influence the formation of the American image in Russia—from
America’s racial and ethnic characteristics to the deep divisions in the
understanding of privacy and personal freedom. They have a funda-
mental, historical character, and depend little on Russia’s political
system or changes in American society. The events of 9/11 did not
change these factors.34 But on that day, the war on international ter-
rorism had a major influence on the subjective perception of America.
In that respect, since the end of the 1980s, two tendencies, which are
at first glance contradictory, may be observed.
The first is that anti-American sentiments in Russia were either
increasing or remaining stable at high levels. This period was marked
by a feeling of national humiliation as a result of Russia’s rapid decline
relative to the USSR of the 1980s. Ideas of a conspiracy against Russia
(this time, executed successfully by Washington) began circulating
widely in Russian society, as did notions of hostility of foreign interests
to Russia and the humiliating Russian dependence on the United
States. In 1998, approximately a third of Russians believed in the
“international conspiracy against Russia.”35 Many American stereotypes,
instilled into the public’s consciousness by communist propaganda,
began to self-perpetuate. For example, 25 percent of Russians
believed that Russia is doing badly precisely because its failure is bene-
ficial to foreign countries.36
The society experienced growing disenchantment with the new
sociopolitical realities. The economic crisis was directly reflected in the
quality of life and the Russians’ social security net. A noticeable por-
tion of the population began forming a view that the major political
triumphs of the period—a free press, democratic elections, and a
reform of the government—were not worth so much suffering.37 The
United States was seen as the catalyst of this suffering, pushing the
Russian government in that direction. The economic aid it provided
to Russia was seen not only as a national humiliation, but a desire of
the American corporations to position themselves in the Russian market.
For example, in 1999, 75 percent of Russians believed that Russia is
too dependent on the West.38 From 1990 to 1993, the number of
people who thought Russia was threatened with “the selling off of
national riches to foreigners” increased from 48 to 73 percent.39
The exponential growth of contacts between the two societies
should be judged as extremely positive. Yet, this contact became a
sort of a “reality check,” strengthening some mutual stereotypes and
even creating new ones. When people who think they know each
other start to live together, they often discover that they think
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127
differently, get in each other’s way, and degenerate into petty but
endless squabbles.40 Their differences become more apparent. The
initial period of embrace in the years of perestroika could be called a
honeymoon. Continuing the metaphor, it could be said that both soci-
eties brought into their “marriage” the old problems and stereotypes.41
American passiveness toward Russian corruption and organized
crime also contributed to the increase in anti-Americanism. The policies
of privatization and the shock therapy undertaken by Yegor Gaidar with
the recommendations of American economists, put most of the pop-
ulation on the brink of poverty while enriching a select few—primarily
government officials and local bureaucrats.42
Yeltsin’s team became a symbol of corruption, which did not pre-
vent Washington from extending its enormous assistance, seeing a
greater threat in the opposition—the communist Gennady Zyuganov.
The presidential elections of 1996 were the apotheosis of this support.
Half of the Russians, at the time, considered American allies to be
Russian enemies, and more than a third were convinced of the threat
of an American military invasion of Russia.43 Many believed that Yeltsin
was a tool of Washington, since he was working under their control to
complete the extermination of their recent opponent.44
The loss of Russia’s global influence was another factor of animosity
toward the United States. For the people of Russia—the inheritor of
the USSR, which achieved a status of a superpower by paying a hefty
price of blood and sacrifice—the loss became a profound psycho-
logical trauma. The Americanization of former republics and allies,
who sought to distance themselves from Russia, take up anti-Russian
stances, and reorient themselves to the West with Washington’s sup-
port, were seen as an especially negative development. Russia lost
access to international markets, including those for arms, which were
immediately taken over by American corporations. The number of
Russians who thought that their country always provokes the hostility
of other states grew from 42 percent in 1994 to 56 percent in 2000.45
A feeling that democratization was yet another method of under-
mining Russian influence in the world and subjugating Russia’s for-
mer estates was fomenting. In response to the question, “Who should
Russia strengthen its ties with?” in 1999, 16 percent pointed to Asia,
and only 13 percent pointed to the Untied States. A year before that,
18 percent thought it necessary to strengthen ties with the United
States, and only 9 percent with Asia.46 That is, if on the question of
America’s role in Russia’s domestic issues they were ambiguous, in
trade and international matters they did not see the United States as a
friend and ally. In April 1999, 48 percent of Russians considered the
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N ikol ai Zlobin
United States an enemy in the international arena, while two years
prior, only a third thought so. The number of people who saw China
as Russia’s enemy decreased six-fold, and, in 1999, fell to 3 percent.47
The second tendency in Russian society during the 1990s was
related to the fact that the United States ceased to be some abstract
“force of evil.” America became more a nation of regular people in the
form of tourists who visited Russia or seen by Russian tourists visiting
it. American news agencies, government organizations, and NGOs
began to display an active presence in Russia. Russians began traveling
to the United States, buying products made there, and getting their
share of American popular culture. Cultural and scientific exchange
facilitated an evolution of perceptions. America was less and less “the
government of America” of the Cold War and more of “the country
of America,” which could be judged in simple human terms. In 2001,
the number of those who considered the United States an enemy state
decreased from 52 to 43 percent, while the number of those who saw
her as a friend grew from 32 to 43 percent. Sixty-five percent judged
friendly relations with America as a positive development, while only
12 percent saw
this as negative.48
Russians felt the responsibility for world order out of sheer inertia.
