est in turn of many visitors from Congress and the administration concerned
with the growth of the US economy and economic opportunity abroad. By
early 1994, Chinese officials were well aware that proponents for continuing
the human rights conditions on MFN treatment for China had become isolat-
ed in the administration and centered in the State Department. The private
reservations held among senior officials in US departments concerned with
business, notably the Treasury Department and the Commerce Department,
about these conditions on China’s MFN status had become clear through
their earlier visits to China and through other interactions. Moreover, US
business groups had moved into high gear in warning that conditions on
MFN treatment could jeopardize US access to the burgeoning Chinese mar-
ket. 61
Sino-American disagreements over human rights conditions in China and
MFN status rose sharply during Secretary of State Warren Christopher’s
March 11–14, 1994, visit to Beijing. 62 Before and during Secretary Christopher’s visit, Chinese leaders appeared defiant in the face of US human rights
requirements. Most notably, Chinese security forces detained prominent dis-
sidents immediately prior to the secretary’s visit and also detained some
Western journalists covering interaction between Chinese dissidents and Chi-
nese security forces. In public interchange during the secretary’s visit, Chi-
nese leaders strongly warned against US use of trade or other pressure to
prompt changes in China’s human rights policy.
This tough approach reflected a determination to rebuff overt US pressure
seen as targeted against the priority Chinese leadership concern of sustaining
CCP rule. It also reflected the fact that the secretary’s trip coincided with the annual convening of the National People’s Congress. That meeting was the
focal point of dissident activism in Beijing, and Chinese leaders were deter-
mined to take a hard line toward those both at home and abroad who pressed
for political change.
Tiananmen, Taiwan, and Post–Cold War Realities, 1989–2000
115
Perhaps of most importance, Chinese leaders calculated that the time was
right to press the United States to alter its human rights policy, especially the linkage with MFN renewal. They saw the Clinton administration leaders
divided on the issue. They saw members of the US Congress as much more
supportive than in the recent past of maintaining MFN treatment for China.
Congress was perhaps influenced, too, by the fact that while the United
States had been debating the issue, countries that were political allies to the United States but economic competitors, like Japan, Germany, and France,
had been sending high-level officials to China—underlining their willingness
to help fill the vacuum should US-China economic relations falter with the
withdrawal of MFN tariff treatment. 63
Reflecting a calculus of costs and benefits along the lines of realism in IR
theory, Chinese leaders adopted a tough stance during the Christopher visit.
Those in the US government favoring linkage of MFN treatment and human
rights conditions were further isolated, and US leaders were forced to change
their policy or lose the considerable economic opportunities in the Chinese
market. In the end, Chinese leaders were generally pleased with President
Clinton’s May 26, 1994, decision to “delink” MFN treatment to China from
US consideration of Chinese human rights practices.
Subsequently, Chinese officials and commentators in official Chinese
media were anxious for the United States and China to take advantage of the
improved atmosphere in bilateral relations to push for more far-reaching and
comprehensive progress in the US-China relationship. 64 Whatever hopes Chinese leaders held about advancing relations with the United States were
dashed by President Clinton’s reversal of past policy, permitting Taiwan’s
president, Lee Teng-hui, to make an ostensibly private visit to Cornell Uni-
versity in June 1995.
Beijing’s tough military and polemical responses and the Clinton admin-
istration’s eventual dispatch of carrier battle groups to Taiwan highlighted
mixed lessons for China. 65
On the positive side, Chinese officials claimed several achievements re-
sulting from the PRC’s forceful reaction to Lee Teng-hui’s visit to the United
States:
ther assertive actions to lobby in the US Congress or elsewhere for greater
international recognition. Pro-independence advocates in Taiwan also had
to reassess previous claims that the PRC was bluffing in its warnings
against Taiwan independence.
• It prompted second thoughts by some pro-Taiwan advocates in the Con-
gress and elsewhere in the United States as to the wisdom of pursuing
their agenda at that time. International officials seeking to follow the US
116
Chapter 5
lead in granting greater recognition to Taiwan had to reevaluate their
positions as well.
• It resulted in heightened sensitivity by the Clinton administration regard-
ing China. This led to official reassurances to the PRC that US policy
toward Taiwan would not deviate from past practice; it also led to an
invitation for the Chinese president to visit the United States, a summit
meeting long sought by Chinese leaders; and it led to tightly controlled
management of significant developments in US policy toward China by
the president and his senior advisers, who now sought to pursue an active
engagement policy with China and to avoid significant deterioration of
relations.
