Chinese neighbors. Though vigilantes primarily worked within their local
communities, they viewed their actions in a broader frame. “It is not in the
power of any town to drive the Asiatics out of the State,” argued the Truckee
Republican, “but the policy of continued ‘moving on’ must ultimately in-
duce John [Chinaman] to depart for his native shores.” The power of the
movement would be cumulative.36
THE PEOPLE
127
Unauthorized immigration, rumored to be fast increasing, helped spur
communities to action. “As things are now shaping themselves,” declared
The Sacramento Daily Union, “the effort to exclude the objectionable class
of Chinese is doomed to failure.” Under the headline “How the Heathen
Evade the Restriction Act,” the Daily Alta California agreed: “The Restric-
tion Act appears to be a failure.”37 “If laws cannot be made that will protect
[us] from [the Chinese] presence,” wrote the Sonora Union Demo crat, “the
people must exert their innate right and with moral sentiment drive him
from our shores.”38 Newspapers on the East Coast began echoing dire re-
ports of unauthorized migration, common in the U.S. West. The Philadel-
phia Press observed, “A trial of nearly four years of the restriction act has
shown that it is little better than a rope of sand as a bulwark against the
Mongolians. The frauds that can be practiced under it are numerous and
the wily Chinese were not slow to find the loopholes and take advantage of
them.” Even from afar, the Philadelphia Press sensed imminent danger and
warned its readers, “The knowledge of these facts has aroused the people of
the Pacific slope as they were never aroused before on the subject.”39
Back in February 1885, James Beith had lauded the Eureka expulsion but
had been deeply skeptical of the copycat incident in Arcata, which was based
on no “real grievance.” A year later, these reports of unauthorized migration
were beginning to change his thinking. Writing in his diary, Beith bemoaned
the law as “restriction which does not restrain.” He was starting to suspect
that this debacle was due to more than government ineptitude. “The public
have come to the conclusion, that [the law’s] errors & inefficiencies were not
from the lack of ability to realize its weakness,” observed Beith, “but were
the result of careful study and consummate design. This idea is gaining
strength day by day as the powerlessness of the Federal authorities is wit-
nessed.” 40 Increasingly, it appeared to some that the federal government never
meant to stop Chinese migration in the first place. Terence Powderly, leader
of the Knights of Labor, endorsed this view. “The recent assault upon the
Chinese at Rock Springs is but the outcome of a feeling caused by the indif-
ference of our law- makers,” Powderly declared to his followers, “nothing short
of the enactment of just laws and a full and impartial enforcement of the
same will prevent other and far more terrible scenes of bloodshed.” 41
Moreover, the Restriction Act itself— and not just its failure— offered a
power ful justification for expulsion. The law clearly signaled to West Coast
workers that the federal government supported their fight against Chinese
128
VIO LENCE
labor migration and endorsed deportation as a solution. By layering new legal
classifications on top of old racial divisions, the law had a profound effect
on how everyday Americans viewed racial difference. Being Chinese had be-
come a badge of alienage and, increasingly, a marker of illegality. When
vigilantes drove thousands of Chinese from their homes, they were reacting
to and reinforcing new legal lines of difference. Federal law and racial vio-
lence converged to make the Chinese into outsiders within the nation.42
Though anti- Chinese advocates shared a common goal of ousting the
Chinese, they were divided over expulsion tactics. Radical factions, like the
Mechanics’ and Laborers’ Anti- Chinese League in California, pushed for
“total expulsion of the coolie race” through white worker “rebellion.” Others
hewed more closely to the Tacoma Method, which began with coercion and
ended with vio lence. Echoing Tacoma’s Committee of Fifteen, the East Side
ably if he will, forcibly if he must.”
Newspapers often downplayed the use of such force. Even so, their brief
descriptions summoned images of hidden terror. For example, the Sacra-
mento Rec ord Union reported that vigilantes outside Roseville, California
went to a Chinese camp in the dark of night, “roused” Chinese workers from
their sleep, “escorted them to the next train,” and “told them they would be
killed if they returned.” After this brief but disquieting description, the Union
assured readers that “no vio lence” had been used.43
Others disavowed all forms of force and believed that boycott was the
nonviolent answer. James Beith, for example, recorded a poem in his diary
that advocated for only indirect tactics. The ditty was in the style of the classic
children’s rhyme “ Little Bo- Peep”:
Little Ah Yip
Has lost his grip
And does know where to find [’]em.
Let him alone
And he’ll go home
Bringing his tail behind him.