The concept of “peaceful coexistence” between two major military
powers continues to influence public sentiment.49 It is understood
that the United States has the same responsibility and, therefore, can-
not be interested in weakening Russia, because no one needs a weak
partner. That is, the suspicion toward American politics or the convic-
tion of her aggressiveness did not abate, but human contact and com-
mon sense led many in Russia to see a chance for creating new
relations that would be acceptable for both sides.
The Russian reaction to NATO actions in Yugoslavia in the spring
of 1999 is a good illustration of this. They shocked Russian society. At
the beginning of the bombing, the percentage of people responding
favorably to America fell from 57 to 14 percent, while the number
responding unfavorably grew from 28 to 72 percent.50 The aggres-
sion, as the Russian press called the action, was considered a direct
threat to their nation by 70 percent of Russians.51 Sixty-one percent
responded favorably to Evgeny Primakov’s response, who, when he
learned of the attack en route to the States on an official visit, turned
his airplane around and went home.52 Sixty-three percent placed the
blame for the events on NATO, and only 6 percent on Yugoslavia.53
Relations with the United States worsened (51 percent), the number
of people opposing the relationship increased.54 Twenty-seven percent
thought that the United States had benefited as a result of the war,
while only 1 percent thought the Kosovar Serbs did.55
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The Special Russian Way
129
But, on the other hand, the explosion of anti-Americanism ran head-
first into the well-defined boundaries of realism—namely, the desire to
avoid a military conflict with the United States at all costs. Eighty-six
percent thought Russia should not engage itself in such a conflict; only
13 percent supported shipping arms to Yugoslavia, 4 percent supported
sending volunteers, and 3 percent supported severing diplomatic ties
with the United States. Two months after the start of the bombings, a
more balanced assessment could be observed. The number of people
who blamed the West for the conflict decreased from 63 to 49 percent,
while the number of those who supported strengthening ties with the
United States increased from 26 to 59 percent.56
Similar tendencies could be observed during the U.S. Iraqi cam-
paign in the spring 2003. From the campaign’s very beginning, the
Russian media mounted an unprecedented anti-American attack. In
the March of 2003, according to VTsIOM data, 83 percent of Russian
citizens responded with indignation to American actions in Iraq, and
only 2 percent approved of these actions. Fourteen percent of the
people characterized relations between Russia and the United States
as tense, against 6 percent in August 2002. From November 2002
to March 2003, the number of Russians who expressed negative
or extremely negative sentiments toward America rose from 29 to
55 percent.57 Seventy percent considered America as a conqueror, not
a liberator of Iraq. In March 2003, 70 percent said that their feelings
toward Saddam Hussein were either positive or neutral. The number
of people who thought that the United States played a positive role
in the world dropped sharply, from 23 percent in August 2002 to
14 percent in March 2003.58
The anti-American hysteria in the Russian media continued until
April 2, 2003, when President Putin stated that Russia is not interested
in an American defeat in Iraq. The tone of the Russian press changed
immediately. Pragmatic considerations began to take over. The
number of people who expressed positive sentiments about Saddam
fell from 23 percent in March to 10 percent in April, while those
who expressed negative sentiments more than doubled—from 14 to
29 percent.59 At the end of April, according to FOM data, the number
of respondents who felt positive about the United States was over 50
percent, and 70 percent supported maintaining close relations between
the two countries. Only 5 percent backed the contrary stance.60
Approximately the same reaction can be discerned in other uneasy
moments of the Russian–American relationship—NATO’s eastward
expansion, U.S. withdrawal from the ABM treaty,61 differences over
Chechnya, the Winter 2002 Olympics, and trade wars over steel and
poultry.62 On the one hand, anti-American sentiment grew, but on
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N ikol ai Zlobin
the other, an orientation toward a union with the United States
remained strong.