At the same time, Beijing appeared to have overplayed its hand in press-
ing the United States for pledges against Taiwan official visits to the United
States and in pressing Taiwan’s people to abandon Lee Teng-hui in favor of a
leader more committed to reunification with the mainland. Beijing also ap-
peared to recognize that it was not productive to continue strident accusa-
tions in official Chinese media during 1995–96 that the United States was
attempting to contain China, or to shun dialogue with the United States.
Given China’s perceived need to sustain a working relationship with the
United States for the foreseeable future, Beijing officials tried, for example
through President Jiang Zemin’s meeting with President Clinton in 1995, to
find and develop common ground while playing down differences. Whereas
Beijing had appeared prepared in mid-1995 to freeze contacts with the Clin-
ton administration, awaiting the results of the 1996 US elections, Beijing
now appeared to have judged that endeavoring to work constructively with
the current US government was in China’s best interests. Also, Jiang Zemin
told US reporters in October 1995 that lobbying Congress would be an im-
portant priority in the year ahead, and Chinese specialists also said that the
PRC would put more effort into winning greater understanding and support
from other US sectors, notably the media and business. 66 For its part, the Clinton administration continued strong efforts to avoid serious difficultie
s
with China; to emphasize a policy of engagement with the PRC; and to seek
high-level contacts, summit meetings, and tangible agreement with China on
sensitive issues.
The events of the next two years in US-China relations were highlighted
by the summit meetings of Presidents Jiang and Clinton in Washington in
1997 and Beijing in 1998. Despite the continued debate in the United States
over the Clinton administration’s new commitment to a policy of engage-
ment with China, Chinese officials and specialists claimed to be confident
that China’s rising power and influence in world affairs, and its willingness
to cooperate with the United States on issues of importance to both countries,
Tiananmen, Taiwan, and Post–Cold War Realities, 1989–2000
117
made it unlikely that the US opponents of the engagement policy would have
a serious, lasting impact on US-China relations. 67
The events of 1997 and 1998 seemed to bear out the Chinese view. The
US-China summit meetings capped the Beijing leaders’ decade-long effort to
restore their international legitimacy after the Tiananmen incident. The re-
sults redounded to the benefit of the presiding Chinese leaders, especially
President Jiang Zemin. Jiang was anxious to carve out a role as a responsible
and respected international leader as part of his broader effort to solidify his political base of support at home. Basically satisfied with the results of the
smooth summit meetings with the US president, Beijing saw little need to
take the initiative in dealing with continuing US-China differences like hu-
man rights, trade, and weapons proliferation. It was the US side that felt
political pressure to achieve results in these areas.
Responding to repeated US initiatives to reach agreements at the summit
meetings and elsewhere on these kinds of questions, Chinese officials took
the opportunity to make demands of their own, especially regarding US
policy toward Taiwan. At the same time, Beijing was willing marginally to
improve human rights practices, and it curbed nuclear and cruise missile
exchanges with Iran, for the sake of achieving a smoother and more coopera-
tive US-China relationship.
In sum, despite strong and often partisan debate in the United States over
policy toward China, Chinese officials were well pleased with the progress
they had made in normalizing relations with the United States from the low
points after the Tiananmen crackdown of 1989 and the confrontation over
Taiwan in 1995–96. The progress had been made largely by changes in US
policy toward China, and with few concessions by Beijing in key areas of
importance to China. The summits of 1997 and 1998 represented the cap-
stone of the normalization effort, in effect strongly legitimating the PRC
leaders at home and abroad—a key Chinese goal after the Tiananmen inci-
dent. Once this was accomplished, Chinese leaders could turn to their daunt-
ing domestic agenda with more assurance that the key element of US-China
relations was now on more stable ground.
At the same time, Chinese leaders had few illusions about US policy.
