of certain other natural entities which are not in a state of flux, on the assumption that entities in flux were not possible objects of
knowledge.10
9 Jonathan Barnes, The Complete Works of Aristotle. Two Volumes. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), Metaphysics: Alpha6, 987a.
10 Ibid., Metaphysics: Mu4, 1078b.
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In order to verify Aristotle’s claim I will search for the Heraclitean basis of Plato’s philosophy between the lines of the relevant dialogues Theaetetus, Cratylus, and Phaedo. Through various participants in these dialogues Plato paints a picture of what the world would be
like if there were no ideal forms beyond the sensible realm, at times directly and at times implicitly attributing such a view of the world
to Heraclitus and his followers. Plato does this in order to make the
case that in such a terribly unreliable world of perpetual Becoming
rational knowledge of definite objects would be impossible.
So as to present the most coherent picture I will abstract relevant
statements from their differing contexts and interweave them in an
explication that aims to elucidate the unspoken assumption forth
from which Plato philosophizes. This pastiche does not do injustice
to the contexts of these Heraclitean statements because I admit that
they are being made by Plato’s Socrates for argument’s sake and are
to be proven wrong in the course of each dialogue. However, what
is important is that in every case the only way that these Heraclitean views are discredited is by demonstrating that the existence of forms
that lie beyond the world is a prerequisite for rational knowledge.
Plato’s narrative in effect reads: ‘if there were no forms the world would be like this...so there must be forms.’ The validity of the Heraclitean view of the world is not challenged but only restricted
to not being the whole story. Time and again it is embraced as the
ground of arguing for a Parmenidean transcendence of the physical
world. This Parmenidean aspect should be kept in mind until
I turn to explore it explicitly as the template for the forms, once I have completed an explication of the Heraclitean element of Plato’s
ontology.
First a brief overview of the original context of these spliced
passages. Theaetetus is a discussion of the nature of knowledge, which stems from the belief of one of its participants’ in the truth of Protagoras’ view that ‘knowledge is perception’ and truth is relative
to the perceiver. Plato equates the views of Protagoras and Heraclitus in this respect and embarks on a detailed exposition of how a world
of Becoming could “come to be” without necessitating independently
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de-limited ‘beings’ either as subjects or as objects. Cratylus, named in honor of the young Plato’s Heraclitean teacher, is an argument
over the appropriateness of names to their objects and the very
possibility of naming things at al , which is, of course, a precondition for the existence of Logic. During the course of a discussion on the
significance of names Plato embarks on a profound elaboration of
the meaning of Justice, which he himself implies is Heraclitean.
The dialogue ends with Socrates’ advice to Cratylus not to so easily
accept Heracliteanism because its view of the world defies the
possibility of rational knowledge. Final y, Phaedo takes place on the day that Socrates executes his death sentence by drinking hemlock.
During the course of his arguments for why the philosopher should
not fear death, but should rather long for it, we are presented with an exposition on the interdependence of mental and physical opposites
towards the end of proving that rebirth follows life. Let us begin
reading between the lines of the various dialogues…
The world is an ever-changing Becoming in that all things
are always simultaneously undergoing two kinds of change: 1)
movement from place to place or revolving in the same place and 2)
seeming to remain fixed in position while changing qualitatively (as
in growing old, changing color, or hardening, etc).11 Since everything is always changing nothing can be properly named as such; i.e.
the mirroring of simple concept (name) and simple object, which
is the very foundation of Logic, is impossible.12 Thus such a world
of becoming defies knowledge ( episteme) because there is neither a fixed object to be known nor a unified subject to be a knower.13
We can see this to be the case through an examination of how the
perceived ‘object’ and the structure suited to perception mutual y
define each other when they approach one another in the overall
motion of nature. This definition occurs without necessitating a
11 Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns, The Col ected Dialogues of Plato (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), Theaetetus: 181c–182a.
12 Ibid., 182d–183b.
13 Ibid.,
Cratylus: 440a-e.
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someone, but also someone can become so only for something. All beings in the movement of nature become for each other and in
this way a Necessity binds all things in the universe together, and
so also in the same breath does not allow anything or anyone to be
‘bound to itself’ as a unitary subject or object that can be isolated
from others.14
In this definition of the world through the mutual perception of
that which comes to be, that which is perceived is never a quality,
for example, ‘redness’ or ‘hotness’, but merely an example or degree
of a quality that does not itself exist. This seeming contradiction is resolved in that “Opposites come from opposites – wherever there
is an opposite.”15 This is true for both physical and moral qualities.
