4:34, where men and women have different but reciprocal obligations
in respect to each other, is clearly set forth as the Islamic ideal. It is a precept of the Quran, a guidance in life, and the Quran says that these are eternal y valid, inscribed as they are on an imperishable
heavenly tablet and merely translated into Arabic (see below).
Barlas quotes and refers to Wadud’s most ridiculous assertion
that daraba in this verse may not refer to hitting a wife at al . She cites several other possible meanings given by other, no doubt
contemporary, interpreters. Her aim in doing so is to be able to
conclude her interpretation of 4:34 by suggesting that the verse
should be de-emphasized in a reading of the Quran due to its murky ambiguity, as testified to by a variety of divergent readings. In fact, the ‘different’ views on daraba she offers are not many, and they all actual y boil down to the same alternative translation of the word as
“confinement”.20 Unbeknown to Barlas, this actual y runs counter to
her aim in making the verse sound more lenient. Logical y, a man
cannot subject his wife to house arrest without using physical force.
If a wife, so unruly that reasoning with her and shunning her has no
effect, wishes to leave her house she can, and probably would, simply
walk out no matter what her husband tel s her. For house- arrest to real y work under these circumstances, a man would have to apply
much more physical force against his wife than if he were merely ‘to
hit’ her along the line of the traditional interpretation of daraba.
Final y, because even Barlas realizes that daraba in verse 4:34
probably does mean ‘to hit’ (though much more grudgingly than
Wadud) she says without any citation that “tradition holds” that
it is not supposed to inflict pain and is thus only symbolic. Her
appeal to tradition here, when she whol y rejects the ‘traditional’
interpretation of this verse as well as traditional methods of
interpretation altogether, is hypocritical.
19 Ibid., 187.
20 Ibid., 188-189.
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Like Wadud, she also argues that it was a restriction on already
severe and liberal battery of women by their husbands and could
not have been permission, given the social-historical context of
seventh century Arabia. She claims that it was an injunction aimed
at a less civilized society and that we who are ‘more civilized’ should not use it as an allowance.21 As we stated above, seventh century
Arabia can be used as a straw-man to prop up many different and
contradictory arguments, since there is little objective social history of the pre-Islamic era. Also, the concept of a historical progression
in ‘civilization’ is one born of the Western enlightenment and is
not only absent from the Quranic world-view, but profoundly
contradicts it.
As we have seen Wadud and Barlas’ interpretations are very
unsound. Their reinterpretations of specific words like qanitat,
nushuz and bi, to which they devote much attention, are questionable from a linguistic point of view given the context of the passage as a
whole, a context which Barlas explicitly ignores by refusing to treat a whole and important phrase in the verse that would compromise her
argument. Beyond these details, Wadud and Barlas share two major
biases in common that prevent them from engaging in viable tafsir.
The first of these is that as a matter of principle God, being
“God” (whatever that means), inherently cannot subordinate
women in human society. We see this when Wadud explains that
she is “calling for a reading that regards [the] reforms [of the Quran]
as establishing precedent for continual development toward a just
social order,” and then adds “[a] comprehensive just social order
not only emphasizes fair treatment of women, but also includes
women as agents, responsible for contributing to all matters of
relevance to human society.”22 Barlas writes, even more strikingly,
in a phrase that discredits her entire endeavor at its outset: “At the very least, we should be willing to agree that ‘theological y speaking, whatever diminishes and denies the full humanity of women must
be presumed not to reflect the divine or an authentic relation to 21 Ibid., 188.
22 Wadud,
Qur’an and Woman, xiii.
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the divine.’”23 These statements show that Wadud and Barlas are
approaching the Quran with the preconceived demand that it must accommodate the equality of women, because only that would be
fitting of a religious message from God. Of course, this also involves a notion of God and Divine Justice that is not drawn from the Quran but is preconceived by these two women who are, admittedly, not
even open to the possibility of finding that the Muslim divinity,
Al ah, could be otherwise than they wish him to be.
In fact, a very strong case can be made that Al ah does view the
subordination of women to men as Just and Natural. There are many
verses other than 4:34 that suggest this. In 4:11 a woman is given the right to only half of the inheritance entitled to a man. In 2:223 men
are told that they may sleep with their women whenever it pleases
them to do so. In 43:15-18 and 53:27 the notion of female divinity is ridiculed and in the same breath the idea that male heirs are
more desirable than female children is sanctioned. Verses 78:31-33;
55:54-66; 56:35-38; 52:19-20; and 37:40 all objectify women as sexual
playthings for men in paradise, while there is never any mention in
the Quran of heavenly sexual consorts for women. 2:282 requires two female witnesses to compensate for the lack of only one of two
prescribed male witnesses at a legal proceeding, on account of the
feeblemindedness of women. 23:1-6 allows a man to have sexual
relations with as many slave women as he has seized in battle (in
addition to his legal wives), whereas a woman is the sole sexual
possession of her lawful husband. Verse 2:222 burdens women with
the stigma of being ritual y unclean during their monthly menstrual
cycle, which, given Islam’s code of ritual purity, prevents them from
religious leadership. Verse 4:16 enjoins men to confine women
convicted of adultery to their houses until death overtakes them, but
the same verse says that adulterous men (which interestingly is only
homosexual y conceived) should be let alone if they repent after a
corrective punishment.
