that the nation’s council had resolved to join the British alliance. he and John
heckewelder, a missionary, sent urgent messages to Brodhead warning that
the delawares were “getting ready to go to fight you.”18
gelelemend’s warnings freed Brodhead from the perennial challenge of
distinguishing friendly indians from enemies, offering instead the simpler
prospect of a “general indian war.” he promptly mobilized about three hun-
dred regulars and Virginia militia— lochry and erwin offered scant help
from Westmoreland— and marched into Ohio. Brodhead’s men surrounded
goschachgünk without warning, trapping its inhabitants between their guns
and the swollen muskingum river. about forty men, women, and children
fell into their hands, offering little resistance. The attackers killed forty cattle,
plundered all they could carry, and burned the rest. Brodhead wanted to
march onward, but his men refused. soon after they set out for home, militia-
men killed and scalped their fifteen adult male prisoners. Brodhead released
the surviving women and children, after assuring them that he had not sanc-
tioned the killings. his little army soon ran out of food, only to be brought
meat and corn by moravian indians. as they sated their hunger, some of the
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men plotted to slaughter their moravian benefactors, but Brodhead and an
Ohio county militia commander, david shepherd, quashed the scheme.
meanwhile, over 160 delaware refugees fled to sandusky, begging for food.
at detroit, de peyster mused that he need no longer doubt their nation’s
loyalty.19
despite their differences, both erwin’s abortive raid and Brodhead’s de-
struction of goschachgünk exemplified how government influence spurred
frontier violence. current or former militia officers, as well as a recently
elected sheriff, led the erwin gang. Their experience mobilizing men for
state- sanctioned duty undoubtedly helped them organize this unsanctioned
foray. equal y important, pennsylvania entrusted Westmoreland militia offi-
cers with money, weapons, and other supplies. The would- be murderers
probably loaded their guns with state- issued powder, redirecting government
resources to serve their own ends. and though Brodhead distanced himself
from both the erwin gang and his prisoner- killing militia, he had scant love
for indians himself, insisting that “much confidence ought never to be placed
in any of the colour.” Though he insisted the militia had killed the prisoners
against his orders, he simultaneously threatened to “Beat all the indians out
of this country” within seven months. equal y important, he and his subor-
dinates had raised and supplied the men he could not control. tellingly,
Brodhead’s official report mentioned only that his men had “killed fifteen
Warriors,” not that they were prisoners. like his predecessors, hand and
mcintosh, he disclaimed responsibility for the atrocities of the men he nom-
inal y led, but nonetheless tolerated them as a necessary cost of frontier
warfare.20
in mid- august 1781, a large force rode into gnadenhütten under an english
flag. dunquat and abraham Kuhn, a german- born Wyandot adoptee, led
parties from Upper and lower sandusky, with detroit Wyandots behind
them. shawnee and haudenosaunee warriors followed, along with pipe
and Wingenund, Brodhead’s erstwhile delaware allies. Other delawares,
mohicans, and Ojibwes rounded out the army. British agent matthew elliott,
sandusky trader alexander mccormick, and several other white men ac-
companied them. Over several years of war, such visits had become com-
monplace. as usual, the moravians offered their guests food and the warriors
“behaved in a friendly way,” though mccormick, an old friend to the mis-
sionaries, warned them to expect trouble. and, as usual, missionary david
Zeisberger dispatched a messenger to Fort pitt to warn of the warriors’
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131
approach. he begged Brodhead to keep his message secret, “for it wou’d prove
dangerous” if the British and their allies learned of his warning.21
in a formal council at gnadenhütten, dunquat urged his “cousins the
christian indians” to move to Upper sandusky, warning that they lived “in a
dangerous place.” his words reflected sharp disagreements among his allies.