For example, anything deemed ‘large’ or ‘heavy’ in comparison to
one thing will always also be ‘smal ’ in comparison to something
else. Thus we can never speak of ‘largeness’ or ‘heaviness’ but only
of larger than ... , heavier than ... , smaller or lighter than ... . This
‘than...’ yet again underlines the greater unity of all things within
the relativity of Becoming.16 Similarly, pleasure and pain seem
to yield to one another at their extreme thresholds. One always
follows, or is the ground of, the other. (Plato’s mundane example is
Socrates’ feeling of pleasure in his leg after the fetter that has been causing it pain is released.) In saying that when one seeks the one
the other follows, Plato is probably also implying emotional pain,
for example, the pain of being abandoned after selfishly seeking
pleasure in a relationship.17 Fear and bravery are also aspects of the same phenomenon, because the man who defines his character by
his willingness to die courageously for some alleged cause does so
above all out of fear of cowardice – although the very definition of
bravery is to be free from fear.18
14 Ibid., Theaetetus: 156a–157c; 160b–c.
15 Ibid.,
Phaedo: 70e.
16 Ibid.,
Theaetetus: 152d-e.
17 Ibid.,
Phaedo: 60c.
18 Ibid., 68d-e.
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What all of these examples of th
e mutual generation of opposites
imply is that seeming opposites are on the same spectrum and
precisely when they approach the greatest extremity of distance from
each other they at once become each other. One of the two seeming
opposites can only be seen as such by being defined against the other
as an abstracted aspect of this spectrum, thereby simultaneously
defining the other as wel . The finite spectrum within which they
can be distinctly judged col apses at its extremities – and so real y
throughout – into infinity. It is the indifference of this free space, of a oneness that is void, which alone makes the spectrum of opposites
in the drama of Becoming both possible and necessary. This drama is
the means by which the tension of existence satisfies itself. We could call such satisfaction Justice and conceive of it as an abstract (never-setting) Sun or Fire. This Justice is different from the relative quality by the same name; it has no opposite of ‘injustice’. The moving
universe is receptive to the penetrating force of Justice, which is not only the agent of its perpetual creativity but also its cause and end.
That it “must pass by other things as if they’re standing stil ” means that since the other things are in fact a movement of Becoming, this
Fire or Sun of Justice is the stillness of Being that incandescently
burns through and beyond them.19 There you have the elements of
Plato’s tacit Heraclitean ontology.
The influence of Parmenides on the development of Plato’s
Theory of Forms is even clearer than that Heraclitus, the man who
Parmenides saw as his philosophical adversary. We are not required
to read between the lines. Two of Plato’s dialogues explicitly deal with Parmenides, the dialogue bearing the latter’s name as well as The
Sophist. In these works Plato goes so far as to quote whole passages of Parmenides’ The Way of Truth word for word. The Parmenides is staged as a dialogue that is supposed to have taken place between
an elderly Parmenides and a ‘Socrates’ still in his youth. As we shall see, Plato probably intends this dramatic situation to imply that his
own early confrontation with Parmenides was a key factor in his
development. The Theory of Forms can be seen in part as an answer
19 Ibid.,
Cratylus: 412d–413c.
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to the problem that Plato has Parmenides bring to bear on the young
‘Socrates’ in this dialogue. A glimpse into what the beginning of that answer must have been comes in The Sophist. I will start with the Parmenides.
In order to provide an example of the method young Socrates
should follow in investigating his own philosophical problems,
Parmenides sets about to examine whether or not his idea of
the existence of “the One” withholds tight scrutiny. To this effect,
Parmenides engages in three main arguments. The first two concern
the existence of the One, and the third its non-existence.
In the first argument Parmenides demonstrates that a true
(simple) unity such as the One must not have parts and cannot be
spatial or have place; can be neither in motion nor at rest; neither
the same as or different from itself or anything else, nor equal to,
greater or less than itself; as it is immeasurable it also cannot have anything whatsoever to do with Time; because it is not within Time
and so neither comes to be nor passes away, we can not even say that
it ‘is’, therefore neither can it be the object of knowledge nor can it be spoken of.20
In the second argument Parmenides demonstrates the
consequences of positing that the One as a truly simple unity does,
in fact, exist or ‘have being.’ If this is so then the One is both like and unlike other things (the many) and itself; it both touches and does
not touch itself and the many; it is at once equal to, greater than, and less than itself and the many; in respect to Time it is both becoming
older and younger than itself at the same time as it neither becomes
older nor younger than itself, and it would be both younger and older
than the many and at once neither younger nor older than them.21
Parmenides goes on to explain that in this case the One would undergo all of these transitions between seemingly contradictory
conditions in a certain timeless “instant” (i.e. the moment) that
always endures between and beyond the contradictory states. It is
out from within and back into this instant “situated between the
20 Ibid.,
Parmenides: 137d–142a.
