from the Muslim camp about the fulfilment of the terms of the agreement,
but when none was forthcoming he acted in a way which horrified
the watching spies. Numbering around 3,000, the garrison of Acre was
marched out on to the plain, roped together, men leading men, their hands
bound. Then the massacre commenced. By the time night fell, so had the
3,000. Ibn Shaddad wrote that:
Our spies had informed Saladin of the enemy's manoeuvres, and he sent
some reinforcements; but by then the slaughter had already taken place . . .
The . next morning the Muslims wanted to see who had fallen, and found
their martyred companions lyin^ where they fell; and some they recognised.
It is impossible to determine who was to blame for the massacre. Richard
may genuinely have believed that Saladin had broken the terms of the agree-
ment. In any case Richard was determined to march south from Acre and
the delays were both frustrating and dangerous, for it was clear that Saladin
was rapidly calling up reinforcements. At the same time the massacre - chill-
ing in its severity - would have had a salutary effect on the Muslim popu-
lace, for no garrison would now resist Richard's advance. As for Saladin,
his natural prevarications may have contributed to the massacre, but the
truth was that neither side trusted the other. Ibn Shaddad's commentary is
probably the fairest analysis of Richard's actions. He believed that only two
possibilities could explain the massacre: 'One was that they had Idlled them
as a reprisal for their own prisoners Idlled before then. Another was that the
king of England had decided to march on Ascalon and did not want to leave
behind a large number of enemy soldiers.' AVhat was certain was that with
the arrival of Richard, Saladin was faced with a foe the calibre of which he
had previously not encountered. He had suspected that the capture of
Jerusalem would unleash a terrible storm from Europe and now, on the
plains of Acre, the corpses of the 3,000 Muslims was a bloody proof of how
severe this storm would be.
On hearing of the massacre Saladin was moved to fury, which was unlike
him. For the next few days - and until his natural benevolence was restored
- few Christians who crossed his path were spared. In this manner, a day
after the massacre a knight - 'his appearance announced that he was a lead-
ing man among them' - was captured and brought to Saladin. Through an
interpreter, he was asked about the state of Richard's army and then as to
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why the massacre of the Muslims had taken place. The Icnight replied that
it had been the will of the king of England. Saladin then ordered that the
knight be put to death, and when this was translated to him, he visibly
blanched and requested that he would free a Muslim prisoner in his place
instead. Normally this was standard practice, for the release of a high-
ranldng Muslim was invaluable for Saladin. The Icnight was fettered and
judgement on his fate deferred as Saladin rode out to look over his army.
On his return, however, he ordered that the Icnight be put to death. Later
that afternoon two Franks were brought in as prisoners and were executed
on Saladin's orders. The following day two further prisoners were captured
and were executed, and that night 14 Franks and a Frankish women were
brought in. With them was a Muslim captive, a woman who clearly served
the Franldsh woman. Saladin ordered the release of the Muslim woman and
the execution of the Franks.
The march towards Jaffa
A few days after the massacre Richard's army was ready to move, though we
read that he had great difficulty clearing the inns and brothels in order to
get his men on the road. But by 25 August 1191 the Muslims witnessed the
Franks lighting fires and the army began its move. Richard's strategy was to
take control of the entire coastline, thereby ensuring supremacy at sea. By
sticking to the coast his army would also gain constant replenishment from
the fleet. Then when Jaffa had fallen, he aimed to march inland to cap-
ture Jerusalem. The journey from Acre to Jaffa is around 130 kilometres
have been intolerable. In addition, Richard Icnew that the Muslims would
harass his men at every stage. Above all an iron discipline was required;
the army could not allow itself to be dragged away from the coastUne, nor
could the knights be tempted to break away and charge the Muslim raiding
parties. The marching army clung to the coastline, but the reality was that
the Franks were an invading army with barely a toehold on the coast, while
the hinterland was overwhelmingly Muslim. There was little sense of hurry
as the army set off in three divisions, while the fleet sailed alongside. In each
division the cavalry was flanked by two columns of infantry, one between it
and the Muslim forces and the other marching along the shore. In that way
Richard alternated his infantry; those on the march faced the enemy raids
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and those on the shore carried the baggage and tents due to the lack of
transport animals. The discipline of the army gready impressed the watch-
ing Muslims. Ibn Shaddad noted that the infantry surrounded the cavalry
like a wall. Wearing solid iron corslets and full-length chain mail, they
appeared impervious to the Muslim arrows. 'I saw', wrote Ibn Shaddad,
'Franks with ten arrows fixed in their backs, pressing on in this fashion quite
unconcerned.' Meanwhile the cavalry waited for opportunities to charge
and then retreat behind the infantry. So disciplined was the Christian army
under such severe conditions that Ibn Shaddad could not but be impressed
and wrote of the 'endurance of these people, bearing exhausting tasks with-
out any pay or material gain'. As for Imad al-Din al-Isfahani, he wrote that
the marching infantry resembled hedgehogs brisding with arrows.
