ALSO BY STEVE COLL
Private Empire
The Bin Ladens
Ghost Wars
On the Grand Trunk Road
Eagle on the Street (with David A. Vise)
The Taking of Getty Oil
The Deal of the Century
PENGUIN PRESS
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Copyright © 2018 by Steve Coll
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Lyrics from “Everybody Knows” written by Leonard Cohen and Sharon Robinson © 1988 Sony/ATV Music Publishing LLC. All rights on behalf of Sony/ATV Music Publishing LLC, 424 Church Street, Suite 1200, Nashville, TN 37219. All rights reserved. Used by permission of Sony/ATV Music Publishing and Sharon Robinson.
Photograph credits:
Here: Courtesy of David O. Smith; here: U.S. Department of State; here: Mian Kursheed/Reuters Pictures; here: Reuters Photographer/Reuters Pictures; here: White House photo by Tina Hager; here: By Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung via Wikimedia Commons; here: By U.S. Embassy, Kabul, Afghanistan (U.S. Department of State), via Wikimedia Commons; here: AP Photo/J. Scott Applewhite; here: AP Photo/Anjum Naveed; here: U.S. Department of State; here: Department of Defense photo by Tech. Sgt. Jacob N. Bailey, U.S. Air Force (Released); here: Baz Ratner/Reuters Pictures; here: Courtesy of Cpt. Timothy Hopper; here: Pool New/Reuters Pictures; here: White House Photo/Alamy Stock Photo; here: Courtesy of Barnett Rubin; here: Courtesy of the Loftis family; here: From personal collection of Marc Sageman; here and here: Photos by Robert Nickelsberg
ISBN 9781594204586 (hardcover)
ISBN 9780525557302 (ebook)
Maps by Charles Preppernau
Version_1
In Memory of Robert and Shirley
Everybody knows that the dice are loaded
Everybody rolls with their fingers crossed
Everybody knows that the war is over
Everybody knows that the good guys lost
—LEONARD COHEN, “Everybody Knows,” 1988
AUTHOR’S NOTE
Two extraordinary colleagues contributed deeply to this book. Christina Satkowski, who earned an undergraduate degree at Wellesley College and a master’s degree at Georgetown University, carried out important interviews and document analysis for more than two years. She was singularly responsible for the rich interviews that inform chapter 26, among many contributions. I could not have finished the book without her. The same is true of Elizabeth Barber, a graduate of the honors college at the State University of New York who also earned a master’s degree from Columbia University’s Graduate School of Journalism. Among other things, Elizabeth carried out a nine-month fact-check of the manuscript, recontacting sources and reaching out to new ones. She used this reporting to improve the manuscript from start to end, adding new scenes and revelations, and pushing tirelessly for accuracy, nuance, and completeness. Although I am solely responsible for what appears in these pages, Directorate S belongs to Christina and Elizabeth as much as it does to me. There are other colleagues from Columbia and elsewhere who made important contributions; I have tried to thank them all in the acknowledgments.
Contents
Also by Steve Coll
Title Page
Copyright
Dedication
Epigraph
Author’s Note
List of Maps
Cast of Characters
Introduction
PART ONE
BLIND INTO BATTLE,
September 2001–December 2001
1. “Something Has Happened to Khalid”
2. Judgment Day
3. Friends Like These
4. Risk Management
PART TWO
LOSING THE PEACE,
2002–2006
6. Small Change
7. Taliban for Karzai
8. The Enigma
9. “His Rules Were Different Than Our Rules”
