nected longstanding economic arguments against Chinese labor to the local
realities of the recession. Visiting Seattle, he claimed he saw “100 families
destitute, who did not know where the next sack of flour would come from.”
Traveling through the small mining town of Newcastle, Cronin found sixty-
five unemployed white men. And in the nearby Black Diamond mine, the
foreman told him “ there had been 25 men every day traveling over the rail-
road looking for work for the last three months who did not expect to get
any work.”16 The prob lem, Cronin said, was that cap ital ists were using ser-
vile and cheap Chinese workers to undercut white wages. He decried the
current “racket” in which “moneyed power” only looked out for the inter-
ests of Chinese “pigtails.” The only answer was for employers to “let [their]
Chinamen go and give us their places.”17
In other words, Cronin rehashed old rhe toric that linked anti- Chinese
and anti- monopolist beliefs. Though couched in economic terms, these ar-
guments were primarily based on racial assumptions. Allegedly, it was Chi-
nese workers’ innate servility and productivity that enabled monopolists to
post high profits.18 James Wickersham, Tacoma’s probate judge and another
leader of the local anti- Chinese movement, agreed that the Chinese repre-
sented a unique form of racial peril. “The fear I have always had was not
that the Pacific coast would be overrun by [Chinese] criminals and a for-
eign race of base and immoral character,” explained Wickersham, “but that
we would be confronted by millions of industrious hard- working sons and
daughters of Confucius who, if given an equal chance with our people, would
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outdo them in the strug gle for life and gain possession of the Pacific coast
of Amer ica.”19 Despite his belief that white Americans were more civilized
and advanced than the Chinese, Wickersham feared that if it came to a fair
fight, the white race might very well lose.
Media reports of swelling undocumented migration brought new urgency
to these preexisting racial anx ieties. When Congress passed the Restriction
Act in 1882, many citizens believed that the federal government had fi nally
listened to their pleas to close Amer ica’s gates. But it did not take long be-
fore newspapers reported that Chinese workers were still entering the country.
In Washington Territory, warnings came almost daily. In September 1885, the
Seattle Daily Call reported, “Chinese are being smuggled across the border
from British Columbia at the rate of 100 a month and the tide is increasing.”
Days later, the Tacoma Daily Ledger claimed that the rate was more like a
hundred a week. Citing the expected completion of the Canadian Pacific
Railway, the workingmen’s newspapers believed the current flow of unau-
thorized mi grants was a sign of an imminent flood. The Ledger predicted
“twelve thousand of these buff imps” would cross the border upon driving
the last spike and called for immediate action to “stem the tide of barbaric
invasion.”20
If the government could not or would not save the West Coast from alien
invaders, anti- Chinese spokesmen argued that the white people of the West
Coast had to take the law into their own hands. Anti- Chinese advocate
James H. Lewik, speaking to a mass meeting in Seattle, joined a chorus ar-
guing that the people had the right to rebel when federal policies endan-
gered the nation’s welfare. It appeared to Lewik that the federal government
had abdicated all responsibility on the Chinese Question. This was simply a
matter of self- defense. The government “must protect you,” Lewik argued,
“or you must protect yourself. I trust peaceably if you can, but forcibly if
you must.”21
Anti- Chinese advocates in Washington Territory argued it was pos si ble
to expel the Chinese “in a cool, business- like manner.” Based on the premise
that “if the Chinese are asked to go, they will leave,” Cronin proposed a
series of resolutions to or ga nize and publicize the anti- Chinese cause. He
believed that the movement had to carefully skirt the law to garner broad
support and avoid legal repercussions. This would avoid the bloodiness of
the Rock Springs massacre and the bad press that followed. The stakes were
THE PEOPLE
121
high. Any public acts of vio lence could have long- term consequences for the
fledgling territory. “To plunge the city into lawless disturbance and riot,”
argued the Seattle Call, “would tend to unsettle values, tighten the grip of
hard times, diminish customers, and embarrass debtors, check both immi-
gration and investment, throw labor out of employment, lessen the population
and set the city back where it was four or five years ago.” Cronin believed that
a campaign based on coercion, ultimatums, and harassment would prevent an
open war. If these indirect efforts at expulsion did not succeed, prophesied
Cronin, “ there will be riot and bloodshed this winter.”22
Though the Chinese in Tacoma remembered death threats, smashed win-
dows, and hurled rocks, local papers described the anti- Chinese agitation as
“peaceful” in September and October 1885. In Seattle, newspapers made
proud declarations about the “perfect quietness and order” of anti- Chinese
rallies and parades. The movement was even a family affair. One torchlight
pro cession in Tacoma, for example, was “headed by the Tacoma band; then
followed by five or six boys with arms full of sky- rockets and fiz- pops”; next
came the “representatives of the press” and the “Tacomanite Country Trea-
surer John Murray,” who led “100 or more sons of freemen, ranging in age
