as to what the Idng of England's intentions were. From Jaffa, which
would surrender to him without a serious fight, Richard could strike to-
wards Jerusalem, but what if Jerusalem was not his target? Equidistant
to Jerusalem from Jaffa lay the city of Ascalon, and if Jaffa was the key to
Jerusalem, then Ascalon was the key to Egypt - and no one understood the
importance of Egypt to the whole struggle more than Saladin. The dilemma
which Saladin now faced went to the core of the holy war which he had over
the years so assiduously claimed to fight. Jerusalem had been the centre of
his propaganda campaign and the ultimate prize that the Sunni Revival
demanded. And he had delivered Jerusalem as he promised he would. But
at the heart of the matter was the realisation that though Jerusalem was
symbolically important, strategically it was marginal. The intractable mes-
sage proclaimed in the mosques and the madrasas across the Muslim world
was 'Jerusalem, Jerusalem'; yet in the war councils it was whispered that
while to lose Jerusalem was indeed a misfortune, to lose Egypt would be a
catastrophe. In Richard's camp the same debate was raging. For him the
prize of Egypt was tantalisingly close, but the shortage of manpower did not
make it a realistic goal. Richard knew that Egypt had catapulted Saladin to
power and he calculated that its downfall would signal his end. On the other
hand, Richard was in the Holy Land because he had vowed to recapture
Jerusalem and not in order to carve out an empire.
While Richard pondered Saladin acted. He knew he could not defend
both cities but he anguished over his next step. He was certain that Richard
would move against Jerusalem, but should he abandon the city and defend
Ascalon, and if that city fell like Acre had done, should he retreat to Egypt
where surely Richard would not pursue.!' Egypt was his powerbase and his
treasury, and from Egypt he could ponder his next move. But to abandon
Jerusalem would destroy his legitimacy and forever tarnish his reputation. It
would be a betrayal of the principles of the holy war which he had so long
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13: T H E ARRIVAL O F R I C H A R D
advocated. Jerusalem, Saladin decided, could not be abandoned. Once
that decision had been taken then the next one followed immediately; if
Jerusalem was to be defended then Ascalon had to be destroyed, since it
could not be left fortified for Richard. 'I would rather lose all my children
than cast a stone from the walls', Saladin told Ibn Shaddad. 'Yet, if God
decrees it and prescribes it as a way of preserving the best interests of the
Muslims, what else can I doi'' Having made the decision there was no time
to lose. Saladin himself travelled to Ascalon, reaching it on 11 September,
leaving al-Adil to keep an eye on Richard in Jaffa. Within two weeks the city
walls had been torn down. The distress of the inhabitants was obvious to all;
people started to sell what they were unable to transport, and things that
were worth 10 dirhams were sold for 1 dirham. But what mattered now
was speed, and when the towers of the city walls were filled with wood and
set on fire, Saladin became anxious that the smoke would be spotted by
Richard, whose camp was less than 80 kilometres (50 miles) away. While
Ascalon was being torn down, news reached Saladin that al-Adil had been
approached by the Franks to parley. 'String them along and spin out your
talks with them', he advised his brother, 'so that we can perhaps manage to
destroy the town.' In fact Richard had been caught by surprise. News of the
dismanding of Ascalon reached him while he was in Jaffa, and though he
immediately tried to move south to prevent the total destruction of the city,
he was too late: Ascalon, Icnown as the 'bride of Syria', had been razed to
the ground by the Muslims to prevent it falling fortified to the crusaders.
One wonders how al-Qadi al-Fadil felt watching his city of birth being razed
by his own Muslim soldiers. No matter, by the end of September Saladin
had left Ascalon and made his way to Ramla: since the route from Jaffa to
Jerusalem ran across the plain by Ramla, the city walls there were similarly
torn down. Saladin had made his choice - Jerusalem would be defended at
• 217 •
Chapter 14
A Bitter Siege of Attrition:
Saladin, Richard and Jerusalem
I saw him prostrating himself and repeating words with tears pouring
down on to his prayer mat.
Ibn Shaddad
The death of Taqi ul-Din
On 1 November 1191 Ibn Shaddad received an urgent message from Saladin:
'Come now and come quickly'. The message asked him to bring with him
al-Adil and another two close relatives, and by the tone of the message Ibn
Shaddad Icnew he had no time to waste. When the men arrived, Saladin
ordered that the tent be cleared and then took out a letter. As he read it aloud
he began to weep, and so deep was his sorrow that those around him wept
too, though they did not know the content of the letter. Quickly, however,
it transpired that Taqi ul-Din had fallen ill and died. His death affected
Saladin greatly and such was his sorrow that Ibn Shaddad had to admonish
him, gendy reminding him that too much grief was a challenge to God's
will. Saladin replied simply, '1 ask pardon of God'. He then washed his eyes
with rose-water and asked for a meal to be served. He ordered those present
that Taqi ul-Din's death needed to be kept secret in order to maintain the
morale of the army. The reason for Saladin's sorrow is not hard to explain
for, of all his family, Taqi ul-Din was the one in whom he had most faith.