Wadud and Barlas would attempt to explain away as many of
these incidents as they could by claiming that the Quran was in each 23 Barlas,
“Believing Women” in Islam, 19 my emphasis.
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case intending to ameliorate an already deplorable social situation in pre-Islamic Arabia. The argument is that the Quran showed restraint in the degree of its ‘progressive’ reforms so that they would not be
rejected altogether by such a society. Wadud writes: “With regard to
some practices, the Quran seems to have remained neutral: social patriarchy, marital patriarchy, economic hierarchy, the division of
labour between males and females within a particular family.”24 She
goes on to explain that women activists who question this neutrality
basical y do not realize that while the Quran is
concerned with
“consciousness raising with regard to women” this is only one of its
concerns, and some other ones are more important.
This claim does not hold at al . The Quran’s message does not
simply involve an evolutionary “consciousness raising”. It did
confront seventh century Arabia with impossibly sudden and radical
demands for social change. These include the total eradication of
the society’s centuries-old religious polytheism by the sword, the
dismantling of tribal order and relationships in favor of a universal
Muslim brotherhood, the restructuring of the Arabian peninsula’s
economic system, and the demand to accept dogmas that were
total y ridiculous to most pre-Islamic Arabs, such as the Day of
Judgment and the resurrection from the dead. Any God that would
consider these priorities above the total liberation of women from
subordination to men, is in effect sanctioning their subordination.
The second bias that Wadud and Barlas share in common is
the belief that: as a matter of principle, the Quran being a “divine”
text (whatever that means), must be ‘cultural y and historical y
transcendent’ in such a way that it accommodates the progressively
“changing needs and requirements of developing civilizations
worldwide”.25 Barlas echoes this statement by Wadud when she
defines her opponents as believing that “the Quran’s meanings
have been fixed once and for all as immutably patriarchal and …
one cannot develop a new way of reading it that incorporates
theories and insights that have matured twelve or so centuries after
24 Wadud,
Qur’an and Woman, 9.
25 Ibid., 77-78.
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its own advent.” She then defines her own task as finding out “how
the Quran’s teachings address or accommodate ideas we find to be
true or compelling today.”26 As believing Muslims, neither Wadud
nor Barlas, deny that there are eternal verities in the Quran and that it is historical y transcendent. However, they believe that eternal
verities are to be found by subtracting any perceived reflection of the historical context in which an injunction was revealed from the
essence of the injunction itself. For them, the text transcends history by allowing one to implement this extracted essence in a radical y
different cultural and historical context where it would concretely
manifest itself as a different practice, but supposedly one ‘with the same spirit’.
In fact, the claim Barlas cites as the position of her opponents,
namely, that of the eternal validity of Quranic decrees in their
specificity, is emphatical y and repeatedly declared by the Quran
itself. Wadud and Barlas do not realize that ‘historical transcendence’
does not mean ‘historical adaptability’, in fact, it means its opposite.
According to the Quran itself this ‘transcendence’ means that human society, at all times in history, and irrespective of different pre-Islamic or non-Islamic cultures, must accommodate the divinely
ordained culture of the Quran – not the other way around.
The Quran takes great pains to make clear that its injunctions are perfect, eternal y valid, and are to be followed without any
alteration. Verses 6:114-116 depict the Quran as a perfect and complete guide to life that should be followed over the opinions of
the majority of people in the world: “Should I seek a judge other
than God when it is he who has revealed the Book for you with all
its precepts? Those to whom we gave the scriptures know that it is
the truth revealed by your Lord. Therefore have no doubts. Perfected
are the words of your Lord in truth and justice. None can change
his words. If you obeyed the greater part of those on earth, they
would lead you away from God’s path.” Verses 43:2 and 85:21-22 both
clearly state that the Quran is a literal transcript of an “eternal book”
