality (cf. Diod. 18.72.6).
Antigonus, realizing that Cassander was back in Macedonia, and with winter
approaching, abandoned his enterprise and entered winter quarters possibly in
Hellespontine Phrygia (Diod. 19.77.5–7).
Even though Antigonus had not achieved his grand design of capturing
Macedonia, his operations in Greece had flourished.18 When Cassander returned
to Macedonia, Polemaeus succeeded in capturing the city of Chalcis, which in line with Antigonus’ propaganda he did not garrison. Polemaeus also took Oropus by
siege and turned the fortress over to the Boeotians. Afterwards the Antigonid
commander formed alliances with the Euboean cities of Eretria and Carystus, and
proceeded to enter Attica. His presence encouraged the Athenians to force
Cassander’s governor Demetrius of Phalerum to form a truce with the Antigonid
general and to send envoys to Antigonus about an alliance. From Attica, Polemaeus returned to Boeotia, where he captured the Theban citadel, the Cadmea, driving
out Cassander’s garrison, and thus “freeing” Thebes. His grand march through
central Greece next took him to Phocis, where he succeeded in driving all of
Cassander’s garrisons out of the region by the fall of 312, and subsequently on to Locris, where he began a siege of Opus (Diod. 19.78). This campaign was amaz-ingly successful. With the great exception of Athens, virtual y all of central Greece had been brought into alliance with Antigonus. The Peloponnesus had, through
the efforts of Telesphorus, also joined the Antigonid alliance, with certain notable exceptions, in particular Sicyon, Corinth, and Megalopolis.19
During the fal , however, a problem appeared within the Antigonid command.
Antigonus’ admiral Telesphorus, who was camped near Corinth, became jealous
of Polemaeus’ seeming preferment and success and decided to seek his own
fortune. Antigonus relied heavily on his family and in particular his sons and
nephews. Unfortunately, his nephews on occasion became upset with Antigonus’
preference for his sons or, as in this particular case, a rival nephew. The very personal nature of these politics at this time made changes in loyalty one-dimensional. There was as yet no Diadochan state (except Macedonia), nor dynasty, to which populations or subordinates could be devoted. Armies were now mercenary and hence
tied to their paymasters. Telesphorus took advantage of both aspects of this new
144
Alexander’s Heirs
world. He enlisted those soldiers and commanders who were his loyalists and as
such would support this independent enterprise, but he also sold his ships to raise money to retain their loyalty. Subsequently, he marched to Elis, where he was
admitted due to his previous tie to Antigonus and the inhabitants’ lack of
knowledge of his revolt. Here he seized and garrisoned the citadel, plundered the sacred treasury at Olympia, and began hiring mercenaries. This action was very
reminiscent of the actions of the Phocians in 356–46, when they plundered
the treasuries at the sacred site of Delphi to finance their wars (Buckler 1989).
Polemaeus now was forced to leave a small besieging force at Opus, and with the
bulk of his troops move to Elis. He seized the citadel and leveled it so that it could not be used by a garrison in the future.
He restored their freedom to the Eleans
and the treasure to the sanctuary. Not only had he freed Elis from a rogue Antigonid commander, but he also coaxed Telesphorus to return to the fold (Diod. 19.87). He then returned to the siege of Opus, which likely fell soon after his return (Billows 1990: 124), and where he prepared to spend the winter.
The summer and fall of 312 also witnessed activities in the northwest of the
Greek peninsula (Diod. 19.78.1). The people of Corcyra freed Apollonia and
Epidamnus, dismissing Cassander’s garrisons under a truce. This city, noted for
its strategic position in the Ionian Sea (Isoc. 15.108), clearly wished to remain free of Macedonian power. It had joined with Athens prior to Chaeronea and the
imposition of the League of Corinth by Alexander the Great’s father (Dem. 18.237), and had likely, like Rhodes (Diod. 18.8.1), broken whatever connection it had with the Macedonians after Alexander’s death. Corcyra does not appear on either side
during the Lamian War, maintaining its independence until 303 when it was
captured by the Spartan adventurer Cleonymus (Diod. 20.104.4, 105.3), the
brother of Acrotatus (cf. Diod. 20.29.1), who, as seen, had involved himself in this same area in 313. While Apollonia remained free and autonomous, Epidamnus
was given over to the Illyrians (Diod. 19.78.1). An attempt by Cassander to restore his control of Apollonia failed, and the Corcyraeans then freed the Leucadians
from the Macedonian’s garrisons (Diod. 19.89.3). In Epirus, with the death of
Aeacides, the throne passed to Alcetas (II), the younger brother of his predecessor (Paus. 1.11.5), who immediately renewed hostilities with Cassander, but in the end the two formed an alliance and Cassander returned to Macedonia and entered
winter quarters (Diod. 19.88.1–89.2).