Anti-American phobia, skepticism, disillusionment, and suspicion
were counterbalanced to an increasing extent not only by the “human-
izing” of America, but also by practical considerations. If the United
States wants to strengthen ties with Russia for its own selfish purposes,
Russia should use the situation to its advantage. In the mass con-
sciousness, the idea of integration with America and the West picked
up speed during the 1990s. In 1999, 63 percent thought that strength-
Rapprochement with America was becoming an independent Russian
priority. More and more people saw in this a necessary pre-condition
for Russia’s economic and political renaissance, and its full entry into
global civilization. In the summer of 2001, 73 percent of respondents
said that they viewed the United States in a positive light, while
22 percent viewed it as negative; 77 percent noted that they felt
positive toward the American people, while only 9 percent viewed
them negatively.64
In the period between the Yugoslavian crisis and the events of 9/11,
one could observe a decrease in both negative and highly positive
judgments of the United States, with the concurrent increase in
neutral assessments. Since then, this tendency has stabilized. In
September of 2001, 46 percent were neutral in their feelings toward
the United States. Polls from March 2002 and February 2003
showed the same results.65 That is, the emotional approach to the
issue waned while a pragmatic approach became more prevalent.
Emotional indifference is a necessary component for a rational–pragmatic
perception.66 President Putin, while making a strong political
statement by announcing his unconditional support for the United
States in the wake of 9/11, was not contradicting the evolution of his
country’s public opinion.
The position of the Russian elite proved to be a greater obstacle for
Putin. Throughout the 1990s, this elite had been the driving force for
the Westernization of Russia. One of the main methods that the new
generation of politicians used in fighting the old Soviet nomenklatura
was the deliberate, accuratissime67 Americanization of life and culture,
which corresponded to their sociopolitical and economic agenda.
&nb
sp; To be “pro-American” at the time, in the eyes of a casual participant,
meant being a progressive liberal, a proponent of the free market, a free
press, and human rights; that is, to have an image that was in direct
opposition to that of the representatives of the old communist ideology.
Orienting toward the United States brought political power.
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The Special Russian Way
131
But the situation gradually changed. On the one hand, as compen-
sation for the national humiliation, the disillusionment with the new
social ideals and a demand for a return to the old social and political
ways, which were thought to have been discarded, returned. Thus, in
the winter of 2001, to the question “Did the democrats of early pere-
stroika bring Russia more harm than good?,” 47 percent said “more
harm,” and only 2 percent said “more good.” Sixty-six percent said that
reforms of the Gaidar administration were unnecessary and destructive,
and 50 percent were willing to return to the pre-perestroika USSR.68
The idea of a Russian “special way” began gaining popularity. In the
spring of 2000, 60 percent of respondents said that Russia should go
its own way, and 18 percent that it should use the path taken by the
USSR.69 Debates about the Russian “national idea”70 and the nature of
Russian government began heating up, while the political role of the
Russian Orthodox Church increased.71 The belief in the inability of
Western analytical tools to comprehend Russian society, as well as the
concept of Russian uniqueness and its incompatibility with Western
sociopolitical norms received mass support.72 There was a movement
to buy domestically made products, and nostalgia for the cultural val-
ues of the Soviet times: films of the 1950–1970s gathered huge televi-
sion audiences, and radio stations playing Soviet-era music gained
record numbers of listeners. The change in mood was reflected in the
elite, parts of which took on extremely anti-American positions.73
On the other hand, further Americanization for certain Russian
circles was a fraught with the possible loss of comfort, of transparency
in the decision-making processes, the opening of financial flows, the