“more disposed” toward peace. a delighted general hand promised that if
the Wyandot called in their warriors and attended an upcoming treaty at Fort
pitt, the United states would “enter into friendship with them.”29
militant bravado and moravian panic together foiled this bid for peace.
From detroit, hamilton rallied his allies to squash the delaware proposals.
War captains from various great lakes nations threw their weight behind
him. Odinghquanooron, a detroit Wyandot leader, publicly scolded the del-
aware for “turn[ing] [their] heads towards the rebels.” rumors reached
goschachgünk that the other nations “wanted to force [the delaware] to join
in the war,” and White eyes concluded that the Wyandot would not heed his
proposals. in mid- July Odinghquanooron came to lichtenau with eighty
Wyandot warriors and a few British agents. as usual, they “behaved very qui-
etly and politely,” but accused Zeisberger of reporting their movements to the
americans. The missionary had done just that, and he did so again as soon as
messengers could get away with his letters, but now he feared for his life. ter-
rified, he told morgan that White eyes wanted the United states “to send an
army against the Wyandotts &c,” and he insisted that negotiations would be
fruitless. These warnings made a strong impression: the congressional com-
missioners charged with making peace concluded they could not do so un-
less “the War be carryed in to [indian] country.”30
Zeisberger underestimated Wyandot interest in peace. less than a month
later, Odinghquanooron returned to lichtenau and told glikhican that his
men had suffered “much danger, hunger, and trouble,” while accomplishing
little. With glikhican’s encouragement, he agreed to offer the United states
terms, asking only respect for Wyandot territory. if the americans marched
on detroit, he promised his people would “shake hands . . . & make peace,”
provided that the army leave their “towns along the road unmolested.” But
Zeisberger had given up on the Wyandot. a week after sending Odinghqua-
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nooron’s message, the erstwhile pacifist renewed his call for an army, predict-
ing that “there [would] be no peace” without military conquest. a few days
later, translating letters from Fort pitt, his fellow missionary John heckewelder
told the delaware that the congressional treaty commissioners “tore up and
rejected the Wyandot chief’s message . . . as soon as they had read it.” gen-
eral lachlan mcintosh, who had recently replaced hand at Fort pitt, later
boasted that several indian nations had “earnestly applyed to [him] for
peace,” but that he would give them “no encouragement” until he marched
an army into their territory.31 Zeisberger’s pleas for an american invasion
were about to be answered.
The rejection of Odinghquanooron’s proposal reflected shifting ameri-
can debates over indian relations. revolutionary officials and Ohio Valley
colonists broadly agreed on the need for an offensive campaign, and they all
coveted indian land, but they disagreed over the best means to that end.
some, including morgan, blamed hostilities on British trade networks and
thus called for a naval campaign on lake erie to cut off the forts at detroit
and niagara. But many favored instead “an immediate attack” on enemy
towns, taking indian leaders as hostages, and seizing “all the lands of the
ofending tribes or nations.” By the summer of 1778, the debate had turned
against morgan. in appointing treaty commissioners, congress rejected him
in favor of andrew lewis, who had helped lead dunmore’s 1774 invasion. in
July, Virginia’s revolutionary council authorized mcintosh to draft as many
militia as needed “to carry on an expedition against the hostile indians, &
chastise them as they deserve.” congress promptly agreed. mcintosh himself
clung to the dream of capturing detroit, but he favored an overland cam-
paign through delaware and Wyandot country. to cow indians into submis-
sion, he planned “to keep possession” as he went by building and maintaining
forts.32
to make a treaty. hundreds of indians had attended prior councils, but now,
mindful of cornstalk’s fate, few dared risk american hospitality. The delega-
tion’s leaders— gelelemend, pipe, and White eyes— represented the turtle,
Wolf, and turkey phratries of the delaware nation. Where previous councils
had dragged on for weeks, these negotiations lasted only a few days, leaving
little time for customary speechmaking. But in these brief meetings, the del-
aware forged an agreement that addressed nearly all their chief concerns. in
their opening speech, the commissioners invited the delaware into a confed-
eration, suggesting that congress would treat them “as their own people.”
