taken to Egypt.
While the decision to invade Egypt had been approved by consensus, placing
Eumenes in charge in Asia Minor must have sparked bitter debate and rancor.
Yet Perdiccas had used his authority to overwhelm the opposition, and, if the
Hellespontine defensive line had held, it is probable that none of these latent difficulties would have manifested themselves. Clearly, Perdiccas lacked the necessary qualities of leadership so obviously demanded by the circumstances. He could not
even get his own brother to obey his authority. His leadership style was clearly that of intimidation. When during the dispute in Babylon he was threatened with
death by the agents of Meleager, he taunted and terrified them (Curt. 10.8.3).
Under the pretext of a reconciliation, he had the leaders of the mutinous infantry in Babylon in 323 killed (Diod. 18.4.7; Curt. 10.9.18). Meleager was murdered
shortly thereafter, charged with “plotting” against the regent (Diod. 18.4.7).
Perdiccas had ordered his troops to execute all the Greeks who had rebelled in the upper satrapies on the news of Alexander’s death (Diod. 18.7.5); Ariarathes after capture was tortured and impaled (Diod. 18.16.3; App. Mith. 2.8); the male Larandians of fighting age were all killed, the rest of the population enslaved (Diod.
18.22.2); Cynnane was murdered, in all probability on his orders. Alexander’s
former chiliarch was not a man to be crossed. Apparently, most acceded to his
demands in his presence rather than incur his wrath.
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Upon arriving in Asia, Craterus and Antipater sent appeals to both Eumenes
and Neoptolemus (Arr. Succ. 1a.26; Diod. 18.29.4). Eumenes was promised
continued possession of his satrapy with additional lands and troops besides, and Craterus promised to reconcile him with Antipater (Plut. Eum. 5.6). Eumenes refused the proposal, instead offering to reconcile Craterus and Perdiccas (Plut.
Eum. 5.7–8). Neoptolemus, however, was prepared to betray Eumenes to the
Europeans (Diod. 18.29.4; Plut. Eum. 5.4; Arr. Succ. 1a.26–7). He had moved from his previous location either in Pisidia or in Armenia to join Eumenes ostensibly
to confront the invaders. When Eumenes ordered him to comply with Perdiccas’
orders, his treachery was discovered. Neoptolemus drew up his phalanx in battle
array (Plut. Eum. 5.4). Nepos ( Eum. 5.1) mistakenly places the ensuing battle at or near the Hellespont (accepted by Billows 1990: 65; Hornblower 1981: 6 n. 11, 30 n.
43), but Diodorus’ (18.37.1) placement “near Cappadocia” is to be preferred.
Nepos is most likely reflecting the original location of Eumenes’ forces (Diod.
18.29.3). But, with the col apse of the defense of the Hellespont, Eumenes had
retreated even before the crossing had taken place. It is difficult to know the
location of the respective forces, but most likely Eumenes and Neoptolemus
fought in Phrygia, and most likely in May.
In the ensuing battle, Eumenes’ infantry was defeated, but his cavalry secured
the victory (Diod. 18.29.4–5; Plut. Eum. 5.5–6; Just. 13.8.4).29 Neoptolemus had either permitted his infantry to pursue in a disorderly manner or they had followed their own inclinations, allowing Eumenes’ cavalry, already victorious over the
enemy’s horse and in possession of Neoptolemus’ camp, to attack the scattered
soldiers. While many were killed, the majority laid down their weapons and swore
an oath to serve Eumenes; only Neoptolemus and 300 horsemen escaped (Diod.
18.29.5–6; Plut. Eum. 5.5–6). Eumenes now sent word to Perdiccas of his victory and of his acquisition of most of Neoptolemus’ army; the news reached Perdiccas
shortly after his arrival in Egypt and before any actual hostilities had commenced (Diod. 18.33.1).
After his defeat Neoptolemus fled to Craterus and Antipater.30 While he asked
that both come to his aid, he intimated that because of his popularity Craterus
would be sufficient (Plut. Eum. 6.1–3). As a result, it was decided that Craterus with the bulk of the Macedonian forces would attack Eumenes; Antipater would
continue on to Egypt with the remaining troops (Diod. 18.29.6–7; Plut. Eum. 6.4; Arr. Succ. 1a.27). With 20,000 infantry, primarily Macedonians, and more than 2000 cavalry, Craterus advanced into eastern Phrygia or, perhaps, Lycaonia (Diod.