The heat was intense and the pace was accordingly slow. Marching
was only in the mornings and rest was on alternate days. Countless men
fainted and many dropped dead. Richard ordered the dead to be buried
where they fell and the sick to be transported on to the ships. And from the
high ground Saladin watched the slow inexorable march. He Icnew that
as long as the Christian army maintained its discipline and ignored the
skirmishes and harassment, he could do little. But he could bide his time
and wait for the moment when the Crusaders would surely tire and lose
their discipline. Then he would strike, and a second Hattin would be his. In
the meantime he even enrolled 300 robbers from among the Bedouin to
infiltrate the enemy and steal their property and horses. But Saladin had not
reckoned with Richard. To march an army in the height of summer and to
maintain such an iron discipline elevated him to the ranks of the great mil-
itary commanders. And on the march he seemed to be everywhere. Furious
assaults were launched against the marching army with Saladin at the heart.
'I saw him [Saladin] actually riding among
the sldrmishers as the enemy's
arrows flew past him', wrote Ibn Shaddad. 'He was attended by two pages
with two spare mounts and that was all, riding from division to division and
urging them forward.' But when the Muslim raids attacked the rearguard
trying to separate it from the rest of the army, Richard himself rushed to
its defence, and in the words of a chronicler landed on the Muslims 'like a
thunderbolt'. To the watching Saladin this was evidence of a great warrior
and a formidable presence, but he was also shrewd enough to know that it
was foolhardy for kings to take such risks, for surely an army that relied on
its king to intervene personally would be lost without him. Nevertheless
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Saladin was impressed. This was an army that maintained a discipline the like
of which he had not seen previously. Yes, the Turldsh cavalry could continue
to harass the crusaders, but as long as they stayed out of reach of the
Christian crossbowmen they were unable to inflict casualties and if they
came too close they were picked off by the crossbowmen.
The two armies now marched down the coast in parallel, sometimes only
3 Idlometres (2 miles) apart. Daily Saladin kept up the raids, and the cru-
saders, too, must have wondered at this enemy that never seemed to flag.
To slow them down the Muslims targeted the horses which the laiights
depended on, and it was not long before many laiights were marching
shoulder to shoulder with the infantry, their lances carried on their backs.
As for the numbers on the march, it is hard to estimate with great accuracy
but a combination of the English and French crusaders of Richard, the
remaining crusaders of Phillip, the German remnants of the Barbarossa
crusade, and the forces of Guy, along with the Templars and Hospitallers
would probably have numbered in the region of 20,000-30,000 infantry,
with a cavaliy force not likely to exceed 4,000-5,000 men. Saladin would
have fielded an army roughly the same size as Richard's, 20,000-30,000
men, though with considerably more cavalry. As the armies moved south,
more prisoners were captured and some revealed usefial information. On
one occasion Saladin was told that the Bedouin had approached Richard
and had informed him that the Muslim army was not as numerous as he
feared. The following day, however, a Muslim assault, which was so severe
that it left hundreds of Christian soldiers wounded, convinced Richard other-
wise and he had two of the Bedouin Idlled as a consequence. There was no
doubt that the Christian army was suffering heavy casualties and around
5 September contact was made which requested that talks between the two
camps be held. Saladin immediately welcomed this proposal and delegated
al-Adil to be in charge, but he was motivated by factors other than peace
talks: 'If you are able to spin out the talks with the Franks', he wrote to his
brother, 'then perhaps they will remain where they are today' - for Saladin
Icnew that reinforcements were arriving daily to strengthen his army. Al-Adil
then met with Richard, but neither side truly wanted peace for there was still
much fighting to be done. When al-Adil told Richard to elaborate on his
offer, the king replied that the basic condition was that Saladin restored all
the lands to him. Ibn Shaddad diplomatically wrote that al-Adil gave a harsh
answer to that demand and the meeting broke up.
