tious economic, security, political, sovereignty, foreign policy, and other
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issues. Economic issues became more prominent: The growing inequities
seen in the United States with regard to America’s economic relationship
with China’s ever more powerful economy included a massive trade deficit,
Chinese currency policies and practices, US dependence on Chinese financ-
ing of US government budget deficits, and Chinese national security and
industrial espionage and abuse of intellectual property rights.
Security issues became more prominent in the United States with the
buildup of Chinese military forces and the threat they posed to US interests
in Taiwan and the broader Asia-Pacific. China was increasingly assertive in
using security forces backed by its robust military presence and other coer-
cive means to expand influence at expense of neighbors in disputed territory
in the East China Sea and the South China Sea. Its actions seriously under-
mined American interests in regional security and the US leadership role as a
security guarantor in the Asia-Pacific.
Political issues included China’s controversial record on human rights,
democracy, religious freedom, and family planning practices. Sovereignty
questions involved disputes over the status of Taiwan, Tibet, Xinjiang, Hong
Kong, and Chinese claims to disputed islands and maritime rights along
China’s rim. Foreign policy disputes focused on China’s support for such
“rogue” states as North Korea, Sudan, Myanmar/Burma, Iran, Cuba, Zim-
babwe, and Venezuela; and on Chinese trade, investment, and aid to re-
source-rich and poorly governed states in Africa that undermined Western
sanctions designed to pressure these governments to reform.
Meanwhile, China’s new boldness in foreign affairs saw Beijing create
and lead a variety of international economic, political, and security organiza-
tions that challenged existing US-backed bodies, stressed norms more in line
with China’s objectives, and underlined US international leadership. The
broad Chinese challenge seemed to sharpen with ever closer Chinese collab-
oration with Russia under President Vladimir Putin as Russia pursued blatant
land grabs and military incursions among other egregious affronts against the
international order supported by the United States. 5
As in the past, these many areas of acrimony and friction developed in
tandem with a wide range of cooperation between the two governments and
societies. Economic interaction and deepening ties between the elites and
peoples had major positive impacts. Relations between the two militaries, a
heretofore weak link in US-China ties, made substantial progress. The two
governments continued and advanced cooperation on a variety of internation-
al issues, including climate change, nuclear security, and various accords,
which were highlighted notably during periodic meetings of groups like the
G-20 dealing with issues in global governance. President Obama and Presi-
dent Hu Jintao and President Xi Jinping had several lengthy summits and
numerous other meetings that announced progress in the multifaceted Sino-
American relationship. The biannual senior dialogues between the two coun-
Barack Obama, Donald Trump, and Xi Jinping
149
tries produced long lists of more than two hundred accomplishments in ef-
forts to advance Sino-American cooperation. Many were the results of in-
tensely focused collaboration by different agencies and departments of the
two governments.
Such progress in the relationship gave support to liberals who argued that
the overall relationship was changing for the better due to increased contacts
and the impact of trade and economic interdependence. Constructivists also
highlighted the common ground between the United States and China over
issues like climate change, nuclear security, and other issues of international governance as reflecting positive learning by leaders on both sides and conducive to progress and mutually advantageous development. Meanwhile, re-
alists needed to weigh the importance of these various areas of cooperation
against the rising differences in the relationship, in charting recommended
courses for the way ahead. 6
At a practical level, whether the pragmatic engagement in US-China rela-
tions that developed during the tenure of the George W. Bush–Hu Jintao
governments would continue depended heavily on the choices of Chinese
and US leaders, especially regarding the major differences between the two
countries. What the record over the next decade showed to this writer and
many but certainly not all American specialists was that China’s repeated
policy choices sought advantage at the expense of the United States and
others, as it endeavored to rectify the key differences it had with those coun-
tries. Those policy choices were supported by Chinese judgments of greater
Chinese strengths and declining US influence and resolve and by a uniquely
self-righteous and aggrieved Chinese nationalism fostered by the govern-
ment, which provided an important moral imperative for China to seek ad-
vantage at the expense of others. The main counterarguments to the above
assessments came from those American officials and specialists who judged
that the recent negative trends and frictions were exaggerated, and they did
not take enough account of China’s legitimate concerns nor correctly weigh
the differences against the many benefits that continued to flow from the
Sino-American relationship. Indeed, as Obama government officials left of-
fice, they offered private assessments to American specialists that the admin-
istration had been remarkably successful in charting a course between US-
China differences and common ground that redounded to the overall benefit
of the United States. Other American specialists acknowledged the rising
tensions and differences but judged that American myopia about China’s
concerns obscured what they saw as needed compromise where the United
States would “meet China half-way” in seeking mutually advantageous out-
comes. 7
What the recent record does show clearly is that at times in the past, even
as recently as the first two years of the George W. Bush administration,
assertive Chinese proclivities to seek rectification of differences with Ameri-
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ca and others were held in check by effective and resolute US countermea-
sures. As discussed in chapter 6, the perception in China and actual reality of US economic, military, and political strength and determination to use it at
that time influenced Chinese leaders to shift to a stance that focused on
reassuring the United States that China’s rise would not challenge the United
States. And as seen in chapter 6, the Bush government’s ability to employ
such countermeasures declined as it came to depend heavily on China and
faced enormous preoccupations at home and abroad.
