Alexander

  phalanx.

  Once Alexander was awakened the Macedonian army was marshaled in the most complex

  formation used thus far. The tactical requirements of the situation demanded no less.

  On the right wing was the Companion cavalry, led by the Royal Squadron in front, and commanded

  by Cleitus the Black. Parmenio’s son Philotas was the general officer in charge. The shock troops

  ( agema) of the Guards were closest to the Companion cavalry, supported by the rest of the Guards

  units who were commanded by Nicanor, another son of Parmenio. Next were the infantry battalions

  commanded successively by Coenus, Perdiccas, Meleager, Polyperchon, and Simmias.

  The left of the Macedonian line was held by the infantry battalion of Craterus, who also

  commanded the entire left of the phalanx. Next to them came the allied cavalry under Erigyius and

  next to them, on the left wing, the Thessalian cavalry commanded by Philip. Parmenio was the overall

  commander of the Macedonian left. Close around him were the mounted troops of Pharsalus, the best

  and most numerous of the Thessalian cavalry. Crucially, behind the front line was a reserve phalanx

  formation. The officers of this formation had orders to face about and meet any attack coming from the

  rear.

  Half of the Agrianes under Attalus, and the Macedonian archers under Brison were thrown forward

  at an oblique angle on the right wing next to the Royal Squadron of the Companion cavalry in case it

  was necessary to extend or close up the front line of infantry. Next to the archers were the “Old

  Guard” of mercenaries under Cleander.

  In advance of these units were posted prodromoi and the Paeonians under Aretes and Ariston. At

  the very front of the oblique formation on the right wing was the Greek mercenary cavalry under

  Menidas. He and his men had orders to wheel about at an angle and attack the enemy flank if the

  enemy tried to ride around their wing.

  In front of the Royal Squadron of the Companion cavalry were half of the Agrianes and archers,

  supported by Balacrus’ javelin men, who were posted opposite the Persian scythed chariots.

  On Alexander’s far left, forming another oblique angle to his front, were the Thracian javelin men

  under Sitalces, supported by the allied cavalry under Coeranus, and then the Odrysian cavalry under

  Agathon. At the front of this section were the foreign mercenary cavalry commanded by

  Andromachus. Thracian infantry guarded the pack animals. Alexander’s entire army totaled 7,000

  cavalry and about 40,000 infantry.

  His battle order obviously was set in order to deal with the Persian numerical superiority and the

  likelihood of being outflanked on the right or the left or on both wings. Thus, Alexander and his staff

  presented Darius and the Persian army with a kind of rectangle or tactical square, designed to repel

  attacks on all four sides. It was a brilliant adaptation to the situation facing the Macedonians.

  THE BATTLE OF GAUGAMELA

  Before the two armies met, Alexander gave a long address to the Thessalians and the other Hellenes,

  who shouted for him to lead them against the barbarians. Alexander realized that the role of the

  Thessalians in the battle would be crucial. If they broke or were defeated on the left of his line, all

  would be lost. If they held up under the pressure of the inevitable Persian cavalry charge,

  Aristander’s prophecy might come true.

  Alexander was wearing a vest made in Sicily and over this a breastplate of two-ply linen taken

  from the spoils of Issos. The helmet he wore was a work of Theophilos, made of iron. It gleamed like

  silver and fitted to it was an iron gorget set with precious stones. Around his waist was fastened an

  elaborate belt, a work of Helicon, given to him by the city of Rhodes. He carried a sword of

  astonishing temper and lightness, presented to him by the king of the Citieans. Unlike many of the

  Macedonian riders, Alexander had trained himself to rely chiefly on his sword in battle.

  As he had been at the Granicus, Alexander was almost ostentatiously visible both to his own troops

  and to the enemy as he rode up and down the line, exhorting the officers and anyone else nearby.

  There could be no doubt who Alexander was and what he was about to do. Readying himself for the

  attack, Alexander, now mounted on Bucephalas, shifted his lance into his left arm and raised his right

  hand. The king then called upon the gods and prayed: if he really were sprung from Zeus, let the gods

  protect and strengthen the Greeks.

  Aristander, wearing a white mantle and with a crown of gold on his head, also rode along the lines

  and fortuitously spotted an eagle that hovered above Alexander’s head, apparently directing its flight

  against the Persians. This was said to have filled the Macedonians with great courage. The

  Macedonians could have received no better omen: the eagle was the creature most dear to Zeus.

  The proper omens found, Alexander sparked the combat, moving to the attack with the Royal

  Squadron. At once, he was outflanked on his right, and he inclined farther to that side. The Persians

  countered this move, far outflanking the Macedonian right. During this time the Persian chariots

  remained on their smooth, prepared ground. However, as Alexander moved even farther out to the

  right, the Persian mounted troops moved with him, out to their left.

  Alexander’s initial attack in the battle of Gaugamela, at an oblique angle until his right wing made

  contact with the Persian left, was a tactical innovation that anticipated by two millennia tactics that

  would make Frederick the Great the most celebrated soldier of his day. Attacking at an oblique angle

  allowed Alexander to “economize”—that is, to hold in reserve his other forces until he was ready (as

  always) to launch his decisive offensive thrust at the head of the Companion cavalry.