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The eventual treaty guaranteed to the delaware “all their territorial rights in
the fullest and most ample manner.” The United states also promised to build
a fort to protect delaware old men, women, and children and to establish “a
well- regulated trade, under the conduct of an intelligent, candid agent.”
above al , the treaty laid out a path for integrating an autonomous delaware
nation into the emerging american polity. The final article declared that al-
lied indian nations might “form a state whereof the delaware nation shall be
the head, and have a representation in congress.” as White eyes signed the
document he likely considered it a promising roadmap for a new political
order. But the concessions came at the price of military alliance. after years
of championing neutrality, White eyes now pledged to fight the United states’
enemies. mcintosh promptly appointed him “lieutenant colonel of all the
indian nations” between the Ohio and the mississippi.33
The hard- won alliance soon soured. in late september, White eyes re-
turned to goschachgünk, where Zeisberger read and translated the treaty to
a host of visiting indians. British- allied munsees pleaded to the delaware
council for “pardon and peace,” but mcintosh spurned their offer just as he
had rejected the Wyandots’. meanwhile, most delawares balked at sending
warriors to join the american army. pipe, who had signed the treaty, now
moved his town closer to sandusky, where he declared he would take “all his
men to one side” and stay out of the war altogether. The third signer, gelele-
mend, later claimed they had agreed to provide only guides, not warriors,
and alleged that the interpreter John gibson had misrepresented the treaty’s
contents.34
his achievements in jeopardy, White eyes hurried back to pittsburgh.
The contents of his saddlebags evoked the cultural fluidity of his career: gar-
ments made of buckskin, linen, and silk; a european felt hat and an ameri-
can fur cap; breech clouts and breeches; a bag of body paint and a pair of
spectacles; a rifle and a peace pipe; and a large wampum belt and “sundry
papers.” he joined mcintos
h’s army as it built a new fort, named after the
general himself, at the mouth of the Beaver river. On 4 november they
marched into Ohio; two moravian indian messengers marched with him and
the army for two days and reported that all was wel . On reaching home, one
announced that “there is real peace.” But by then, White eyes was dead,
“treacherously put to death” by one of his new allies.35
at the time, writing from philadelphia, morgan warned that White eyes’s
loss could cause the United states “very great difficulties.” But his fears proved
ill- founded. Other delaware leaders, most notably gelelemend and the
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113
moravian Welapachtschiechen, continued the murdered diplomat’s work.
pipe and Wingenund, despite misgivings, ultimately joined them. Thanks to
their efforts, the delaware- american alliance endured for over two more
years, as did attempts to make peace between americans and Wyandots.
These efforts failed less because of White eyes’s death than because of the
failings of the continental officers to whom he had pledged his service.36
On 22 november, isaac glikhican and a delaware delegation met mcin-
tosh’s army at an old vil age site called tuscarawas, about fifty miles upstream
from goschachgünk. as the army arrived, the delawares lined up “with great
regularity,” gave “Three indian cheirs,” and fired off an orderly salute with
their guns. mcintosh’s less disciplined militia replied with a “hasty running
Fire round [their] whole lines.” despite the news of White eyes’s death,
glikhican reported that he “heard and enjoyed nothing but kindness” from
the general and his men. The delawares in turn gave mcintosh venison and
deerskins and invited his army downriver to goschachgünk “to Build a fort
for their defence and safety.”37 One of White eyes’s chief goals— physical pro-
tection for his people— seemed close to fruition.
all such hopes died when mcintosh spoke. addressing the crowd through
the interpreter John gibson, the general first declared he had come to Ohio
to defend his delaware allies. But rather than building a fort at goschachgünk,
he would build one at tuscarawas “as it is in my path to detroit.” next he
announced he would make peace with any British- allied indians who surren-
dered within the next two weeks, and he pledged to hunt down those who
refused. But then he pleaded with his hosts to bring him corn, “and also all
the horses, cattle, hogs, deer skins, Venison or anything else you can spare,”
promising to pay either in certificates or in worthless paper currency. The
delawares, unimpressed, politely “signifyed their approbation and thanks.”
having shown his desperation for supplies, the general concluded by warn-
ing that any warriors who failed to join his army “should be looked upon as
enemys to the United states of america.” Unable to contain themselves, the
delawares broke into “a general laugh.”38
not for the last time, a United states commander had overestimated his
leverage over Ohio indians. mcintosh dreamed of dispatching armies on
long campaigns, securing supply lines with a chain of forts, and cowing the
enemy into submission. But by the time he addressed the delawares, that vi-
sion had proven a mirage. eager to take the field, he began his campaign in
late fal , when the landscape offered scant forage for his army’s livestock. Be-
cause of salt shortages, the army could preserve no meat, so once- fat cattle
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slowly wasted away or strayed past inattentive sentries into the woods. Fam-
ished packhorses crumpled under their loads, forcing the army to abandon
its food reserves. mcintosh had drafted most of them as militia for three-
month terms ending 1 January. When he called for replacements, their com-
manders howled in protest and Virginia’s government countermanded him.
