THE BREAKING POINT
The Stackpole Military History Series
THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR
Cavalry Raids of the Civil War
Ghost, Thunderbolt, and Wizard
In the Lion's Mouth
Pickett's Charge
Witness to Gettysburg
WORLD WAR I
Doughboy War
WORLD WAR II
After D-Day
Airborne Combat
Armor Battles of the Waffen-SS, 1943–45
Armoured Guardsmen
Army of the West
Arnhem 1944
Australian Commandos
The B-24 in China
Backwater War
The Battalion
The Battle of France
The Battle of Sicily
Battle of the Bulge, Vol. 1
Battle of the Bulge, Vol. 2
Battle of the Bulge, Vol. 3
Beyond the Beachhead
Beyond Stalingrad
The Black Bull
Blitzkrieg Unleashed
Blossoming Silk Against the Rising Sun
Bodenplatte
The Brandenburger Commandos
The Breaking Point
The Brigade
Bringing the Thunder
The Canadian Army and the Normandy Campaign
Coast Watching in World War II
Colossal Cracks
Condor
A Dangerous Assignment
D-Day Bombers
D-Day Deception
D-Day to Berlin
Decision in the Ukraine
The Defense of Moscow 1941
Destination Normandy
Dive Bomber!
A Drop Too Many
Eager Eagles
Eagles of the Third Reich
The Early Battles of Eighth Army
Eastern Front Combat
Europe in Flames
Exit Rommel
The Face of Courage
Fatal Decisions
Fist from the Sky
Flying American Combat Aircraft of World War II, Vol. 1
Flying American Combat Aircraft of World War II, Vol. 2
For Europe
Forging the Thunderbolt
For the Homeland
Fortress France
The German Defeat in the East, 1944–45
German Order of Battle, Vol. 1
German Order of Battle, Vol. 2
The Germans in Normandy
Germany's Panzer Arm in World War II
GI Ingenuity
Goodwood
The Great Ships
Grenadiers
Guns Against the Reich
Hitler's Nemesis
Hitler's Spanish Legion
Hold the Westwall
Infantry Aces
In the Fire of the Eastern Front
Iron Arm
Iron Knights
Japanese Army Fighter Aces
Japanese Naval Fighter Aces
JG 26 Luftwaffe Fighter Wing War Diary, Vol. 1
JG 26 Luftwaffe Fighter Wing War Diary, Vol. 2
Kampfgruppe Peiper at the Battle of the Bulge
The Key to the Bulge
Knight's Cross Panzers
Kursk
Luftwaffe Aces
Luftwaffe Fighter Ace
Luftwaffe Fighter-Bombers over Britain
Luftwaffe Fighters and Bombers
Massacre at Tobruk
Mechanized Juggernaut or Military Anachronism?
Messerschmitts over Sicily
Michael Wittmann, Vol. 1
Michael Wittmann, Vol. 2
Mission 85
Mission 376
Mountain Warriors
The Nazi Rocketeers
Night Flyer / Mosquito Pathfinder
No Holding Back
On the Canal
Operation Mercury
Packs On!
Panzer Aces
Panzer Aces II
Panzer Aces III
Panzer Commanders of the Western Front
Panzergrenadier Aces
Panzer Gunner
The Panzer Legions
Panzers in Normandy
Panzers in Winter
Panzer Wedge, Vol. 1
Panzer Wedge, Vol. 2
The Path to Blitzkrieg
Penalty Strike
Poland Betrayed
Prince of Aces
Red Road from Stalingrad
Red Star Under the Baltic
Retreat to the Reich
Rommel Reconsidered
Rommel's Desert Commanders
Rommel's Desert War
Rommel's Lieutenants
The Savage Sky
The Seeds of Disaster
Ship-Busters
The Siege of Küstrin
The Siegfried Line
A Soldier in the Cockpit
Soviet Blitzkrieg
Spitfires and Yellow Tail Mustangs
Stalin's Keys to Victory
Surviving Bataan and Beyond
T-34 in Action
Tank Tactics
Tigers in the Mud
Triumphant Fox
The 12th SS, Vol. 1
The 12th SS, Vol. 2
Twilight of the Gods
Typhoon Attack
The War Against Rommel's Supply Lines
War in the Aegean
War of the White Death
Warsaw 1944
Winter Storm
The Winter War
Wolfpack Warriors
Zhukov at the Oder
THE COLD WAR / VIETNAM
Cyclops in the Jungle
Expendable Warriors
Fighting in Vietnam
Flying American Combat Aircraft: The Cold War
Here There Are Tigers
Land with No Sun
MiGs over North Vietnam
Phantom Reflections
Street without Joy
Through the Valley
Tours of Duty
Two One Pony
WARS OF AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST
Never-Ending Conflict
The Rhodesian War
GENERAL MILITARY HISTORY
Carriers in Combat
Cavalry from Hoof to Track
Desert Battles
Guerrilla Warfare
The Philadelphia Campaign, Vol. 1
Ranger Dawn
Sieges
The Spartan Army
THE BREAKING POINT
Sedan and the Fall of France, 1940
Robert A. Doughty
STACKPOLE
BOOKS
Copyright © 1990 by Robert A. Doughty
Published by
STACKPOLE BOOKS
5067 Ritter Road
Mechanicsburg, PA 17055
www.stackpolebooks.com
All rights reserved, including the right to reproduce this book or portions thereof in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. All inquiries should be addressed to Stackpole Books.
