South China Sea claims. Rapidly expanding Chinese military and paramili-
tary capabilities along with impressive oil rigs, fishing fleets, dredging ma-
chines, and construction abilities allowed and probably prompted China’s
leaders to expand in areas that were long claimed by China. China’s advance
also was in reaction to the Obama government’s rebalance policy opposed by
Beijing.
On the other hand, Xi’s China married its tough policy on South China
disputes with visionary publicity of China’s proposed Silk Road Belt, Mari-
time Silk Road, and related proposals, including the still-forming Asian
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and related economic initiatives. In
effect, China set forth a choice for the Philippines, Vietnam, other Southeast
Asian disputants of China’s South China Sea claims, ASEAN, and other
governments and organizations with an interest in the South China Sea,
notably the United States. Pursuit of policies and actions at odds with Chi-
nese claims in the South China Sea would meet with more of the demonstra-
tions of Chinese power seen in China’s takeover of Scarborough Shoal from
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Chapter 10
the Philippines in 2012, its deployment of an oil rig and a massive armada of
defending ships near islands very sensitive to Vietnam in 2014, and its subse-
quent massive land reclamation for force projection in the far reaches of the
South China Sea. At the same time, Southeast Asian and other neighbors’
moderation and/or acquiescence regarding Chinese South China Sea claims
would result in mutually beneficial development flowing from Chinese eco-
nomic largess. 46
The most notable advance of Chinese intimidating and coercing other
claimants in the South China Sea came in 2014 and involved Vietnam. On
May 2 China’s abrupt deployment, in the disputed Paracel Islands of the
South China Sea, of a forty-story oil rig along with a protecting armada of
more than one hundred fishing, coast guard, and reportedly military vessels
shocked the region and particularly Vietnam, the other main claimant to
these islands. Concurrent disclosures showed large-scale dredging that creat-
ed Chinese-controlled islands on previously submerged reefs in the disputed
Spratly Islands, with China fortifying some of these sites for surveillance and power projection far from the Chinese mainland. 47
The egregious Chinese advances demonstrated to audiences at home and
abroad how far Beijing was prepared to go in confronting its neighbors, the
United States, and other powers concerned with regional stability in order to
advance its broad territorial claims in the South China Sea. The Chinese
moves to defend and advance control in the South China Sea elicited uni-
formly positive treatment in Chinese media while Chinese leaders exuded
confidence in facing predictable negative international reactions.
Nevertheless, probably unanticipated by Beijing’s planners were mass
demonstrations in Vietnam that turned violent, killing five Chinese and injur-
ing many more while causing widespread damage to Chinese and other
Asian-invested enterprises. Sharply critical rhetoric and moves at odds with
Chinese interests by the United States, Japan, Australia, and some Southeast
Asian countries also underlined deepening wariness and growing diplomatic
and security measures directed at China. Chinese delegates at the annual
Shangri-La defense forum in late May were on the defensive in the face of
direct attacks on China led by the United States and Japan.
Against this background, China’s removal of the rig and its protective
fleet in mid-July, much earlier than expected, was widely interpreted outside
China as designed to reduce tensions, at least for a time. China denied this
interpretation. It nonetheless toned down harsh rhetoric while continuing to
defend the rig deployment. High-level Sino-Vietnamese talks in Beijing on
August 27 reduced bilateral tensions.
There was no easing of the disputes over Chinese dredging to create
outposts for power projection in the far reaches of the South China. Those
issues worsened and provided the focus on American and allied complaints
at the 2015 Shangri-La defense forum. 48
Taiwan and East Asian Maritime Disputes
235
The regional reaction to the Sino-Vietnamese confrontation appeared to
show unwillingness by most Southeast Asian countries to take a stand
against China. The Philippines was very critical of Chinese actions and Ma-
nila collaborated with Hanoi in seeking options. The United States came into
the lead of international critics of Chinese coercion; Japan and Australia
usually weighed in supporting the American stand. However, most Southeast
Asian countries remained on the sidelines.
