Christianity accounts, for example, would frame the election as a spiritual
battle between Jesus and a memeified, demonic depiction of Hillary Clinton. 48
Pro-patriotism accounts would lay the groundwork for anti-immigration,
anti-Muslim, anti-LGBTQ, or anti-anything-that-could-be-construed-as-
contrary-to-“traditional”-American-values content. This negativity was part
of a secondary goal: to sow division, distrust, and general social discord in
American society. Regardless of who wins the election, if Americans are
more divided and more focused on divisive domestic issues, they are less of
a partner to NATO allies and less of a threat to the Kremlin’s geopolitical
aims.
This secondary goal is why U.S.-directed IRA operations didn’t cease in
November 2016. In fact, even as the U.S. government and public started to
become aware of Russian influence operations after the fact in early 2017, and
account takedowns started to occur on Twitter and Facebook, IRA Instagram
activity aimed at U.S. audiences increased. To be sure, influence operations
continued on all major platforms, but the data provided by the social media
companies tell a clear story of increased activity on Instagram in particular in
2017, especially content stoking social fears among African Americans and the
anti-Trump “resistance.” 49 IRA activity in 2017 targeted right-leaning audiences with predominately anti-Clinton messaging, solidifying support for Trump, and
narratives about platform censorship of conservatives (as Russian accounts
began to be taken down); they targeted left-leaning audiences with anti-
Electoral College narratives, stoking dissatisfaction with the electoral process;
and they targeted everyone with anti-Robert Mueller narratives, attempting
to discredit the investigation of Russian interference in the election and
potential collusion with the Trump campaign.
What Now?
As we conclude in our Senate report, “it appears likely that the United States
will continue to face Russian interference for the foreseeable future. ”50 In the fallout from the 2016 election, many of the IRA’s best U.S.-directed assets
have been taken down and many of their key leadership and shell corporations
have been indicted. This makes it far more difficult for them to conduct a
high-impact operation in the United States. But not impossible. My colleagues
48For examples of the most popular Jesus-vs.-Hillary memes, see Kate Shellnutt, “Russia’s
Fake Facebook Ads Targeted Christians,” Christianity Today, published November 3, 2017,
www.christianitytoday.com/news/2017/november/russia-fake-facebook-elec-
tion-ads-targeted-christian-voters.html. Some of the memes are also displayed and discussed in the New Knowledge report to SSCI.
49“The Tactics and Tropes of the Internet Research Agency,” p. 93.
50Ibid., p. 99.
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and I have continued to observe likely Russian propaganda on social media,
including content directed at the 2018 U.S. midterms.51 It’s not clear yet to
what extent they may have been effective, but they have not disappeared. In
addition to online propaganda, we also know that Claire McCaskill’s
(unsuccessful) reelection campaign to the U.S. Senate was the target of
hacking, likely by the GRU.52 Russia’s state-run, English-language mass media
outlets, like RT and Sputnik, and hundreds of Kremlin-linked and Kremlin-
aligned blogs and “journals” abound on the English-language web. We also
know that Russia’s geopolitical ally, Iran, has been identified as the source of
online disinformation operations, which so far have received less direct
scrutiny from researchers than Russia’s operations. And we haven’t even
discussed Russia’s suspected involvement in the UK Brexit referendum of
2016 or the hack-and-dump operation targeting Emmanuel Macron’s
presidential campaign in France in 2017.
At least for now, this is the new normal.
Summary
In this chapter, we took a detailed look at Russian disinformation operations
on social media throughout the old battlefield of the Cold War.
Multiplatform influence operations in Ukraine preceded and supported
military operations in Crimea and eastern Ukraine. Fearmongering
narratives on television and online sought to discourage cooperation
between Sweden (and Finland) and their NATO friends that might threaten
the Russian energy industry. And operations from Russian military
intelligence (the GRU) and a Russian contractor (the IRA) sought to
destabilize and discredit the U.S. democratic process in 2016 and elect
Donald Trump as president of the United States.
These operations preyed upon some of the West’s greatest virtues: freedom
of speech, freedom of the press, openness, and technological advances. But
they also preyed upon fundamental human weaknesses: cognitive limits that
make it difficult to sort fact from fiction online, tribalism, and fear of the
“other.” These weaknesses, combined with the reality that social evolution
and legislation will always trail behind technical innovation, mean that we’re
likely going to be dealing with the problem of online disinformation for a long
time to come.
51Jonathon Morgan and Ryan Fox, “Russians Meddling in the Midterms? Here’s the Data,”
New York Times, published November 6, 2018, www.nytimes.com/2018/11/06/opinion/
midterm-elections-russia.html.
