ii. Income statement accounts
c. Determining the income or loss
5.
Preparing the statements—rearranging the work sheet information into
• A balance sheet
• An income statement
Intelligence Files and Analytical Investigative Methods
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6.
Adjusting the ledger accounts—preparing adjusting journal entries from information in the adjustments columns of the work sheet and posting the entries in order to bring the account balances up
to date
7.
Closing the temporary proprietorship accounts—preparing and post-
ing entries to close the temporary proprietorship accounts and transfer the net income or loss to the capital account
8.
Preparing a postclosing trial balance—proving the accuracy of the adjusting and closing procedure (Figures 12.10 and 12.11)
Link analysis
chart
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Case # 12TF123456
SA J.J. Angleton
September 11, 2012
Figure 12.10 Example of a link analysis chart.
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Advanced Criminal Investigations and Intelligence Operations
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Intelligence,
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13
Misappropriation Law
We should all be concerned about the future because we will have to spend the rest of our lives there.
Charles F. Kettering
Inventor and Businessman
Technology of interest to national security is as diverse as it is rapidly emerging and ever evolving. Metatechnology is the application of technologies for problem-solving. Technology must be selected and adapted for each problem.
Nanotechnology is the manipulation of matter on an atomic and molecular scale. Nanotechnology, defined by size, is broad and includes diverse fields of science such as microfabrication, molecular biology, organic chemistry, semiconductor physics, and surface science. Nanotechnology may be able to create many new materials and devices with applications, such as biomateri-als, electronics, energy, and medicine.
Bill Gates said, “I’m a great believer that any tool that enhances communication has profound effects in terms of how people can learn from each other, and how they can achieve the kind of freedoms that they’re interested in.”
He also said, “We always overestimate the change that will occur in the next two years and underestimate the change that will occur in the next ten. Don’t let yourself be lulled into inaction” (http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/
authors/b/bill_gates.html; June 5, 2013).
Overview of International and Military Law
International law is generally a product of international conventions, international custom, and general principles of law recognized by civilized nations.
As early as 1900, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in the Paquette Habana, 175
U.S. 677 (1900), that international law is a part of U.S. law. Treaties are recognized under Article 6 of the U.S. Constitution. The U.S. Supreme Court also recognized the applicability of the laws of war to military conduct in In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 16 (1945), in which the court said, “We do not make the laws of war but we respect them so far as they do not conflict with the commands of Congress or the Constitution.”
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The Supreme Court also recognized the international rule that a state
has power and authority over criminal acts committed within its territory and the authority of the U.S. government to permit the trial of its military personnel when consistent with this rule and its treaty obligations. In Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524, 529 (1957), the court said, “A sovereign nation has exclusive jurisdiction to punish offenses against its laws committed within its borders….”
The legal status of military forces is determined by (1) a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), (2) a Military Assistance Advisory Agreement (for a
MAAG), or (3) a Military Mission Agreement (for a mission). A mission was a designat
ion given when established before WWII and a MAAG designation was assigned after WWII. The SOFA designation involved large num-
bers of equipment and civilian personnel and dependents usually accompany the forces.
A SOFA is an agreement between a host country and a foreign nation
stationing forces in that country. SOFAs are often included, along with other types of military agreements, as part of a comprehensive security arrangement. A SOFA does not constitute a security arrangement; it establishes the rights and privileges of foreign personnel present in a host country in support of the larger security arrangement. SOFA grants to the United States the right to exercise authority over criminal acts committed within the territory of the host country by members of U.S. forces. (Other relevant legal issues are also involved in the SOFA.) Criminal offenses and war crimes are usually investigated by the USACIDC, the U.S. Air Force Office of Special Investigations (USAF OSI), and the Naval Criminal Investigation Service
(NCIS). They are prosecuted by the respective branch Judge Advocate
General (JAG) corps.
Modern laws of war address declarations of war, acceptance of surrender,
and the treatment of POWs. Conventions, such as the Hague Conventions ( of 1899, 1907, and 1954) and the Geneva Convention ( of 1929 and 1949), are written conventions covering such issues as prohibitions on targets, illegal tricks and methods (such as pretending to surrender to facilitate an attack), prohibitions on weapons (i.e., those that are calculated to cause unnecessary suffering), humane treatment of noncombatants (including POWs), illegal
means of interrogation, criminal violations of the law of war and criminal orders, and obligations to report violations of the laws war.
The enemy population is divided into two general classes: protected persons and unprotected persons. Protected persons include POWs, chap-lains, medical personnel, and civilians who abstain from the fighting. The protection of noncombatant civilians exists whether the population is that of an enemy state, an ally state, or a state that does not have forces engaged in the conflict.
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Unprotected persons include spies and guerillas or persons who commit hostile acts or engage in the fighting without complying with the conditions of the law of war for recognition as legal y organized resistance units.
POWs are divided into two general categories: combatants and noncombatants. Combatants are participants in a war who are lawful y entitled to carry on hostilities:
1. Members of armed forces
2. Members of regular militia or volunteer units
3. Members of irregular partisan or guerilla units (who comply with
the conditions of the law of war for recognition as legal y organized resistance units)
4. Levee en masse (inhabitants of a nonoccupied territory who spon-
taneously take up arms to resist an invading force, without time to
form regular units, upon the approach of the enemy; these people
must carry arms openly and respect the laws of war in order to be recognized as POWs if captured)
Noncombatants who are protected as POWs when captured and those who accompany Armed Forces without being members of the Armed Forces
include war correspondents (journalists), supply contractors, technical representatives, labor units, and welfare units.
