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Table of Contents
Publishing information
About the author
Dedication
Acknowledgments
USER GUIDE
The book’s main idea
Extended summary
Principal components of this book’s main idea
Qualifications needed to understand this book
PEACE
Transforming aggression into production
Two types of social accounting
What does efficiency mean?
The dividend of the peace of Pareto
When property rights fail
PROPERTY
Enter Pareto
The three pillars of Pareto efficiency
Pareto efficiency as a dynamic concept
Property rights and Pareto efficiency
The importance of transferability
Government planning and Pareto efficiency
The challenge of incorrect information
The high cost of property rights
Enter government
SPENDING
The two reasons property rights fail
Public goods
Prisoner’s dilemma
Samuelson’s rule
The informational challenge to Samuelson’s rule
The median voter model in relation to Samuelson
The tragedy of the commons
The benefits of inefficient government
The fiscal commons
So what about fairness?
Pulling the ideas together
TAXES
Deadweig
ht loss and efficient taxation
The non-linearity of deadweight loss
The theoretical rule for efficient taxation
The competitive advantage of countries that tax efficiently
Refinements to the idea of efficient taxes
The political side of efficient taxation
Regulations as hidden taxes
The Buchanan-Brennan conjecture
POLITICS
What is a political market?
Political competition
Natural barriers to entry in politics
Artificial barriers to entry
Solution #1 for what ails political competition: mobility
Solution #2 for what ails political competition: democracy
The two good things about democracy
The end of politics
FUTURE
Insuperable antagonisms
The challenge of Malthus
Getting there
READINGS