naval combatants, including China’s aircraft carrier and air force bombers
carrying out exercises in areas surrounding Taiwan. China cut off SEF-
ARATS talks and curbed other formal or informal contacts with Taiwan
officials. It curbed the active flow of Chinese mainland tourists to Taiwan. It broke with the so-called diplomatic truce in place at the time and established
relations with two African countries that previously had official relations
with Taiwan. 21
Beijing eschewed close contacts with DPP leaders. It used continued
close contacts with the now-weakened KMT to reaffirm China’s main de-
mand on cross-strait relations that the Tsai government had to affirm the so-
called 1992 consensus. The consensus was used by the Ma Ying-jeou
government and Beijing to provide a sense of agreement on China’s insis-
tence that what Beijing has called its one-China principle was recognized by
Taiwan and East Asian Maritime Disputes
223
both sides, thereby allowing China to go forward with improved cross-strait
relations. Ma held a summit meeting with President Xi Jinping two months
prior to the January 2016 presidential elections in Taiwan that reaffirmed
both sides’ commitment to the 1992 consensus. Though avoiding any abrupt
changes in the cross-strait status quo she inherited from Ma, Tsai refused to
meet China’s demands on the 1992 consensus. The result reinforced Bei-
jing’s suspicion of her alleged pro-independence tendencies and prompted
carefully applied increases in Chinese military, diplomatic, and economic
pressure on Taiwan. 22
While the Obama government stressed cross-strait communication to
avoid serious instability, American critics of the administration’s policy fa-
vored stronger support for Taiwan. They included Republican leaders in
Congress, Republican-leaning think tanks, media, and interest groups, along
with many Democrats and progressive think tanks, media, and interest
groups advocating change that would allow for a US-Taiwan policy that was
less deferential to China. 23
Some Americans strongly urged US policy to deal with Taiwan for its
own sake, rather than in a contingent way that was dependent on US interests
with China. They opposed the US government intervention, by its voicing
concern about Tsai Ing-wen’s cross-strait policies in 2011, in Taiwan domes-
tic politics. They favored more forthright American government support for
Taiwan’s entry into the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) multilateral econom-
ic agreement, more frequent US cabinet-level visits to Taiwan, and the sale
of more advanced US military equipment to Taiwan; and they averred that
strident American leadership complaints about Chinese bullying and intimi-
dation of neighbors, using military and other coercive means, needed also to
highlight and condemn China’s two decades of massive bullying, coercion,
and intimidation toward Taiwan.
A second group of Americans focused on using Taiwan’s strategic loca-
tion in opposition to what they saw as Chinese efforts to undermine the
American strategic position around China’s rim and achieve overall domi-
nance in the region contrary to long-standing American interests. In their
view, to counter such perceived efforts required a clear American strategy
working with China’s neighbors involving maritime control, and interdiction
if necessary. Because of its location at the center of the so-called first island chain, Taiwan looms large in plans to counter Chinese expansion along its
rim. The plans involve gaining the Taiwan government’s cooperation in set-
ting and monitoring sensors and other means of surveillance, preparing mo-
bile units with antiship missiles to deploy to various locations in the first
island chain, and preparing the use of mines and other means to deny access
to Chinese ships and submarines.
