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gold- and- blue logo. The race director’s automobile, which rode at the head
of the peloton and, thus, loomed large during television coverage of the
Tour, bore on its roof a large, conspicuous, blue- gold sign bearing the words
“Crédit Lyonnais.” The STF transformed the fi nish- line area into a marketing
arena devoted exclusively to the Tour Club partners. Each race day, the Tour’s
road crew spray- painted the fi nal fi fty meters of street leading to the fi nish line with large, blue- and- white Fiat logos and placed banners with the Fiat
name at twenty- fi ve meter intervals leading up to the stage fi nish. The crew erected crowd- control barriers along the last kilometer of the course, each of which carried large banners bearing the Champion, Crédit Lyonnais, Coca-Cola, or Fiat logos. Television cameras captured exciting images of the Tour
riders sprinting toward the fi nish line and transmitted them, along with the
logos of the Tour Club members, to billions of potential worldwide viewers.
The STF’s new management also fashioned the Tour into a powerful pub-
lic relations event for its sponsors. At the suggestion of key sponsors, Naquet-Radiguet created in 1987 starting- line and fi nish- line “villages” that served the same function during the Tour as corporate skyboxes in stadiums — to facilitate business networking between fi rms and their clients. The “villages” were
exclusive, invitation- only areas where the Tour’s sponsors welcomed current
and potential clients and other VIPs. In the villages, corporate executives,
politicians, sponsors, clients, television and radio personalities, and famous
cyclists mingled while attractive hostesses served them food and drink. The
STF allowed important corporate sponsors to distribute several seats in offi -
cial Tour vehicles — including one place in the race director’s car — to clients that they wished to impress.107
Finally, the Amaury Group strengthened its grip on the sport of cycling
by purchasing many of the world’s most important races. In the new millen-
nium, the Tour of Spain (Vuelta a España), Spain’s “National Tour,” strug-
gled through fi nancial woes and declining television viewership. In 2008,
the Amaury Group bought a 49- percent ownership share of the competition
from Spanish organizer Unipublic.108 The agreement called for the Amaury
Group’s “Tour Club” members — comprised in 2008 of Vittel, Champion
supermarkets, Crédit Lyonnais, and Skoda automobiles — to become spon-
sors of the Vuelta.109 With its investment in the Vuelta, the Amaury Group
owned two of cycling’s three prestigious “Grand Tours.” The Tour de France’s
ownership also expanded its market share abroad by creating new events in
untapped markets. The Amaury Group created the Tour of Qatar in 2002 and
the Tour of Oman in 2010. These races, held in February, extended the racing
calendar into what was traditionally the European road racing off- season. In
2008, American biotechnology company Amgen reached an agreement with
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the Amaury Group to sponsor, promote, and televise the Tour of California,
a multiday stage race created in 2006. Andrew Messick, the event’s organizer,
predicted that the partnership would help the Tour of California evolve into
a “Grand Tour” in the near future.110
The Tour de France’s global reach also appealed to multinational busi-
nesses, many of whom used sport sponsorship to increase their brand- name
recognition in new markets. During the 1996 event, for example, massive
Asian consumer markets China, India, and Indonesia each received thirteen
hours of televised Tour coverage.111 Tour sponsorship also helped American
companies Coca- Cola, the Tour’s “offi cial drink,” and Nike, whose “swoosh”
logo appeared on the sleeves and lapel of the yellow jersey, to increase their
recognition in existing markets like France. Coca- Cola placed fi rst and Nike
fi fth in a 1995 poll that asked consumers to rank the most recognized brand
names in French sports sponsorship.112
The Tour also remained a preferred sponsorship venue for French busi-
nesses. Crédit Lyonnais valued its relationship with the Tour since it produced enormous amounts of national and international publicity yet maintained its
quintessentially French, provincial character. Crédit Lyonnais viewed itself as a national bank with fi rmly planted provincial roots, since the large majority of the bank’s 2,000 branch agencies were located outside Paris. Since most of
the event took place on France’s country roads, the Tour partnership allowed
Crédit Lyonnais to maintain its provincial character while increasing its na-
tional and international exposure.113
The Tour demanded larger payments from its biggest corporate partners
in return for the special privileges and publicity they received. Crédit Lyon-
nais paid the STF fi fteen million francs in 1987— three times the size of its three- year contract in 1981— to become the exclusive sponsor of the yellow
jersey. The STF- Crédit Lyonnais contract rose to twenty million francs in the
mid- 1990s.114 The STF reaped handsome rewards. Total revenues ballooned
from 70 million francs in 1987 to 250 million francs in 1998. Gross sponsor-
ship revenue rose from approximately 42 million francs in 1987 to 155 million
francs in 1999. Sponsorship contracts accounted for approximately 60 per-
cent of the STF’s revenues throughout this period.115
*
Why is it that the Tour de France retains such power and infl uence in the
world of cycling? And why is it that the event is synonymous with “French-
ness?” Interesting parallels exist between the Tour and other potent symbols
of French culture around the world — food and cinema. As Amy Trubeck has
argued in her history of haute cuisine, the continuing preeminence of French
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chefs, techniques, knowledge, and sensibilities in the world’s prestigious res-
taurants and cooking schools derives partly from the fact that the French have
dominated the realm of elegant cooking and dining since its inception in
France in the eighteenth century. The subsequent globalization of a particu-
larly French haute cuisine, however, depended on the patronage of the upper
classes abroad, who spent their leisure time and incomes developing a taste
for French food and their money on the delicacies prepared by French chefs.