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14: A B I T T E R S I E G E O F A T T R I T I O N : S A L A D I N , R I C H A R D & J E R U S A L E M
His bravery was renowned and he had commanded and fought in Saladin's
army with tremendous valour and courage, never more so than at Hattin.
Of course, Taqi ul-Din had also deserted and defied his uncle and had left
Acre at a time which was critical, but in doing so he was simply conforming
to the spirit of the age. Saladin had blamed his nephew for the loss of Acre,
but now that he was dead he mourned him deeply. Humphrey's assessment
of Saladin's reaction to Taqi ul-Din's death may appear severe, but it cer-
tainly is not without justification: 'Saladin was heartbroken to hear about his
nephew's death', Humphreys wrote, 'but he was fortunate that it happened.
By his selfish recklessness Taqi ul-Din had contributed to the disaster of
Acre and had almost wrecked Saladin's painfially assembled coalition.'
Ironically, the day after news of Taqi ul-Din's death reached Salaldin, he
received a letter from Baghdad in which the caliph complained bitterly
about Saladin's nephew's actions across the Euphrates. Saladin replied
diplomatically, even though he obviously laiew that ambition played a large
part in his nephew's actions: 'We did not give orders for any of this. Al-
Muzaflfar [Taqi ul-Din] crossed the Euphrates only in order to gather troops
and to return to Jihad'. However when the caliph th
en insisted in the letter
that al-Qadi al-Fadil travel to Baghdad to explain Taqi ul-Din's actions,
Saladin refiised to budge and simply wrote back that he was too ill to under-
take such a journey. As Saladin grieved, he also worried and calculated, for
he understood that the consequences of Taqi ul-Din's death would require
careftil handling. The situation could not be more critical: Richard was only
a few miles away from Jerusalem; Ascalon, one of the most important cities,
had been razed to the ground to render it useless to the enemy; and Saladin
was committed to fighting to the end. But, in the wake of his nephew's
death, that is not what was uppermost on his mind. To understand why, it
is necessary to appreciate that the rest of the Muslim world showed an oblivi-
ousness to what was happening that would have been comical if, from
Saladin's point of view, it had not been so dispiriting.^ First, at the height
of the crisis, a minor ruler from Anatolia arrived in Saladin's camp demand-
ing his support against his father, Kilij Arslan. Saladin patiently welcomed
him and sent al-Adil to resolve his dispute. This reminds us of Saladin's
claim that people were too terrified to speak when they used to approached
Zengi, but that they constantly tired him with their pleadings. Then, when
that matter had been resolved, the consequences of Taqi ul-Din's death
arose as Saladin must have feared they would. Taqi ul-Din's young son, al-
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SALAD IN
Mansur, now demanded that he should be given his father's fiefs. Saladin
hesitated, for he feared that he was too young to control them, for it
should be recalled that Taqi ul-Din's lands were east of the Euphrates and
it required a strong man to keep the Zengids in their place. Reluctantly,
however, he agreed, though not without placing strict conditions.
What followed next shocked Saladin, for news reached him that the
20-year-old had allied himself with Bektimur of Khilat and had gone into
open rebellion. The situation was critical, since it could signal the loss of
Saladin's position east of the Euphrates and with it control over Sinjar and
Edessa and maybe even Mosul. In addition Saladin desperately needed men
to fight Richard and many now, including Bektimur, who was on the verge
of sending forces, were holding back to see how the rebellion would resolve
itself At this most critical of junctures, when Richard was a few miles from
Jerusalem, Saladin found himself submerged in a family quarrel. At first he
ordered his son al-Afdal to cross the Euphrates to relieve Taqi ul-Din's son,
but when the latter asked for al-Adil to intercede on his behalf, Saladin
appeared to change his mind, only for his anger at his nephew's son to
resurface, as he tore up the agreement that al-Adil had drawn as a compro-
mise. 'Saladin', noted Ibn Shaddad, 'was overcome with rage that he could
be addressed in such a way on the part of one of his grandchildren.'
Obviously, this was not typical Saladin behaviour; clearly the loss of Acre,
the destruction of Ascalon and the bitter war of attrition he was fighting
were taking a heavy toll on his health. Fortunately he was surrounded by
cool heads who urged caution. Abul Huija the Gross, one of his most
loyal men, was accustomed to keeping his nerve in tense moments for he
had once helped crush the Fatimid Sudanese rebellion in Cairo. Now he
summed up the situation succincdy:
We ccmnot carry on two wars at the same time. If the sultan wishes us to
fight the Muslims he must make peace with the infidels; then we will cross the
Euphrates andfi^ht but it must be under his leadership. If he wishes to keep
on the holy war, let him pardon the Muslims and^rant them peace.