52Kevin Poulsen and Andrew Desiderio, “Russian Hackers’ New Target: a Vulnerable
Democratic Senator,” Daily Beast, published July 26, 2018, www.thedailybeast.com/
russian-hackers-new-target-a-vulnerable-democratic-senator.
Data versus Democracy
89
But this isn’t just a problem for NATO countries and the former Soviet
republics. This is a global problem, as both foreign and domestic groups seek
to use online media to manipulate others, to their own advantage. And in
countries where not only is the technology new, but democracy is new, online
disinformation poses an even greater threat to free speech and the free flow
of information, both of which are vital for a democracy to thrive.
That’s the subject of the next chapter.
C H A P T E R
6
Democracy
Hacked, Part 2
Rumors, Bots, and Genocide in the Global South
New technology is neither inherently good, nor inherently bad, nor inherently
neutral. When it comes to new ways to communicate and to share information,
new technology irreversibly alters the social structure of a community, making
new things possible and rendering the old ways of doing things inaccessible.
When a community is already experiencing social change or tension, this only
adds fuel to the fire. New access to information can lead to positive social
change, but tools like social media can also be turned into a weapon. New
tech plus new social structures can bring great instability and uncertainty to a
society. That story—far more than foreign meddling—has played out
repeatedly throughout the Global South.
© Kris Shaffer 2019
K. Shaf fer, Data versus Democracy,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4842-4540-8_6
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Chapter 6 | Democracy Hacked, Part 2
A Digital Revolution
Technologies alter our ability to preserve and circulate ideas and
stories, the ways in which we connect and converse, the people
with whom we can interact, the things that we can see, and the
structures of power that oversee the means of contact.1
These words from Zeynep Tufekci frame her discussion of how digital
platforms, like social media, transform and interact with the kinds of societal
and political structures in which we live and work. Think about it this way:
before the invention of the automobile, many Western communities were
smaller, and we lived much closer to where we worked, where we worshiped,
where our children were educated, even where our food was grown. Now
that we have cars, trucks, buses, trains, and airplanes, we don’t need to live so
close to those things. In some cases, people live more spread out; in others,
people still live and work close together, but the farms that sustain those
communities are far away. My parents and grandparents all grew up—and
stayed—in the same county; my parents each went to the same high school
as their parents did, in towns right next to each other; and when I was in high
school (one more town over), I competed in track meets against my parents’
and grandparents’ alma maters. But when I went to college, I went out of
state, and this Midwestern boy met and married a New England girl, and we’ve
since lived in just about every part of the United States. Our kids weren’t
even all born in the same state.
Just as the introduction of industrial technology, and the infrastructure that
supports it, gradually led to significant changes in social structures and human
relationships,2 the introduction of digital technology has done the same, only
faster. For people like me, those changes have meant that I can stay connected
to family, even when we live over a thousand miles away. It meant that I could
pursue a career that required multiple cross-country moves. It meant that I
could pursue professional development online that would allow me to make
a career change without going back to (and paying for) school. And it means
that my spouse could pursue her career in person in one state while I work
remotely for a company in another state. The digital revolution has been a
major paradigm shift for me and my family.
But for many, the revolution isn’t digital.
1Zeynep Tufekci, Twitter and Tear Gas: The Power and Fragility of Networked Protest (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 2017), p. 5.
2See Chapter 1 for a discussion of how this phenomenon played out at several points in human history.
Data versus Democracy
93
The quote from Tufekci about technology’s power to change social structures
was written largely in reference to the Arab Spring—the wave of protests
across North Africa and the Middle East that led to the overthrow of a
number of autocratic governments in 2011. After many failed attempts at
major governmental change in Tunisia, Egypt, and elsewhere, revolution swept
much of the Arab world in 2011. What was different in 2011?
Before the Arab Spring, it was easy for people in those countries to live in a
state of “pluralistic ignorance”—when you feel alone in your beliefs because
you simply don’t know that many others agree with you. When a government
controls mass media, and people are afraid to speak out in front of all but a
select few trustworthy friends and family, it is easy to be ignorant of the
millions of others who share your dissatisfaction with the status quo. But
digital technology, especially social media, changed that. As Tufekci writes,
“Thanks to a Facebook page, perhaps for the first time in history, an internet
user could click yes on an electronic invitation to a revolution.” 3
That’s exactly what happened in Egypt in 2011.
