other provinces and many rural areas, such independent gatherings experi-
ence harassment by local authorities, and their leaders have been beaten,
detained, and imprisoned. 53
Many Chinese Protestants reject the official church, known as the Three-
Self Patriotic Movement, for political and theological reasons. The govern-
ment claims it has encouraged unofficial Protestant churches to register with
the state but that many of them have been discouraged from doing so by
foreign Christian groups. Chinese pressure on such unofficial churches has
included arresting leaders of house churches, harassing members of congre-
gations, shutting down places of worship, and denying visas to foreign mis-
sionaries. 54
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China has engaged in dialogue with the Vatican, which broke ties with
China in 1951. Both sides express an interest in improved relations. One of
the key obstacles to normalization has been China’s rejection of the Holy
See’s authority to appoint bishops. In April 2015 a Chinese bishop was
ordained in Guangdong province with the tacit consent of the Vatican. Bei-
jing and Pope Francis have expressed interest in improving relations. Obsta-
cles remain, however, particularly regarding the appointment of bishops, the
Vatican’s diplomatic ties with Taiwan, and the Vatican’s stances on religious
freedom in China. 55
Tibetans
Religious freedom and human rights issues in Tibet have a long history in
Sino-American relations. Partly because of past clandestine US support for
Tibetan insurgencies against Chinese rule following the escape to India from
Chinese rule in Tibet by the Dalai Lama and many thousands of his followers
in the late 1950s, the Chinese government remains wary of American inten-
tions regarding Tibet. Even after the normalization of US diplomatic rela-
tions with China, US ambitions to challenge Chinese sovereignty over Tibet
have been revealed from time to time as Congress has asserted its view of
Tibet as a separate country, though the US administration consistently ac-
cepts Chinese sovereignty over Tibet. The intertwined issues of sovereignty,
border security, and ethnic and religious freedom make the issue of Tibet
difficult to manage in Sino-American relations. Added to the mix is the
attraction of many Americans to the Dalai Lama, the leader of Tibetans
abroad who also enjoys a strong but suppressed following among Tibetans in
China. 56
Coming against this background, a series of demonstrations on March 10,
2008, began in Lhasa and other Tibetan regions of China to mark the forty-
ninth anniversary of an unsuccessful Tibetan uprising against Chinese rule in
1959. The demonstrations appeared to begin peacefully with small groups
that were then contained by security forces. But the protests and the response
of the PRC authorities escalated in the ensuing days, spreading from the
Tibetan Autonomous Region into parts of Sichuan, Gansu, and Qinghai
Provinces with Tibetan populations. By March 14, 2008, mobs of angry
people were burning and looting establishments in downtown Lhasa. Author-
ities of the PRC responded by sealing off Tibet and bringing in large-scale
security forces. The Chinese government defended its actions as appropriate
and necessary to restore civil order and prevent further violence. Media,
interest groups, and some officials in the West responded to the Chinese
actions by calling for boycotts of the opening ceremonies of the Beijing
Olympics and calling on China to hold talks with the Dalai Lama. 57
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257
The Chinese government and many Chinese people see China as having
provided Tibet with extensive economic assistance and development using
money from central government and provincial government coffers, and Chi-
nese officials often seem perplexed at the simmering anger many Tibetans
nevertheless retain against them. Despite economic development, Tibetans
charge that the PRC interferes with Tibetan culture and religion. They cite as
examples: Beijing’s interference in 1995 in the choice of the Panchen Lama,
Tibet’s second-highest-ranking personage; enactment of a “reincarnation
law” in 2007 requiring Buddhist monks who wish to reincarnate to obtain
prior approval from Beijing; and China’s policy of conducting “patriotic
education” campaigns, as well as efforts to foster atheism, among the Tibetan
religious community. The PRC defends the campaigns as tools that among
other things help monks become loyal, law-abiding citizens of China. 58
Increasingly expansive government controls on Tibetan religious life and
practice have caused or contributed to discontent in Tibetan areas. The State
Department has annually reported “serious human rights abuses” of Tibetans,
including extrajudicial detentions and killings, arbitrary arrests, and severe
mistreatment, torture, and deaths of Tibetan detainees and prisoners of con-
science. In addition to chafing at religious controls, many Tibetans complain
of the domination of the local economy by Han Chinese, particularly in urban
areas; forced resettlement; cultural preservation that amounts to cultural reg-
ulation; and the adverse environmental effects of Beijing’s development
projects in the region. China’s leaders remain resolute. In August and Sep-
tember 2015 they convened the Sixth Work Forum on Tibet and issued a
white paper on Tibet, both of which touted PRC achievements in Tibet,
reaffirmed PRC policies, and condemned the Dalai Lama’s “separatist activ-
ities.” As the CCP has sought to control the reincarnation process for Tibetan
spiritual leaders, Beijing has asserted that the government has the prerogative to determine the reincarnation of the Dalai Lama. For his part, the 14th Dalai
Lama has suggested that he may not be reincarnated at all. 59
The Obama administration sought to show its support for religious free-
