techniques later applied on a vastly greater scale in World War I.
BRITISH PRoPAgAnDA In WoRLD WAR I
British propaganda in World War I was very extensive, effective, and well-docu-
mented. As mentioned earlier, the word “propaganda” became an extensive entry in
the Encyclopedia Britannica in the twelfth edition, 1922, following the events of this period, whereas the eleventh, pre-war edition had no entry for the word. Hitler and
Goebbels later claimed with some justification that a significant part of their own
propaganda technique was modelled on that of the British at this time. A wealth of
different methods were developed, and they make for instructive study. They use, in
different ways, principles of persuasion we have already discussed, but the introduction
of new mass media in the form of pictorial magazines, radio, cinema, and telegraphic
news services gave a whole new dimension to the speed and reach of propaganda as
well as greater powers of orchestration. As we shall see, the British also emphasized a
form of personal propaganda, getting the message to media-influential people.
CHAPTER 2: HISToRy oF PRoPAgAnDA
55
BV-Propaganda-Interior-04.indd 55
9/5/13 4:52 PM
The study of propaganda is a complex undertaking. It is not always easy, for example, to determine the extent to which propaganda activity is directed from above as
distinct from spontaneously generated by individuals or groups below. H.G. Wells was
recruited to carry out propaganda, but he was already publishing materials suitable
for propaganda purposes before any formal state-sponsored structure was organized.
Here the distinction between political and sociological propaganda, in Ellul’s terms,
is applicable, but it is only one of many different ways of categorizing the propaganda
to be studied. Also to be considered is the target audience: propaganda directed at the
British people themselves, al ies, neutral nations, and the enemy. A third, quite differ-
ent grouping is by the media chosen to disseminate messages—books, periodicals, pic-
tures, movies, telegraph, or personal contact. A fourth, overlapping approach concerns
the nature of the message itself and the form of its appeal, such as the creation of anger
and indignation by the use of atrocity stories. A fifth focal point relates to the develop-
ment, over time, of the propaganda organization, in the case of Britain from its begin-
nings in Wellington House and the Foreign Office to the Department of Information
under John Buchan and then to Lord Beaverbrook’s Ministry of Information. Finally,
propaganda can also be treated by examining single episodes, such as the use of the
Bryce Report; the handling of the sinking of the Lusitania; and, most importantly, the
“corpse utilization” atrocity story, singled out by numerous commentators as the most
notorious of the whole propaganda war.
Wellington House
With important exceptions, the bulk of British propaganda was carried out by an
organization that worked at Wellington House under the direction of Charles F.G.
Masterman; its first meeting was held September 2, 1914. His detailed reports, con-
taining submissions from individual directors of propaganda targeted at individ-
ual countries or groups of countries, are very informative. An insider’s overview of
propaganda activities can also be found in the form of a published but unsigned
report, “British Propaganda During the War 1914–1918” (hereinafter cited as the “BP
Report”), a copy of which, marked “secret,” is in the Sir Campbell Stuart collection
in the Imperial War Museum55 and is no longer secret. Although the document con-
veys an element of self-justification, it provides much factual information, which can
be usefully compared with other sources. Of course, people engaged in propaganda
activities can be expected to be adept at self-promotion, and some discounting of self-
congratulatory interpretations may be in order. For example, the BP Report describes
the work of the Department of Information as “remarkably successful—largely owing
to the honesty of the means it employed,” whereas German propaganda was charac-
terized by a “complete disregard for the truth and entire lack of scruple. The German
Government spent on propaganda vastly greater sums than we.”56 Whatever the
56 PROPAGANDA AND THE ETHICS OF PERSUASION
9/5/13 4:52 PM
authors may have thought, “honesty” is hardly the right term to apply in connection with some of the materials disseminated by the department.
C.F.G. (Charles) Masterman (1874–1927), former literary editor of The Daily News
and a Liberal Member of Parliament, was already involved in what could be viewed as a
kind of propaganda activity prior to the outbreak of war on August 3–4, 1914. As chair-
man of the National Insurance Commission, he worked in Wellington House coordi-
nating speakers in and outside government to travel the country persuading people of
the value of the National Insurance Act, a progressive piece of legislation.57 When Prime
Minister Herbert Asquith called upon him to take on the propaganda work, he set up
the organization conveniently in his own building. He brought together a distinguished
group of writers and paid various publishing houses to publish their books.58His orga-
nization sought and obtained the co-operation of the publishers to not reveal that the
government was subsidizing these works. One of the aims was to produce propaganda to
counteract German propaganda and “to present the al ied case and Great Britain’s share
in the war in the proper light” (BP 1).