The answer, suggests the poem, is boycott. If the Chinese were simply “let
alone,” that is, denied any form of employment, they would eventually “go
THE PEOPLE
129
home.” 44 For some, boycott was a “quiet” method of expulsion that avoided
direct confrontation or force. For others, it represented a far more contro-
versial tactic than vio lence, because it targeted white employers alongside
their Chinese workers. In retrospect, the line between expulsion and boy-
cott appears blurred, almost to the point of irrelevance. Some observers rec-
ognized this at the time; the Los Angeles Times described boycotts as an
invitation to “strife” and “anarchy,” while the Santa Barbara In de pen dent
feared that boycotts would mean “innocent immigrants slaughtered.” 45
As expulsions swept the U.S. West, white Americans increasingly argued
that they had no choice but to join the movement. The Daily Transcript ar-
gued that Nevada City in California, which had seen little agitation, must
participate or risk becoming “an asylum for Mongolians.” In nearby Truckee,
vigilantes had successfully driven out hundreds of Chinese, and refugees
were pouring into Nevada City. “ Will our citizens do some of this agitating,”
queried the editors of the Transcript, “or do they want Nevada City to be-
come a harbor of refuge for all the Mongolians who will not be tolerated in
other towns of the coast?” The answer came in the form of rallies, boycotts,
and harassment. Vio lence begot more vio lence.46
“Heroes and Genuine Men”
As anti- Chinese vio lence became a common occurrence, it also became a
vital expression of working- class manliness. Then, as now, manliness was not
explic itly defined by a prescribed list of traits; instead, it was a dynamic pro-
cess by which men claimed power based on the nature of their bodies. In
the late nineteenth century, there were several competing images of manliness
in Amer ica, including the middle- class ideal of the moralistic, respectable,
civilized, “restrained” man and the working- class ideal of a rough, physical,
sexual, “martial” man.47 Anti- Chinese agitators drew from both loose
definitions, highlighting their bravery and pugnacity, but also their moral
superiority and restrained methods. They defined their manliness in direct
opposition to the servile Chinese and high- minded white elites who refused
to participate alongside them.
In a letter seized by the police, one workingman, J. M. Montgomery,
offers a colorful example of the link between gender and vigilantism. On
February 9, 1886, Montgomery participated in a planned expulsion from
130
VIO LENCE
Olympia, capital of Washington Territory. Reminiscent of the Tacoma ex-
pulsion months earlier, events began early in the morning with the loud
pealing of fire bells and the sight of white men marching double- file down
Main Street. The pro cession halted in front of each Chinese dwelling to de-
liver orders to vacate by 2 p.m. But in the territory’s capital, the vigilantes’
efforts were for naught. The sheriff, backed by a hundred deputies, quickly
stopped the expulsion by arresting several ringleaders, including L. L. Bales,
J. J. Hetzel, W. Frazier, and E. Gooding. Unable to post the $2,500 bail,
the leaders were sent to the U.S. penitentiary on McNeil’s Island.48 Two
weeks later, Montgomery deci ded to write to the imprisoned men. His
letter was intercepted by law enforcement and later used as evidence against
them.
Despite the failure in Olympia, Montgomery maintained in his letter that
the attempted expulsion was the epitome of manliness. He believed his four
“comrades” on McNeil’s Island should be “lauded to the sky as heroes and
genuine Men, ” while “the fin ger of scorn is pointed at every Knight of Labor who was not found in the ‘Line of Duty.’ ” 49 Those who refused to participate were no more than “white chinamen.” “Many Knights have expressed
their regrets that they were not in line,” Montgomery told his friends, “but
I only gave them a good cussing and told them plainly that we wanted
nothing more to do with them.” The capital’s elite had denounced the vio-
lence, but this did not give Montgomery pause. “I sally out down town every
day and some of the old stiffs look at me as though I was some highwayman,”
he boasted, “and I throw my hat back on my head and show the Gents I am
an American citizen.” Elites might see him as a lowly lawbreaker, but Mont-
gomery knew his fight was on behalf of the nation.
With disapproval, Montgomery reported that even the local Knights of
Labor assembly had retroactively denounced the expulsion. Angered by the
betrayal, he declared the assembly a “Chinese Ring” and pledged to main-
tain loyalty to the anti- Chinese cause even if they “whoop me out of the
assembly for my lip.” To Montgomery, anyone who failed to participate in
the expulsion was a traitor to his sex and his race. He infantilized his adver-
saries, calling the pro- Chinese “ mothers sons [ sic]” and the territorial gov-
ernor a “government Titsucker.”50
Now that his leaders were behind bars, Montgomery believed himself to
be the manliest man still in Olympia. He bragged, “This town is now in the
THE PEOPLE
131
worst shape you ever seen it & Every man is afraid of his own life,” with the
notable exception of himself. He was “not afraid of ‘God, man nor Devil’
when it comes to the Chinese question.” While other men feared arrest,
Montgomery claimed to think little of such concerns. In fact, he wrote, “ were
it not for my family,” he would find some way of becoming “one of your
Honorable Body on McNeil’s Island.” While praising his friends’ imprison-
ment as the height of manliness, Montgomery begged pardon because of his
patriarchal responsibilities.51
Montgomery’s preoccupation with manliness in this private letter echoes
public rhe toric from anti- Chinese leaders. Manhood was a common trope in
anti- Chinese speeches. “If we do not come up this [Chinese] question man-
fully,” one spokesman declared to a crowd in Seattle, “we deserve to be slaves.”