21 Ibid., 142b–155a.
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motion and the rest” that the One “passes from being in existence to
ceasing to exist or from being nonexistent to coming into existence”
and “from one to many or from many to one”, etc...22
If the many were ‘parts’ of ‘the whole’ that is the One, the latter would bring the many into being through giving each thing its
cohering unity by limiting (the being of) unlimitedness. Thus the
many would come to be like each other in respect of their original unlimited nature but unlike each other in the contrary characteristics they are allowed to possess by each having a distinct unity from the
others.23 However, since no true “one” (i.e. - an irreducibly simple
unity) can ever have ‘parts’, the One and the Many are total y distinct.
Thus the many’s unlimitedness cannot be tamed by the coherence of
unity and therefore ‘the many’ cannot exist at all because for there
to be two or three things, each of them has to first be one thing, but the simple nature of the One refuses the many participation in its
quality of oneness.24
The point that Plato makes by juxtaposing these two arguments
is that if we want to preserve the validity of the relative concepts
by which we comprehend and judge the world, we cannot admit –
either in thought or speech – that the One has being or is. For if we do admit that there is a One, then in light of its reality all that seems evidently true and logical of our world is in fact reduced to an unreal il usion.
The dialogue now goes on to examine the consequences of
denying that the One is. Before doing so Parmenides makes clear that by saying the One “is-not” we mean that it is (has Being) in no-way whatsoever (and not that it is in one way but not in another).25 In that case it will be as void of measure, without quality and impossible to think on or discourse over, as the One was shown to be according
to the first argument above. In consequence it would seem that since
the many could not partake of its unity because it exists in no way at 22 Ibid., 156c–157b.
23 Ibid., 158d–159b.
24 Ibid., 159c–160b.
25 Ibid., 163c.
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al , everything in the world – while appearing to be distinct – will on closer examination col apse into infinite divisibility.26 Parmenides
then corrects himself to say that in fact the situation would be
still more dire than this, because even a semblance of a ‘many’ is
inconceivable without there being a One. So if the One is not, then everything else is also no-thing. 27 Plato concludes the dialogue with these words from the mouth of Parmenides: “Thus in sum, we may
conclude, if there is no one, there is nothing at al .”28
In the conclusion of this dialogue we see the problem that
Parmenides’ philosophy must have po
sed for Plato. He has
tremendous, even “awful”, reverence for Parmenides and explicitly
says so himself through the mouth of Socrates on several occasions
in his dialogues. He follows Parmenides in his idealist reaction
against Heracliteanism by using the power of the mind over and
against the senses. However, he is not satisfied with Parmenides’
stark insistence that there is either Being, conceived of as Oneness
without distinction, or utter Nothingness. Plato needs to find some
way of accounting for the semblance of the world of Becoming while still subjugating it to an ideal realm of Being so as to secure the
possibility of rational knowledge. Though many scholars allege that
the Sophist is one of Plato’s later dialogues, in it Plato portrays what must have been the first step on his way to the Theory of Forms by
reinterpreting the meaning of Nothingness in Parmenides.
The dramatic context of The Sophist is that Socrates and a couple of friends are aquatinted with a ‘stranger’ from Elea who belongs
to Parmenides and Zeno’s school. Together with this ‘stranger’
Socrates and friends, mainly Theaetetus, seek to discover the nature
of the practitioners of sophistry and deceptive rhetoric that were
often hired by the wealthy of Athens – especial y as tutors for their
children or as legal counsel. This allows Plato to once again vent his contempt for a traditional enemy of his project. The main argument
of the dialogue begins when Parmenides’ claim that ‘ what-is-not
26 Ibid., 164d–165c.
27 Ibid., 165e.
28 Ibid., 166b.
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never is’ is stated and there is a proposal to investigate its truth.
Socrates asks for the concrete signified of the signifier “that which
is not”. The ‘stranger’ explains that this cannot be “something” so a
person who talks about it is not real y saying anything at al . One
could say that it is even “unthinkable”. In light of this, the dialogue’s own pursuit seems self-contradictory.29 Semblances are offered as
a compelling example suggesting that what-is-not has some sort of
being.
It is at this point that Plato makes explicit his chief concern,
which as in his attacks on Heracliteanism, is to secure the possibility of rational knowledge. The participants realize that if any judgment