terrorism since the terrorist attack on America in September 2001, in manag-
ing tensions between nuclear-armed Pakistan and India in South Asia, and in
managing crises precipitated by pro-independence initiatives by Taiwanese
president Chen Shui-bian (2000–2008). China has endeavored to moderate
and then support Western-backed efforts in the UN Security Council to curb
Iran’s suspected nuclear weapons development program. It also has been
among the most active participants in sending security forces abroad as UN
peacekeepers and, more recently, in contributing to the UN peacekeeping
budget. 36
Trends and Prospects in Military Modernization
Overall, Chinese defense acquisition and advancement have reflected broad
ambitions for Chinese military power. While they have appeared to focus
recently on dealing with US forces in the event of a Taiwan contingency,
these forces can be used by Chinese leaders as deemed appropriate in a
variety of circumstances, including the territorial disputes along China’s rim
that have received higher priority in recent Chinese foreign relations.
Salient Chinese defense acquisitions and modernization efforts include
the following:37
• Research and development in space systems to provide wide-area intelli-
gence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, and the development of antisatel-
lite systems to counter the surveillance and related efforts of potential
adversaries; development of cyber attack and means of defense; develop-
ment of electronic warfare capabilities
Security Issues in Contemporary US-China Relations
177
• Cruise missile acquisitions and programs that improve the range, speed,
and accuracy of Chinese land-, air-, and sea-launched weapons
• Ballistic missile programs that improve the range, survivability (through
mobile systems in particular), reliability, accuracy, and response times of
tactical, regional, and intercontinental-range weapons to augment or re-
place current systems; development of ballistic missiles with warheads
capable of targeting naval surface combatants
• Construction and acquisition of advanced conventional-powered subma-
rines with subsurface-launched cruise missiles and guided torpedoes, and
nuclear-powered attack and ballistic missile submarines to augment or
replace older vessels in service
• Development and acquisition of more capable naval surface ships armed
with advanced antiship, antisubmarine, and air-defense weapons
• Air force advances, including hundreds of modern multirole fighters, ad-
vanced air-to-air missiles, airborne early-warning and control system air-
craft, aerial refueling capabilities, and unmanned aerial vehicles
• Air-defense systems involving modern surface-to-air missiles and air-de-
fense fighters
• Improved power projection for ground forces, including more sea- and
airlift capabilities, special operations forces, and amphibious warfare ca-
pabilities
• Research and development of defense information systems, and improved
command, control, communications, and computer systems
• Increase in the tempo and complexity of exercises in order to make the
PLA capable in joint interservice operations involving power projections,
including amphibious operations
The Chinese advances mean that no single Asian power can come close to
matching China’s military power on continental Asia. With the possible ex-
ception of Japan, no Asian country will be capable of challenging China’s
naval and air power in maritime East Asia. Should Beijing choose to deploy
naval and air forces to patrol the sea lines of communications in the Indian
Ocean, only India conceivably would be capable of countering China’s pow-
er.
Looking to the future, it is possible to bound the scope of China’s military
possible exception is the long-range nuclear weapons systems that target
outside Asia, notably the United States. China has used these to deter the
United States and other potential adversaries by demonstrating a retaliatory,
second-strike capability against them. Other challenges with implications
beyond nearby Asia involve cyber attack and antisatellite weapons. 38
The objectives of the Chinese military buildup seem focused first on
Taiwan, preventing its move toward independence and assuring that China’s
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sovereignty will be protected and restored. More generally, Chinese forces
can be deployed to defeat possible threats or attacks on China, especially
China’s economically important eastern coastline. Apart from conflict over
Taiwan, Chinese forces are designed to deal with a range of so-called local
war possibilities. These could involve territorial disputes with Japan, South-
east Asian countries, or India, or instability requiring military intervention in Korea.