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Saladin's defeat at Arsuf
On 3 September 1191 Saladiii moved to the forest of Arsuf, for he decided
that if he were to prevent Richard reaching Jaffa, then it was here - where
the wooded terrain helped conceal his movements - that the battle had to
take place. A few days later news reached him that the Franks were maldng
for Arsuf; he now drew his army in parallel to the Franldsh columns and,
when the Christian vanguard reached the orchards, he committed his
army to attack. His plan was to cut off the rearguard commanded by the
Hospitallers from the rest of the army, and to destroy it before Richard
rushed to its aid. On the morning of 7 September 1191 the Muslims began
their attack. The Bedouins and Nubians launched arrows and javelins into
the enemy lines, before parting to allow the mounted archers to advance,
attack and wheel off - a well-practised technique to tempt the crusaders to
charge them. At several points along the line the two armies were engaged
in close hand-to-hand combat. As the fighting became more and more
ferocious, there were times when the Christian forces were forced to fight
while marching backwards through the thickets, and throughout the day
the Muslim cries of 'Allahu Akbar' clashed with the Christian army's cries of
'Sanctum Sepulchrum adjuva'. No matter how ferocious the attacks were,
the Hospitallers maintained their discipline and refused to take the Muslim
bait and charge from the centre of the column. Several times messages were
sent to Richard, but each time the reply was the same: they must resist the
urge to charge the enemy. The furious nature of the Muslim assault and the
tactics adopted were striking, for they were completely out of character
for Saladin. This was not the cautious Saladin who carefully planned his
actions and the consequences of those actions. In contrast to Hattin, where
he had meticulously planned his victory, at Arsuf Saladin knew that the
sea prevented him from surrounding his enemy, and by pressing them
so closely while they were still unbroken he was exposing himself to a
counter-attack.
Although the Hospitallers suffered few losses, they were losing horses at
an alarming rate. Several times they begged Richard to launch a full charge
but Richard refused each request, waiting for Saladin to overreach himself
and thereby be vulnerable to a counter-charge. Increasingly, however, as
the day of 7 September wore on, and as the Muslim attacks intensified, the
cohesion of the Hospitallers began to erode and gaps in the Christian
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army appeared. Ibn Shaddad, who was an eyewitness, noted how intensely
Saladin was participating in the batde itself: 'I met his brother in a similar
state, while the arrows were flying past them both.' The battle of Arsuf had
entered a critical stage. When a request by Gamier of Nablus (master of the
Hospitallers) to Richard to attack had been turned down, the Hospitaller
patience snapped, and with a cry of 'St George' the Hospitallers, followed
by the French, charged the Muslim ranks. It was precisely what Saladin had
hoped for: finally a break in the disciplined Christian army. But that day
fortune favoured Richard, since at the same time the Hospitallers charged,
Saladin's archers had dismounted to direct their arrows more accurately, and
were overwhelmed by the unexpected onslaught. Quicldy aware of events,
Richard ordered a general attack all along the line, so breaking Saladin's
army, which was pursued across the hills of Arsuf Ibn Shaddad writes that
he fled in confusion to the left wing but found that it, too, had b
roken and
was in retreat. He then fled to the right wing, to discover that it also had
been routed. Frantically he searched for Saladin, and made his way to the
banners which were stiU upright and the drums which were beating, to
find him surrounded by only 17 horsemen - the rest had fled - desperately
trying to rally his troops. 'I was in attendance on him', wrote Ibn Shaddad,
'offering consolation, which, however, he was unable to accept. He was
protected from the sun by a kerchief and we asked him to take some food.
Something light was brought to him, from which he took only a littie.'
It was a victory for Richard, but not as conclusive as at first thought. He
was wary of the Muslims rallying and the Christian army overextending
itself, and with the forest ahead the risk of ambush was high. Consequently
the order was made to call the pursuit off. Nevertheless, although the defeat
could have been more severe, Arsuf was a bitter blow for Saladin. At Acre
Saladin had come to realise that he could not fight an entrenched Christian
army; now at Arsuf he learned how dangerous it was to attack one that
was on the move, especially one commanded by as formidable a leader as
Richard. 'Never have we seen the like of him', an admiring Aleppan amir
told Saladin. As far as casualties were concerned, the defeat could have been
worse, but psychologically Richard's victory was almost total. As Ibn
Shaddad ruefiilly wrote: 'All our men were wounded, if not in their bodies
in their hearts'. And yet, though after Arsuf it became clear that the Muslim
army could not win, the Franks could still lose.^^ Admittedly the morale
was low, but Saladin could call up reinforcements, and if Richard could
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be tempted to turn inland and make a dash for Jerusalem, then the tables
would turn once again. But Richard was not prepared to risk heading inland
just yet, for he needed Jaffa as his base for the conquest of Jerusalem.
And so the Christian army resumed its march down the coast, and Saladin
- taldng care not to show any signs of wealaiess - continued his tactics of
harassment and sldrmishes.
As Richard made his way to Jaffa - it took just under 20 days to march
the 130 kilometres (80 miles) from Acre - Saladin was deep in thought