With no hope of reaching detroit, he resolved to leave a small garrison of
regulars in a new fort at tuscarawas and wage another campaign in the
spring. as the militia built Fort laurens, a structure they nicknamed “fort
noncence,” each man subsisted on about a cup of flour per day. When they
finished, the general sent them home with nothing to eat but raw cowhide: all
that remained of his army’s meat supply.39
The remaining tuscarawas garrison faced a grueling winter. dunquat had
told the americans he could come to terms only if their army stayed “at some
distance from my towns.” By building “fort noncence,” mcintosh directly
threatened those towns, so the Wyandots resolved to oppose him with “all
[their] might.” While reiterating goodwill for their moravian friends, dun-
quat’s men quickly attacked the fort. its commander, the onetime delaware
captive John gibson, turned to his adoptive nation for food. in early decem-
ber, glikhican brought several horseloads of corn from lichtenau, and gib-
son repeatedly sent men for more. But by building the fort fifty miles upriver,
mcintosh had made it difficult for his delaware allies to supply it. Zeisberger,
who had urged the army to invade, quickly grew disil usioned. “They made
many promises about how they would protect us,” he complained, “but we
did not receive any protection from them. On the contrary, they bring the
war into our town and we then have to protect them.” The aged israel
Welapachtschiechen talked one war party out of ambushing two of gibson’s
men. grateful for their help, gibson urged his superiors “to doe something
for the poor moravians and the friendly delawares.” But Zeisberger now rea-
soned that bringing soldiers any nearer to lichtenau would only invite attack.
gibson had enough trouble defending his own fort. in late February, when
eighteen men ventured out to gather firewood, dunquat’s warriors ambushed
them, capturing two and killing the rest, all within sight of the wal s. a weeks-
long siege ensued. By the time fresh supplies arrived, gibson and his men
had eaten the boiled remains of their shoes.40
But just as mcintosh’s plans col apsed, the opposing alliance began to
splinter. dunquat and other great lakes indians depended on the aid of in-
creasingly unreliable British allies. during the winter, hamilton led an army
into the Wabash Valley, leaving detroit short of troops and food. his Ohio
reluctance, 1777–79
115
allies protested angrily, noting that mcintosh’s army “threatened their lands.”
The British, one Wyandot observed, were becoming “as smooth tongued as
the Virginians.” news of the american alliance with France, their onetime
al y, deepened Wyandot doubts. Then, in late march, news arrived that ham-
ilton had surrendered to the Virginians. Wyandot leaders rushed to detroit
to demand food, troops, and cannon. Without such support, they warned,
they would have to make peace, “being not able to fight the enemy alone.”
disappointed with the response, dunquat welcomed delaware diplomats he
had scorned just weeks before, called his erstwhile British allies “good for
nothing,” and pledged to help end hostiliti
es. in doing so, he adhered to a
long- standing vision of delaware and Wyandot nations jointly protecting
their lands and people. For over a year he had pursued that goal through an
alliance with Britain; now he embraced an alternative route to the same end.41
in april, at Upper sandusky, ten British soldiers chopped down “thick
timber,” arranged the logs into a makeshift wal , rolled out four small cannon,
then blew the wall to pieces. Their commander, henry Bird, boasted to his
Wyandot audience that he would do the same to Fort laurens. his men re-
peated their laborious presentation several times but failed to impress the
Wyandots: it was too little, too late. They flatly refused to help, perhaps
doubting that Bird could haul the guns across miles of swampy terrain. in
early may, both the detroit and sandusky Wyandots resolved to make peace;
Ojibwes and Odawas soon joined them. mcintosh’s replacement, daniel
Brodhead, reported that most Ohio indians were “not hostile at present”; in
July, William crawford noted that indians had “don very litle mischef this
summer.” When Bird tried once more to ral y his allies, dunquat publicly
denounced the venture. Bird fumed, calling Wyandot leaders “either rascals
or cowards.” Other British officers branded them “rebbels” for becoming
“friends to the states.” But their change of heart reflected a pragmatic reas-
sessment of their options. hamilton’s defeat, the new Franco- american alli-
ance, and shortages at detroit all raised serious doubts about their British
allies, while the delaware- american alliance suggested another way to
achieve their goals.42
But they could forge a lasting peace only with american cooperation.
Wyandot leaders reached out once more to the United states, with the
goschachgünk delawares again acting as go- betweens. They suggested hold-
ing a council at Beaver creek, rather than pittsburgh, to keep away from the
unruly colonial population. no doubt remembering cornstalk, one spokes-
man asked Brodhead not to bring “too many of your young men” to their
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