were much more sympathetic to Chiang Kai-shek than Stilwell and his sup-
porters. Chennault pressed for US military efforts that were supported by
Chiang but opposed by Stilwell and his staff. He collaborated with and won
Chiang’s support for plans involving US use of Chinese Nationalist-defended
air bases in China to attack Japanese positions and shipping with US bomb-
ers. Stilwell opposed the plans that diverted US supplies from his efforts to
build Chinese armies in order to open ground supply routes to occupied
China and for other use against Japan. Stilwell warned that once the US
bombing attacks from Chinese air bases rose in Japan’s war calculus as a
result of Chennault’s plan, the bases would be subject to Japanese ground
attack and might be overrun because of weak Chinese Nationalist defenses
for the bases. Indeed, presumably prompted at least in part by the US air
Relations during World War II, Civil War, Cold War
43
attacks, Japanese forces in 1944 overran the weakly defended air bases and
expanded more deeply into Nationalist-held areas, provoking a major crisis
between Chiang and Stilwell and between the United States and its National-
ist allies. 17
The Chinese Communists, for their part, took advantage of limited inter-
action with US officials, media, and nongovernment representatives in
Chungking in order to build on the image they had already established
through their brief encounters with American and other Western news per-
sonnel at the Communist base in Yenan in north China in the 1930s. Consis-
tent with their approach to Edgar Snow and other American visitors in that
period, the Communists emphasized the image of a relatively democratic and
honest political administration, positive public support received by the
Yenan leadership, and the CCP’s reasonably benign attitude at that time
toward free enterprise. In this way, they attempted to appeal to American
ideals. At the same time, the Communist spokespersons tried to drive a
wedge between Americans and Chinese Nationalists by criticizing what they
viewed as the corrupt, oppressive, and totalitarian rule of the nationalist
government. In line with their approach toward Snow and other visitors in
the 1930s, the Communist officials did not disavow the CCP’s ultimate
Marxist-Leninist goals regarding the future of China but indicated that such
objectives were to be achieved at the end of a long “democratic” period.
They thus revealed to American officials and other representatives the image
of a Chinese party worthy of US support, willing to compromise with Wash-
ington, and deserving of a share of power in China. In this context, heavy
stress was placed on the Nationalists’ unwillingness to share power as the
prime cause for continuing Communist-Nationalist confrontation in China. 18
The central role in CCP policy toward and interaction with the United
States was played by senior Communist leader Zhou Enlai, the chief Com-
munist representative in Chungking during World War II. In his frequent
contacts with American officials and other US representatives, Zhou demon-
strated repeatedly a preference for realistic exchange, unencumbered by
ideological constraints or bitterness over past Chinese affronts at the hands of US “imperialism.” He initiated a CCP proposal for the establishment of an
American liaison mission to Yenan, cast doubt on Nationalist willingness to
pursue the war against Japan, and attacked Chungking’s legitimacy as the
regime best serving the interests of the Chinese people. Zhou, along with
visiting senior Communist military leader Lin Biao, in Chungking for negoti-
ations with the Chinese Nationalists, appealed for US supplies so that the
Communists could go on the offensive against Japan. They also promised
close intelligence sharing with the United States regarding enemy activities
near the Communist base areas. They condemned the Nationalists’ passivity
in the war effort while the Chiang Kai-shek forces reinforced their military
blockade against the Communists.
44
Chapter 3
cials visiting Yenan on the part of Mao Zedong and other senior CCP leaders
reflected pragmatic actions to deal with potentially adverse circumstances.