dom for Tibetans in China, notably through presidential meetings with the
Dalai Lama. President Obama met with the Dalai Lama four times. 60
Uighur Muslims
Violent clashes in July 2009 between Uighur and Han Chinese people in
Urumchi, the capital city of the XUAR, left almost two hundred dead and
hundreds arrested. American leaders, media, and NGOs supported Chinese
government efforts to separate and arrest the fighters and end the violence,
but they also were inclined to place blame on Chinese policies and practices
seen to discriminate against and otherwise treat unfairly the Uighur Muslim
people. 61
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As reported by the Congressional Research Service, in the past decade,
Chinese authorities have carried out especially harsh religious and ethnic
policies against Uighurs. Once the predominant ethnic group in the XUAR,
Xinjiang’s roughly ten million Uighurs now constitute less than half of the
region’s population of twenty-two million as many Han Chinese have mi-
grated there, particularly to Urumqi, the capital. Uighurs have complained of
restrictions on religious and cultur
al practices, the regulation and erosion of ethnic identity, economic discrimination, arbitrary harassment by PRC public
security forces, and a lack of consultation on regional policies. Government
restrictions affect the training and role of imams, the celebration of Ramadan, participation in the hajj, and use of the Uighur language. Uighur children are
forbidden from entering mosques or studying the Koran while CCP mem-
bers, civil servants, and teachers are not allowed to openly practice Islam and are discouraged from fasting during Ramadan. In December 2014 the Urumqi government banned the wearing of veils in public areas. The XUAR
government’s redevelopment of the ancient heart of Kashgar, a center of
Islamic and Uighur history and culture, also has angered many Uighurs. 62
PRC leaders often mix the religious and cultural practices of Uighurs in
Xinjiang with criminal and subversive activities or the “three evils of reli-
gious extremism, splittism, and terrorism.” The East Turkestan Islamic
Movement (ETIM) and the Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP) are blamed by
Beijing for violent attacks in various parts of China since the 1990s. ETIM
and TIP are Uighur groups that advocate the creation of an independent
Islamic state in Xinjiang, are believed to be based in Afghanistan and Paki-
stan, and have had some ties to Al Qaeda and the Taliban. PRC officials
assert that Islamic fundamentalism, jihad, and terrorist techniques, much of
them promoted over the Internet, have contributed to violence in Xinjiang,
and have referred to Islamist-inspired attacks in Beijing and Kunming as well
as Xinjiang as “the greatest threat since the founding of the PRC.” They also
claim that one hundred to three hundred Uighur Muslims have been iden-
tified among ISIS fighters. The United States designated the ETIM as a
terrorist organization under Executive Order 13224 in 2002 (to block terrorist
financing) and placed it on the Terrorist Exclusion List in 2004 (to prevent
entry of terrorists). The ETIM also is on the United Nations’ lists of terrorist organizations. 63
The PRC government’s three-pronged strategy in response to Uighur
grievances and unrest involves (1) carrying out a “strike hard” campaign
against “religious extremism,” “separatism,” and “terrorism”; (2) developing
the XUAR economy; and (3) introducing policies to assimilate Uighurs into
Han society. Foreign critics say the policies do not address long-standing
Uighur religious, ethnic, and political grievances well, and Uighurs accused
of criminal acts have been deprived of procedural protections that are pro-
vided under China’s constitution and laws. Meanwhile, assimilation policies
Issues of Human Rights in Contemporary US-China Relations
259
may contribute to the erosion of Uighur identity and breed further resent-
ment. 64
Falun Gong
Falun Gong is a movement that combines spiritual beliefs with an exercise
and meditation regimen derived from traditional Chinese practices known as
qigong. The movement remained out of the public spotlight while it gained millions of adherents across China in the 1990s. On April 25, 1999, thousands of adherents gathered in Beijing to protest the government’s growing
restrictions on their activities. The demonstration seemed to take the Chinese
leadership by surprise. The ability of the movement to mobilize such an
impressive show of support at the seat of Chinese administrative power was
viewed as a threat—one that reflected infiltration of Falun Gong supporters
throughout the police and security forces and other sensitive apparatus of the
Chinese government. 65
Party leader Jiang Zemin led a major crackdown against the movement
that continued for years. The harsh measures against suspected adherents
who refused to recant their beliefs and cooperate with the authorities led to
widespread reports by the Department of State, US-based and other human
rights groups, and foreign media of torture; estimates of adherents who have
died in state custody range from several hundred to a few thousand. The
Chinese government acknowledges that deaths while in custody have oc-
curred but has denied that they were caused by mistreatment. As the Chinese
suppression succeeded in wiping out the movement in China, its salience as a
human rights issue in US-China relations declined. 66
Hong Kong
The US government, especially the Congress, took a special interest in work-
ing to ensure that Hong Kong’s transfer to Chinese sovereignty in 1997
under terms of a Sino-British agreement reached in 1984 did not impinge on
Hong Kong’s autonomy and on the nascent democracy movement in the
territory. As time passed and Chinese rule caused few major controversies,
American interest in Hong Kong as a human rights issue declined for several
years.
