nevertheless characterized as úâstra and, indirectly, can be classified
as smçti! They are still given some status as important texts intended
for tamo-yogyas, those who are fit only for darkness, despite being
83 mohârthâny anyaúâstrâõi kçtâny evâjñayâ hareþ | atasteùûktam agrâhyam asurâõâü tamogataþ | yasmât kçtâni tânîha viùõunoktaiþ úivâdibhiþ | eùâü yan na virodhi syât tatroktaü tan na vâryate | MBhTN 1.34.
84 eùa mohaü sçjâmyâúu yo janân mohyiùyati | tvaü ca rudra mahâbâho mohaúâstrâõi kâraya | atathyâõi vitathyâõi darúayasva mahâbhuja | prakâúaü kuru câtmânam aprakaúaü ca mâm kuru | iti vârâhavacanaü brahmâõóoktaü tathâ param |
MBhTN 1.48–50. This same passage is found also in BSB 1.1.1.
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confusing. Even texts that conflict with Mâdhva tenets, then, serve an
important purpose in the Mâdhva theology.85 Not only were they
‘emitted’ by Viùõu, an inherently âpta, reliable, being, but they also help
to confirm the unusual Mâdhva position regarding predestination and
assume an important role in Mâdhva philosophy.
Pratyakùa vs. âgama vs. anumâna
As already mentioned, each school of Vedânta claims that its position
is upheld by passages from the úruti and smçti. How relevant is úruti?
What happens if it conflicts with pratyakùa? Are the three pramâõas
also hierarchically arranged? Which pramâõa is upajîvya, foundational, and which is upajîvaka, dependent?86 It is crucial to the persuasiveness of his doctrine for Madhvâcârya to answer these questions and to offer a
coherent interpretive strategy.
Madhvâcârya gives greater importance to both pratyakùa, perception,
and âgama, scriptural authority or verbal testimony, than to anumâna, logical inference. Not only are all constituents of anumâna dependent
on either pratyakùa or âgama, but anumâna is a means to an end, not an end. Reasoning is not permitted outside of the úruti canon and is
therefore subservient. This rule is found in sûtra 1.1.18 of the Brahma Sûtras itself: ‘And the requirement for an inference is not [simply] from
the desire [to prove something].’87 Madhvâcârya’s commentary further clarifies this point:
It is possible to make an inference [to prove whatever] one desires.
Therefore, in connection with the truth, a distinct inference is not
required. In the Skanda [ Purâõa, the following] is said: ‘As
inference can be used to prove what is desired, therefore, consistent
inferences are desired for the sake of [removing] contradiction in
preceding and succeeding [passages] of the úruti. There is no other
[use for inference].’88
Madhvâcârya contends that anumâna itself is problematic when used
for purposes other than interpreting úruti. It is upajîvaka, dependent, on
85 amohâya guõâ viùõorâkâraú ciccrîratâ | nirdoúatvaü târatamyaü muktânâm api cocyate | etadvirudhaü yat sarvaü tanmohâyeti nirõayaþ | MBhTN 1.50–51.
86 See Sharma’s Philosophy, Chapter 17, for more on this topic.
87 kâmâc ca nânumânâpekùâ | BSB 1.1.18.
88 yathâkâmaü hy anumâtuü úakyate | ato na tattve pçthaganumânam apekùyate |
uktaü ca skânde | yathâkâmânumâ yasmât tasmât sânapagâ úruteþ | pûrvâparâvirodhâya ceùyate nânyathâ kvacit iti | BSB 1.1.18.
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âgama-pramâõa. Madhvâcârya, for example, cites a passage from the
Kûrma Purâõa in order to explain this emphasis on the supremacy of
âgama:
‘And there is no definite authority of inference. Without the
assistance of úruti, inference would certainly not accomplish [its]
goal. The other pramâõa [perception] when accompanied by úruti
and smçti is the best pramâõa and [therefore] gets the status of
pramâõa. [In this way,] no [further] discussion ought to be
undertaken. This [is an example of] reasoning [that] is [good] logic:
“What meaning should be assented to here [given] the non-
contradictions of the preceding and subsequent [in úâstra]?”