18.37.1; Plut. Eum. 6.4). Eumenes now decided to change the agreed-upon strategy, which had been to avoid battle. With the forces of the Europeans divided and
with his superior cavalry, Eumenes determined to meet Craterus in battle. His
Cappadocian cavalry had proven both loyal and efficient (Diod. 18.29.4–5).
While, with the division of the enemy forces, Eumenes’ infantry was now equal
in numbers to that of Craterus, it was certainly not equivalent in quality.
Moreover, due to Craterus’ popularity, Eumenes concealed from his Macedonians
the name of their opponent. He announced that Neoptolemus and an otherwise
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67
unknown Pigres31 were coming against them after enrolling new native forces
(Plut. Eum. 6.7; Arr. Succ. 1a.27; Nep. Eum. 3.4–5).
When the armies were drawn up for battle and Eumenes saw that Craterus was
occupying the right wing, he placed two squadrons of foreign cavalry, commanded
by Pharnabazus, the son of Artabazus and Eumenes’ Persian brother-in-law,32 and
Phoenix of Tenedos on his left (Plut. Eum. 7.1). No Macedonians were to face Craterus. Eumenes also gave these commanders strict orders to launch their attack as soon as the enemy came into view in order to make sure that this deception was not discovered until after the battle. Eumenes himself with his agema, his elite personal guard of 300 horsemen, held the right wing opposite Neoptolemus (Plut.
Eum. 7.1–2; cf. Diod. 19.27.2, 28.3). Each Diadoch would eventual y establish his own military units paralleling those of the royal army, with cavalry companions
and infantry hypaspists. In 316, Eumenes is listed as having in his army a personal corps of hypaspists, distinct from Alexander’s former hypaspists, the argyraspids (Diod. 19.28.1, 40.3–4), and companion cavalry (Diod. 19.28.3). Antigenes and
the satrap Persis, Peucestas, had their own personal cavalry guards (Diod. 19.28.3), Antigonus, his own hypaspists (Polyaen. 4.6.8), Leonnatus, had his own personal
cavalry guard, his agema (Suda s.v. Leonnatus), and Alcetas, “his hypaspists and pages” (Diod. 18.45.3). The institution of the pages was borrowed from the
Persians and introduced by Alexander’s father, Philip II (Arr. Anab. 4.13.1). These young men had guarded the king while he slept, mounted the king on his horse,
attended him in the hunt (Arr. Anab. 4.13.1; Curt. 5.1.42; 8.6.4), guarded him while he dined (Curt. 5.1.43; cf. 8.6.5), and during their final year as pages, served with the king in combat (Hammond 1990: 266). The institution came to serve
under Philip II and Alexander the Great as a sort of school for future military
commanders (Curt. 5.1.42; 8.6.6). While often referred to as paides, boys, it is clear that they were recruited as young men, not children (Curt. 5.1.42; 8.2.35, 6.2, 8, 25).
Hammond (1990: 266) reasonably asserts that one became a page at roughly 14
years of age and graduated to other responsibilities by one’s eighteenth birthday.
These basic personal institutions of the Macedonian national monarchy were
being created to serve each of Alexander’s Successors.
As soon as the opposing force came into view, Eumenes launched his attack.
This sudden assault caught Craterus by surprise, for he had been led to believe
by Neoptolemus that Eumenes’ Macedonians would desert. With this pro
spect
in view, Craterus had assumed that at the very least Eumenes would be hesitant
to force the issue. Both cavalry forces rode well in advance of their respective
infantries. In the first collision of forces, Craterus was killed.33 With his death, the cavalry wing under his command was quickly crushed and fled back to
the phalanx. Several different versions of Craterus’ death are preserved in the
sources. In Arrian ( Succ. 27), Craterus is killed by Paphlagonians, but in Plutarch ( Eum. 7.5) the deed is done by a Thracian. In Plutarch’s account ( Eum. 7.4, 8), the dying Craterus is tearful y pitied by Eumenes.