A series of sit-in street protests, often called the Umbrella Movement,
occurred in Hong Kong from September to December 2014. They registered
widespread discontent with, among other things, the limited franchise of
Hong Kong voters who were not able under provisions of the Chinese-passed
Basic Law governing Hong Kong to directly elect the chief executive of
Hong Kong. Beijing used an indirect election by a group of several hundred
local notables to ensure that the chief executive was compatible with China’s
interests in Hong Kong. 67
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The Umbrella Movement captured the attention of US media, interest
objective of direct election and more accountable government. These
Americans primarily paid attention to Beijing’s perceived encroachment on
Hong Kong rights and interference in the territory’s affairs in ways that
violated the spirit of the “One Country, Two Systems” concept incorporated
into the Sino-British Joint Declaration signed in 1984. According to a list
provided by the Asia Society, Hong Kong grievances voiced by many, but
often not a majority of, political economic and social leaders in Hong Kong
included:
• Beijing’s perceived manipulation of the nomination procedures for direct
election of the chief executive of Hong Kong in 2017
• Beijing’s banning in 2016 of elected members of the city’s legislative
council because of their association with Hong Kong independence
• Political and economic pressure on local student activists and their fami-
lies who are associated with the Umbrella Movement protests demanding
more local democracy
• Increased pressure and tightened censorship on the press and local media
• Increased scrutiny and pressure on both foreign and Hong Kong NGOs
• Instances of perceived encroachment on the autonomy of the local judici-
ary
• Instances of encroachment on local academic freedom
• The kidnappings and rendition to the mainland of non-Chinese-passport-
holding Hong Kong booksellers by mainland security personnel (dis-
cussed above)68
US influence in Hong Kong–Beijing relations seemed small. The Obama
government officials generally eschewed comment. The State Department’s
&nb
sp; annual reports on human rights in Hong Kong registered a long list of
American concerns. There were some congressional hearings and statements.
Overall, the issue of Beijing’s interference in Hong Kong reinforced negative
trends in US-China relations.
China’s International Challenges to Human Rights
With its expanding international profile and greater assertiveness under Pres-
ident Xi Jinping, Chinese government and Chinese Communist Party organs
have been expanding the reach of their censorship and control activities
beyond purely domestic affairs into the United States and other countries.
Examples reported by the Asia Society and other observers include the ab-
ductions and detaining of foreign nationals and Hong Kong residents, which
were discussed above. Chinese consular and embassy officials warn US and
Issues of Human Rights in Contemporary US-China Relations
261
other foreign think tanks, churches, media outlets, NGOs, and universities
against giving public platforms to people they deem politically unacceptable.
Chinese officials also have pressured or boycotted international cultural
events ranging from book fairs to beauty pageants in order to censor certain
topics or expel certain participants for political reasons. Beijing agents target relatives of Chinese living abroad who express views that challenge party
orthodoxy, not only by denying them visas to visit ailing and dying parents
but also by threatening the human rights of family relatives within China.
Meanwhile, as also noted above are China’s massive public diplomacy/prop-
aganda efforts that feature media distortions, censorship, and defamation of
democratic values. 69
US Government Policy Options
Contemporary US government policies and practices regarding human rights
issues in relations with China reflect the generally secondary importance of
these issues in recent Sino-American relations. The US government has a
range of approaches endeavoring to promote democracy, individual rights,
and the rule of law in China; their impact has not had a substantial effect on
the continuation of one-party authoritarian rule in China. Despite recent neg-