Empty logic should be avoided.’ [This passage is from] the Kûrma
Purâõa.89
By giving a lower status to anumâna, Madhvâcârya directly contradicts
the positions of the Advaita school of Vedânta. Úaükarâcârya, as I show
below, purports that anumâna is more authoritative than pratyakùa,
thereby permitting him to reject perceptual evidence that all is not
brahman. Perception cannot be supplanted by reason alone. Placing a
primacy on pratyakùa clashes with the foundations of the chief rivals
of the Mâdhva school. Passages such as this one taken from the Kûrma
Purâõa also remind readers that philosophical speculation is not an end
in itself, that it always occurs in conjunction with properly interpreting
the úâstra and that epistemic reflection is always in service of obtaining
mokùa. Logic is a means to an end, not an end in and of itself.
Given the centrality of hierarchy in Madhvâcârya’s philosophical
theology, one might expect either pratyakùa or âgama to be supreme.
Although both are held to have supremacy relative to their respective
scope, it appears that pratyakùa has preeminence. That is, each has
internal supremacy in a limited range, while âgama is supreme in
matters of dharma and knowledge of Viùõu and pratyakùa is supreme
in matters of mundane reality, the foundation of all pramâõas remains
the sâkùî.90 Recall that the sâkùî is the final judge of the truth of the
89 na ca anumânasya niyatapramâõyam | úrutisâhâyyarahitam anumânaü na kutra cit | niúcayât sâdhayed arthaü pramâõântaram eva ca | úrutismçtisahâyaü yat pramâõântaram uttamam | pramâõapadavîü gacchen nâtra kâryâ vicâraõâ |
pûrvottarâvirodhena ko ‘trârtho ‘bhimato bhavet | ity âdyam ûhanaü tarkaþ úuùkatarkaü tu varjayet ity âdi kaurme | BSB 1.1.3.
90 pratyakùam upajîvyaü syât prâyo yuktir api kvacit | âgamaikapramaõeùu tasyaiva hy upajîvyatâ | AV 2.1.19. Generally, perception would be the foundation and sometimes it is inference. In the case of testimonial evidence, it is the foundation.
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pramâõas.91 The úruti that conflicts with pratyakùa must be reinterpreted such that they do not. The pramâõa that is upajîvaka, foundational, must not conflict with the upajîvya, dependent. If an âgama concerns anything experiential, then it must agree with pratyakùa. This
hermeneutic allows Madhvâcârya to reinterpret and reevaluate úruti
which, at first glance, seems to agree with the Advaita position. In this
way, Madhvâcârya is able to establish his philosophy of realism.
Khyâti-vâdas, theories of false cognition
South Asian traditions are primarily concerned with khyâti-vâda,
theories of false cognition. How does one account for false cognitions in
one’s everyday activity? How could one mistakenly see an object when
one is not present or see an abheda, identity, where there was none?
Are the objects of one’s perception actually there? Each school of
philosophy must offer satisfying answers to these questions. There are
two standard examples for false cognitions that are commonly utilized
as heuri
stic devices by the schools of South Asian thought. One is
incorrectly seeing a rope as a snake. The other often plagues treasure
seekers at the beach who see a moistened piece of shell and think that
it is silver. How and why do these false cognitions occur? How is this
epistemic conundrum connected to sat, real, entities?
Madhvâcârya provides a different sort of account of error than his
Advaita opponents and Nyâya predecessors. It will be useful to examine
briefly both theories before explaining Madhvâcârya’s own.
Anirvâcanîya-khyâti , the theory that the ontological status of the
object of a false cognition is indescribable
The Advaita theory is comprehensive, applying to the microcosmic as
well as the macrocosmic level.92 The errors that we make in seeing individual things on the level of microcosm is the same kind of error
that occurs when we see anything at all on the level of macrocosm. All
perceptions, in some sense, can be sublated. The Advaita position
has been compared to Berkeley, the English idealist philosopher.93
91 sâkùîpratyakùato hy eva mânânâü mânateyate | AV 3.2.55.