In 2010, a man named Khaled Said filmed Egyptian police allegedly “sharing
the spoils of a drug bust. ”4 He shared this video widely, and on June 6, he died in police custody. Many believe his death to be police retaliation for his
exposing their alleged corruption. On July 19, an activist created a Facebook
page5 to draw attention to Said’s plight. That page was named “We Are All
Khaled Said,” “because all of us might face the same destiny at any point in
time,” according to the activist who created the page. 6
Fast-forward to January 2011. January 25 was a holiday in Egypt, technically in
honor of the police, but frequently used as an occasion for anti-government
protest. 7 We Are All Khaled Said posted an invitation to an event—a protest in Cairo’s Tahrir Square (literally translated “Liberation” Square). The invitation
went viral, and ultimately hundreds of thousands of Egyptians joined an
18-day-long protest. Initially, Mubarak’s government dismissed the online
“clicktivism.” But just like in Tunisia, the online activity of the previous six
months had stirred the pot just enough to get people to come out. And when
they did, their “pluralistic ignorance” was gone. Between Facebook and Tahrir
Square, Egyptians desiring change realized they were not alone. They called
for the ouster of Mubarak. When Mubarak realized he couldn’t ignore the
3 Twitter and Tear Gas, p. 27.
4Lara Logan, “The Deadly Beating that Sparked Egypt Revolution,” CBS News, published
revolution/.
5“We Are All Khaled Said,” Facebook page, www.facebook.com/elshaheeed.co.uk.
6Lara Logan, “The Deadly Beating that Sparked Egypt Revolution.”
7Twitter and Tear Gas, p. 23.
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Chapter 6 | Democracy Hacked, Part 2
protesters, nor could he placate them, nor imprison or murder all of them, he
relented. Eighteen days after the start of the protest, he relinquished power
to the military.8
Digital connectivity—Facebook, in particular—changed Egypt forever. Like in
Tunisia, anti-government citizens in Egypt were able to discover each other,
recruit others, and organize a rally that brought down the government. But
that wasn’t the end of things. There weren’t instant elections. Rather, the
military stepped in to keep order until elections could be held. And when
they were held, the activists that brought down the government were not
sufficiently organized into a political party or even a meaningful voting bloc.
The Muslim Brotherhood stepped into the power vacuum left by the Tahrir
protests, winning elections in 2012,9 quickly attempting to move Egypt toward
a more right-leaning, Islamic government. This was opposed by many in Egypt
who had participated in the January 25 revolution and ultimately led to a
coup10 and early elections, which brought current Egyptian president el-Sisi
into power.11
The turmoil that followed the January 25 revolution made one thing abundantly
clear: digital connectivity is not an inevitably democratic force. Though it can
transform social structures, it does not necessarily lead to equal participation,
equal representation, and transparent governance. And it does not transform
every society in the same way. In the case of most Arab Spring countries,
digital connectivity and social networks served as an accelerant. It brought
existing grievances to the surface, brought would-be revolutionaries together,
and—unimpeded by existing governmental leaders who did not understand
its power—upended social structures so fast that activists could not keep up.
Facebook’s “frictionless design” 12 made revolution so easy that no one slowed
down and did the necessary work of community organizing, political party
building, and planning for the future.
8“Timeline: Egypt’s Revolution,” Al Jazeera, published February 14, 2011, www.aljazeera.
com/news/middleeast/2011/01/201112515334871490.html.
9Abdel-Rahman Hussein and Julian Borger, “Muslim Brotherhood’s Mohamed Morsi
declared president of Egypt,” The Guardian, published June 24, 2012, www.theguardian.
com/world/2012/jun/24/muslim-brotherhood-egypt-president-mohamed-morsi.
10David D. Kirkpatrick, “Army Ousts Egypt’s President; Morsi Is Taken Into Military
Custody,” The New York Times, published July 3, 2013, www.nytimes.com/2013/07/04/
world/middleeast/egypt.html.
11“Egypt election: Sisi secures landslide win,” BBC News, published May 29, 2014, www.
bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27614776.
12Kevin Roose, “Is Tech Too Easy to Use?,” The Shift, The New York Times, published
December 12, 2018, www.nytimes.com/2018/12/12/technology/tech-friction-
frictionless.html.
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95
This is a pattern we see repeatedly throughout the world, but perhaps more
starkly in the Global South. Whether Egypt, Brazil, or Myanmar, young
democracies and new technology can be a volatile mix. Hand someone
experiencing social upheaval and political or ethnic conflict both freedom of
speech and a smartphone at the same time, and the results will be unpredictable
at best. That’s true even when everyone is acting with the best of intentions. But
when they’re not, the results can be disastrous.
Ultimately, social media and digital connectivity are a mixed bag, even