An interesting aspect of the Wellington House operations, at least from the point
of view of our study of propaganda, is the secrecy with which they were carried out.
The ethos of the writers chosen to propagate the British side of the propaganda war
was high, but it is a fair assumption that it would have been greatly reduced if the tar-
geted audience had known these writers were representing a propaganda organization.
The BP Report stated:
The existence of a publishing establishment at Wellington House, and, a fortiori,
the connexion of the Government with this establishment were carefully concealed.
Except for official publications, none of the literature bore overt marks of its origin.
Further, literature was placed on sale where possible, and when sent free was always
sent informally, that is to say through and apparently from some person between
whom and the recipient there was a definite link, and with a covering note from the
person to whose private patriotism the sending of the literature seemed due. (BP 7)
Much of the distribution took place through British steamship companies, who
absorbed the costs. Other business firms, patriotic organizations, religious societies,
and the like also gave their help.
Six classes of literature were produced: official publications; speeches of minis-
ters, the full texts of which were often translated into the language of target countries;
pamphlets and books generated by Wellington House, either original material writ-
ten on request or already existing work; pamphlets and books merely distributed by
Wellington House; declarations of opin
ion by various classes of persons; and articles
and interviews in the press (BP 5). Masterman gives a figure of 300 books and pam-
phlets distributed in 21 languages by September 1916.
CHAPTER 2: HISToRy oF PRoPAgAnDA
57
BV-Propaganda-Interior-04.indd 57
9/5/13 4:52 PM
Masterman’s committee was designed to influence opinion in Allied and neu-
tral nations, not to affect the enemy nor even, ostensibly at least, the home audience,
although in the latter case substantial effects can be presumed. In the beginning,
pamphlets and press summaries were the main focus of activity. Later came the
production of weekly, fortnightly, and monthly illustrated papers in English and
foreign languages as well as films. From the first there was constant collaboration
with the News Department of the Foreign Office under G.H. Mair. After January
1916, Wellington House activities were subsumed under the office of the Secretary
of State for Foreign Affairs.
The scope of the British undertaking grew, and, under the Department of
Information, during 10 months of 1917 over 40 million items of all sorts (includ-
ing pamphlets, pictures, postcards, and so on) were issued. Monthly and fortnightly
journals (see below) in many languages were distributed throughout the world.
Photographs were taken of the Navy, of troops in training, and of munitions-making.
Artists added an aesthetic dimension, which had its own “propagandist value.” Both
photos and drawings were sent to newspapers all over the world, in the case of the for-
mer at the rate of 4,000 a week by September 1916 and more later on. Exhibitions in
Britain and abroad were arranged for the materials. For rural districts in Russia, Italy,
and other countries, lantern slides were prepared along with picture postcards. Other
materials produced were “maps, diagrams, gramophone records, cigarette cards, model
tanks for ashtrays, calendars showing German crimes and British victories, bookmark-
ers and blotting slips” (BP 6–7).
After January 1916, films such as “Britain Prepared,” the “Battle of the Somme,” and
the “Battle of Arras” were successfully produced and distributed, and film came to be
one of the main features of the Ministry of Information. The change in emphasis came
with a feeling that Masterman’s approach had been too soft and indirect and that what
was needed was louder and bolder propaganda “developing with special energy the most
direct and effective known forms of publicity—personal propaganda, and propaganda
by film, by wireless and by cable” (BP 7, 8).
Masterman clearly states that the important propaganda work of supplying cur-
rent news items to daily newspapers of the world was not one of his responsibilities.
This work was organized by G.H. Mair, at first under the Home Office but always in
conjunction with the News Department of the Foreign Office. Censorship for the
different news organizations meant daily consultation with the Foreign Office to
speed things up. Newspapers were generally very co-operative, but the Hearst news-
papers “provided the exception” and underwent severe sanctions. According to the
BP Report, the Hearst papers, despite a warning, printed material damaging to the
British, which was generated in New York but which was presented as coming from
London. As a result, the Foreign Office “stopped supplying the Hearst newspapers
with news, and arranged for a similar cessation of facilities from all other Government
Departments, including the use of the British cables” (BP 2). In those days. the
58 PROPAGANDA AND THE ETHICS OF PERSUASION
BV-Propaganda-Interior-04.indd 58
9/5/13 4:52 PM
telegraph was the source of the most up-to-date information. By carefully feeding countries around the world with a regular diet of material by telegraph, the British
propaganda organization helped to ensure that its own side of the story reached audi-
ences with the greatest speed. It is a matter of common experience that the person who
tells his or her side of the story first has the better chance of influencing the recipient’s perceptions.