The American entry into the war against Japan strengthened the position of
the Communists’ adversary, Chiang Kai-shek, and raised the strong possibil-
ity that the United States would continue to side firmly with Chiang follow-
ing the defeat of Japan and the establishment of a new Chinese administra-
tion. The relatively weak strategic position of the Chinese Communist forces
in China at the time and the low probability that the Soviet Union would take
decisive actions to protect the Chinese Communists from US-backed pres-
sure from Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalists added to incentives for the CCP to
appeal to the United States for closer relations and support. 19
The depth of the American–Chinese Nationalist alignment meant that the
Communists could have little hope of undermining the American-Nationalist
relationship. But by opening formal contacts with Americans through a US
liaison mission in Yenan or other means, the Communists would at least have
the opportunity to encourage the Americans to move away from Chungking
over the critical issue of the Chinese civil dispute. In particular, a formal
American mission in the Communist base area would allow CCP leaders to
present their case to the highest levels in Washington; it would enable Mao
and his group to scotch many ill-founded Nationalist allegations concerning
the Communist leaders and policies, which had heretofore enjoyed credibil-
ity with US policy makers. Further, formal ties with Washington would
enhance the Communists’ ability to solicit US military supplies. The Com-
munist leaders also seemed confident and proud of the economic, political,
and military situation in their base area; if their administrative achievements could be shown to American officials, they would compare favorably with
the deteriorating situation in Nationalist-held areas. 20
In early 1944 there was a formal US presidential request to Chiang Kai-
shek for the establishment of an American military observer mission in the
Communist-held areas of China. The proposal was grudgingly approved by
Chiang Kai-shek during the visit to China of American Vice President Henry
Wallace in June 1944. Amid the crisis caused by Japanese forces overrun-
ning US air bases in China and penetrating deep into previously Nationalist-
controlled territory, Chiang was in a weak position to resist the US request. 21
American officials were not only interested in shoring up Chinese resis-
tance to Japanese aggression and improving military coordination against
Japan with the Chinese Communists. By this time US officials were deeply
involved in plans for dealing with previously unanticipated divisions that
weakened China and posed the danger of Chinese civil war once Japan was
defeated. There was concern that the Chinese Nationalists might draw in the
United State
s on their side of the conflict and that the Chinese Communists
might draw in the Soviet Union on their side of the conflict. To deal with this
Relations during World War II, Civil War, Cold War
45
potentially dire situation warranted closer American interaction with, and
understanding of, the policies and intentions of the Chinese Communist
forces through the establishment of the US military observer mission to
Yenan. 22
Responding to Vice President Wallace’s expressions of concern over the
Chinese war effort and the Nationalist government’s loss of public support,
Chiang focused on American and especially Stilwell’s responsibility. Chiang
impressed the American visitor with his determination to remove Stilwell or
to have the United States send a personal representative from Roosevelt to
control Stilwell and give Chiang regular access to the president free from the
interference of the Departments of War and State, which were seen as influ-
enced by Stilwell and his supporters in the US embassy. 23
Patrick Hurley, a prominent Republican who served as President Herbert
Hoover’s secretary of war, was a key figure in US policy toward the KMT
and the CCP in 1944–45. His strong support for the Chinese Nationalists and
accusations against opponents within the US government had lasting impacts
on US relations with China. Hurley was sent to China as a special envoy by
President Roosevelt in September 1944. Dealing with the major disputes then
causing a crisis between Chiang Kai-shek and General Joseph Stilwell, Hur-
ley sided with Chiang. Roosevelt recalled Stilwell in October 1944, appoint-
ing General Albert Wedemeyer as his replacement. Hurley was appointed as
ambassador to replace Clarence Gauss, who shared Stilwell’s negative opin-
ions about Chiang and the Nationalists. 24
In November 1944 Hurley traveled to Yenan and negotiated a Five-Point
Agreement with Mao Zedong and his senior colleagues. Among other things,
the agreement summarized Hurley’s promises of equal treatment and US aid
to the Communists in a coalition with the Nationalists. Returning to Chung-
king, he switched and sided strongly with Chiang Kai-shek in his demand
that Communist forces be disbanded before the Communists could be
brought into a Nationalist-led Chinese coalition government. Much of the US
embassy staff in Chungking rebelled against Hurley by sending a collective
message to Washington in early 1945 warning of the negative consequences
of Hurley’s alienation of the Communists and bias toward Chiang’s Nation-
alists. The ambassador disputed the charges in a meeting with President
Roosevelt, who supported Hurley, leading to transfers of dissident US staff
from Chungking. 25
As US ambassador, Hurley supported the Nationalist-Communist peace
talks in Chungking in September 1945. Chiang Kai-shek, backed by Hurley
and the Harry Truman administration, demanded the Communists surrender
their forces and territory as a precondition for joining a coalition. Fighting
spread in China, and the talks collapsed. Hurley, unsuccessful in urging a full US commitment to Chiang’s cause, abruptly resigned as ambassador in November 1945, blaming pro–Chinese Communists in the State Department for