In 2015 Xi Jinping’s government entered its third year registering signifi-
cant success in advancing control in the disputed South China Sea. China’s
bold tactics involving the massive dredging and rapid construction, shows of
force involving large military exercises, deployments of China’s impressive
coast guard fleet, and movement of massed fishing vessels and large oil rigs
warned weaker neighbors of China’s power and determination to have its
way. US Pacific Commander Admiral Harry Harris said in July that the
dredging over the past eighteen months rapidly created three thousand acres
of Chinese island territory, which is widely seen for military use and mari-
time control.
In early 2016 Chinese-Southeast Asian relations were dominated by Chi-
na’s unremitting expanding control in disputed territory in the South China
Sea in the face of complaints, maneuvers, and challenges by a range of
regional governments and concerned powers headed by the United States. At
the top of the list of American-led challenges to Chinese expansion were
military shows of force, expanded military presence, and freedom-of-naviga-
tion operations accompanied by strong rhetoric from American defense lead-
ers warning of Chinese ambitions. China rebuked the American actions and
pressed ahead with military deployments, construction of defense facilities,
and island expansion. Beijing remained determined to gain greater control in
the disputed sea despite earlier indications of moderation, notably President
Xi Jinping’s pledge not to militarize disputed territory made during his Sep-
tember 2015 summit in Washington. Reflecting the Obama government’s
careful management of South China Sea tensions with China, the rising
tension did not spill over and impede the constructive outcome of the US-
China summit on March 31, 2016. This served to reinforce various indica-
tions showing Southeast Asian governments and other concerned powers that
Washington sought to avoid confrontation, as did Beijing though China was
prepared to risk tensions with the United States caused by its expansion in
the South China Sea. 49
Against that background, when China reacted with harsh rhetoric and
intimidating threats to the July 2016 decision of an international tribunal in
The Hague ruling against China’s South China Sea claims in a case br
ought
by former Philippines President Benigno Aquino, the onslaught worked to
China’s advantage. The United States was in the lead among regional powers
in calling for restraint and moderation, and no other regional country was
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Chapter 10
willing to get out in front of Washington. In contrast to the high tempo of
large-scale US and US-led naval exercises and other military maneuvers in
the South China Sea prior to the decision, there were no US military actions
signaling pressure on China in the weeks following the July 12 decision.
Japan and Australia, important American allies in the Asia-Pacific and con-
cerned with China’s territorial expansion, joined the United States in restricting reactions mainly to official statements of approval of the tribunal’s deci-
sion. The Philippines, a US ally and the initiator of the case, had come under
a new government on June 30 and was much more interested in seeking
common ground with China. 50
In 2017 Chinese officials showed growing confidence and satisfaction
that the cooling tensions in the South China Sea demonstrated increasing
regional deference to Beijing’s interests, while China’s economic importance
to Southeast Asia loomed larger in a period of anticipated international eco-
nomic retrenchment. They remained alert to possible actions by the United
States, Japan, Australia, and South China Sea claimant states that might upset
the recent positive trajectory but generally saw those states preoccupied or
otherwise unwilling to push back strongly against Chinese ambitions. The
incoming Trump government seemed preoccupied with the Middle East and
Russia; its main initiative in East Asia focused on working cooperatively
with China to press North Korea to halt its nuclear weapons program. There
was a notable decline in US freedom-of-navigation demonstrations and other
US efforts to challenge China’s expansion in the South China Sea. For the
time being at least, the way seemed open to a steady Chinese consolidation
and control of holdings and rights in the South China Sea, a Chinese-sup-
ported code of conduct in the South China Sea, Chinese diplomatic initiatives
to promote closer ties and reduce regional suspicion of Chinese intentions,
and an array of economic blandishments in line with Beijing’s ambitious Silk
Road programs. 51
Chapter Eleven
Issues of Human Rights in
Contemporary US-China Relations
Issues of human rights in US-China relations reflect a wide range of values
dealing with economic, social, political, cultural, and other interests and
concerns of groups and individuals. Differences over human rights issues
have long characterized Sino-American relations. The differences have their
roots in the respective backgrounds of the American and Chinese societies,
governments, and peoples. Those backgrounds foster values that are often at
odds. 1
Such differences may be understood through the constructivist school of
thought in the field of international relations, which sees national identity as an important determinant of international affairs. As discussed in chapter 1
and noted elsewhere, the governments and societies of China and the United
States reflect a self-centered exceptionalism that comes from their very well
developed national identities. The US identity has evolved over more than
two centuries while China’s has developed over millennia. Adding to this
mix, the Communist Party (CCP)–ruled government of China, seeking to
preserve its rule, works very hard to reinforce an identity based on China’s
past. Overall, these circumstances make it difficult for either power to com-
promise with the other on issues of values and norms that impact their re-
spective deeply rooted identities.