Eumenes’ right was also victorious, with Eumenes killing Neoptolemus in single
combat, also related in dramatic terms by our sources (Diod. 18.30.4–5; Arr. Succ.
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1a.27; Plut. Eum. 8.2). This victory occurred just ten days after his initial defeat of Neoptolemus (Plut. Eum. 8.1). Eumenes now sent Xennias, a Macedonian veteran (Heckel 2006: 271), to the surrounded enemy, who were not disheartened and in
close array awaited Eumenes’ expected attack. Xennias informed the Macedonians
that Eumenes would not challenge them with his phalanx, but using his cavalry
and light-armed troops, he would prevent them from gathering provisions ( PSI
12.1284). The enemy phalanx was now invited to join Eumenes, an invitation
they readily accepted (Diod. 18.32.2; Nep. Eum. 4.3). With their surrender, Eumenes gave them permission to forage for supplies in the nearby vil ages.
These Macedonians, however, after they had collected sufficient supplies, deserted and by forced marches reached Antipater and continued with him toward Egypt
(Diod. 18.32.3–33.1; Arr. Succ. 1a.27; Nep. Eum. 4.3).
If the news of Eumenes’ victory over Craterus had arrived sooner, the entire
history of the post-Alexander era might have been dramatical y altered; Perdiccas might have emerged supreme, the successor of Alexander and the ruler of the vast
Macedonian empire, with the inauguration of a new royal family. The regent,
however, was slain in a mutiny of his own officers two days before the report of
Eumenes’ great victory over Craterus arrived (Plut. Eum. 8.2). Diodorus (18.37.1) states that the report came immediately after Perdiccas’ death. His death occurred no later than early July 320.
Perdiccas’ campaign in Egypt had been a disaster almost from its inception.
Upon entering Egypt the regent assembled the troops and recited the charges
against Ptolemy (Arr. Succ. 1a.28). Alexander late in his reign often called together such meetings whenever he sensed that the army needed encouragement.
Errington (1978: 89–90) has called these meetings tests of the commander’s
authority before he asserted his power. The need for such assemblies is the mark
of soldiers who have been too long on campaign, and who have begun to take on
the corporate mentality of mercenaries (Anson 1985: 311–12). Mercenaries from
the Greek world tended to resolve issues involving their interests by assembly.
This was certainly true of those who accompanied Cyrus in his attempt to seize
the throne of Persia from his brother in 401 bc and recorded by Xenophon in his
Anabasis.34 Another characteristic was seen in Neoptolemus’ defeated force taking employment with Eumenes. That Craterus’ Macedonians did not follow suit is
testimony to their continued national character. While this force may have
included troops who had served with Alexander and returned to Macedonia with
Craterus, it is likely that the bulk of the force were those recruited more recently in Macedonia. It is unlikely that Antipater would have brought back to Asia many
of the veterans whose loyalty might be conflicted when in contact with their old
officers and colleagues.
It is unclear what led to Perdiccas’ calling of this assembly of his troops. It could easily have been grumblings about a campaign to fight another Macedonian
commander and many of their former comrades-in-arms. Moreover, the text
states that Ptolemy personal y defended himself against Perdiccas’ charges, which suggests that, perhaps, the satrap or some spokesperson for him instigated the
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69
meeting. Even though the “many” did not accept Perdiccas’ rationale for the war,
Perdiccas continued the campaign anyway. Perdiccas was not violating any law or
an autocracy (see the Introduction above, and see Anson 2013b: 13–82, 126–9,
160–1) and Perdiccas was the regent, and the campaign was technical y being
carried out in the name of the kings, i. e., by King Philip III, the new monarch
who owed his position to these very soldiers. If Perdiccas was responsible for the assembly, hoping to create enthusiasm for the coming campaign, it was a mistake.
Even with his army’s grumblings, he decided to continue his march regardless;
he had no choice. While Perdiccas was certainly risking a reaction similar to that which forced him to accede to the marriage of Philip and Eurydice, the former
Adea, it is doubtful that he could be reconciled with Ptolemy. Moreover, Antipater was on his way south and to turn around now could have placed Perdiccas and
his forces between two armies. The soldiers, however, loyal to their king and his regent, continued on to Egypt. If Perdiccas had enjoyed success in the campaign,
the complaints and lack of confidence would have been replaced by enthusiasm
in and renewed loyalty to their commander.
