hegemony was almost complete, as was made apparent by the
president herself during her recent visit to the United States when she
stated that:
While Asia must take greater responsibility for its own political and eco-
nomic security, it must also recognise that strong relations with the
United States of America will contribute greatly to regional peace and
prosperity, stability and security, especially from terrorism.33
It is clear that the Philippines has always been a client state of the United
States and that American political, economic, and military interests
extend deep into the country’s domestic politics and political/
governmental institutions. Furthermore, half a century of American
colonization, coupled with half a century of indirect U.S. intervention
into Philippines politics, means that, in terms of both its domestic and
foreign policies, the Philippines is no more than a proxy state acting
under the direction of the United States.
How the War against Terror has
Divided the Governments of
ASEAN and Allowed the United States
to Assume Center Stage Once More
ASEAN, today, is at a crossroads of its history. Since its formation in
1967, the regional grouping has been trying to carve a place for itself
as a major actor in global politics and its membership has now been
expanded to include Brunei, Myanmar, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam.
Yet, despite the pomposity and grandeur of ASEAN meetings and
conferences, the regional grouping has little to show in terms of concrete
political success.
ASEAN’s attempts to put forward and implement the Zone of
Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) was soon exposed for the
cosmetic phenomenon that it really was. Despite claims to neutrality
during the Cold War, it was clear that ASEAN was quietly neutral “on
the side of the West.” Committed as they are to free market principles
and being among the first countries to embrace the globalization
process, the nation-states of ASEAN have been important trading
allies and strategic partners to their Western counterparts—though
the relationship between the two sides was never one based on equality
of stature and respect. The governments of ASEAN turned to the
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Uncle Sam to the Rescue?
237
West, and most notably to the United States, to save them from the
grip of Soviet expansion and America remains the number one trading
partner of every ASEAN state, including the Muslim-majority states
of Malaysia, Indonesia, and Brunei.
This unequal relationship, brokered between Washington’s elite
and its nominated counterparts in ASEAN, has also been based on
very real differentials of political, economic, and military power which
the leaders of ASEAN are more than aware of. As a result of this
enduring legacy of dependency that has been underwritten by American
intervention (or threats of intervention), sponsorship, and patronage,
the governments of ASEAN have also been at the mercy of the whims
of America’s political elite and economic managers.
This was most clearly evident in the wake of 9/11 when each and
every leader of ASEAN echoed America’s concern over the danger of
“global Islamic terrorism” and the “threat” that it posed for global
economic and political relations. Despite the cautious words of warning
issued by the political leadership of Malaysia and Indonesia about
America’s subsequent military exercises in Afghanistan and Iraq, both
countries have played along with the American line and Malaysia has
even gone as far as laying the foundations for a regional ASEAN Anti-
Terror Center that is meant to coordinate the intelligence activities of
the security services of the ASEAN states, with the Americans (via the
CIA and FBI) giving close support. Malaysia has also shifted the focus
of the Five-Nation Defence Group (comprising of Malaysia, Singapore,
Britain, Australia, and New Zealand) toward the issue of “terrorism”
and religious extremism in its bid to ensure that its military and strategic
links with the West are not broken.34
As we have seen, the divisive nature of intra-ASEAN rivalry and
competition has also meant that some ASEAN governments have
been able to exploit Washington’s ambitious agenda to the pull, pay-
ing lip-service (if not more) to American designs on the region as a
whole. Already the governments of Singapore, Thailand, and the
Philippines have gone out of their way to ingratiate themselves to the
Bush administration and both Lee Kuan Yew and Gloria Arroyo have
openly called for a more visible and lasting U.S. military presence in
the region.
The Americans, in turn, have reciprocated these demands with
their own renewed commitment to ASEAN’s future, no doubt with
the intention of ensuring that ASEAN’s future development will be
in line with U.S. political, economic, and strategic-military interests.