10. Mr. Big
11. Ambassador vs. Ambassador
12. Digging a Hole in the Ocean
13. Radicals
PART THREE
THE BEST INTENTIONS,
2006–2009
14. Suicide Detectives
15. Plan Afghanistan
16. Murder and the Deep State
17. Hard Data
18. Tough Love
19. Terror and the Deep State
20. The New Big Dogs
21. Losing Karzai
22. A War to Give People a Chance
PART FOUR
THE END OF ILLUSION,
2010–2014
23. The One-man C.I.A.
24. The Conflict Resolution Cell
25. Kayani 2.0
26. Lives and Limbs
27. Kayani 3.0
28. Hostages
29. Dragon’s Breath
30. Martyrs Day
31. Fight and Talk
32. The Afghan Hand
33. Homicide Division
34. Self-inflicted Wounds
35. Coups d’État
Epilogue: Victim Impact Statements
Photographs
Acknowledgments
Notes
Bibliography
Index
About the Author
LIST OF MAPS
Al Qaeda’s Escape from Tora Bora (here)
C.I.A.–Special Forces Bases Along the Afghanistan-Pakistan Border (here)
The Battle for Kandahar, 2010 (here)
Osama Bin Laden in Hiding, 2001–2011 (here)
CAST OF CHARACTERS
AT THE C.I.A.
Frank Archibald, case officer, Kandahar, circa 2002; later Chief of Islamabad Station; C.I.A. liaison to Richard Holbrooke’s office at the Department of State, 2009–2010
Jonathan Bank, Chief of Islamabad Station, 2010
John Bennett, Chief of Islamabad Station, 2009; later Deputy Director of Operations
Cofer Black, Director of D.C.I.’s Counterterrorist Center, 1999–2002
Rich Blee, Chief of ALEC Station, 1999–2001; Chief of Kabul Station, 2002; Chief of Islamabad Station, 2004–2005
John Brennan, Director of Central Intelligence, 2013–2017
Michael D’Andrea, Director of the C.I.A.’s Counterterrorism Center, 2006–2015
Porter Goss, Director of Central Intelligence, 2004–2006
Robert Grenier, Islamabad Station Chief, 2001; Director of C.I.A. Counterterrorism Center, 2004–2006
Michael Hayden, Director of Central Intelligence, 2006–2009
Michael Hurley, senior case officer, Kabul Station, 2002–2004
Stephen Kappes, case officer, Pakistan, 1980s; Deputy Director for Operations, 2004; Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, 2006–2010
Mark Kelton, Chief of Islamabad Station, 2011
Leon Panetta, Director of Central Intelligence, 2009–2011
David Petraeus, Director of Central Intelligence, 2011–2012
Jose Rodriguez, Director of C.I.A. Counterterrorism C
enter, 2002–2004; Deputy Director of Operations, 2004; Director of National Clandestine Service, 2004–2008
Tony Schinella, senior military analyst; director of District Assessments project mapping the Afghan war, 2009–2016
George Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence, 1997–2004
Greg Vogle, Chief of Base, Peshawar, Pakistan, 2001; C.I.A. liaison to Hamid Karzai, November–December 2001; paramilitary officer, Kabul Station, 2002; Chief of Kabul Station, 2004–2006 and 2009–2010; Director of C.I.A. paramilitary operations, 2014–
Brian Glyn Williams, consultant on suicide bombings in Afghanistan, 2006–2007
Chris Wood, case officer, Pakistan, 1997–2001; case officer, Northern Alliance Liaison Team, autumn 2001; head of operations, Kabul Station, 2002; Chief of ALEC Station, circa 2003–2004; Afghan specialist at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2010; Chief of Kabul Station, 2011; Director of C.I.A.’s Counterterrorism Center, 2015–2017
AT OTHER U.S. INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES
Jeff Hayes, D.I.A. analyst on South Asia, assigned to National Security Council, 2009–2014
Peter Lavoy, National Intelligence Officer for South Asia, 2007–2008; Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Analysis, 2008–2011; Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, 2011–2014; Senior Director for South Asia, National Security Council, 2015–2016
Marc Sageman, former C.I.A. case officer, consultant to U.S. Army intelligence, 2010–2012; consultant to International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, 2012–2013
David Smith, Defense Intelligence Agency representative in Islamabad, 2001; senior Pakistan analyst at D.I.A. and the Pentagon until 2012
AT THE PENTAGON AND THE ARMED SERVICES
David Barno, U.S. and coalition commander in Afghanistan, 2003–2005
Karl Eikenberry, U.S. and coalition commander in Afghanistan, 2005–2007; U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, 2009–2011
Michael Flynn, International Security Assistance Force intelligence chief, 2009–2010