Printed in the United States of America
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
STACKPOLE FIRST EDITION
Cover design by Wendy A. Reynolds
Front and back cover photos from Blitzkrieg France 1940
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Doughty, Robert A.
The breaking point : Sedan and the fall of France, 1940 / Robert A. Doughty.
pages cm. — (Stackpole military history series)
, Conn. : Archon Books, 1990.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-0-8117-1459-4
1. Meuse, Battle of the, 1940. 2. Sedan (France)—History. I. Title.
D756.5.M4D68 2014
940.54'214312—dc23
2014012870
eBook ISBN: 978-0-8117-6070-6
For Georgia Hanes Doughty
and
John Lee Doughty, Sr.
Contents
List of Maps
Foreword
Preface
Introduction
Chapter 1. Strategy and Doctrine
Chapter 2. The German Fight in the Ardennes
Chapter 3. The French Fight in the Ardennes
Chapter 4. French Defenses Along the Meuse
Chapter 5. The German Attack Across the Meuse
Chapter 6. The French Fight Along the Meuse
Chapter 7. The German Pivot and Breakout
Chapter 8. The “Counterattack” by the 55th Division
Chapter 9. The Second Army and XXIst Corps
Chapter 10. The Failure of the French Sixth Army
Chapter 11. Conclusion
Notes
Select Bibliography
Index
Maps
Dispositions of Forces and Plans, 10 May 1940
The Fight in Belgium, 10–12 May 1940
Bodange, 10 May 1940
French Positions on the Meuse, 13 May 1940
1st Panzer Division, Crossing of the Meuse, 13 May 1940
Pivot and Breakout, 13–15 May 1940
Situation Morning, 15 May 1940
Battle of the Meuse, 10–15 May 1940
Foreword
William Faulkner once wisely observed that truly great literature invariably plumbs the “old verities of the heart.” Great military history achieves a similarly lofty standard. It probes the timeless, often grisly truths of bloody battle. Judged on that scale, Colonel Robert Doughty's The Breaking Point: Sedan and the Fall of France, 1940 has much to offer its readers.
Colonel Doughty paints a striking picture of the remarkable events of mid-May 1940 when General Heinz Guderian's superbly trained XIXth Panzer Corps traversed the tortuous terrain of the Ardennes, punched across the Meuse, and quickly unhinged the entire strategic design of the French Army. Viewed from the comfortable perspective of 1990, the determination and vigor of the German campaign and the contrasting doctrinal inertia and leader languor of the French appear all too obvious. But these are not the timeless truths of great military history. The truly valuable lessons which Doughty draws from the Wehrmacht's decisive victory affirm the critical importance of surprise, deception and, above all else, small-unit preparation and tactical acumen. He reminds us that company actions win battles.
Guderian's so-called miracle on the Meuse proves, in reality, to have been no miracle at all. As battles throughout the ages always have, this fight confirmed that the best-prepared companies of warriors with the sharpest short swords ultimately carry the day by defeating their opponents’ will. Moreover, the fight around Sedan once again demonstrated the inviolable axiom that the victory invariably goes to the dynamic frontline leader who exploits maneuver to focus combat power on his enemy's weaknesses, who uses terrain as a lever not as a solution, and who personally intervenes when decisive action is required but does not exercise overriding, oppressive control of his subordinates.
I am convinced that in this fine volume Robert Doughty has achieved something beyond a highly informative battle narrative and an incisive assessment of the fascinating pantheon of characters who achieved victory and suffered defeat along the Meuse. He has shown us the face of battle and underscored many of the ageless truths of armed conflict. In doing so, he has given us some great military history.
—Crosbie E. Saint
General, U.S. Army
Commander-in-Chief
U.S. Army Europe and Seventh Army
Preface
Fifty years after the fall of France, an investigation of the 1940 campaign seems in order. The timing is particularly opportune, for the French have made available their rather extensive archives relating to the fighting in 1940. Though a great deal of important material was destroyed in the chaotic days of the six-week campaign, the French made an intensive effort in subsequent years to collect materials relating to the campaign. As a result of these efforts, they now have more than 2,000 cartons of documents relating to 1939–40.