The choice could not be starker.
Other than Abul Huija the Gross there was al-Adil himself, on whom
Saladin relied increasingly. When he had heard that his brother had ordered
his son al-Afdal to cross the Euphrates to relieve al-Mansur, he was anxious,
for he knew that al-Afdal himself had ambitions. There was no doubt that
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14: A B I T T E R S I E G E OF A T T R I T I O N : S A L A D I N , R I C H A R D & J E R U S A L E M
Saladin's son was brave: at Arsuf he had charged the enemy so ferociously
that a blood vessel in his face had burst. But his bravery could not conceal
a certain self-indulgence in his character which, accompanied by a fondness
for wine, raised suspicions of whether he would be fit to govern such a deli-
cate area. In many ways he was like his other uncle Turan Shah - exemplary
bravery in the heat of batde and insolent indolence in matters of governance.
What followed next tells us a great deal about Saladin's character. When
al-Adil approached him with his doubts about al-Afdal, Saladin did not allow
his anger to obscure his judgement and he listened and accepted his brother's
words. He then sent orders to al-Afdal to return at once, and when this
order provoked his son to anger, he deflised it by waiting for a while then
riding out to meet him and showing him great honour by dismounting
from his horse to greet him, which normally a son would do for his father.
Ultimately Saladin had to send al-Adil across the Euphrates to settle matters,
and this deprived him of his brother at a critical time. Of those who troubled
Saladin throughout his life, none troubled him more than his family.
Fortunately for Saladin Richard was equally preoccupied with internal
matters. The question which dominated was who was to be appointed as
Icing of Jerusalem. There were two contenders. Guy was the appointed Idng
but although as Richard's vassal he was his chosen candidate, he lacked any
popular support. His vacillation at Hattin remained a powerful obstacle to
his credentials. The other candidate was Conrad, who lobbied for recogni-
tion and who increasingly feared Richard. In fact Saladin was remarkably
well-informed about the disputes in the Christian camp - to such an extent
that Richard once exclaimed in frustration 'Does Saladin know everything
that happens.>' - and he was eager to play the diplomatic game to gain any
advantage. So when Conrad approached him with an offer to take his side
against Richard in return for certain concessions, Saladin eagerly welcomed
his rapprochement. Similarly Saladin encouraged al-Adil to enter into dis-
cussions with Richard, and the two men developed a respect - friendship is
probably too strong a word - which involved hunting and feasting over
French delicacies together. How seriously Saladin took these negotiations is
hard to tell, but he was happy to prolong the talks, for he Icnew that Richard
was eager to return to Europe. Militarily he had changed his tactics and now
no longer intended to take the offensive; having dug in, it was up to Richard
to fight, and Saladin could afford to wait indefinitely. As he pointed out to
Richard in a letter, he was on his own land, surrounded by his own family
• 221 •
SALAD I N
and he had renounced the pleasures of the world. Richard, on the other
hand, was still a young man and he was far from home. The defensive strat-
eg
y was borne out of the realisation that Richard could not be defeated in
open batde - and with the increasing dissension in the Christian camp and
with pressure on Richard to return to Europe, it was the correct strategy.
And so Saladin fortified Jerusalem and waited; when he was informed that
the northern approach was vulnerable, he and his sons worked to carry
stones to strengthen the walls.
The winter of 1191 was a bitter one. For three months the rain fell inces-
santiy and there was littie shelter in Ramla for the Christian army. As Christmas
came and went the rain turned to snow and sleet, and the tents were bat-
tered by hailstones. Food rotted and men shivered and died. Saladin, in the
meantime, waited, for he had no intention of taldng the offensive. He had
disbanded his army, but the Muslims kept up constant raids against the
Christian camp. If Richard wanted Jerusalem he had to march inland and
fight for it. On 2 January 1192 Richard gave the order to begin the march
on Jerusalem, though it was half-hearted and was probably only done to raise
the morale in his army. Richard was now approached by the Templars and the
Hospitallers, who urged him to halt the march. If they lost touch with the
coast there was the danger of being cut off, they argued, and even if Jerusalem
was to fall, what then.? As soon as the crusaders had visited the Holy Sepulchre
they would return to Europe and Jerusalem would fall once again to Saladin.
This was advice which went fiindamentally against the whole point of
the crusade, but it was borne out of experience and wisdom, and Richard
listened. Turn away from Jerusalem, they advised, and fortify Ascalon, for
the key was Egypt. Richard then asked for a map of Jerusalem to be brought
and having studied it he concluded that the city could not fall to him as long
as the Muslims were united. By January, and to the great consternation of many
of those in the ranks, Richard turned towards Ascalon. The news of Richard's
withdrawal came as little relief to Saladin, for he feared that he would turn
his attention to Egypt, and if he did so then Saladin would have no option
but to follow. This would be hazardous in the extreme, since with the Franlcs