46
Chapter 3
thwarting US policy. After the Communist victory in China and the Chinese
intervention in the Korean War, Hurley’s charges provided a leading wedge
for congressional investigators seeking to purge alleged pro-Communists and
other security risks from among the ranks of the Chinese affairs specialists in the State Department and other agencies. 26
US leaders worried about conditions in China and how they would affect
the final stages of the war against Japan. They foresaw the inability of weak
Chinese Nationalist forces to defeat the hundreds of thousands of Japanese
forces in China as the war in the Pacific moved toward an end, and the
danger of a Nationalist-Communist civil war in China that would drag in the
United States and the Soviet Union on opposite sides. As a result of the so-
called Far Eastern Agreement of the Allied powers at Yalta in February
1945, Soviet forces, not Chinese forces, would take on the main task of
defeating Japanese armies concentrated in Manchuria and northern China. In
compensation, Russian territory taken by Japan would be restored; Russian
interests in Manchuria, including a naval base, would be restored; and Outer
Mongolia would remain independent. The United States promised to obtain
the concurrence of China’s Nationalist government to provisions regarding
Manchuria and Mongolia, which were claimed by China. The Soviet Union
also expressed willingness to negotiate a friendship and alliance treaty with
China’s Nationalist government. The Far Eastern Agreement had negative
implications for the Chinese Nationalist government, which was not con-
sulted on the territorial concessions to the Soviet Union, and for the Chinese
Communists, who appeared to be isolated from the Soviet Union. 27
The broad outlines of US policy toward China prevalent in early 1945
persisted as Harry Truman became president upon the death of Franklin
Roosevelt in April 1945, and as the war in the Pacific came to an unexpected-
ly quick end with Japan’s surrender after the US atomic bomb attacks in
August 1945. US policy strongly supported Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist
forces. US airplanes and other means were used to transport Nationalist
forces to various parts of China to take the surrender of Japanese forces. The
US government provided hundreds of millions of dollars of military equip-
ment and other assistance. The rival Communists were urged to participate in
peace talks and come to terms in a united Chinese government under Chi-
ang’s overall leadership. President Truman commanded that Japanese-con-
trolled forces in China surrender their positions and arms to Chiang Kai-
shek’s representatives, not to Communist forces. 28
The Soviet army entered the war in China and defeated Japanese armies.
The Soviet Union signed a friendship treaty with Chiang Kai-shek’s Nation-
alist government, as noted in the Far Eastern Agreement at Yalta. Seemingly
isolated, the Chinese Communists agreed to join peace talks in Chungking in
September where Chiang, backed by US Ambassador Hurley and the Tru-
man administration, demanded the Communists surrender their armed forces
Relations during World War II, Civil War, Cold War
47
and territory as a precondition for joining a coalition government under Chi-
ang’s leadership.
There was little consideration at high levels of US policy makers for a
more evenhanded US approach to the Nationalist-Communist rivalry in Chi-
na, though some American officials warned of the danger of civil war and
were uncertain how the Chinese Nationalists, weakened by years of warfare
and led by often corrupt and inept officials, would fare. As the peace talks
deadlocked and Communist-Nationalist armed conflict spread in northern
China in late 1945, it became clear to US planners that Chiang’s forces
would not defeat the Chinese Communists without a substa
ntial commitment
of US military forces. It was against this background that Ambassador Hur-
ley pushed for an open-ended US commitment to Chiang Kai-shek, but
Washington decision makers demurred and Hurley resigned. 29
President Truman appointed General George Marshall as his personal
representative to salvage the deteriorating situation in China. Marshall man-
aged a few months of shaky peace, but they were followed by frequent
fighting in Manchuria as Nationalist and Communist forces vied to take
control as Soviet occupiers retreated. US aid continued to go exclusively to
Nationalist-held areas and increased markedly in mid-1946. On July 1, 1946,
Chiang Kai-shek ordered a nationwide offensive against the Communists.
Marshall intervened, got Truman to stop US arms aid to Chiang, and Chiang
agreed to US-Nationalist-Communist truce teams to prevent fighting in
northern China. The fighting still spread, however, and soon became a full-
scale war. 30
The failure to avoid civil war in China did not lead to fundamental change
in the broad framework of US policy in China. Even though the Nationalists
appeared increasingly weak and inept, and seemed headed for defeat on the
mainland by 1948, the Truman administration continued support for them
and took no significant steps to reach out to the Chinese Communists. In
1948 the administration supported the China Aid Act providing $125 million
for the failing Nationalist government in China. This was done in large
measure to avoid resistance from many pro–Chiang Kai-shek congressional
members regarding the administration’s requests for funding the Marshall
Plan for Europe and Japan. Prospects for positive US relations with the
Chinese Communists were soured by years of one-sided US support for the
Chinese Nationalists. 31
Given what were seen by Truman administration officials as continued
strong US congressional and other domestic constraints against abandoning
Chiang Kai-shek and opening US contacts with Chiang’s enemy, the Chinese
Communists, the Truman administration officials allowed developments in
China to settle the civil war in favor of the Chinese Communists. Over time,