French chefs acted as “apostles of hautness” who established restaurants and
culinary institutes abroad and preached the gospel of French culinary tastes
to eager, cosmopolitan elites in other lands.116 In her history of transatlantic cinema culture, Vanessa Schwartz traces the emergence of cinematic “cosmopolitanism,” or the development in America and France of an international-
ist fi lm culture steeped in Frenchness, in the 1950s and 1960s. “Frenchness,”
in Schwartz’s lexicon, indicates a cinematic style, embraced in America and
in France, that elevated certain cultural symbols, especially Parisian ones like Belle Epoque imagery and the Can- Can dance. The term also encompassed
the emergence of the structures of cosmopolitanism and Frenchness, includ-
ing th
e creation of the internationalist Cannes Film Festival in 1946, the growing exchanges of acting talent and production expertise between France and
America, and the emergence of a global cinematic celebrity and fi lm culture
that accompanied them.117
In the story of the Tour in France and abroad after the Second World War,
one witnesses the culmination of a century- long process that resembled the
globalization of French food and cinema. The French created the model for
the multistage “Grand Tour” that was mimicked throughout Western Eu-
rope in the decades after 1903. Road racing’s popularity spiked signifi cantly
around the world in the television age. Global cycling looked to the French
classic for inspiration, technical assistance, commercial models, and athletic
talent. Although the printed press remained a powerful medium for instilling
Frenchness into the sport of cycling abroad, the advent of television shifted
the Tour de France’s commercial raison d’être, and its relationship with the
broader world changed. The rapid transformation of French television in the
1980s spurred the Tour’s evolution into a televised spectacle funded primarily
by broadcast media. The event’s successful navigation of the turbulent me-
dia upheavals of the television age left it well positioned to exploit the novel opportunities of the global media era and maintain its place at the heart of
world cycling.
7
The Global Tour and Its Stars
Athletes play crucial roles in building and perpetuating global sporting com-
munities. The Tour remained at the heart of cycling’s global exchanges of
athletes. Thousands of riders from six continents participated in the Tour.
The Tour’s stars were among the most famous athletes on the planet, even
at the dawn of the television age. Millions of people around the globe rec-
ognized their names and faces, even if they were not cycling fans. The Tour’s
stars transported knowledge of cycling and its culture across borders and
conveyed publicity of the sport’s sponsors to consumers. Its riders, both great and small, French and foreign, played an integral role in globalizing cycling,
especially in the period after the Second World War.
The Tour de France served as the capstone event of the French School and
global cycling’s annual competitive calendar. Famous cyclists like Frenchman
Jacques Anquetil and American riders Greg LeMond and Lance Armstrong
also served as powerful symbols of the evolving cultural meaning and func-
tions of the event in a globalizing world. Their career trajectories demonstrate the workings of the French School of cycling and the perceived challenges to
it posed by globalization in the second half of the twentieth century.
Tour victories by Greg LeMond and Lance Armstrong,* who won a com-
bined ten Tours after 1986, epitomized the rise of New World cyclists in the
European cycling heartland. Their victories seemed to validate the viability
and vigor of the French School and symbolized the globalization of a quintes-
sentially French cultural phenomenon. At the same time, the specter of drug
use by French and foreign riders loomed. Armstrong’s dramatic Tour victory
* Armstrong was stripped of his seven yellow jerseys in October 2012 when cycling’s authorities determined that he had doped during his reign as Tour champion.
t h e g l o b a l t o u r a n d i t s s t a r s
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in 1999, the fi rst of seven consecutive titles, occurred at a time when doping scandals hobbled France’s “national bicycle race.” The Texan’s inspirational
triumph occurred less than two years after his recovery from metastasized
testicular cancer and vaulted the Tour de France into the mainstream of
American sporting culture and commerce. In France, however, Armstrong’s
unexpected domination of the event fueled rumors that the American owed
his victory more to steroids than to stamina. The embarrassing scandals and
angry, public debates about doping were emblematic of French ambivalence
about the Tour’s globalization. Internationalization of the fi eld of contenders seemed to precipitate declining French fortunes in the race, and the drug
abuse that plagued France’s most famous world sporting event epitomized
the doping culture that disgraced the entire sport. Nevertheless, the drug de-
bacles opened the door for a potential rejuvenation and reassertion of tradi-
tional Frenchness in cycling. The Tour and its French cyclists emerged at the
vanguard of a push for clean, drug- free racing, even as doping continued to
scandalize the race.