Perhaps more importantly, the French made an intensive effort shortly after 16 May 1940 to accumulate personal statements and after-action reports from individuals involved in the fighting around Sedan. Some were completed as early as 18 May; others were completed much later. The reports include statements from most of the battalion, regimental, and division commanders involved in the fighting around Sedan. They also include reports from many platoon and company commanders, as well as key staff officers. Altogether, these reports provide a wealth of information—sometimes contradictory, sometimes obviously false, but always useful—about the fighting around Sedan and permit an unusually detailed analysis of the battle.
Additionally, a remarkable amount of material about the campaign is available in German archives. Shortly after the May–June campaign, the German Army collected after-action reports from commanders at all levels in the XIXth Panzer Corps. While these reports are less detailed and emotional than the French reports, they also provide a wealth of information about the battle. The existence of the German after-action reports for the 1940 campaign is fortunate, for many of the archives for the army were destroyed in a bombing raid and ensuing fire on 27–28 February 1942. Some of those remaining from the 1940 campaign were singed or partially destroyed in the fire.
When the French reports are combined with the German reports, they agree to a surprising extent. Despite the chaos and misconceptions that usually exist on battlefields, the most important differences pertain to time.
In short, the combination of the French and German reports permits an almost unique opportunity to examine this important campaign in detail. And the campaign itself offers numerous examples of the complexities of modern warfare.
During the course of my research and writing, I have benefited from the assistance of a number of friends and colleagues. Among those who have provided encouragement and insights during my sabbatical in Pennsylvania were Robert F. Frank, Harold Nelson, Ted Crackel, Jay Luvaas, Charles R. Shrader, Rod Paschall, and Roger Spiller. At West Point, my debts are too numerous to list, but I am particularly appreciative for the support and advice of Colonel Paul Miles. I am also grateful for the confidence and friendship of Brigadier Generals Roy K. Flint and William A. Stofft.
General Robert Bassac graciously allowed me to conduct research at the Service Historique de l'Armée de Terre in Paris. Key assistance with German materials came from Major (Dr.) Karl Frieser of the Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt. Without Dr. Frieser's generous suggestions, my discussion of the Germans in the 1940 campaign would have suffered significantly. Captain Robert J. Edwards willingly assisted me with the translation of German materials. Special thanks are due to Mr. Edward J. Krasnoborski of the Department of History at West Point for having completed the maps.
As usual, however, my greatest debt is to my family—Diane, Mike, and Kevin—for their patience and toleration.
While it is difficult to exaggerate the value of the assistance of those I have mentioned and others, I alone am responsible for the text. The opinions expressed in this book do not necessarily represent the views of the Department of Defense, the Department of the Army, or the U.S. Military Academy. Any errors in fact or interpretation are solely my own.
Introduction
On 14 May 1940, the day after the Germans crossed the Meuse River at Sedan and while heavy fighting was still ongoing to the south, General Heinz Guderian, commander of the XIXth Panzer Corps, visited some of the high ground overlooking the area where his soldiers had crossed the Me
use. As he surveyed the strongly defensible terrain, the remarkable success of the German attack struck him “almost as a miracle.”1 The advance across the forests and hills of the Ardennes, the crossing of the Meuse, and the seizure of high ground on the far side of the river had occurred so rapidly and so smoothly that its stunning success seemed almost miraculous to Guderian.
The German “miracle,” however, was based less on supernatural forces than it was on sound military preparation. Ultimately, Germany won the campaign because her military forces were better led, had a sounder strategy, and had developed more viable tactical and operational-level doctrines. And France lost because her leaders tried to manage rather than lead, her strategy was ill conceived and based on fallacious assumptions, and her tactical and operational-level doctrines were inadequate for the mobile war Germany thrust upon her. What seemed to be “almost a miracle” at the time in fact came from a better prepared force rapidly overwhelming an inadequately prepared force.
Although the fighting around Sedan had an enormous and immediate effect on the history of the world because of the fall of France, it has continued to affect world history because of the myths that surround it. One of the most important of these myths pertains to the nature of the blitzkrieg, or lightning warfare. Immediately after the unexpected collapse of France, military leaders and analysts tended to portray the campaign as the classic example of the blitzkrieg. They marveled at how effortlessly German tanks moved through the dense forests of the Ardennes, punched through the decadent French defenders, and rolled almost unopposed toward the English Channel. Almost in unison, they declared that the main feature of this new mode of warfare was the shock action of devastatingly effective tanks and airplanes—aided by mobility, speed, and surprise.
Perhaps the earliest example of portraying the 1940 campaign as something fundamentally new came from President Franklin D. Roosevelt in an address to a joint session of the Senate and House of Representatives on 16 May 1940. In his remarks, the president said:
Motorized armies can now sweep through enemy territories at the rate of 200 miles a day. Parachute troops are dropped from airplanes in large numbers behind enemy lines. Troops are landed from planes in open fields, on wide highways, and at local civil airports.
We have seen the treacherous use of the “fifth column” by which persons supposed to be peaceful visitors were actually a part of an enemy unit of occupation. Lightning attacks, capable of destroying airplane factories and munition works hundreds of miles behind the lines, are part of the new technique of modern war.