A third group of Americans focused on the Xi Jinping government’s
coercive expansionism at American expense along China’s rim and the other
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practices grossly at odds with US interests, to argue that America should take
actions showing greater support for Taiwan as part of a cost imposition
strategy to counter Xi Jinping’s anti-American practices. In their view, the
kinds of steps forward in US relations with Taiwan that were advocated by
the previous two groups should be considered and used, as the United States
endeavored to show Beijing that its various challenges to US interests would
not be cost free and actually would be counterproductive for Chinese con-
cerns on the all-important Taiwan issue. 24
Meanwhile, the US election campaign of 2015–16 featured acrimony
with China and some attention to Taiwan. A few Republican candidates and
the Republican Party platform used the arguments of the three schools of
thought described above in calling for change in policy toward Taiwan. Since
before his stint as a presidential candidate, Senator Marco Rubio has been
active in congressional measures to support Taiwan along the lines of the
first group of critics noted above, who urge treating Taiwan for its own sake
and without so much deference to Beijing. He frequently highlighted those
initiatives during his campaign. He notably backed a US military buildup to
ensure Taiwan’s protection in the face of China’s military power. He advised
that US policy should be guided by historic American reassurances of sup-
port for Taiwan and not by reputed need to avoid exacerbating tensions with
China over the issue. 25
Senator Ted Cruz released a statement on the results of Taiwan’s January
2016 presidential elections lauding Taiwan on ideological grounds as a bea-
con for democracy and inspiration to those in China and Hong Kong seeking
freedom against the oppressive Communist government. 26
Senator John McCain and other senators visited Asia in May–June 2016
to reassure US allies and partners of continued strong American regional
engagement despite Trump’s call for allies depending on US military protec-
tion to do more to offset the US costs or face American withdrawal. McCain
and six of the visiting senators stopped in Taiwan to affirm support for
recently installed President Tsai Ing-wen. The visit marked the first by the
Chair of the Senate Armed Services Committee in twenty-six years and the
largest group of US senators to visit Taiwan in ten years. 27
Though Mr. Trump said little about Taiwan, Professor Peter Navarro, an
Asia expert, used a byline as a policy adviser to Trump on Asian issues in
publishing in July 2016 an extensive assessment of the importance of strong-
er US support for Taiwan; he employed the arguments of the three schools of
thought noted above. 28
Overall, the implications of the US election debates on policy toward
Taiwan were limited. They showed little deviation from the arguments seen
in the Congress and the media prior to and during the American campaign.
How Hillary Clinton’s promised hardening of policy on disputes with China
would impact her approach to Taiwan remained undefined, though her senior
Taiwan and East
Asian Maritime Disputes
225
staff member Jake Sullivan said in July 2016 that Hillary Clinton would not
change Taiwan policy. 29 Candidate Trump devoted little attention to the issue.
Interviews in Taipei with officials and think tank experts in July 2016
showed concern that Taiwan would suffer if Trump followed through with
pledges to negotiate major agreements with China as the Taiwan issue would
likely be raised by the Chinese side in those negotiations. There also was
worry in Taipei that candidate Trump’s stance on demanding more payment
from US ally Japan would seriously weaken the US ability to support Taiwan
in the face of China’s military intimidation. Observers in Taiwan appreciated
the resolve shown by Senator McCain and his Senate colleagues to continue
support for US allies and partners in Asia regardless of the results of the
American presidential election. They were encouraged by interactions with
Navarro when he visited Taiwan and by strong support for Taiwan registered
in the Republican Party platform. There was broad worry among Taiwan
observers on how they could advance Taiwan’s importance in US adminis-
tration’s policy deliberations. In particular, the Taiwan government was pre-
paring actively for future entry into the TPP and hoped the agreement would
be approved by Congress, thereby allowing Taiwan to be supported for entry
by the United States in the next round of membership for the body. 30
Interviews with officials and specialists in Beijing in July 2016 registered
low concern over the US election campaign and its implications for US
policy toward Taiwan. Observers in Beijing saw negatives with both Hillary
Clinton and Donald Trump. Like many Americans, they were frustrated with
the downward trend in US-China relations and judged that trend would wors-
en at least to some degree if Clinton were elected. Some in Beijing nonethe-
less voiced confidence that mutual interests and highly integrated US-China
government relationships would guard against relations going seriously off
track. Chinese derision of Trump earlier in the campaign shifted to seeking
advantage, given the candidate’s disruption of US alliances along China’s
rim and emphasis on seeking common ground with China through negotia-
tions. Overall, a common view was that China could “shape” President
Trump to behave in line with its interests as Trump was seen as less ideologi-
cal and more pragmatic than Clinton was. High-level interlocutors in Beijing
judged that Hillary Clinton’s tougher approach than Obama toward China
would not involve major moves on Taiwan. 31
The uncertainty surrounding US China policy under a Trump administra-
tion included the sensitive issue of Taiwan. As noted at the start of this
chapter, although Donald Trump said little about Taiwan during the cam-
paign, once elected he broke ranks with past practice and reflected the views
of many Republican Party leaders and other Americans in publicly question-
ing past deference to Beijing over this matter of acute sensitivity to Chinese
leaders. The outgoing Obama government reacted in part by halting a
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planned large US arms sale to Taiwan at the end of the US president’s term.