Meanwhile, the school of thought of liberalism in the field of internation-
al relations can deepen understanding of a fundamental ingredient in the
American incentive to engage positively with China despite wide differ-
ences, especially over values and norms. That is, America’s engagement with
China, especially after the Cold War, was premised on a commonly held
assumption by liberals that economic change and integration of China with
developed countries having free-market economies and pluralistic political
237
238
Chapter 11
systems would eventually lead to social and then political change toward
pluralism and democracy in China. As discussed below, a major reason for a
growing sense among Americans that US engagement with China is failing is
the fact that many Americans previously optimistic that engagement with
China would lead to change in China’s political system and other norms and
values in line with American norms and values have become more pessimis-
tic about the possibility of this kind of change.
In general, since the opening of Sino-American relations in the early
1970s, the Chinese and American governments have endeavored to manage
of Sino-American relations. At times when one side or the other has focused
high priority on human rights issues, as did the United States following the
Tiananmen crackdown of 1989, US-China relations have tended to stall or
retrogress. As US and Chinese leaders more often have devoted only secon-
dary consideration to human rights differences, the obstacles posed by these
issues for Sino-American relations have also been less significant. 2
The importance of human rights differences between the United States
and China has also been influenced by changes in policies and practices,
especially on the part of China. In a broad sense, the United States has sought to prompt the Chinese authorities to adopt policies and practices in line with
the international values and norms prevalent in modern developed countries
of the West. The review of economic issues in chapter 9 and the examination
of security issues in chapter 8 show how Chinese leaders have frequently
seen their interests better served by conforming more to international norms
in these areas. Economically, China’s government has embraced many of the
norms of the globalized international economy and has adapted comprehen-
sively to economic market demands. A significant benchmark in this process
was China’s decision to join the World Trade Organization (WTO) with an
agreement demanding extensive changes in Chinese economic policies and
practices. Evidence of shortcomings of the process include rising complaints
by Americans and others regarding China’s failure to live up to WTO com-
mitments. China’s conformity to world norms in the security area has been
slow but substantial, especially in areas involving such sensitive issues as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Meanwhile, as China has
grown in international power and prominence, it has endeavored to create
new international norms in economic and security matters more in line with
its interests and often at odds with US-backed norms. 3
China’s leadership also has endeavored at various times to appear more in
line with internati
onal norms regarding issues affecting political power and
processes in China. Chinese officials have engaged in a broad range of dis-
cussions, dialogues, and agreements with various countries and international
organizations designed to advance political rights in line with world norms
supported by the United States. China has signed international covenants
Issues of Human Rights in Contemporary US-China Relations
239
dealing with economic, social, and political rights. Chinese leaders routinely
pledge cooperation with other countries in promoting human rights. They
have fostered reforms emphasizing the rule of law, greater transparency, and
accountability; and promoting democracy and democratic decision making in
handling various human rights concerns in China. At times, the progress of
Chinese reform in these areas has encouraged some Chinese and foreign
specialists to anticipate continued change leading to the transformation of
China’s authoritarian one-party political system. 4 However, other specialists in China and abroad see the Chinese leadership as following policies of
adaptation and adjustment in the area of political reform and related human
rights. 5 The reforms in these areas are seen as undermining neither Chinese leadership control of political power in China nor what is viewed as the
overriding concern of Chinese leaders to sustain and strengthen one-party
rule in China through authoritarian as well as more liberal means.
CHANGING IMPORTANCE OF
HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES, 1969–2017
It’s hard to imagine two societies and governments with more different sets
of values than the United States and Maoist China. The progress made in US-
China reconciliation during the initial efforts of normalization begun by Pres-
ident Richard Nixon and Chairman Mao Zedong is a testament to the prag-
matism of their respective leaderships. Other interests—notably each coun-
try’s need for support in the face of rising Soviet power and other complica-
tions—overrode differences regarding political and other values that divided
the United States and China. 6
President Jimmy Carter rose to power on a platform pledging to devote