Meanwhile, the Chinese military plays a direct role in Chinese foreign
policy, which seeks to spread Chinese international influence, reassure
neighboring countries and others of Chinese intentions, and nurture an inter-
national environment that will allow China to rise in power and influence
without major disruption. This role likely will involve continued active di-
plomacy by Chinese military officials, increased numbers of military exer-
cises with Asian and other countries, some Chinese arms sales to and training
of foreign military forces, and more active participation by Chinese national
security officials in regional and other multilateral security organizations,
some created or fostered by China. 39
The Chinese military is on course to continue a transformation from its
past strategic outlook, that of a large continental power requiring large land
forces for defense against threats to borders. The end of the threat from the
Soviet Union and the improvement of China’s relations with India, Vietnam,
and others have eased this concern. China is likely to move away from a
continental orientation, requiring large land forces, toward a combined conti-
nental/maritime orientation, requiring smaller, more mobile, and more so-
phisticated forces capable of protecting China’s inland and coastal periphery.
Unlike the doctrine of protracted land war against an invading enemy preva-
lent until the latter years of the Cold War, Chinese doctrine probably will
continue its more recent emphasis on the need to demonstrate an ability to
strike first in order to deter potential adversaries and to carry out first strikes in order to both gain the initiative in the battlefield and secure Chinese
objectives.
To fulfill these objectives, Chinese forces will need, and will further
develop, the ability to strike or respond rapidly, to take and maintain the
initiative in the battlefield, to prevent escalation, and to resolve conflict
quickly and on favorable terms. Chinese military options will include pre-
emptive strikes and the use of conventional and nuclear forces to deter and
coerce adversaries. Chinese forces will expand power-projection capabilities,
giving Chinese forces a solid ability to deny critical land and sea access (for example, Taiwan Strait) to adversaries, and providing options for force projection farther from Chinese borders. 40
To achieve these objectives, Chinese conventional ground forces will
evolve, consistent with recent emphasis, toward smaller, more flexible, high-
ly trained, and well-equipped rapid-reaction forces with more versatile and
Security Issues in Contemporary US-China Relations
179
well-developed assault, airborne, and amphibious power-projection capabil-
ities. Special operations forces will play an important role in these efforts.
Navy forces will build on recent advances with more advanced surface com-
batants and submarines having better air defense, antisubmarine warfare, and
antiship capabilities. Their improved weaponry of cruise missiles and torpe-
does, an improved naval air force, and greater replenishment-at-sea capabil-
ities will broaden the scope of their activities and pose greater challenges to potential adversaries. Air forces will grow with more versatile and modern
fighters, longer-range interceptor/strike aircraft, improved early warning and
air defense, and longer-range transport, lift, and midair refueling capabilities.
These forces will be used increasingly in an integrated way consistent
with an emphasis on joint operations that involves more sophisticated com-
mand, control, communications, computers, intelligence, and strategic recon-
naissance (C4ISR), early warning, and battlefield management systems. Im-
proved airborne and satellite-based systems will improve detection, tracking,
targeting, and strike capabilities, as well as enhanced operational coordina-
tion of the various forces.
Chinese strategic planners are sure to build on the advantages Chinese
strategic missile systems provide. While estimates vary, it appears that Chi-
nese plans call for more than 1,500 short-, medium-, and intermediate-range,
solid-fueled, mobile ballistic missiles (with a range under four thousand
miles), and short-range cruise missiles, with increased accuracy, and some
with both nuclear and conventional capabilities. China is also modernizing a
small number of longer-range nuclear missiles capable of hitting the conti-
nental United States, and has developed a submarine-launched nuclear mis-
sile that would broaden Chinese nuclear options. Chinese nuclear missiles
will have smaller and more powerful warheads with multiple independently
targeted reentry vehicles or multiple reentry vehicle capabilities. The empha-
sis on modern surveillance, early warning, and battle management systems
with advanced C4ISR assets seen in Chinese planning with regard to conven-
tional forces also applies to nuclear forces.
These advances will build on China’s existing military abilities. They
pose a long list of serious concerns for the United States, as well as Taiwan,
Japan, and some other Chinese neighbors, and an overall strategic reality of
increasing Chinese military power that influences the strategic outlook of
most Chinese neighbors. The existing military abilities include the following:
• The ability to conduct intensive, short-duration air and naval attacks on
Taiwan, as well as prolonged air, naval, and possibly ground attacks.
China’s ability to prevail against Taiwan is seen as increasing steadily,
especially given lax defense preparedness and political division in Tai-
wan. Massive US military intervention is viewed as capable of defeating a
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Chapter 8
Chinese invasion, but Chinese area denial capabilities could substantially
impede and slow the US intervention.