Timothy J. Hopper, platoon leader, 320th Field Artillery Regiment, Combined Task Force “Strike”
Darin Loftis, chief plans adviser for the International Security Assistance Force, in the AFPAK Hands program, 2011–2012
Stanley McChrystal, Commander of Joint Special Operations Command, 2003–2008; Director of the Joint Staff, 2008–2009; Commander of I.S.A.F. and U.S. Forces Afghanistan, 2009–2010
Mike Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2007–2011
Barry Shapiro, deputy for the Office of the Defense Representative–Pakistan, 2002–2003 and 2005–2008
AT THE WHITE HOUSE
Tony Harriman, senior director for Afghanistan at the National Security Council, 2005–2007
Jim Jones, National Security Adviser, 2009–2010
Doug Lute, Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Adviser for Iraq and Afghanistan (“War Czar”), 2007–2009; Special Assistant to the President and Senior Coordinator for Afghanistan and Pakistan, 2009–2013; U.S. Ambassador to N.A.T.O., 2013–2017
Paul Miller, Director for Afghanistan and Pakistan on the National Security Council, 2007–2009
AT THE STATE DEPARTMENT
Wendy Chamberlin, Ambassador to Pakistan, 2001–2002
Hillary Clinton, Secretary of State, 2009–2013
Ryan Crocker, Ambassador to Pakistan, 2004–2007; Ambassador to Afghanistan, 2011–2012
James Dobbins, Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, 2013–2014
Robert Finn, Ambassador to Afghanistan, 2002–2003
Marc Grossman, U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, 2011–2012
Richard Holbrooke, U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, 2009–2011
Zalmay Khalilzad, Ambassador to Afghanistan, 2003–2005
David Kilcullen, Special Adviser to the Secretary of State, 2005–2009
Cameron Munter, Ambassador to Pakistan, 2010–2012
Ronald Neumann, Ambassador to Afghanistan, 2005–2007
Anne Patterson, Ambassador to Pakistan, 2007–2010
Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of State, 2005–2009
Barnett Rubin, Senior Adviser to the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, 2009–2013
Frank Ruggiero, senior deputy special representative and deputy assistant secretary of state for Afghanistan and Pakistan, 2010–2012
IN PAKISTAN
Mahmud Ahmed, Director-General of Inter-Services Intelligence, 1999–2001
Benazir Bhutto, Leader of the Pakistan People’s Party, 1988–2007
Ehsan ul-Haq, Director-General of Inter-Services Intelligence, 2001–2004
Ashfaq Kayani, Director-General of Inter-Services Intelligence, 2004–2007; Chief of Army Staff, 2007–2013
Pervez Musharraf, President of Pakistan, 2001–2008
Ahmed Shuja Pasha, Director-General of Inter-Services Intelligence, 2008–2012
Nadeem Taj, Director-General of Inter-Services Intelligence, 2007–2008
Asif Zardari, President of Pakistan, 2008–2013
IN AFGHANISTAN
Abdullah Abdullah, Minister of Foreign Affairs, 2001–2005; Chief Executive of Afghanistan, 2014–
Tayeb Agha, head of the Taliban political commission, 2009–2015
Engineer Arif, head of intelligence for the Northern Alliance, 1994–2001; head of the National Directorate of Security, 2001–2004
Abdul Rashid Dostum, Deputy Defense Minister, 2003; Vice President of Afghanistan, 2014–
Marshal Mohammed Fahim, Vice Chairman of the Interim Government, 2001–2002; Interim Vice President of Afghanistan, 2002–2004; Vice President of Afghanistan, 2009–2014
Ashraf Ghani, Minister of Finance, 2002–2004; President of Afghanistan, 2014–
Ibrahim Haqqani, representative for the Haqqani network, 2002–
Hamid Karzai, Chairman of the Interim Government, 2001–2002; Interim President of Afghanistan, 2002–2004; President of Afghanistan, 2004–2014
Ahmad Shah Massoud, Commander of the Northern Alliance, 1996–2001
Rahmatullah Nabil, head of the National Directorate of Security, 2010–2012 and 2013–2015
Amrullah Saleh, Intelligence Adviser for Ahmad Shah Massoud, 1997–2001; head of the National Directorate of Security, 2004–2007
Gul Agha Sherzai, Governor of Kandahar, 1992–1994 and 2001–2003; Governor of Nangarhar, 2005–2013
Introduction
In 1989, I moved to New Delhi for The Washington Post to become the newspaper’s South Asia correspondent. I was thirty years old and responsible for a phantasmagoria of news from India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Nepal. For three years I hopped from capital to capital, and from one guerrilla war, coup d’état, and popular revolution to another. It was thrilling and affecting work.
