or “Neo-isolationist” school, it also was in line with realism in IR theory,
though it stressed different elements than the first school of thought noted
above. Rather, it contended that the United States had become overextended
in world affairs and was being taken advantage of in the current world
security-economic system. It called for sweeping cuts in spending for inter-
national activities, favoring US pullback from foreign bases and major cuts
in foreign assistance and foreign technical-information programs. Some in
this school favored trade measures that were seen as protectionist by US
trading partners. 17
A third school of thought seemed to combine elements of liberalism with
realism and a strong American identity in line with constructivism. It argued
for policy that would promote more vigorously US interests in international
political, military, and economic affairs and would use US influence to pres-
sure countries that do not conform to the US-backed norms on an appropriate
world order. Supporters of this stance wanted the United States to maintain
military forces with worldwide capabilities, to lead strongly in world affairs, and to minimize compromise and accommodation in promoting American
interests and values.
Those who supported this view perceived a global power vacuum, caused
mainly by the collapse of the Soviet empire, which allowed the United States
to exert greater influence. 18 In the immediate post–Cold War years, some advocates of this third view were most vocal in pressing for a strong US
policy in support of democracy and human rights. They opposed economic or
trading policies of other countries seen as inequitable or predatory. They
pressed for a strong policy against proliferation of weapons of mass destruc-
tion. Members of this school also argued variously for sanctions against
countries that practiced coercive birth control, seriously polluted the environment, harbored terrorists, or promoted the drug trade. Proponents of this view
came from both the left and the right in the American political spectrum. In
Congress, they included conservative Republican Newt Gingrich and liberal
Democrat Nancy Pelosi, both of whom would serve as speaker of the US
House of Representatives.
As far as US policy toward China was concerned during the 1990s, advo-
cates of the third group—proponents of active US leadership and internation-
Tiananmen, Taiwan, and Post–Cold War Realities, 1989–2000
99
al intervention—were forceful in calling for policies opposing Chinese hu-
man rights violations, weapons proliferation, and protective trade practices.
They pressed Beijing to meet US-supported international norms and called
for retaliatory economic and other sanctions. By contrast, the more cautious
and accommodating first group believed that the advocates of strong asser-
tion of US values and norms were unrealistic about US power and were
unwilling to make needed compromises with the Chinese government in
order to (1) protect and support US interests and regional stability and (2)
avoid strategic enmity. 19
As the decade wore on, it was unclear what approach to China would
prevail in US policy. Some in the George H. W. Bush and Clinton adminis-
trations advocated a moderate, less confrontational policy of “engagement”
with China, for fear that doing otherwise could, among other things, promote
divisions in—and a possible breakup of—China, with potentially adverse
consequences for US interests in Asian stability and prosperity. Impressed by
subsequent growth in Chinese economic and national strength later in the
decade, many US officials, business interests, and others sought opportu-
nities in closer economic and other relations with China. They also promoted
engagement in order to guide China’s power into channels of international
activity compatible with American interests.
A tougher approach was supported by US officials and advocates outside
the US government who stressed that China’s leaders were biding their time
and conforming to many international norms in order to avoid difficulties as
China built national strength. Once the Chinese government succeeded with
economic and related military modernization and development, Beijing was
expected to become even less inclined to sacrifice nationalistic and territorial ambitions for the sake of cooperation in engagement policies by the United
States and the West. Given this reasoning, US leaders were urged to be firm
with China, to rely on military power as a counterweight to rising Chinese
power, to remain resolute in dealing with economic and security disputes
with China, and to work closely with US allies and friends along China’s
periphery in dealing with actual or potential Chinese assertiveness. Senator
John McCain was identified with this view. 20
An even tougher US approach to China at the time was advocated by
some leaders in the Congress along with commentators and interest group
leaders who believed that China’s political system needed to change before
the United States could establish a constructive relationship with Beijing.