dunquat and pipe considered the moravians beloved kin, with whom they
might disagree without losing affection. Other British- allied indians, as well
as elliott, thought the missionaries and their followers at best suspect, and at
worst adversaries deserving capture or death. By inviting them to sandusky,
dunquat hoped to both guard the moravians from his allies and sever their
ties to his enemies. some moravians welcomed the proposal, but many ob-
jected, citing rumors that the delawares at sandusky were now “tired of the
war and [were] starving.” Zeisberger, meanwhile, distrusted dunquat’s prom-
ises, dreading physical violence less than the spiritual danger of associating
with non- moravian indians. For guidance, he looked to his church’s daily
“watchword,” from isaiah 8:10: “take counsel together, and it shall come to
nought; speak the word, and it shall not stand: for god is with us.” rather
than heeding mortals like dunquat, Zeisberger argued, they should trust in
god’s presence “and hope that all would go wel .”22
tactful enough not to refuse outright, the moravians promised to answer
the following spring, noting that leaving their crops midsummer would ex-
pose them to “extreme need and misery.” This answer appeased dunquat,
who was well aware of the region’s precarious food supplies, but it frustrated
his allies, including elliott. some called for slaughtering the missionaries and
their indian assistants, until “a leading chief”— likely dunquat himself—
threatened to kill anyone who harmed them. The dispute further frayed
anglo- Wyandot relations; at one point, Wyandots tore down and burned el-
liott’s British flag. some of the warriors began “to dance, to play, and to carry
out their own devices” in defiance of the moravians’ long- respected prohibi-
tions. The moravian indians, still divided over dunquat’s invitation, busied
themselves feeding their troublesome guests. The very pregnant missionary
anna sensemann moved upriver to schönbrunn to give birth in comparative
peace. meanwhile, small war parties scouted upper Ohio forts, captured
some colonists, and brought them back to gnadenhütten.23
When they returned, a young prisoner, taken near Wheeling, admitted
that Zeisberger’s letters had put “the country in general . . . on their guard.”
The moravians’ critics now called for blood. dunquat gave them one more
chance to move voluntarily. When Zeisberger continued to stal , the
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Wyandots seized, stripped, and bound him and his fellow ministers. Others
pil aged their houses, then sent parties to salem and schönbrunn to bring in
the remaining missionaries, including anna sensemann and her three- day-
old son. They slaug
htered the moravians’ livestock, leaving the meat to spoil
in the summer sun, and burned crops and fences. some converts wanted to
fight back, but cooler heads prevailed. together with friends among the war-
riors, moravian indian leaders persuaded the captors to untie the missionar-
ies and give them back some of their clothing. The obstinate Zeisberger
covered his nakedness with one of sensemann’s old nightgowns. meanwhile,
a recently converted woman stole pipe’s horse, “the best in the whole com-
pany,” and hurried off to report the missionaries’ plight to Fort pitt. in retali-
ation, delaware warriors seized and threatened to kill her kinsman isaac
glikhican. dunquat stepped in to interrogate him. as they met, the two men
no doubt recalled their meeting four years before at lichtenau, where glikh-
ican had championed his moravian teachers and dunquat accepted them as
figurative fathers. in the intervening years, dunquat, glikhican, and other
Ohio indian leaders had strived to balance the demands of their various alli-
ances with the metaphorical kinship that bound them together, insisting that
they could remain friends, and kin, with their enemies’ friends and with their
friends’ enemies. That hope had now faded, but some sense of kinship re-
mained: dunquat quickly pronounced glikhican innocent and set him free.24
as the moravians endured a forced march to sandusky, the British and
their allies continued to debate their fate. The delaware war captain Buckon-
gahelas, who had joined the British alliance early in the war, warned that
even at sandusky, the moravians could send messages to Fort pitt. he urged
de peyster to move them north to detroit, where the British could keep a
closer eye on them. British agents alexander mcKee and matthew elliott
agreed. By contrast, pipe agreed that the moravians had “always apprized the
enemy of our manouvers,” but pointed out that he himself, as a onetime
member of the U.s.- allied goschachgünk council, had compelled the mis-
sionaries to write letters on their behalf. if he could shift allegiances to the
British, he implied, so could the moravians. he added that he wanted to keep
the missionaries nearby “to instruct our people.” dunquat similarly wel-
comed the moravians and urged them to help defend the sandusky towns
from rebel attack. de peyster acceded to their demands: he released the mis-
sionaries after a brief interrogation and agreed that they should stay at
sandusky.25
Unfortunately, because the moravians left their crops unharvested, they
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133
further drained an already overtaxed local food supply. Ohio indian women
planted corn, beans, and squash for local subsistence, but they did not tradi-
tional y grow surplus crops for market. Their fields could not easily accom-
modate large numbers of refugees. clark’s august 1780 attack had left
shawnees “destitute of shelter . . . or Food.” The following spring, Brodhead
similarly displaced the goschachgünk delawares, heightening the crisis. in
previous years Ohio indians in need had turned to the moravians, who often
sold surplus grain and livestock. Their forced migration eliminated that
emergency food supply and added hundreds more hungry refugees. Those
with food to spare demanded ever higher prices. as winter neared, shaw-
nees, delawares, and Wyandots faced dire shortages. The cost- cutting de
peyster recognized that the Ohio indians’ plight enabled Britain to purchase
their allegiance more cheaply. he aimed to send just enough food, clothing,
and ammunition to keep his allies south of lake erie, both to maintain a
buffer against rebel attack and to avoid feeding thousands of refugees at
detroit.26
de peyster was similarly unwilling to feed the 350 moravians who were
now, he knew, “starving in the woods.” some had predicted they could pros-
per at sandusky by selling milk and butter, but in swampy northern Ohio
their remaining cows starved for lack of forage. White traders periodical y
offered the missionaries food but could not feed hundreds of converts. Those
who sought help from the shawnee towns found even higher prices there.