The customary law of war and the Geneva Convention of 1949 establish rules governing the treatment of noncombatants, POWs, sick and wounded,
and other detained civilians. These rules are based upon the principle that they all receive the same humane treatment.
Some of the articles included in the Hague Conventions or the Geneva Convention related to spies are as follows:
Article 29—A person can only be considered a spy when, acting clandestinely or on false pretences [sic], he obtains or endeavours [sic] to obtain information in the zone of operations of a belligerent with the intention of communicating it to the hostile party.
Thus, soldiers not wearing a disguise who have penetrated into the zone of operations of the hostile army, for the purpose of obtaining information, are not considered spies. Similarly, the following are not considered spies: soldiers and civilians carrying out their mission openly, entrusted with the delivery of despatches [sic] intended either for their own army or for the enemy’s army.
To this class belong likewise persons sent in balloons for the purpose of carrying despatches [sic] and, generally, of maintaining communications between the different parts of an army or a territory.
The definition of a spy given in this article remains valid because the
Geneva Convention contains no similar provision. However, a spy is also a
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protected person in so far as he conforms to the definition given in Article 4
of the Fourth Convention. Under Article 5 of the convention, the spy may
nevertheless be deprived temporarily of certain rights, particularly the right of communication:
Article 30—A spy taken in the act shall not be punished without previous trial.
The Convention contains several provisions in this respect which extend
the principle and make it precise. Thus Article 3 prohibits “the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pro-nounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.”
Article 3, although it applies only to armed conflicts not of an international character, contains rules of absolutely general application. The prohibition mentioned is, moreover, confirmed by Article 5 and Articles 64-76.
[Paragraph 2 of Article 68 authorizes the Occupying Power under certain
conditions to inflict the death penalty on protected persons found guilty of espionage.]
Article 31—A spy who, after rejoining the army to which he belongs, is subsequently captured by the enemy is treated as a prisoner of war, and incurs no responsibility for his previous acts of espionage.
Wiretap Surveillance
In Katz v. United States (1967), the U.S. Supreme Court established its
“reasonable expectation of privacy” test. It overturned Olmstead v. United States and held that wiretaps were unconstitutional searches, because there was a reasonable expectation that the communication would be private.
The government was then required to get a warrant to execute a wiretap.
Ten years later, the Supreme Court held that a pen register is not a search because the “petitioner voluntarily conveyed numerical information to the telephone company” ( Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979)). Since the defendant had disclosed the dialed numbers to the TelCo so they could connect his call, he did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the numbers he dialed. The court did not distinguish between disclosing the
numbers to a human operator and just the automatic equipment used by
the TelCo. The Smith decision left pen registers outside the scope of constitutional protection. Any privacy protection would, therefore, have to be enacted as a privacy law statute. (This is criminal procedure, which is different from the civil tort of invasion of privacy.)
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) was passed in 1986
and consisted of three main provisions or titles. Title III created the Pen Register Act, which included restrictions on private and law enforcement uses of
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pen registers. Private parties were general y restricted from using them unless they met one of the exceptions, which included an exception for the business providing the communication (usual y the Telco) if it needed to do so to ensure the proper functioning of its busine
ss. Law enforcement agencies must get a court order from a judge to get a pen register approved for surveil ance.
Under 18 U.S.C. § 3123(a)(1),
the court shall enter an exparte order authorizing the installation and use of a pen register or trap and trace device anywhere within the United States, if the court finds that the attorney for the Government has certified to the court that the information likely to be obtained by such installation and use is relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation (emphasis added).
A government attorney must certify that information will likely be obtained in relation to an ongoing criminal investigation.
This is the lowest requirement for receiving a court order under the
ECPA, because in Smith v. Maryland, the Supreme Court ruled that use of a pen register does not constitute a search. The court held that only the content of a conversation should receive constitutional protection under
the right to privacy, because pen registers do not intercept conversation.
The Pen Register Act did not include an exclusionary rule in the statute (although case law and civil remedies may still apply). Section 216 of the 2001 USA PATRIOT Act expanded the definition of a pen register to include devices or programs that provide an analogous function for Internet
communications.
Surveillance, Satellites, and Civil Liberties
United States v. Jones, 615 F. 3d 544, affirmed (U.S. Supreme Court 2012) The government obtained a search warrant permitting it to install a GPS
tracking device on a vehicle registered to respondent Jones’s wife. The warrant authorized installation in the District of Columbia and within 10 days, but agents installed the device on the 11th day and in Maryland. The government then tracked the vehicle’s movements for 28 days. It subsequently secured an indictment of Jones and others on drug trafficking conspiracy
charges. The district court suppressed the GPS data obtained while the vehicle was parked at Jones’s residence but held the remaining data admissible because Jones had no reasonable expectation of privacy when the vehicle was on public streets. Jones was convicted. The DC Circuit reversed, concluding that admission of the evidence obtained by warrantless use of the GPS device violated the Fourth Amendment.
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Held: The government’s attachment of the GPS device to the vehicle, and its use of that device to monitor the vehicle’s movements, constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment.
a. The Fourth Amendment protects the “right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures.” Here, the Government’s physical intrusion