inscribed on an “imperishable tablet” in God’s keeping: “We have
26 Barlas, “Believing Women” in Islam, 25.
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revealed the Koran in the Arabic tongue that you may understand
its meaning. It is a transcript of the eternal book in Our keeping,
sublime, full of wisdom”;27 “Surely this is a glorious Koran, inscribed on an imperishable tablet”.28 The description of the revealed Quran as a “transcript” of the imperishable Quran and of its translation into Arabic (from some verses in another, perhaps universal,
language) makes clear that the eternal Quran includes the specific injunctions of the revealed text in a more or less verbatim manner
and not simply some abstract ‘essential spirit’ or ‘vision of justice’. If one has any remaining doubt as to the eternal validity of the verses
of this book inscribed on the heavenly tablet and merely translated
for Muhammad, verses 86:12-14 leave us with no doubt: “By the sky
that thunders, by the earth that splits, this [Qur’an] is a word once
and for al , not meant lightly.” Verse 2:85 insists that the Quran must be followed in the entirety of its injunctions: “Can you believe in
one part of the Scriptures and deny another? Those of you that act
thus shall be rewarded with disgrace in this world and with grievous
punishment on the Day of Resurrection.” This condemnation for
heresy by selective belief is echoed by verses 2:174-177: “Those that
to gain some paltry end shall swallow nothing but fire into their
bellies…That is because God has revealed the Book with the truth;
those that disagree about it are in extreme schism.”
Final y, Muhammad’s last revelation in verse 5:3: “This day I
have perfected your religion for you and completed My favour to
you,” means that Islam, as defined by the content of the Quran, was perfected at that time in such a way that any historical evolution
in Muslim practices along the lines desired by Wadud and Barlas
is ruled out. When Muhammad addressed his followers in 632
CE at Ghadir Khumm with this final ayeh, the ‘spirit of Islam’ was already completely embodied by the Quran’s injunctions on the just life and the practice of piety. To suggest otherwise is blasphemous
“innovation” ( bida’). In this light, we see that the lines along which 27 Dawood,
The Koran, 43:2.
28 Ibid., 85:21-22.
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Ibn Kathir and Maududi interpret verse 4:34 are much more sound
than the approach of Wadud and Barlas. I have not critiqued their
readings because I find them both in harmony with each other and
with the Quranic text. Ibn Kathir and Maudidi both claim that 4:34
involves the ideas that: a) women are subordinate to men; b) men
are therefore responsible for being their protectors and sustainers; c) women, in turn, owe their male guardians obedience; d) disobedient women are to be first rebuked, then shunned and final y beaten, but only lightly; e) if they return to obedience, or are obedient, women should never be harassed by their husbands.
Given the many verses of the Quran cited above as support for women’s subordination by God and the non-evolutionary nature of
Islam evidenced by many other verse citations above, I believe that
this is the most convincing r
eading of verse 4:34. Moreover, both Ibn
Kathir (and surprisingly) Maududi use hadith material not only to support the subordination of women, which is not necessary in light
of the Quranic material I have cited, but also to make clear that the
‘beating’ referred to by the verse should be mild and avoid the face.
This is not a conclusion that can be drawn from the verse itself or the greater context of the Quran. Thus, when Wadud and Barlas reject the use of hadith, they are compromising the little possibility that exists for lessening the plight of Muslim women – especial y given
that their alternative readings and methods are an embarrassing
failure if not a self-conviction of blasphemy.
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A CRITIQUE OF SHIITE ESOTERICISM
In the very words of its title, Mahmoud Ayoub’s essay
“the Speaking Qur’an and the Silent Qur’an” sums up
the basic principle of Shiite tafsir (interpretation) of the
Quran. Shiites believe that their holy book possesses an
esoteric inner dimension beyond its exoteric dogmas and decrees,
a dimension whose interpretation is entrusted to infallible spiritual
leaders known as the Imams. I do not believe that this esotericism withstands an examination in light of the Quran’s own claims
concerning its nature and its relationship with those to whom it was
revealed.
Ayoub begins by discussing the Shiite belief that when the Quran
was revealed to Muhammad, so too was its proper exegesis ( tafsir).
While Muhammad openly taught the Quran itself to the masses, he secretly taught its exegesis to his son in law and cousin ‘Ali.1 Some
even believe that ‘Ali literal y wrote down this secret commentary
along with the text of the Quran, and passed this work down to his successors, the Imams. The supposed ‘complete Quran’ is now in hiding with the Twelfth Imam.2 According to Shiites, ‘Ali was chosen
for the role of successor by God, and Muhammad was initial y
informed of this during his miraj to heaven by a voice from beneath 1 Mahmoud Ayoub, “The Speaking Qur’an and the Silent Qur’an” in Approaches to the History of the Interpretation of the Quran, Andrew Rippin Ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 178.
2 Ibid., 182.
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God’s throne.3 However, Muhammad feared his companions’
reaction to ‘Ali being appointed as his successor, so he suppressed