“In this same summer” of 312 (Diod. 19.79.1), the people of Cyrene revolted
from Ptolemy, freeing their city and putting the garrisoned citadel under siege.
The Egyptian satrap sent an army under Agis, an otherwise unknown commander,
who retrieved the situation, recapturing the city (Diod. 19.79.1–2). With the
revolt crushed, Ptolemy himself now took an army to Cyprus and attacked
the kings still in alliance with Antigonus (Diod. 19.79.3–80.2). Once these were
subdued and the cities on the island were his (Diod. 20.21.1), he left Nicocreon, the king of Salamis, in charge of the army, and sailed across to northern Syria.
There he sacked two cities and sailed on to Cilicia, where he captured the
community of Malus, selling the inhabitants into slavery, and plundering the
“War, both the King and Father of Al ”
145
surrounding countryside, before returning to Cyprus, and subsequently to Egypt
(Diod. 19.79.4–7, 80.3). When Demetrius, stationed near Gaza, learned of
Ptolemy’s activities in Cilicia, he left Pithon behind as general in charge of the region, leaving with him the elephants and the heavy infantry. The son of
Antigonus, along with the cavalry and light-armed infantry, now hastened north
to intercept the Egyptian ruler while he was still in Cilicia. He arrived only after Ptolemy had returned to Cyprus and, having accomplished nothing, returned to
his former location near Gaza (Diod. 19.80.1–2; Plut. Demetr. 5.2). It was now late in the fall of 312 (cf. Diod. 19.80.5).
Back in Egypt, at the urging of Seleucus, Ptolemy decided to confront the
22-year-old Demetrius (Plut. Demetr. 5.2), and began marching his army north (Diod. 19.80.3). Demetrius summoned his troops from their winter quarters and
prepared to confront the satrap of Egypt and his al y Seleucus. The advisors that Antigonus had left with the young commander advised him not to take the field.
Demetrius, however, was anxious to show his ability. Ptolemy marched across
Sinai with an army of 18,000 infantry, including mercenaries and a “great number”
of Egyptians, some armed, most support personnel, 4000 cavalry, but no elephants.
Demetrius prepared to meet his opponents to the south of the city of Gaza. He and his associated commanders led a force of 11,000 heavy infantry, consisting of 8000
mercenaries, 1000 Lycians and Pamphylians, and 2000 Macedonian phalangites;
4400 cavalry, 2150 light-armed infantry, and 43 elephants (Diod. 19.82).20
In the battle, Demetrius commanded the left wing with 2900 heavy and light
cavalry, 1500 light infantry, and 30 elephants; his right contained 1500 mostly light cavalry. The infantry phalanx of some 11,000 was deployed in the center, with 13
elephants in front, interspersed with 650 light-armed troops. Demetrius ordered
his right wing to refuse battle until the issue had been decided on the left. Initial y, Ptolemy had placed the majority of his cavalry on his left, but learning of
Demetrius’ deployment, he transferred himself and Seleucus, along with 3000
heavy cavalry, to his right wing. To deal with Demetrius’ elephants, Ptolemy placed a screen of archers, javelin men, and men equipped with caltrops, spikes connected to chains to be thrown in front of the elephants. Ptolemy’s center consisted of his infantry phalanx, with his left wing protected by only 1000, probably light, cavalry.
Demetrius’ right wing was, then, far superior to that of his enemy’s left, but, as per the plan, never ful y engaged during the battle (Diod. 19.83.1–3).