China’s Communist leaders were perceived as inherently incapable of partic-
ipating in truly cooperative relationships with the United States. US policy
should aim to change China from within while maintaining vigilance against
disruptive Chinese foreign policy. Prominent congressional leaders such as
Senator Jesse Helms, Representative Frank Wolf, and Representative Chris-
topher Smith were associated with these views. 21
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Chapter 5
Nongovernment advocacy groups interested in influencing China policy
found fertile ground in the often acute debate in the 1990s over the proper
American approach to China and the broader debate over the appropriate
course of US foreign policy after the Cold War. The groups endeavored to
muster recruits, gain financial support, and build coalitions by focusing on
issues related to China policy. Their concerns focused on issues like human
rights, trade disputes, weapons proliferation, and other topics. Competing
coalitions of interest groups fought bitterly, especially during major crises
such as the decisions of the Bush and Clinton administrations to grant MFN
tariff treatment to China. 22
In general, the organized American interest groups active in China policy
following the end of the Cold War can be divided among those dealing with
economic interests, specific values or causes, ethnic issues, and issues impor-
tant to foreign governments and foreign economic interests. Within the eco-
nomic realm, the National Association of Manufacturers, the Chamber of
Commerce, and the Business Roundtable endeavored to promote such busi-
ness concerns as foreign trade and investment beneficial to American compa-
nies. The Emergency Committee for American Trade worked successfully to
ensure that the United States would continue nondiscriminatory trading rela-
tions with China. 23
Often at odds with these pro-business groups were groups representing
organized labor. They favored more trade restrictions; they often viewed
Chinese exports to the United States as a threat to US jobs; and they also
weighed in on a variety of social justice issues including human rights and
labor rights and the use of prison labor to produce Chinese exports. 24
A number of public interest or citizen groups have common concerns of a
noneconomic or nonoccupational nature. Many of these organizations focus
on a single issue or a small group of issues. Examples include groups con-
cerned with independence or greater autonomy for Tibet (e.g., the Interna-
tional Campaign for Tibet); freedom for political prisoners in China (e.g.,
Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch); religious freedom and
freedom from coercive birth control and abortions (e.g., the Family Research
Council, very active in the 1990s); as well as those concerned with curbing
Chinese practices that endanger the regional and international environment
or that promote instability and possible conflict through the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction and related technology (e.g., the Wisconsin
Project, prominent in the 1990s in its focus on egregious Chinese failings in
the area of weapons proliferation). 25
Ethnic groups have long been a key factor in American foreign policy.
Although Chinese Americans represent around 1 percent of the US popula-
tion, they have not become a unified ethnic bloc influencing US foreign
policy. However, there have been instances when segments of this group
have been active in the politics of US foreign policy making. Expatriate
Tiananmen, Taiwan, and Post–Cold War Realities, 1989–2000
101
Chinese students heavily lobbied Congress and the administration during the
years immediately following the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown. Their influ-
ence waned as the students became divided over their goals regarding US
policy toward China. A much more cohesive ethnic group has been the more
than half million Americans who trace their family background to Taiwan.
Taiwanese-Americans have formed a variety of organizations that have ac-
tively encouraged US foreign policy to respect Taiwan’s separate status and
autonomy from the mainland. Many of these groups are strong advocates of
independence for the island. 26
Foreign governments, foreign businesses, and other elites also work ac-
tively to influence US foreign policy. Government, business, and other lead-
ers of Taiwan have been active for many years in pressing their points of
view on the US government. With the break in official Taiwan relations with
the US government in 1979, they have focused more effort to lobby the
Congress. Reports have linked the Taiwan government and other groups
supportive of Taiwan with sometimes large campaign contributions to US
political candidates. Taiwan government and nongovernment entities also
have been prominent in promoting academic, think tank, media, local
government, and other research and exchanges that enhance goodwill and
positive feelings between Taiwan and the United States. 27
The mainland Chinese government, business leaders, and other elites
were much less active on these fronts, though their efforts to influence US
foreign policy continue to grow. Media and congressional reports in the
1990s focused on charges that the Chinese government clandestinely was
funneling campaign contributions to US candidates. Chinese government and
business leaders found they were more attractive to and influential with US
officials and elites as a result of the rapid growth of the Chinese economy.
Against this background, the Chinese government was successful in promot-
ing regular exchanges with Congress. The Chinese government also worked
closely with like-minded US business leaders and officials in sustaining vi-
brant economic interchange with the United States. 28
Relations during the Bush and Clinton Administrations
Developments in US-China relations after the Tiananmen crackdown in 1989
and through the 1990s witness repeated cycles of crisis heavily influenced by
the newly active domestic debate in the United States over American policy
toward China. The first major turning point came during the George H. W.