92 There are a number of excellent introductions to the epistemology of Advaita Vedânta. See Deutsch, Advaita Vedânta: and Potter, Advaita Vedânta. Many thanks to Vrajaprana Brahmaprana for reading this section.
93 See Berkeley, Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous.
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According to the Advaita position, things are never what they seem.
Such a global cognitive confusion requires that they posit several
concepts and mechanisms.
Perceiving a snake as a rope, for example, involves the mechanism of
adhyâsa, superimposition. A careful householder circumambulating her
house before retiring may superimpose a snake on a rope. A putatively
sat, real, rope is thus mistaken for a snake. After a flashlight is obtained and shined on the snake, the superimposition is lifted and the sat, real,
rope is perceived. But what is the ontological status of the snake? Is it
sat, real? Or asat, unreal? It cannot be sat, real, as it was denied by the rope. According to the Advaita school, it also cannot be asat, unreal,
as it was the object of a perceptual cognition. For this reason, it is held
to be anirvâcanîya, indescribable, neither sat, real, or asat, unreal (see
Fig. 2.9).94
ROPE
SNAKE
asat
anirvâcanîya
2.9 Anirvâcanîya-khyâti-vâda
According to the Advaita perspective, a parallel error occurs on the
macrocosmic level as well. The rope in the above example, like the
snake, is superimposed on something else. The rope and, in fact, all
empirical perceptions in vyâvahârika, everyday experience, are
superimposed on brahman. All conventional perceptions, this book,
your thumb holding the page and the tea you are about to spill as you
read, are superimposed on brahman. And why does this superimposition
occur? Scholars of the Advaita school conjecture that avidyâ, ignorance,
is responsible for false perceptions on the microcosmic level. On the
macrocosmic level this cosmic ignorance is known as mâyâ, the means
to illusion as is illustrated in Fig. 2.10.
94 See the Brahmasiddhi of the 7th-century Advaita scholar, Maõóana Miúra.
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brahman
vyâvahârika
mâyâ
2.10 Superimposing vyâvahârika on brahman
As with the snake, the ontological status of the objects in our illusory
world is anirvâcanîya, indescribable, neither sat, real, or asat, unreal.
This paradox inspires Úaükarâcârya’s theory to be called the
anirvâcanîya-khyâti-vâda, The Theory that the Ontological Status of the
Object of False Cognitions is Indescribable.
This brief summary is not meant to be comprehensive but to provide
a foil for the Madhvâcârya’s abhinava-anyathâkhyâti-vâda, the New
Theory that the False Cognition is Knowing [Something] as Otherwise.
I examine Madhvâcârya’s refutation of the Advaita position below in
Chapter 5.
Anyathâ-khyâti , the theory that false cognition is knowing
[something] as otherwise
Madhvâcârya’s theory is called abhinava, new, because it is a
modification of an earlier one proposed by the Nyâya School, anyathâ-
khyâti, The Theory that False Cognition is Knowing [Something] as
Otherwise.95 The Nyâya School holds that, when one sees a shell as silver then one has contact with a sat, real, piece of silver perceived at an earlier time and in an earlier place, for example in a shop, and then
confuses them. The error is seeing an abheda, identity, of the sat silver and the sat shell as sat, real, when it is asat. But how could such a connection between the silver and the shell occur in the first place? After
all, it is the shell, not the silver, that is immediately in front of the
cognizer! According to the Naiyâyikas, the connection occurs through
alaukika, a super-normal sense relation, fostered by a recollection of the
previously perceived silver that existed elsewhere (see Fig. 2.11). There is a connection with the earlier perception of the sat, real, silver despite it
95 See Mohanty’s Classical Indian Philosophy and Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy for more on this school.