They saw plenty of opportunities for continued difficulties. American behav-
ior continued to be seen as fitting into the pattern of engagement and contain-
ment—the “two hands” of US policy seen by Chinese officials and special-
ists. The main trend in 1997 and 1998 was toward greater engagement, and
China endeavored to encourage that. But there remained many forces in
Congress, in the media, and among US interest groups that were prepared to
challenge any forward movement in US-China relations. And the fact re-
mained that although it was clearly in China’s interest to cooperate with the
United States under existing circumstances, the two countries continued to
have fundamentally contradictory interests over the international balance of
118
Chapter 5
influence, the American strategic role in East Asia, US support for Taiwan,
and American support for political change in China. 68
Events in 1999, highlighted by the US bombing of the Chinese embassy
in Belgrade, posed new challenges for Chinese leadership efforts to sustain
workable economic and other ties with the United States while defending key
Chinese interests of sovereignty, security, and nationalism. Chinese mob
violence against US diplomatic properties was accompanied by a virulent
leadership debate over how to deal with the United States that was not
resolved for months. In the end, Chinese leaders decided their interests were
best served by working with the US administration to restore calm and to
continue US-China engagement that was beneficial to China.
Amid the contentious US presidential campaign of 2000, where policy
toward China figured as an issue of some importance, senior Chinese offi-
cials told senior Clinton administration officials that China was intent on
approaching the United States constructively, regardless of which candidate
won the election. Such comment was seen by these US officials as support-
ing a coherent and consistent Chinese strategy toward the United States. This
strategy appeared similar to that seen in 1997 and 1998 in that it accepted US
leadership in world affairs and in Asian affairs and sought Chinese develop-
ment in a peaceful international environment where the United States main-
tained primacy. 69
However, the limitations, fragility, and apparent contradictions of this
Chinese moderate approach toward the United States also were starkly evi-
dent. Whatever this strategy entailed, it did not show Chinese willingness to
curb harsh commentary and the use of military force in challenging US
power and influence in Asian and world affairs. Thus, Chinese officials and
commentary in 2000 and until mid-2001 continued to be full of invective
against the United States, opposing alleged US power politics, hegemonism,
and Cold War thinking. China repeatedly criticized the United States over a
variety of key foreign policy issues, such as US plans for national missile
defense in the United States and theater missile defense abroad, NATO ex-
pansion, enhanced US alliance relations with Japan, and US policy and prac-
tices in dealing with Iraq, Iran, Cuba, and other countries. 70 Chinese aircraft and ships monitoring US surveillance aircraft and ships in international waters near China carried out dangerous maneuvers in apparent efforts to harass
and deter the Americans from carrying out their objectives.
Chapter Six
Pragmatism amid Differences during
the George W. Bush Administration
George W. Bush became president in 2001 with a reputation of toughness
toward the People’s Republic of China (PRC) but no clearly articulated poli-
cy. The new US administration’s approach to the Chinese government was
based in large measure on a fundamental uncertainty: China was rising and
becoming more prominent in Asia and world affairs, but US leaders were
unsure if this process would see China emerge as a friend or foe of the United
States. 1 The administration dealt with this ambiguous China situation within a broader US international strategy th
at endeavored to maximize US national
power and influence in key situations, including relations with China. This
involved strengthening
• US military and economic power.
• US relations with key allies; those in Asia, Japan, South Korea, and Aus-
tralia—received high priority.
• US relations with other power centers; the Bush administration was suc-
cessful in moving quickly, before September 11, 2001, to build closer
relations with the two major flanking powers in East Asia: Russia and
India. 2
In 2001 the new US president and his leadership team displayed a notably
less solicitous approach to China than the one displayed by the outgoing Bill
Clinton administration. As seen in chapter 5, the Clinton administration dur-
ing its second term adopted an engagement policy toward China that re-
ceived the top priority among US relations with Asia. The administration was
anxious to avoid serious downturns in US-China relations over Taiwan and
other issues; it also repeatedly sought negotiations with Beijing to develop
119
120
Chapter 6
“deliverables”—agreements and other tangible signs of forward movement
in US-China relations. President Clinton, senior US officials, and US special-
ists repeatedly made clear that key objectives of growing US engagement
with China were to enmesh China in webs of interdependent relationships
with the United States, international organizations, world business, and oth-
ers that would constrain and ultimately change Chinese policies and practices
at home and abroad that were seen as offensive to or opposed to US inter-
ests. 3
PRC bargainers used a prevailing atmosphere of strong, public Chinese
criticism of US policies and warnings of Chinese actions against Taiwan in
order to press for US concessions in areas of importance to them, notably
regarding US relations with Taiwan. Chinese criticism of US policy had a
broad scope involving Taiwan and a wide range of issues in US foreign and
security policy including missile defense; NATO expansion; US-Japan se-
curity cooperation; US human rights policy; US efforts in the United Nations