The Obama government also remained preoccupied with other problems
at home and abroad and gave a high priority to sustaining smooth relations
with China despite growing diffe
rences. The Obama administration’s ap-
proach to Beijing stressed transparency and predictability, with any change
coming only after careful deliberations that usually resulted in incremental
adjustments in policy. Linkage—using US policy in one area to influence
Chinese policy in another—was not used. The result was that Chinese leaders
could easily assess the likely reaction of the United States to China’s in-
creased assertiveness and probes seeking to advance control in disputed terri-
tory, economic advantage at US expense, cooperation with Russia against
American concerns, and other initiatives sensitive to US interests. The likeli-
hood of substantial changes adverse to Chinese interests seemed low, thereby
weighing China’s calculus in favor of the assertiveness and probes at
American expense. 8
The 2016 American election campaign made it evident that American
discourse was shifting away from the optimistic outlook of Obama govern-
ment officials and other specialists emphasizing the positive accomplish-
ments in the relationship and the need for greater compromise with China.
Democratic Party front-runner Hillary Clinton registered the broadest-rang-
ing indictment of Chinese infringements on American interests. She warned
against China’s incremental advances to the detriment of the United States,
promising to confront Beijing as it endeavored to maneuver in duplicitous
ways and “game” the United States over various issues. Her rhetoric captured
growing frustrations in the United States as China advanced its influence at
American expense. 9
Republican presidential candidate Trump had a narrower set of com-
plaints against China, giving a high priority to negotiating more advanta-
geous economic deals for America. During the election campaign, Chinese
specialists judged that observers in China as well as the United States had
adopted a more negative view of relations, highlighting salient differences
seen from both sides. They disliked both the Democratic and the Republican
nominees but judged that Beijing would be better off with a Trump govern-
ment than a Clinton government. 10 They were taken up short when President-elect Trump, reflecting the views of key staff members in his administration
and among Republicans in Congress, showed unusual support for Taiwan
Barack Obama, Donald Trump, and Xi Jinping
151
and questioned the US one-China policy as well as Chinese economic poli-
cies and expansion of control in the disputed South China Sea. After inaugu-
ration, the president reaffirmed the one-China policy and conducted a busi-
nesslike series of meetings with President Xi Jinping at the US leader’s
Florida resort, establishing negotiation frameworks for advancing relations
and dealing with problems. The problems remained unresolved and highly
prominent, raising tensions in the US-China relationship. 11
COMPETITION CHALLENGES POSITIVE ENGAGEMENT
A major theme in President Obama’s initial foreign policy was to seek the
cooperation of other world powers, including China, to deal with salient
international concerns such as the global economic crisis and recession, cli-
mate change, nuclear weapons proliferation, and terrorism. He and his team
made vigorous efforts to build common ground with China on these and
related issues. China’s leaders offered limited cooperation; they focused
much more on their own interests than the need for global responsibility
urged by President Obama. Chinese officials suspected that added global
responsibilities would hold back China’s economic development and mod-
ernization. 12
More worrisome, Chinese actions and assertions in 2009 and 2010 direct-
ly challenged the policies and practices of the United States, as follows:
• Chinese government patrol boats confronted US surveillance ships in the
South China Sea. The Chinese government took the position, opposed by
the United States and the majority of concerned world powers, that China
had the right to regulate the movement of military naval and air vehicles in
the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) along China’s rim. A coastal state’s
EEZ generally extends from the edge of its territorial sea (twelve nautical
miles from its coast) to a distance of two hundred nautical miles from its
coast.