The battle opened with the two strong cavalry wings attacking one another.
While the cavalry battle on this flank was progressing, those in charge of Demetrius’
elephants advanced to the attack. The elephants were stopped by the light-armed
The defeat of the elephants caused a general panic among Demetrius’ cavalry,
which began to flee the battle in large numbers. The battle ended in a rout. Five hundred,21 mostly cavalry, were dead, and 8000, primarily infantry, captured. This battle was the only major confrontation between the forces of the principal antagonists during this entire war (Diod. 19.83.4–85; Plut. Demetr. 5.1–3; Just. 15.1.7).
146
Alexander’s Heirs
After the conflict Demetrius retreated with the remnants of his forces to Tripolis in Phoenicia, and then to Cilicia, summoning troops from garrisons throughout
the area to augment his now very depleted army. Ptolemy acquired Gaza the very
night after the battle (Diod. 19.84.7–8), and subsequently was able to occupy
Phoenicia, including the ports of Sidon and Tyre (Diod. 19.85.5–86.1–2). Having
collected what forces he could, Demetrius had moved from Cilicia back to Upper
Syria. Ptolemy, still encamped in Phoenicia, sent his general Cilles with an army to dislodge his beaten opponent. Demetrius learned of the enemy’s approach and
also that the force was carelessly encamped, and proceeding rapidly by forced
march with light-armed troops caught the enemy by surprise in the early morning
hours. He captured the army without a battle and made Cilles his prisoner. The
latter, along with his staff, was subsequently repatriated to Ptolemy (Diod. 19.93.1–3; Plut. Demetr. 6.2–7), possibly in recompense for the Egyptian satrap’s similar generosity after the Battle of Gaza with respect to commanders captured
from Demetrius’ force (Diod. 19.85.3; Just. 15.1.7–8). After this success, which
Demetrius believed retrieved his previous defeat (Diod. 19.93.2),22 he wrote to
his father urging him to come immediately. Antigonus was in winter quarters
in Celaenae when the request reached him. He quickly left his base and within a
few days joined his son in Syria. Whe
n Ptolemy learned of Antigonus’ arrival, he
determined to retreat back to his safe haven of Egypt. However, before leaving the coast of the eastern Mediterranean he razed a number of the cities he had captured, including Gaza, which stood on the threshold of Egypt. Antigonus regained possession of that important coast without striking a blow (Diod. 19.93.1–94.1).
While Ptolemy may have feared that his rival would launch an immediate
assault on Egypt (cf. Diod. 19.93.5), Antigonus decided instead to attack the
Nabataean Arabs, who inhabited the northern and eastern regions of Sinai and
the southwestern part of the Arabian peninsula. While the area was rich in bitumen or asphalt, which was useful in waterproofing, caulking, and, in Egypt, embalming, and was a nexus for the incense trade (Hammond 1959), an economic motive
for the invasion would appear unlikely. Diodorus (19.94.1) only states that the
Nabataeans were “hostile to his [Antigonus’] interests,” and it would appear that this campaign was in reality a preliminary to an attack on Egypt itself (Billows
1990: 130). The Nabataeans carried on regular trade with Egypt and knew the
desert regions well (Str. 16.4.24). Athenaeus, “one of Antigonus’ friends,” with
4000 light-armed infantry and 600 cavalry, was sent to raid Petra, the chief
Nabataean city, and take hostages. While enjoying initial success, he was subse-
quently defeated due to his “carelessness and indifference,” and although it is not stated, given his absence from the subsequent historical record was likely killed (Diod. 19.94.1, 95.2–7). When the Nabataeans protested to Antigonus, he dis-avowed the expedition, stating that Athenaeus had made the attack contrary to his orders. By this subterfuge, Antigonus hoped to lull the Arabs into a false sense
of security, leaving them unprepared for another surprise attack. Even though
the Nabataeans were relieved, they did not entirely trust Antigonus and placed
watchmen on the hil s to warn of any future incursions. Antigonus, when he
“War, both the King and Father of Al ”
147
believed that the Arabs had been completely deceived, sent his son Demetrius with another army of 4000 foot and 4000 horse. Demetrius’ advance was spotted by the