• Power-projection abilities to dislodge smaller regional powers from near-
by disputed land and maritime territories, and the ability to conduct air and
sea denial operations for two hundred miles along China’s coasts.
• Strong abilities to protect Chinese territory from invasion, to conduct
ground-based power projection along land borders against smaller region-
al powers, and to strike civilian and military targets with a large and
growing inventory of ballistic missiles and medium-range bombers armed
with cruise missiles.
• Limited ability to project force against the territory of militarily capable
neighboring states, notably Russia, India, and Japan.
• Continued ability to deter nuclear and other attacks from the United States
and Russia by means of modernized and survivable Chinese nuclear mis-
sile forces capable of striking at these powers.
As China’s military capabilities continue to grow more rapidly than those
of any of its neighbors, and as China solidifies its position as Asia’s leading military power, the situation clearly poses serious implications for, and some
complications in, China’s foreign policy. Many neighboring officials and
those in the United States, sometimes publicly but more often privately,
remain concerned for several reasons.
The history of the use of force in Chinese foreign policy provides little
assurance to Americans or others that China’s avowed peaceful emphasis
will be sustained. The Chinese government has resorted to the use of force in
international affairs more than most governments in the modern period. 41
The reasons have varied. 42 China’s growing stake in the international status quo and its dependence on smooth international economic interchange are
seen to argue against Chinese leaders’ resorting to military force to achieve
international objectives. At the same time, the rapid development of Chinese
military capabilities to project power and the change in Chinese doctrine to
emphasize striking first to achieve Chinese objectives are seen to increase the likelihood of Chinese use of force to achieve the ambitions and objectives of
the Chinese government. Against this background, it is not surprising that an
active debate continues in the United States and elsewhere about Chinese
national security intentions and whether they will override the Chinese
government’s public emphasis on promoting peace and development in Chi-
nese foreign affairs. Prudence argues for increased US defense preparations
in the face of China’s rise. Those American efforts continued, notably under
the rubric of the Obama government’s reengagement with the Asia-Pacific
region, and they reinforced long-standing Chinese suspicions that the posi-
tive hand of US engagement was accompanied by the negative hand of US
Security Issues in Contemporary US-China Relations
181
containment. Deeply rooted Chinese suspicions of US intentions and policies
continue to be reinforced.
From five years or so into this century, Chinese and American security
officials have tended to register their reservations and concerns in dialogues
or less prominent briefings and statements. Chinese concerns and differences
with the United States on security issues involve a long list of US security
activities that are seen to underline a US security posture opposed to China.
They include:
• US statements and actions seen by China to show that the United States
viewed China as a potential adversary, that it sought to change China
’s
authoritarian political system, and that it endeavored to complicate and
hold back China’s rising international role
• Perceived US support for Taiwan independence, US refusal to support
Taiwan’s reunification with China, and US use of Taiwan as a “card,” a
source of leverage, in negotiations with China
• US support for leaders and groups in Tibet and Xinjiang that undermine
Chinese sovereignty
• US force deployments and defense arrangements in the Asia-Pacific re-
gion that are seen to surround China with adverse strategic pressures and
to prompt China’s neighbors to contest more actively with China over
territorial disputes
• A strengthened US-Japan alliance directed at countering rising China
• A US nuclear weapons strategy that sees China as an enemy
• US, Japanese, and South Korean missile defense efforts that are seen as or
are in fact targeted against China’s growing ballistic missile capabilities
• A US-backed Western arms embargo against China
Forecasts of Chinese military strengths and their challenges to the United
States differ because of variables involving political, economic, and other
developments and because of possible upturns or downturns in Sino-
American relations. Nonetheless, the United States and China have become
more competitive; China’s economy is catching up with and is widely seen to
surpass that of the United States in the next decade. Against that background,
more attention is focused on China’s robust military buildup targeted along
its periphery and on what forces the United States, still the world’s largest
military power, can bring to bear to offset negative impacts from China’s
military rise.
The debate in the United States on what to do about China’s rise features
a range of specialists who see the implications of China’s military strength-
ening as a demand for substantial changes in US policy. On one side are
those arguing in support of US Defense Department stance that in the event
of an armed confrontation with China, the United States should be ready to