Visits to the fleet, beginning October 1915, were regarded as an “immense success,”
the journalists writing “ecstatic accounts of it to their papers.” Four to five months
later, correspondents were allowed to visit the lines in France, writing “enthusiastic
accounts of what they saw.” The War Office made it a policy to grant facilities to cor-
respondents, giving them 12 hours notice before the Battle of the Somme, for example,
so that they could arrive on time to witness the activities.
The Department of Information
In February 1917, a Department of Information was formed, under Colonel John
Buchan, with a view to coordinating more closely the separate propaganda activities
already described. It also became more aggressive, as the case of the “corpse factory
story,” discussed below, illustrates. Clerics generally had been targeted by Wellington
House operations, but the BP Report specifically mentions that monthly letters were
sent to “nearly every Catholic priest in the United States and Canada, and they were
issued in French, Italian, Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch and German for distribution
to leading Catholic priests and laymen in the countries concerned.” Cinema produc-
tion exceeded a million and a half feet, sent to 40 foreign countries. “The Battle of
Arras” was considered particularly successful. About 400 press articles a week were
sent to foreign newspapers. Copies of British newspapers were delivered daily to more
than 300 newspapers in small US towns. A London letter was supplied weekly to
109 papers in the US midwest. In Russia, broadsheets were issued for distribution to
soldiers and workmen at the rate of one million a day, despite the difficulties caused
by the Russian Revolution.
Some activities were aimed simply at creating goodwill. For example, in Spain “for
some months about 200 free dinners a day were provided for poor women with babies,
and a great many were without doubt kept by these meals from starving.” Members
of the embassy in Spain also met with many high-ranking clerics to discuss the war.
Hospitality operations flourished. Close to 500 visitors were taken in the last six
months of 1917 to munition areas, military camps, the fleet, debates in Parliament,
hospitals, schools, universities, Ireland, internment camps, etc. Visitors were con-
stantly sent to three chateaux on the Western Front, which were under the depart-
ment’s control. The large amount of space given by the French and Italian press to
British military operations was attributed to this hospitality (BP 9–25).
CHAPTER 2: HISToRy oF PRoPAgAnDA
59
BV-Propaganda-Interior-04.indd 59
9/5/13 4:52 PM
The Ministry of Information
By the time propaganda activities became consolidated in March 1918 under the
Ministry of Information, headed by Lord Beaverbrook, much experience had been
gained. The BP Report records an even more aggressive stance and gives an interesting
overview of the nature of propaganda, reflecting past and current activity:
There are three types of propaganda: propaganda by the written w
ord, including
pamphlets, articles, cables and wireless; propaganda by picture, including cinemas,
photographs and drawings; and propaganda by getting hold of the right man, tell-
ing him the facts, and then taking him to the places where he can see for himself
that what you say is true. Personal propaganda of this kind is obviously the most
convincing of the three, but it can be used only on a limited scale, and, though
through showing one important editor the concrete evidence of this country’s
achievement you can reach hundreds of thousands of readers, for getting into more
direct touch with large masses of men other means have to be found.
Pictures were useful for “conveying a fact or the summary of an argument to immense
masses, educated and uneducated.” Some subtle as well as crude means were used to
affect opinion as well:
The task of the Ministry of Information was therefore to direct the thought of most
of the world. This task it performed sometimes through hints and indirect suggestion,
more often with the brazen tongues of facts and statistics. In the way of propaganda by
implication and nuance, it sent British musicians at times to strengthen the reputation
of British music abroad; or it sent Union Jacks to remote parts of France where they
were rarely seen; or unofficially offered prizes in French schools for essays on the British
Navy … Such activities are, however, exceptional….
As an everyday concern, the ministry communicated to the United States the total
number of British killed and wounded in the war to “point out to Americans the hard
facts of what this country has done and suffered” and to hint at the “moral significance
of these facts—the soul that lurks in the statistics.”
One form of propaganda pioneered by the ministry was, as indicated, that of
personal propaganda and hospitality. It deserves special attention because of the
widespread imitation of this method later in the century by Nazi Germany, South
Africa, the Soviet Union, and the US Pentagon. The BP Report calls it one of the
“greatest achievements” of the ministry. High-ranking military officials gave regular
briefings to US and other “foreign and colonial” journalists who met regularly at the
Overseas Press Centre, which was used mostly by Americans and “guests from the