In Afghanistan, the last units of the Soviet occupation forces had recently pulled out of the country. The war caused by the Soviet invasion had claimed an estimated one to two million Afghan lives, or up to 10 percent of the prewar population. Land mines and indiscriminate bombings maimed hundreds of thousands more. About five million Afghans became refugees. Soviet and Afghan Communists purposefully decimated the country’s educated elites, executing or exiling traditional leaders. By the time I turned up, this culling had left much of the field to radical preachers and armed opportunists.
In Kabul, the Soviets had left behind a few thousand K.G.B. officers and military advisers to prop up a regime led by Mohammad Najibullah, a physician turned secret police chief. Najibullah’s forces controlled the Afghan capital and an archipelago of cities. The countryside belonged to the mujaheddin, the anti-Communist rebels funded and armed by the C.I.A., as well as by Pakistani and Saudi intelligence. The war had settled into a grinding stale
mate.
The Soviet troop withdrawal knocked the Afghan story off front pages and network broadcasts in the United States, but for the Post it remained a matter of running interest, not least because the C.I.A. was still smuggling guns and money to the rebels; the agency’s career officers and analysts were among our subscriber base in Washington. Like other correspondents in those years, I covered the Afghan war from both sides. I flew periodically to Kabul, to interview Najibullah and his aides, or to travel around the country with Afghan Communist generals. From Pakistan, I went over the border to see the Islamist rebels’ hold on the countryside. The work was generally safe, as correspondence from a medium-grade civil war goes. Yet during this period, Western reporters and humanitarian workers learned to be wary of the loose bands of Arab Islamist volunteers circulating among the Afghan mujaheddin. These international radicals sometimes staged roadside executions of nonbelievers they came across. We did not yet know them as Al Qaeda.
The C.I.A. subcontracted its aid to the Afghan rebels through Pakistan’s main spy agency, Inter-Services Intelligence, or I.S.I. By 1989, the service had grown into a powerful, corrosive force within Pakistan, a shadowy deep state that manipulated politics on behalf of the army and increasingly promoted armed groups of Islamists, including the Arab volunteers we had learned to approach cautiously. I.S.I. officers were not easy to meet, but not impossible to track down, either. I became somewhat obsessed with reporting on the underbelly of the Afghan conflict. I wrote for the Post about how the C.I.A. program to arm the rebels functioned, why its escalation had helped to defeat the Soviet occupation, and how, simultaneously, the C.I.A.’s covert action had empowered the more radical factions in the rebellion, largely at I.S.I.’s direction.
In December 1991, the Soviet Union collapsed. The political upheavals in Moscow and Central Asia rippled into Afghanistan. Soviet cash, food, and arms supplies to Najibullah’s government looked to be finished. This altered the civil war’s balance. By late April 1992, the fall of Kabul to the I.S.I.-backed Islamist rebels seemed imminent. I flew in. The mujaheddin flowed into the capital unopposed on a Saturday. Kabul’s wary residents had been governed for a decade by an officially secular regime. Hoping to avoid a bloodbath, they greeted the entering long-bearded rebels with flowers. Najibullah tried to flee but was arrested at the airport. His security forces took off their uniforms, abandoned their posts, and went home, trying to blend into the new order. The mujaheddin seemed uncertain initially about whether to trust their acceptance into Kabul. That first day of the takeover, I met a rebel straggler near the zoo. He said his name was Syed Munir. He was carrying an assault rifle. He turned in circles and insisted that anyone who wished to talk to him do so from a distance of ten feet. “Everyone is friendly,” he admitted. “But maybe some people want to take my gun.”