During her recent trip to Washington (May 2003), Philippine presi-
dent Gloria Arroyo was given the assurance that America will protect
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238
F arish A. Noor
the interests of the Philippines, which the U.S. president described
as America’s “oldest ally” in the region. The Philippines was also
described by the U.S. president as a “major non-NATO ally” and a
key country in the global war against terror.35 While the American
government was busy improving its ties with the Philippines and
Singapore, the military campaign conducted by the Indonesian armed
forces against Islamist “rebels” in the north Sumatran province of
Aceh, received scant attention. Despite numerous reports of atrocities
being carried out by Indonesian troops against the civilian population
in Aceh (including the burning down of hundreds of schools, col-
leges, and religious seminaries), it was clear that Washington was more
concerned about the ongoing war against terror in Southeast Asia at
the time.36
This trend, if continued unchecked, can only help to deteriorate
the already poor and weakening state of human rights and democracy
in ASEAN as a whole and to foreground long-existing tensions and
rivalries between states and religious and ethnic communities in the
region. In countries like Malaysia and Indonesia with Muslim majority
communities, the dubious presence of the United States is bound to
lead to even more vocal (and possibly violent) anti-American senti-
ments spilling out onto the streets. While in those countries with
Muslim minority communities, like Singapore, Philippines, and Thailand,
the unwelcome intrusion of American military and intelligence per-
sonnel to deal with the so-called Muslim problem will also lead to
greater alienation and feelings of discrimination among the Muslims,
who increasingly feel that they have been typecast as the “fifth col-
umn” within. The net effect of U.S. intervention in the region would
be the emergence of a politics of divide-and-rule, with Washington in
the pivotal
position to play the role of patron–protector to regimes of
its choice—regardless of the human rights records of the governments
in question.
Under such circumstances, what hope is there for an ASEAN bloc
with a meaningful independent foreign and domestic policy to call its
own? Those ASEAN leaders, like Dr. Mahathir of Malaysia, who have
spoken up against the misguided policies of the United States in
Afghanistan and Iraq have been summarily put down and chastised by
America’s ambassadors with the warning that such talk could jeopar-
dize the economic and political stability and future of their own
countries.37 The “Great Game” has returned to Asia with a vengeance,
and American global hegemony is set to rise once more as it rewrites its
history and pursues its “manifest destiny” as part of a global crusade
against terror.
* * *
Uncle Sam to the Rescue?
239
Notes
1. On the same day (October 8) that the United States invaded Afghanistan,
the leaders of PAS came out with their strongest statement against the
Americans yet. For the Murshid’ul Am (spiritual leader) of PAS, Tuan
Guru Nik Aziz Nik Mat, the attack on Afghanistan was clearly an attack on
ernment, he claimed that: “The US hates the Taliban because the latter is
firmly committed to upholding Islamic values. Osama bin Laden is just an
excuse for the US, which has time and again shown its hostility towards
Islam, to wage war against the religion,” Mohd Irfan Isa, Osama an Excuse
to Wage War against Islam: Nik Aziz (Malaysiakini.com, October 10,
2001). PAS’s (then) president Ustaz Fadzil Noor also stated that the
attacks were not only against Afghanistan’s Taliban regime but that they
constituted a direct assault on Muslims the world over. Speaking to local
and foreign journalists in a press conference of his own, Fadzil Noor said
that “America has attacked a small and defenceless country like
Afghanistan without showing the world strong reason or proof, (and) they
are war criminals,” US Embassy under Guard, PAS Labels Americans “War
Criminals ” (Malaysiakini.com, October 8, 2001). He then added: “If the
Americans are really waging a war against terrorism, why don’t they attack
Israel, who are terrorists against the Palestinians?” (ibid.) The President of
the Islamist party ended the interview with a clarion call to arms when he
stated that: “all Muslims must oppose these criminals—this time, there is
no denying a call for Jihad.” (Ibid.)
2. See Tong Yee Siong, US Thanks Mahathir for Support, Understands
Malaysia’s Dilemma (Malaysiakini.com, October 15, 2001). At a special
press conference held in Kuala Lumpur, the U.S. Trade Representative
Zoellick stated that the United States “respects Malaysia for all the internal
challenges and tensions it has to deal with, which makes its support more
meaningful.” He also denied that the Mahathir government’s objection to
the U.S. air strike on Afghanistan could jeopardize the countries’ bilateral
trade: “Our trade ties are based on close economic relationship. The sup-
port we received in many areas will only strengthen the nature of our rela-
tionship.” He added that “I don’t see any negative variety [of views] in
there. The difference of views is understandable.”
3. See “Admiral Blair: contain terrorism for political stability,” New Sunday
Times, November 25, 2001.
4. See Rohan Gunaratna, Inside al-Qaeda: Global Network of Terror
(London: Hurst and Co., 2002).
5. See Farish A. Noor, Fighting Demons of Their Own Making, in
Malaysiakini.com, July 6, 2002.
6. Robert J. McMahon, The Limits of Empire: The United States and
Southeast Asia Since World War II (New York: Columbia University Press,
1999).
7. Ibid., 1999, p. 73.
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240
F arish A. Noor
8. Robert J. McMahon, The Limits of Empire: The United States and
Southeast Asia Since World War II (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1999), p. 85.