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not being present. There is confusion between the two, the sat, real, shell
and the sat, real, silver from the shop or wherever it was originally
perceived. The result is the cognition, ‘This is silver.’ The error is
negated when the perceiver realizes that the abheda, identity, alone is
SILVER
SHELL
SILVER
(in the shop)
sat
sat
alaukika
2.11 Anyathâ-khyâti
Mâdhvas such as Jayatîrtha, were unhappy with the Nyâya position. If
the realization that ‘this is not silver’ is founded on the negation of the
abheda, identity, between the silver and the shell (that is, abheda is correctly perceived as asast rather than sat), then why cannot the same error apply to the silver. That is, cannot asat silver be incorrectly
perceived as sat? Why is there a need to connect one’s perception to
silver perceived elsewhere?96 Mâdhvas thus question the necessity to posit the connection that occurs through alaukika, a super-normal sense
relation. It is for this reason that Madhvâcârya modifies the Nyâya
theory and derives his abhinava-anyathâ-khyâti, the New Theory that
False Cognition is Knowing [Something] as Otherwise.
Madhvâcârya’s abhinava-anyathâ-khyâti , the new theory that false
cognition is knowing [something] as otherwise
Madhvâcârya believes that error is apprehending sat, real, as asat,
unreal, and the asat, unreal, as sat, real.97 It is thus possible to cognize
96 yathâhuþekadeúâpavâdena kalpyamâne ca bâdhake | na sarvabâdhanaü yuktim iti nyâyavidaþ sthitâþ iti | kiüca rajatasyâtyantâsattve pratibhâso nopapadyate | sthite caivaü sattve bâdhasamaye puro ‘darúanâd deúântare sattvamâsthîyate | doùaduùitaü cakùuþ úuktiúaktiúakalamâtrasannikçùñam api viprakçùñarajatâman
â tadâ darúayatitit ko doùa iti | Nyâya Sudhâ 1.1.1. Thanks to Professor Haridâsa Bhat for this reference.
97 asataþ sattvapratîtaþ sato ‘sattvapratîtir ity anyathâpratîter eva bhrantitvâta |
Madhvâcârya, VTV. I am indebted to Professor Haridâsa Bhat for this characterization.
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the asat, unreal. Error, then, is apprehending something as different
than itself, apprehending a shell, for example, as a piece of silver.
Madhvâcârya does not believe that it is necessary to evoke silver in the
shop in order to explain false cognitions as do his Nyâya predecessors.
Madhvâcârya holds that the error occurs when one apprehends a sat,
real, shell as asat, unreal, and the asat, unreal, silver, as sat, real, as illustrated in Fig. 2.12. There is a denial of the actual existence of the object of the illusion, the asat, unreal, silver, while there is an
affirmation of the existence of the sat, real, shell which is the locus of the false cognition.
ROPE
SNAKE
asat
sat
sat
asat
2.12 Abhinava-anyathâ-khyâti
The cakùus, eye, for example comes into contact with the shell and
then, due to some saüskâra, impression in the memory or defect in the
cakùus, the sat, real, shell is incorrectly perceived as asat, unreal, silver.
When the beachgoer realizes the error, the beachgoer experiences the
realization ‘Silver, which was asat, unreal, appeared to be real, sat.’98
There is no need to stipulate that there is a sat, real, silver in a shop
that the cakùus, eye, contacts. But, how does this theory explain the
confusion between two objects that are similar? According to
Madhvâcârya, false cognition is a result of seeing a sat, real, abheda, identity, when it is, in fact, asat. For example, if one confuses George
Bush senior with his son, George Bush junior, it is because the sat, real,
bheda, difference between the two, is falsely cognized as asat, unreal and the asat, unreal, abheda, identity, is falsely cognized as sat, real.
Madhvâcârya’s position is distinguished from others as he holds
that asat, unreal, things can be cognized. It is for this reason that
Madhvâcârya modifies the Nyâya theory and derives his abhinava-
98 asad eva rajataü pratyabhâ | VTV.
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