  Although the Macedonian Foot Companions ( pezhetairoi) could be deployed in any formation (straight line, oblique, crescent, or wedge) to suit the requirements of the tactical situation, at the battle of Gaugamela it was Alexander’s innovative use of a tactical square that

  allowed the Macedonians to defeat the Persians despite the Persians’ vast numerical superiority.

  Alexander then ordered an attack by Menidas and the mercenary cavalry against the Persian

  mounted troops. This was probably another one of Alexander’s tactical stratagems, designed to draw

  the Persians into committing their cavalry, in preparation for a devastating counterattack. Alexander

  had used a similar “drawing” tactic at the Granicus, when he had sent Socrates and his squadron

  down into the riverbed to bring the Persian cavalry down from the high ground into the river. If this

  was what Alexander intended at Gaugamela, however, it did not work. The numerically superior

  Scythian cavalry and the Bactrians counterattacked in very good order, driving Menidas’ small

  squadron back, but not into disorder. Thereupon, Alexander put into the action the Paeonians and the

  mercenaries. There a cavalry engagement ensued in which the Macedonians eventually broke the

  enemy formation.

  Meanwhile, before Alexander could get off the level, prepared ground, Darius sent his scythed

  chariots into action. They were met by the Agrianes and Balacrus’ javelin throwers, who dragged the

  drivers to the ground and cut down the horses. The Macedonians let other chariots through their

  formations, to be dealt with by guards and Alexander�
��s grooms. The calm way the Agrianes and the

  javelin throwers eliminated these terrifying contraptions helps to explain why the Macedonian army

  never lost a battle while Alexander led it. Alexander was a visionary genius of warfare commanding

  men as brave and as competent as any soldiers of any era.

  On the far left wing, however, the Macedonians fared less well. Mazaeus, who commanded the

  best of the Persian cavalry on the right side of the Persian line, killed a number of Alexander’s men

  during the first onslaught. He also sent 2,000 Cadusians and 1,000 picked Scythian horsemen around

  Parmenio’s flank to the Macedonians’ camp to capture the baggage. When the Scythians stormed into

  the camp, most of the captive Persian women rushed out to welcome them; Sisygambis, the mother of

  Darius, however, did not. She neither trusted the turns of fortune nor wished to tarnish her gratitude

  toward Alexander, we are told. Less colorfully, but more important, using his superior numbers,

  Mazaeus pressed his attack and the Macedonians on the left of Alexander’s line gave ground.

  But what proved to be the decisive action of the battle took place on the Macedonian right. As

  more Persian cavalry were sent to help their comrades who were attempting to encircle the

  Macedonian right, a gap was opened up in the Persian front. Into that gap, at the double, with a loud

  battle cry Alexander rode with the Companion cavalry in its famous wedge formation, along with the

  part of the phalanx stationed there, straight in the direction of Darius himself. This was the one drop

  —or wave—that made the vessel run over, the moment in the engagement when, as Napoleon

  observed in another context, a single maneuver was decisive and gave the victory to one side. A close

  struggle ensued, with the Macedonians thrusting at the Persians’ faces with their spears and the

  phalanx, bristling with pikes, adding irresistible weight. At some point during this fierce encounter

  Darius took fright and rode for safety. Meanwhile, Aretas and his men broke up a Persian outflanking

  party.

  The infantry battalion under Simmias, however, was unable to join up with Alexander as he

  pursued the Persians; it was forced to stand and fight on the spot, especially because the Macedonian

  left still was having difficulties. Between Alexander’s force and Simmias’ a gap opened up in the

  Macedonian line. Some of the Indian and Persian cavalry burst through this hole and advanced to the

  place where the pack animals were held. The reserve phalanx then sprang into action and dealt with

  these Indians and Persians. Alexander’s tactical square had functioned just as designed.

  On Alexander’s far left, however, the Persians were pressing home the attack against Parmenio’s

  forces. Eventually Parmenio was compelled to send a dispatch rider or riders to Alexander to report

  that his troops were in distress and needed help.

  The hypaspistai (whose name in Greek meant literally, “under the shield,”) were heavy infantry, commanded by Nicanor, the son of

  Parmenio, at the battle of Gaugamela. Its elite unit, the agema, protected the king when he fought on foot.

  But, according to one account, Parmenio’s riders found that Alexander was already in pursuit of

  Darius, and the messengers gave up hope of reaching him. Parmenio and the Thessalians were left to

  face Mazaeus and his cavalry on their own. Fighting brilliantly, they eventually emerged victorious

  against an enemy disheartened by Darius’ flight. Indeed, Parmenio eventually took possession of the

  Persian camp including all of its baggage, elephants, and camels. Alexander meanwhile pursued

  Darius to Arbela but could not overtake him; once again he captured Darius’ chariot, his shield, and

  his bow and arrows, but not the Persian king himself.