9. Ibid., p. 88.
10. Ibid., p. 89.
11. Ngo Dinh Diem was, however, totally out of touch with the Vietnamese
people like Bao Dai. He ruled like a feudal warlord and was dependent on
his own network of Catholic advisers, Chinese business cronies, and family
members. Diem also preferred to speak in French, had spent years
abroad, and was known to be supported by the Americans who saw him
as their last chance to block a communist takeover of the country.
12. Ibid., p. 107.
13. Ibid., p. 115.
14. Ibid., p. 115.
15. Ibid., pp. 130–131.
16. McMahon (1999) notes that “in a no-holds-barred effort to block a
North Vietnamese victory, Nixon would unleash the most intensive
bombing campaign of the war . . . Removing previous restraints, the
President ordered the sustained bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong, the
mining of Haiphong harbour and a naval blockade of the entire North
Vietnamese coast” (p. 167).
17. Ibid., p. 130. McMahon notes that “the grossly inflated body counts pro-
duced by US and South Vietnamese forces as the principal index for
military progress never even approximated the real figures. Nor could any
of the other side, that was conditioned by historical experience and cultural
values that few Americans knew and even fewer still appreciated” (p. 131).
Vietnam would remain under Communist rule for the next two-and-a-half
decades, though, by 1978, it would find itself at war again, this time
against its communist ex-allies, Cambodia and China.
18. For a more detailed account of the development of American policy toward
the Moros, see Thomas C. McKenna, “Appreciating Islam in the Muslim
Philippines,” in Islam in the Age of Nation-States, edited by Hefner and
Horvatich (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), pp. 48–67.
19. Ibid., p. 51.
20. Blum, 1995, p. 40. By the end of 1945, the Americans were training a
local force of 50,000 Filipino troops that were later used to contain the
Huk uprising. When the Huk leaders attempted to reintegrate themselves
into mainstream Filipino society, their moves were blocked by the
Americans and pro-American Filipino leaders. Luis Taruc, the leader of
the Huks, was prevented from taking his seat in the Philippines Congress
even though he had won the elections fairly.
21. William Blum, Killing Hope: U.S. Military and CIA Interven-
tions Since World War II (Monroe, Maine: Common Courage Press,
1995), p. 41.
22. Ibid., p. 44.
* * *
Uncle Sam to the Rescue?
241
23. Ibid., p. 43.
24. See Edward G. Landsdale, In the Midst of Wars (New York, 1972); Blum,
Killing Hope.
25. American military and intelligence personnel were stationed in Malaysia
after World War II, tagging along with the British.
At the time was a
detachment of security and intelligence personnel from the American
Office of Strategic Services (OSS), which arrived to survey the political
terrain in the region. The American agents were based at the offices of
the OCBC bank in Kuala Lumpur, close to the Chinatown district of the
capital where they could observe the activities of the Chinese communist
and leftist movements there. Among the American OSS agents based at
the OCBC building were Brig.-Gen. R.C. Pape, L.J.W. Smith, and
Captain Post. It was at the OCBC office that the OSS agents attempted
to lure members of the MCP-backed MPAJU, and one of the MPAJU
leaders, Koon Swan, even tried to gain the support of the Americans in
the MCP’s struggle against the British. None of the MCP’s efforts were
to prove successful, and, in the end, it was the OSS (with the help of the
Malayan intelligence expert C.C. Too) who managed to win over the
communist leaders (like Chan Tai Chee) to their side. Though small in
number, the American presence in Malaysia was destined to be a long-
lasting one. As they had shown in the Philippines, the Americans were
keen to impress upon the people of Southeast Asia that they were the new
power to be reckoned with.
26. See Mohd Irfan Isa, Osama—an Excuse to Wage War against Islam: Nik
Aziz (Malaysiakini.com, October 10, 2001).
27. See We Do Not Support War Against any Muslim Nation: PM
(Malaysiakini.com, October 8, 2001).
28. Ibid.
29. See Tong Yee Siong, Mahfuz Wants Gov’t to Provide Military Aid to
Taliban (Malaysiakini.com, October 11, 2001).
30. Since the Philippine Senate defeated the bases treaty in September 1991,
the Pentagon has been trying to reestablish its military presence in the
Philippines in order to be able to use that country again as a springboard
for U.S. power projection. President Ramos and his administration have
been the Pentagon’s main allies in this effort.
31. In November 1992, at the initiative of high U.S. military officials in the
Pacific, their Philippine counterparts agreed to give the U.S. military
access to Philippine ports, air fields, and military installations for purposes
of ship visits, air transit, and small unit military exercises (as was reported