already disenchanted with the British, some moravians privately hoped that
friends at Fort pitt might somehow come to their aid. Welapachtschiechen,
whom shawnees had captured months earlier, now rejoined the congregation
at sandusky, bringing the wampum belts and medals he had received from
the United states. Others visited friends and kin among a small band of U.s.-
allied delawares who had settled on an island near Fort pitt, where the garri-
son grudgingly fed them. as the moravians faced famine, some wondered
whether they might find more security with the United states.27
soon after reaching sandusky, the moravians asked dunquat for permis-
sion to return to the muskingum towns to salvage their abandoned crops.
Unable to feed them himself, the Wyandot could hardly refuse. Those who
left included Welapachtschiechen’s son Jacob; his daughter- in- law christina;
and her father, assistant missionary John schebosh. in the weeks that fol-
lowed, those at sandusky heard contradictory reports of their fortunes. First
a returning war party reported that the area was “perfectly quiet . . . and no
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gatherers “had been taken prisoners by white people, and also some of them
put to death,” and that a rebel army was marching on sandusky. a week later,
new reports dismissed the rumored invasion and maintained that schebosh
and five others were captured, not killed. schebosh’s son Joseph immediately
set out for Fort pitt to check on his father and sister. meanwhile, more mora-
vians set out for the muskingum, along with some goschachgünk delawares
who faced the same plight. Then, in early February, christina and Joseph
schebosh returned to sandusky with several others. Those who had been
captured were all well and their father had traveled eastward to report the
missionaries’ fate to moravian elders. most important, “the americans had
behaved in every respect to them as Friends” and promised “they would not
be molested in their returning to save their corn.” With this news, dozens
more moravians hurried back to their old homes, including Joseph sche-
bosh; his brother- in- law, Jacob; and the veteran diplomats glikhican and
Welapachtschiechen. With no help to be had from the Wyandots and shaw-
nees, the unharvested corn on the muskingum offered “their only hope of
getting the means of life.”28
Upper Ohio Valley farms, by contrast, had enjoyed a rare bumper har-
vest, yielding over fifteen tons of surplus flour. nonetheless, controversy stil
hindered military and civilian authorities. at Fort pitt, a weeks’ long dispute
erupted between Brodhead and John gibson, a delaware adoptee and vet-
eran trader turned continental officer, with each denying the other’s right to
command. The resulting confusion may have allowed news of Zeisberger’s
warning to spread across the region, d
espite his request for secrecy. among
the nascent regional elite, “commission hunters” angled for official appoint-
ments that promised both personal wealth and public influence. Those who
won such posts continual y struggled with colonists who rejected their au-
thority. some former Virginia partisans now called for a new trans-
appalachian state. in late 1781, general William irvine took charge of Fort
pitt, where he struggled to raise militia, deemed the fort “a heap of ruins,”
and found his troops “deplorable, and at the same time despicable.” seem-
ingly everyone wished to attack British- allied indians, but irvine noted that
“Burning their empty towns has not the desired effect. They can soon build
others.” The United states could secure its frontier, he argued, only by defeat-
ing indians in battle and driving their British sponsors “out of their coun-
try.” he saw little likelihood of that happening without a large and expensive
campaign. “as matters now stand,” he warned Washington, “this country
must be given up.”29
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135
The region’s chronic factionalism flared most heatedly in newly created
Washington county, in the far southwestern corner of pennsylvania. The
state government initial y awarded many local appointments— including that
of militia commander— to irish- born James marshel, whose family con-
trolled large tracts of land on upper cross creek. anti- pennsylvania parti-
sans, led by pentecost, repeatedly stymied his efforts, but they, too, sought
recognition as legitimate political authorities. a wealthy mill and landowner
on chartier’s creek, pentecost had once served as a pennsylvania magistrate,
but he defected to the Virginia camp in 1774. now his faction swept the new
county’s first elections, and pentecost himself won a seat on pennsylvania’s
executive council. he subsequently presented himself as a trustworthy coun-
cilor in philadelphia, but he continued to foment antigovernment resistance
at home. Other erstwhile Virginians proved more cooperative, including
david Williamson, one of the largest landowners in the western part of the