from 10–12 years.” Townspeople and visitors made up the rest of the parade,
which stretched a half- mile in length.23
Other towns joined in this seemingly nonviolent movement. In Whatcom,
hundreds of residents signed a pledge to stop “directly or indirectly” giving
Chinese employment in “any manner.”24 Soon, the Black Diamond and
Newcastle mines fired all Chinese workers, middle- class Seattle women let
their Chinese servants go, and the Tacoma Chamber of Commerce adopted
the anti- Chinese resolutions put forth by the Knights of Labor. In addition to
depriving the Chinese of work, anti- Chinese agitators simply told the Chi-
nese to leave. Then in Tacoma, the Committee of Fifteen presented local
Chinese with the circular demanding their exit by November 1.25
Agitators further legitimized their cause by joining forces with law en-
forcement. When the Territorial governor asked the Tacoma sheriff to
increase his police force to prevent a riot, fifty- five Knights of Labor volun-
teered to be deputized. In nearby Puyallup, the U.S. attorney swore in
forty- five special deputies to “preserve order,” but the Seattle Call reported
that “they are a unit in wanting the Chinese to go.” In Seattle, agitators com-
bined with the police force to increase monitoring of Chinatown. Several
“The Chinese Must Go” (1885). This advertisement for a mass meeting
led by Tacoma’s mayor features the ubiquitous slogan of the anti- Chinese
movement. Courtesy of the Washington State Historical Society,
Edward N. Fuller Ephemera Collection, 1903.1.4.
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123
members of the Knights accompanied Police Chief Woolery and Constable
Van Doren during an eve ning raid made on “two opium dens in Chinatown”
across the street from Chin Gee Hee’s store. When they allied with local
law enforcement, anti- Chinese agitators blurred the lines between state and
nonstate action and between legal force and extra- legal vio lence.26
Many Tacomans hoped that boycotts, threats, and harassment would
be enough to make the Chinese leave. But when the November 1 deadline
came and went, it was clear that the campaign was not a complete success.
There were “Lingering Mongols” in town, declared the Tacoma Ledger in an
article that acknowledged that while the “ great majority” of Chinese had
“accepted the situation” and vacated town, an estimated fifty to one hundred
remained in Tacoma. To the agitators, this dramatic decrease in the Chinese
population was not enough. “If any are allowed to remain others will come,”
declared the Ledger. “ There must be a clean sweep and a thorough applica-
tion of disinfectants after the sweeping is done.” The paper hinted at what
was to come: “Proper means will be found to induce compliance with the
popu lar demand.” At 9:30 a.m. on November 3, anti- Chinese vigilantes
massed at the foundry outside of Tacoma and, armed with rifles and clubs,
marched into town. They certainly knew where the Chinese lived, and may
have known a lot more. In their depositions after the fact, some vigilantes
referred to their victims by name. The Chinese had been their neighbors,
before vio lence made them akin to strangers.27
Later the mayor of Tacoma, R. J. Weisbach, and the sheriff, Lewis Byrd,
would be asked to account for failing to halt the “riot.” Both claimed there
was no riot to stop. Sheriff Byrd remembered telling the mayor that “a body
of men” were headed “to the China houses for the purpose of driving the
Chinese out.” To ensure peace and civility, Mayor Weisbach accompanied
the sheriff to observe the expulsion. They watched as hundreds of white men
moved from house to house, banged on doors, and demanded that the Chi-
nese depart. The mayor turned to the sheriff and asked if he considered this
a mob. “No,” Sheriff Byrd replied, “Their men [are] orderly and [do] not de-
mand any interference.” The mayor agreed it was simply “the anti- Chinese
committee notifying the Chinese to leave.” As long as the vigilantes did not
fire the rifles that they carried at readiness, the mayor saw no wrongdoing
in this “peaceful” expulsion.28
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VIO LENCE
The crowd fostered the appearance of nonviolence. In a bid to maintain
moral high ground, the vigilantes tried to uphold their vows to act without
vio lence, malice, or disorder. More practically, anti- Chinese leaders also
wished to avoid any legal consequences. “If by any accident or through any
disorder on account of drunken men or other wise some Chinamen should
be killed,” explained Judge Wickersham later, “the Committee of Fifteen
would be on the road to Walla Walla [Penitentiary]. With this horrible
vision before us all day we certainly did what we could to protect the
Chinamen.”29 In deference to their standing, the vigilantes gave Chinese
merchants additional time to pack their belongings. And, after they had
forced the Chinese to march eight miles in the pounding rain, they deliv-
ered the refugees three wagons full of food. Three days later, when Tacoma’s
Chinatown was set on fire, the vigilantes denied any responsibility.30
The expulsion from Tacoma was neither orderly nor nonviolent, but the
vigilantes remembered it as such. Despite beatings, the death of two Chi-
nese from exposure, and the burning of Chinatown, anti- Chinese vigilantes
maintained that the expulsion had been peaceful. The populist press con-
gratulated the agitators in Tacoma, declaring, “No blood has been shed, no
one has been hurt; the long agony is at an end [and] the Chinese have gone.”