• China challenged US and South Korean military exercises against North
Korea in the Yellow Sea. Such exercises had occurred in the past and in
2010 they were initiated in response to North Korean provocations in the
sinking of a South Korean warship that resulted in the death of forty-six
sailors and the shelling of a South Korean island that resulted in South
Korean military and civilian casualties.
• Chinese treatment of US arms sales to Taiwan and President Obama’s
meeting with the Dalai Lama in 2010 was harsher than in the recent past.
In both cases the Obama government had delayed these US actions that
conformed to past American practice until after the president’s first visit to
China in November 2009, hoping not to undermine the emerging coopera-
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Chapter 7
tive atmosphere in his administration’s relationship with China. The more
strident Chinese response came as a surprise to the United States.
• Chinese officials threatened to stop investing in US government securities
• The Chinese government for a time responded very harshly to American
government interventions in 2010 that (1) urged collective efforts to man-
age rising tensions in the South China Sea, and (2) affirmed, during Sino-
Japanese disputes over East China Sea islands, that while the US took no
position on the sovereignty of the islands, the US-Japan alliance did pro-
vide for American support for Japan in areas under its control, including
the disputed islands in the East China Sea controlled by Japan but claimed
by China. 13
The Obama government reacted calmly and firmly to what Secretary of
State Clinton referred to as “tests”—that is, this manifestation of new asser-
tiveness by China. It gave no ground on any of the Chinese demands. It made
clear to the Chinese government and the world that the United States was
prepared to undertake military measures needed to deal with the buildup of
Chinese forces targeting Americans and American interests in the Asia-Pa-
cific. US officials also helped move China to curb North Korea’s repeated
provocations by warning privately as well as publicly that the United States
viewed North Korea’s nuclear weapons development as not just a regional
issue nor a concern for global nonproliferation, but as a direct threat to the
United States. 14
The US government also found that prominent Chinese assertiveness and
truculence with the United States and neighboring Asian countries over mari-
time, security, and other issues prompted Asian governments to be more
active in working more closely with the United States and in encouraging an
active US presence in the Asia-Pacific. Their interest in closer ties with the
; United States meshed well with the Obama government’s broad effort begun
publicly in late 2011 to “pivot” and “re-engage” with the countries of the
Asia-Pacific, ranging from India to the Pacific Islands. 15
The Obama government leaders from the president on down articulated
the outlines of a new emphasis on what was called the American “rebalance”
policy in the Asia-Pacific that was welcomed in the region but criticized by
China. 16 The significant elements of the policy, many of which competed with China, included the following:
• The Obama government’s priority international attention would focus on
Asia-Pacific following US military pullbacks from Iraq and Afghanistan.
• The government was determined to maintain force levels and military
capabilities in the Asia-Pacific region despite expected substantial cut-
backs in US defense spending.
Barack Obama, Donald Trump, and Xi Jinping
153
• More widely dispersed US forces and basing/deployment arrangements
indicated rising importance of Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean in
support of long-standing American priorities, including those in Northeast
Asia.
• The dispersal of US forces and a developing US air/sea battle concept
provided a means to counter growing “area denial” efforts in the Asia-
Pacific region, used mainly by China.
• Strong emphasis on US pursuit of free trade and other open economic
interchange, notably through the multilateral Trans Pacific Partnership
(TPP) arrangements was in competition with less liberal regional arrange-
ments supported by China that excluded the United States.
• Significantly enhanced and flexible US diplomatic activism both bilateral-
ly and multilaterally in pursuing American interests in regional security
and stability, free and open economic exchange, and political relations and
values involving human rights and accountable governance often were at
odds with Chinese interests and positions.
At the same time, the US government took pains to reemphasize repeated-
ly the importance of across-the-board close and positive US engagement with
China. US officials well understood that a zero-sum competition with China