Perdiccas’ invasion, however, stalled at the Nile. He was unable to make a
crossing near Pelusium and incurred heavy losses attempting to do so (Diod.
18.33.6–36.1). Moving to Memphis, again his army failed to force a crossing, and
this time 2000 men were lost (Diod. 18.36.1). Indeed, as suggested earlier, Perdiccas may have arrived too late in the year, for there is evidence that the Nile flood had already begun. The crossing was hindered by the depth of the water and its rate of flow (Diod. 18.34.7). During the actual campaign in Egypt, even though many
of the common soldiers had expressed their dissatisfaction with “threatening
shouts” after the second disastrous attempt to cross the Nile (Diod. 18.36.4), in the final analysis it was their commanders, approximately 100 of them, who, even after Perdiccas had given gifts and made promises to them, plotted his demise. Those
directly involved in the assassination were the senior commanders: Pithon,
Antigenes, and Seleucus (Arr. Succ. 1a.29; Diod. 18.36.4–5; Paus. 1.6.3; Nep. Eum.
5.1). This murder took place either during a cavalry engagement with the forces of the Egyptian satrap (Arr. Succ. 1a.30) or in the tent of the regent (Diod. 18.36.5). It also appears likely that Ptolemy had been in communication with the plotters prior to the assassination (Errington 1970: 65–6). The Egyptian satrap was welcomed in
the Perdiccan camp the day after the murder, and participated in a gathering of the conspirators to decide future action (Arr. Succ. 1a.30). He also presented gifts to the kings and proclaimed his loyalty to them (Arr. Succ. 1a.30). In the council with the army leaders, it was decided that Arrhidaeus, who had transported the body of Alexander to Egypt, and Pithon, who had led the expedition against the rebellious Greeks in the upper satrapies, would become co-regents for and guardians of the
kings. Also, the council determined that Ptolemy should address the assembled
army the following day (cf. Plut. Eum. 8.3) to explain the actions of the conspirators, to acquire at least the troops’ acceptance of the act, and to al ay any fears they may have had regarding the Eg
yptian satrap’s attitude towards them (Diod.
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18.36.6–37.2; Arr. Succ. 1a.30). With supplies running short, he assured the troops that they would have all they needed in abundance (Diod. 18.36.6). The speech
was a great success. So appreciative were the soldiers that most wished to proclaim the satrap the new regent, but Ptolemy, true to the understanding reached in his
conference with the conspirators, used his newly found influence to secure
the office for Arrhidaeus and Pithon “without a dissenting voice” from the army
(Diod. 18.36.7).35 Ptolemy may have been reluctant to accept the office because he perceived either the transitory nature of the current appointment, with Antipater and Craterus, whose death was not yet known, approaching, or that the regency
and guardianship were themselves ephemeral.
Even though in Photius’ epitome of Arrian ( Succ. 1a.30) the same council that chose Arrhidaeus and Pithon to be the new regents also condemns the supporters of the former regent, this appears to be the result of radical abridgement. In Diodorus (18.37.1), where the account is fuller, these condemnations are the spontaneous
result of the news of Craterus’ death arriving near the end of the assembly being addressed by Ptolemy. The troops had become enraged over the death of the popular commander (Diod. 18.37.1–2; Plut. Eum. 8.3). While the assassins may have hoped to reach some settlement with these still powerful individuals, the army now passed a sentence of death on all Perdiccans, both those present and those absent.36 Even Perdiccas’ sister Atalante, the wife of Attalus, was slain; Eumenes, Alcetas, and Attalus were among those condemned in absentia (Arr. Succ. 1a.39; Diod. 18.37.3).
The army with the kings and new regents proceeded north to rendezvous
with Antipater. The troops got as far as Triparadeisus in northern Syria.37 Here, by late August or early September,38 what had been for some time general insubordination in the ranks became mutiny. Eurydice, the wife of King Philip, was
its focus. She had become Philip’s wife through the support of these same troops
and her influence with them was considerable. Under this pressure Pithon