Expulsion, he implied, was the “manful” course of action. The Tacoma Ledger
agreed that “no secret society, no Masonic or Odd Fellows dandy” better
embodied “upright manhood” than did anti- Chinese agitators marching
for the cause of free white labor. Montgomery, then, had internalized the
movement’s gendered rhe toric. Now, in public and in private, he “lauded”
the heroism of the vigilantes and “cussed” at the cowardice of the pro-
Chinese, loudly dividing the city into “genuine” men and (white) Chinese.52
Although men were the primary force behind the anti- Chinese move-
ment, women also participated in the agitation, albeit in less power ful or
public roles. Female agitators, like their male counter parts, saw their par-
ticipation in gendered terms. At a time when domesticity was a pillar of
womanhood, women adorned banquet halls and cooked for anti- Chinese
rallies. For a mass meeting in Tacoma, Mrs. H. S. Bixler presented a “hand-
somely decorated” cake, which read “in ornamental candied letters” the
words of “living truth”: “The Chinese Must Go.” When agitators launched
a boycott of Chinese businesses in Seattle, sympathetic white women vowed
to do their own washing to avoid Chinese laundries.53
Mary Kenworthy, who was known as “Mrs. Kenworthy” in the Seattle
papers, was one of the few spokeswomen to emerge from the movement.
Originally from Illinois, she moved to Seattle in the 1870s with her husband,
who worked as a tailor. After she was widowed in 1880, she joined the
Women’s Suffrage Association and opened her house to leaders of the Knights
of Labor. In September 1885, Kenworthy was elected to or ga nize a committee
of five women charged with visiting the “ladies of Seattle” to “induce” them
132
VIO LENCE
to lay off their Chinese domestic servants. By the end of October, she had
risen to vice president of Cronin’s organ izing committee and began to speak
publicly for the cause. At a Seattle pro cession of over twenty- five hundred
agitators on October 24, she addressed the enormous crowd, condemning
Chinese migration and praising white workingmen. She declared, “I shall
always stand by the working men. Abraham Lincoln said, ‘keep near the
working man, and you will always be right.’ ” According to Kenworthy’s rhe-
toric, her role in the movement was as a helpmate to the men, not as an
advocate in her own right. Following the gender norms of the day, she would
go where the workingmen led.54
In November 1885, the workingmen led her into an indictment for con-
spiracy. In the wake of a failed expulsion att
empt in Seattle, Kenworthy be-
came one of two female agitators to be arrested and indicted by a grand
jury. Again she spoke out, this time in her own defense. “I feel a diffidence
in standing before you this eve ning; I feel a pride in so doing, also,” she pro-
claimed to a cheering crowd, “I stand before you as a criminal to night
(cheers) charged with a crime, indicted by a grand jury. . . . I know that my
heart has been at work in your interests and for those of my people and my
country.” She likened the anti- Chinese movement to the recent fight to end
slavery. In the 1860s, she had supported the Union over the “terrible slaver[s]”
because she was “a loyal- hearted woman” who wanted her children “to live
in a free country.” As a woman and a mother, Kenworthy believed it was
her duty to save her children from the curse of competing with slaves. Now,
she believed she was face- to- face with the reincarnation of black slavery: Chi-
nese coolieism.55
When the Seattle courts tried Kenworthy for conspiracy in January 1886,
she was quickly found not guilty along with fourteen other agitators. On
January 16, the vigilantes gathered to celebrate their legal victory. After being
introduced as “our sister and martyr,” Kenworthy took the stage. She retold
the story of Molly Pitcher, an apocryphal tale about a woman who fought
in the American Revolution. According to legend, Molly Pitcher joined her
husband at the front and supported the troops by bringing water to the men
during battle. When her husband was shot, Molly took his place and con-
tinued firing his cannon. A widow herself, Kenworthy vowed, like Pitcher,
to continue “pouring hot shot into the enemy till I see you noble sons where
you belong.” Through this analogy, she justified her public fight against the
THE PEOPLE
133
Chinese and her break with traditional femininity as a necessary ser vice to
the nation.
Though she began with common claims against Chinese labor, Ken-
worthy concluded her speech with a radical call for women’s rights: “The
women are the safeguard of the Nation. When every thing else fails, come
to the mothers for relief. Three cheers for women’s suffrage!”56 She proclaimed
a feminism of difference, using her female moral authority to lend righ-