1. Anquetil Abroad
In 1964, Jacques Anquetil became the fi rst rider to win fi ve Tours de France.
At the time, Anquetil’s record appeared unassailable, although Belgian star
Eddy Merckx would match the feat a decade later. In France, Anquetil was
not universally revered and often served as the Tour’s antihero. The French
sporting world acknowledged his greatness, but Anquetil nevertheless suf-
fered public enmity for his domineering, calculating athletic style and the
disdain he exhibited for fame and the public’s affections. It is important
to note that Anquetil’s fame extended beyond France’s borders. Outside of
France, press coverage of Anquetil’s exploits — and the sporting world’s am-
bivalence toward them — served to popularize the race, educate foreign read-
ers about the Tour, and instill an understanding of the particularly French
School ideals — a calculating and conservative rider who won races by wear-
ing down his opponents instead of relying on dramatic attacks, dangerous
tactics, or passionate grit. Thanks to the numerous Anquetil antihero carica-
tures, Anglophone readers learned much about the nature of French cycling
heroism and its tenets. Press coverage of Anquetil in Britain and America
demonstrates the power of Tour stars and the media that covered them to
build international communities of fans steeped in French cycling traditions
and ideals.
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British and American journalists became students of the French debates
about Anquetil while living in France and riding in the Tour’s press cara-
van. In their columns, they conveyed — in some cases verbatim — the French
press’s evaluation of Anquetil’s qualities and failings. Early in Anquetil’s career, French cycling afi cionados recognized the young Norman’s unequaled
physical talents and his technical perfection on the bicycle. New York Times columnist Robert Daley, writing on the eve of the 1959 Tour, confi rmed for
American readers the French evaluation of Anquetil’s awesome athletic gifts.
Anquetil employed “perfect” bicycling form and technique regardless of the
situation: “Even in the steepest of mountain passes he stayed crouched over
the handlebars, legs pumping rhythmically, never any wobbling from side
to side.” In part, Anquetil owed his domination of the cycling world to his
unusual physical gifts. Daley reported:
His heart- beat was abnormally low, about fi fty beats per minute. The capacity of his lungs was extraordinary. He had t
he ability to digest enormous quantities of food while pedaling, and to fall asleep whenever and wherever he
climbed off his bike. This, particularly in a twenty- four day race like the Tour, is vitally important.1
Although Anquetil won the 1957 Tour, the fi rst he had entered, French ex-
perts remained unconvinced of the young champion’s greatness. Daley wrote,
“Critics complain that Anquetil ‘does not like to suffer,’ the most esteemed
quality in racers being willingness to punish themselves to the point of ex-
haustion.” Daley compared Anquetil’s rapid rise to glory and fame to that of
American baseball star Mickey Mantle, who won his fi rst World Series with
the New York Yankees as a nineteen- year- old rookie, but questioned whether
the young champion Anquetil had “heart” to match his physical talents.2
The characterizations in the French and foreign press of Anquetil as canny
rather than daring, dominant rather than exciting, dogged the French cham-
pion until the end of his career. In a piece published as Anquetil secured his
fi fth Tour win in 1964, the London Times described Anquetil as an “antihero”
of modern sport who “wins races with cold calculation.” Referring indirectly
to the Puy- de- Dôme duel with Raymond Poulidor that year, the Times explained that Anquetil rarely engages in contests of strength and endurance
in the high mountains. Instead, Anquetil “tends to play cat- and- mouse” in
the mountains, allows rivals to sprint ahead on steep slopes, climbs just fast
enough to maintain his time advantage, and then destroys his competitors
in the time trials, where he was nearly unbeatable. While grand champion
heroes like Fausto Coppi triumphed in the traditional fashion, with aggres-
sive panache and daring solo attacks on storied Alpine and Pyrenean climbs,
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171
that classic formula was not Anquetil’s “way,” explained the Times. In the 1964 Tour, as in other races, the Norman veteran cemented his victory with
a dominant time trial victory in Bayonne at the end of the Tour, even though
he had lost time to Poulidor and others in the earlier climbing stages. The
Times concluded that Anquetil’s overall Tour strategy, based on his ability to win time trials by wide margins, “was magnifi cent, but it was not war as the