  By an alternative tradition, Alexander did receive the message from Parmenio; he at once broke off

  his pursuit of Darius and came to the aid of the Thessalians. Encountering first the enemy cavalry

  already in flight, and then the Parthians, the Indians, and the Persian cavalry, the most numerous and

  best of the enemy forces, Alexander and the hetairoi then fought the fiercest cavalry engagement of the

  whole battle. There was no throwing of javelins or maneuvering of horses. The cavalrymen of both

  sides sought only to break their way through, giving and taking blows unsparingly. About sixty

  Companion cavalry lost their lives, and among the wounded were several commanders. But

  Alexander was once again victorious.

  Which of the “messenger” stories is true?

  The first story is consistent with what the majority of sources report about the circumstances at the

  moment when the riders were dispatched. Diodorus tells us that because of the numbers of the

  Persians, and the thickness of the dust, Alexander could not tell in what direction Darius was fleeing.

  Confusion and thick dust thus prevented Parmenio’s riders from delivering their message. If

  Alexander did come to the aid of Parmenio and the Thessalians, it was essentially after the

  engagement on the Macedonian left wing was settled, and perhaps after Alexander had broken off his

  pursuit of Darius anyway.

  The second version, on the other hand, was created by Callisthenes, Alexander’s court historian,

  who was responsible for developing a portrait of Parmenio as sluggish and inefficient in this battle

  and indecisive elsewhere. So the story of Alexander breaking off his pursuit of Darius to help a

  beleaguered Parmenio should be seen as propaganda, generated later to justify Alexander’s failure to

  achieve what for him was the primary objective of the battle itself: the capture of Darius. The story of

  Alexander saving Parmenio was a fig leaf created to cover over or explain Alexander’s failure to

  capture or kill Darius at Gaugamela and thus to bring the pan-Hellenic campaign to an end.

  Nevertheless, the seer Aristander had been right: before the month that saw the moon’s eclipse was

  over, the battle had been fought and Alexander had won it.

  THE COSTS OF THE BATTLE

  The fulfillment of the prophecy had a dreadful human cost. Diodorus tells us that about 500

  Macedonians were killed and very many wounded, among the latter being Hephaestion, Perdiccas,

  Coenus, and Menidas, some of the most prominent Macedonian officers. Diodorus also gives a figure

  of 90,000 Persian cavalry and infantry killed.

  The risks to Alexander and to the Macedonian army as a whole at the battle of Gaugamela cannot

  be overestimated. The Macedonians were outnumbered and potentially overlapped on both wings.

  Moreover, if they had lost the battle, there was nowhere to hide; for them, it was victory or death.

  Once again, Alexander had understood perfectly the tactical dangers facing the Macedonians, and

  he had devised a revolutionary order of battle to meet the challenge. Of the Macedonians, he wisely

  required only that they do their jobs in their places within his brilliantly conceived tactical square. As

  the battle unfolded, the Macedonians fought as if there were no tomorrow. Although his opening

  gambit (the drawing attack of Menidas) failed, Alexander personally led what proved to be the

  decisive charge into his opponent’s line. Despite what Alexander’s propagandists later claimed,

  Parmenio had fought a crucial holding action against the finest of the Persian cavalry. Although

  Darius’ escape was a major setback for Alexander, the victory at Gaugamela against the n
umbers and

  the odds had left open the road to Babylon and Persia. At the age of twenty-six Alexander had led the

  Macedonians and their allies to the greatest military victory in Greek history.

  CHAPTER 11

  The Sack of Persepolis

  BABYLON

  For Greeks and Macedonians, Gaugamela was a moment of unprecedented triumph. Not since Plataea

  in 479 had a Hellenic army so decisively defeated a Persian force. Yet even that famous victory had

  been achieved against what amounted to an expeditionary force, led by one of the Great King’s

  generals. Now Alexander and his peerless Companions had utterly annihilated Persia’s grand

  imperial army, commanded by Darius himself. After three years of warfare Alexander was the sole

  ruler of the western half of the Persian empire. Darius, still the ruler of its eastern provinces, had

  survived Gaugamela, but for how long?

  After the battle, Darius made his escape first to Arbela and thence eastward by way of the

  Armenian mountains into Media with the Bactrian cavalry, some Persians, the royal kinsmen, and a

  few of the Golden Apples. Media, the homeland of the Medes, comprised the Kermanshah-Hamadan

  region in the central Zagros along the Khorasan road. During his flight the monarch was joined by

  around 2,000 of the foreign mercenaries.

  Alexander, as we have seen, had pursued Darius to Arbela, but was too late to capture him.

  Nevertheless, in Arbela Alexander was first proclaimed king of Asia, despite the fact that Darius was

  still alive. In keeping with the propaganda of the campaign, Alexander then wrote to the Greeks,

  stating that all tyrannies were now abolished and that henceforth they were autonomous.

  He wrote to the Plataeans, too, saying that he would rebuild their city because their forefathers had

  made their territory available to the Greeks in the struggle for their common freedom (against the

  Persians in 479). He also sent some of the spoils from Gaugamela to the city of Croton in Italy. In

  480, when the rest of the Greeks in Italy had refused to help their fellow Hellenes against the invading

  Persians, a citizen of Croton, an athlete named Phaÿllus, had equipped a ship at his own expense and