This discourse of nonviolence helped normalize the expulsion as a mundane
event. “We in Tacoma assisted the Chinese pests who infested our burg to
transfer their belongings to a point outside of town,” explained the Tacoma
Daily News, “strictly in accordance with time- honored custom.”31
It was true that Amer ica had a long history of vigilantism. Using the rhe-
toric of popu lar sovereignty and revolution, Americans had claimed the right
to bypass the legal procedures of the state and inflict direct punishment on
supposed wrongdoers for de cades. In the U.S. West, groups of self- appointed
citizens often justified public participation in vio lence by citing the limits
or absence of law enforcement in newly settled territories.32 In their eyes,
these American citizens were not committing an illegal act in defiance of
the state; they were committing an extralegal act in extension of the state’s
interests. The intention was not to contest Amer ica’s legal system of border
control but to aid it. After driving out the Chinese from Tacoma, the vigi-
lantes declared that “the federal government endorsed ‘the Tacoma method’ ”
when they authorized U.S. marshals to deport undocumented Chinese
mi grants. Vigilantes drew little distinction between lawful and unlawful
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125
“Tacoma’s Twenty- Seven” (1885). This commemorative photo graph shows the men
indicted for the Tacoma expulsion, including Mayor Jacob Weisbach (seated center),
two members of the city council, a probate judge, the chief of the fire department,
and the president of the Young Men’s Christian Association. The woman pictured,
Mrs. J. A. Comerford, appears to have posed with her child on behalf of her absent
husband, the editor of the Tacoma Daily Ledger. University of Washington Libraries,
Special Collections, William P. Jackson, photographer, UW1528.
These public retellings of the Tacoma expulsion made the incident into
more than it was. Newspaper stories and sandlot speeches turned a mob of
individuals motivated by personal interest into a unified group engaged in
a self- righteous crusade. And they turned a local event based on local cir-
cumstances into a template for all to follow. These narratives transformed
racial vio lence into vigilantism.
“Lawlessness Triumphant”
For the editors of the Los Angeles Times, the Tacoma expulsion forced a reas-
sessment of the meaning of anti- Chinese vio lence. The Times had assumed
that the Rock Springs massacre was “a sudden outburst of lawlessness due
to special grievances.” After observing the expulsion at Tacoma, the paper
reconsidered how “special” those grievances were. While condemning the
use of force, the Times seemed convinced by the logic behind the Tacoma
Method. The Times realized that “the same condi
tion of affairs” that existed
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in Rock Springs “exists all over the coast; the same dissatisfaction with the
workings of the Restriction law, the same chafing under restraint so long
imposed under the promise of speedy relief.” The editorial opined, “Now that
the example of lawlessness triumphant has been set and copied, we may ex-
pect it to find ready advocates in every town on the coast.”34
As the agitation and vio lence spread in the spring of 1886, no single
spokesperson or organ ization emerged to lead the movement. There were a
few men like Daniel Cronin who were involved in multiple anti- Chinese ex-
pulsions. After the successful expulsion of Chinese from Tacoma, Cronin
made his way to Portland, Oregon, where the Knights and “anti- coolie clubs”
provided a hero’s welcome. But his anti- Chinese message did not prove as
power ful there. Although anti- Chinese agitators succeeded in driving Chi-
nese out of surrounding towns, they failed in Portland, where they met firm
re sis tance from the upper classes. This failure marked the end of Cronin’s
career as a labor or ga nizer and anti- Chinese agitator. He joined a utopian
commune in Oregon and dis appeared from public life.35 Although Cronin
had played a pivotal role in Washington Territory by offering to or ga nize
an eager group of anti- Chinese agitators, the expulsions were not the work
of just one rabble- rouser. Sometimes men like Cronin spread rumors of the
anti- Chinese crusade from town to town, but telegraph wires meant that
news cables traveled faster.
In the weeks following the Tacoma expulsion, California newspapers
began extensive coverage of anti- Chinese activity along the Pacific Coast.
On a single day, for example, the Daily Alta California reported on a “very
enthusiastic meeting” in Dutch Flat, resolutions adopted in Yreka “declaring
that the pres ent restriction law [was] useless,” the beginning of a boycott in
Carson where “some 700 people have signed a pledge to discharge Chinese,”
and the expulsion of 180 Chinese from Albina, Oregon, by eighty masked
white men. Newspapers portrayed anti- Chinese vio lence as an everyday oc-
currence, which helped to make it so. Empowered by the example of others,
local communities believed they could do what they wanted with their