Bush administration with US reaction to Tiananmen and the concurrent end-
ing of the Cold War and emergence of Taiwan democratization. The second
turning point came with President Clinton’s advocacy in 1993 and then his
withdrawal in 1994 of linkage between Chinese human rights practices and
the granting of nondiscriminatory US trade status to China. A third and more
102
Chapter 5
serious crisis resulted from Clinton’s decision in 1995 to allow the Taiwan
president to visit the United States; Chinese military demonstrations in the
Taiwan area ultimately prompted the deployment of two US aircraft carrier
battle groups to the area in 1996. In 1999, contentious negotiations over
China’s entry into the WTO, Chinese mass demonstrations following the US
bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, and a crescendo of congres-
sional opposition to and criticism of the president and his China policy repre-
What would turn out to be a twisted course of US policy in this decade at
first saw President George H. W. Bush strive to preserve cooperative ties
amid widespread American outrage and pressure for retribution and sanc-
tions against the Chinese leaders. President Bush had served as the head of
the US Liaison Office in China in the mid-1970s. He took the lead in his own
administration (1989–93) in dealing with severe problems in US-China rela-
tions caused by the Tiananmen crackdown and the decline in US strategic
interest in China as a result of the collapse of the Soviet bloc. He resorted to secret diplomacy to maintain constructive communication with senior Chinese leaders; while senior administration officials said all high-level official contact with China would be cut off as a result of the Tiananmen crackdown,
President Bush sent his national security adviser and the deputy secretary of
state on secret missions to Beijing in July and December 1989. When the
missions became known in December 1989, the congressional and media
reactions were bitterly critical of the administration’s perceived duplicity. 30
Bush eventually became frustrated with the Chinese leadership’s intransi-
gence and took a tough stance on trade and other issues, though he made
special efforts to ensure that the United States continued MFN tariff status
for China despite opposition by a majority of the US Congress, much of the
American media, and many US interest groups newly focused on China.
Reflecting more positive US views of Taiwan, the Bush administration up-
graded US interchange with the ROC by sending a cabinet-level official to
Taipei in 1992, the first such visit since official relations were ended in 1979.
He also seemed to abandon the limits on US arms sales set in accord with the
August 1982 US communiqué with China by agreeing in 1992 to a sale of
150 advanced F-16 jet fighters, worth more than $5 billion, to Taiwan. The
president’s motives for the sale were heavily influenced by a need to appear
to be protecting
US manufacturing jobs at the F-16 plant in Texas, a key state
in the Bush reelection plan. 31
Presidential candidate Clinton used sharp attacks against Chinese govern-
ment behavior, notably the Tiananmen crackdown, and President Bush’s
moderate approach to China to win support in the 1992 election. The presi-
dential candidate’s attacks, though probably reflecting sincere anger and con-
cern over Chinese behavior, also reflected a tendency in the US-China debate
in the 1990s to use China issues, particularly criticism of China and US
Tiananmen, Taiwan, and Post–Cold War Realities, 1989–2000
103
policy toward China, for partisan reasons. The president-elect and US politi-
cians in following years found that criticizing China and US policy toward
China provided a convenient means to pursue political ends. For candidate
Clinton and his aides, using China issues to discredit the record of the Repub-
lican candidate, incumbent George H. W. Bush, proved an effective way to
take votes from him. Once Clinton won the election and was in office, he
showed little interest in China policy, leaving the responsibility to subordi-
nates. 32
In particular, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia Affairs Winston
Lord in 1993 played the lead administration role in working with congres-
sional leaders, notably Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell, Representa-
tive Nancy Pelosi, who was a House leader on China and human rights
issues, and others to establish the human rights conditions the Clinton admin-
istration would require before renewing MFN tariff status for China. The
terms he worked out were widely welcomed in the United States at the time.
However, Chinese government leaders were determined not to give in on
several of the US demands, and they appeared to calculate that US business
interests in a burgeoning Chinese economy would be sufficient to prevent the
United States from taking the drastic step of cutting MFN tariff treatment for
China and risking the likely retaliation of the PRC against US trade interests.