Subsequently, President Trump saw the wisdom of adhering to the conven-
tional US policy and practice in dealing with Taiwan discreetly and in accord
with the so-called American one-China policy. In a summit meeting with
President Xi in April 2017, President Trump sought improved relations with
China and an increase in Chinese pressure on North Korea as part of the
Trump government’s strong interest in international pressure on Pyongyang
to halt its nuclear weapons development. He lavished repeated public praise
on President Xi’s integrity and leadership. In that context, planned US arms
sales to Taiwan were postponed and a suggested second phone conversation
with Taiwan’s president was publicly rejected, as these activities could
undermine Chinese support for the United States at such an important junc-
ture. 32
As of this writing, the durability of the trajectory in US administration
policy toward Taiwan remains to be seen. Limited experience with President
Trump’s reversal of major policy positions in Asian and world affairs in his
initial months in office has put observers in the United States, China, Taiwan, and elsewhere on guard for circumstances, moods, and other factors that
could prompt further abrupt change. Trump is easily capable of seemingly
minor actions such as tweets, phone calls, and remarks in interviews and at
press conferences and rallies that in a few words will surprise leaders in
China, Taiwan, and elsewhere with serious negative consequences. He val-
ues unpredictability and does not place the high value President Obama did
on policy transparency, carefully measured responses, and avoidance of dra-
matic actions. He is much less constrained than the previous US administra-
tion by a perceived need to sustain and advance US-China relations. Like
President Xi and unlike President Obama, President Trump does not eschew
tension and presumably seeks advantage in tensions between the two coun-
tries. Also like his Chinese counterpart and unlike President Obama, he is
prepared to seek leverage through linking his policy preference in one area of
the relationship with policies in other areas of the relationship. 33
EAST ASIAN MARITIME DISPUTES AND
As reviewed in chapter 7, early Chinese tests of the Obama administration’s
resolve on sensitive issues in US-China relations reached a more assertive
stage around the time of the Obama government’s launching of its rebalance
to Asia policy in 2011 and the ascendance to power of President Xi Jinping,
strong-man ruler and Communist Party leader, in 2012. Following President
Hu Jintao’s last visit to the United States in January 2011 and concurrent
reassurance of the United States and other concerned powers in statements
Taiwan and East Asian Maritime Disputes
227
about commitments to peace and development by authoritative Chinese
foreign policy leaders, there was some anticipation that China would avoid
the type of disruptive assertiveness at US expense that was seen in the first
years of the Obama government. The hope was that China would return to
the pragmatic cooperation with the United States that had marked most of the
Hu Jintao government. 34
Unfortunately, 2012 saw unprecedented demonstrations of Chinese pow-
er short of using military force in defense of Chinese claims to disputed
territories in the South China Sea and the East China Sea. The measures were
accompanied by official Chinese commentary that accused the United States
of fostering the territorial disputes and using them to advance US influence
in the Asian region to the detriment of China. The Chinese demonstrations of
coercive power went well beyond established international norms and re-
sulted in extralegal measures and in some cases in widespread violence and
property destruction. They placed China’s nei
ghbors and concerned powers,
notably the United States, on guard. They compelled the neighbors and the
United States not only to consider methods of dealing effectively with Chi-
nese pressures, but also to consider more carefully the wide range of differ-
ences they had with China that might set off highly disruptive and assertive
actions by the now second-ranking and rapidly growing power in world
politics. The implications for regional order clearly took a negative turn in
2012. 35
Subsequent developments in the East China Sea and the South China Sea
saw no meaningful letup in China’s determination to advance its disputed
claims at the expense of neighbors and at the expense of the US position as
security guarantor of the Asia-Pacific. China’s interest in avoiding military
conflict with the United States meshed with American priorities; senior US
and Chinese leaders stayed in close contact with one another in an effort
highlighted by China to search for a “new type of great power relationship”
that would avoid conflict and manage tensions as China’s rising power and
expanding interests rubbed against American interests, policies, and prac-
tices.
Competition for influence and advantage characterized US-China rela-
tions over these disputes as well as many other issues during the remainder of
the Obama government. As noted earlier, the Obama government was
pleased overall with its record in dealing with China, including over the
disputes in the maritime regions adjoining China’s mainland. Many others
saw reactive and overly restricted US responses to Chinese affronts that gave
priority to other goals. A notable result was substantial setbacks and lost
influence as the United States seemed weak and less than resolute in the face
of determined Chinese expansion at others’ expense. 36
Amid rising frictions in US-China ties, President Obama was pressed by
the sharp attacks on Chinese economic and security policies by Republican
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challengers in the 2012 presidential election campaign. He joined the fray
with harsh rhetoric not seen in his presidential campaign in 2008. In the third presidential debate on October 22, veteran China specialist Donald Keyser