to the age-old assertion ‘God works in mysterious ways!’ and just as
satisfying. One may also venture that Viùõu impels the evolution of
prakçti and, therefore, of the universe for the sake of the jîvas. Within this universe, jîvas can manifest their prârabdha karma, create new karma and either maintain or break, their existence in the cycle. The
jîvas are bound by puõya and pâpa both of which, like bandha, are without beginning.6 Viùõu is the actuator for the establishment of the universe, which is the location where karma can manifest, where
suffering occurs and can end, and where bandha manifests and can
cease.
Keep in mind, though, that birth and bandha do not guarantee
liberation. This is Madhvâcârya’s svarûpatraividhya, three-fold
classification of natural kinds, outlined earlier in Chapter 3. Some jîvas, the mukti-yogyas, are destined to erase the ajñâna, to earn the prasâda, grace, of Viùõu, and to be granted aparokùa-jñâna, unmediated
knowledge, of brahman, and mokùa, while others are nitya-saüsârins, destined to remain in the cycle, or tamo-yogyas, destined to reside for
eternity in Hell.
Tamo-yogyas, unable to understand the true nature of the universe,
namely, that Viùõu is the only independent entity and that the universe is
governed by pañcabheda, five-fold difference, will remain in the cycle,
while mukti-yogyas are destined to understand and will be released from
their bonds and will be granted mokùa. 7 Difference occupies the core of Mâdhva Vedânta. But does this difference also apply to the attributes
that seem so to be shared by both brahman and the jîva? If the jîva is different from and dependent upon, Viùõu, then is their relationship
somehow reflected in its attributes? Are jîvas imperfect reflections of
the grandeur of Viùõu? How else does Madhvâcârya characterize the
jîva?
6 atastasya so ‘nâdinâ puõyena pâpena cânubadhaþ | BSB 2.3.29.
7 vailakùaõyaü tayor jñâtvâ mucyate badhyate ... . | VTV. See subsequent passages for more examples of false beliefs possessed by those who are destined to remain bound.
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Bimba-pratimba-vâda , theory of reflection
According to Madhvâcârya, the essence of the jîva is knowledge, bliss
and other attributes that are also possessed by brahman.8 Still, that the two share these attributes does not mean that the jîva and brahman are also identical as they are in the Advaita school. Instead, Madhvâcârya
understands this intersection to mean that the jîva is merely a reflection
of brahman. This is called Madhvâcârya’s bimba-pratibimba-vâda,
theory of reflection. The jîva is related to Viùõu as the pratibimba, reflection, is to the bimba, object of reflection. This metaphor must not
be misunderstood to prove the position of the Advaita school, namely
that the jîva and brahman are identical and that the object and its reflection are one and the same.9 Instead, this relationship merely illustrates the dependence of the jîva upon brahman, rather than their identity.
The relationship between the jîva and the brahman is eternal and
cannot end. To distinguish between the eternal and the temporary ones,
Madhvâcârya holds that there are two types of reflections: sopâdhika,
having an upâdhi, limiting adjunct, and anupâdhika, not having one.
In a sopâdhika reflection some extrinsic object is necessary for the
reflection to occur. For example, seeing a reflection of the sun on a
mirror requires the existence of the mirror. If the mirror is removed,
then there is no longer any reflection. The relationship between the jîva
and the brahman is not sopâdhika, since it is permanent. There is
no metaphorical mirror that can be broken or removed. Mutability,
moreover, would imply that the relationship between the pratibimba
and the bimba is impermanent. On the other hand, reflections which
are anupâdhika, without a limiting adjunct, do not require anything
extrinsic. Madhvâcârya offers the example of the reflection of the sun
through a rainbow as anupâdhika, an unconditioned reflection.10 The seven colors of the rainbow are of the rainwater. The rainwater itself is
considered to be the upâdhi. This dependent and permanent relationship
is intrinsic to the jîva and does not require an upâdhi or any other kind of
mediator.11 As will become clear below, an awareness of the dependence upon brahman is essential for obtaining mokùa.
8 jñânândâdibrahmaguõâ evâsya yataþ sâraþ ... .| BSB 2.3.29.
9 ... pratibimbatvâc ca na sâmyam | BSB 2.3.50.
11 This is a matter of some debate among Mâdhvas who hold that the jîvas itself is an upâdhi. I am reliant on Professor Varakhedi for information about this controversy.
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Kartçtva , agency, svarûpatraividhya , predestination, and karma
It would seem that the individual jîva has no kartçtva, agency, whatsoever, given Madhvâcârya’s theory of svarûpatraividhya, predestination.
Does Madhvâcârya actually propose such a strict determinism, or do
jîvas have some free will? Madhvâcârya addresses this question of
whether or not the jîva has kartçtva, agency, in his BSB and he concludes that ultimately the jîva is paratantra, dependent, and, has no absolute agency, that is, free will.
To prove why, he first appeals to the validity and utility of âgama-
pramâõa, scriptural authority, arguing that some agency is indicated by
the very fact that there is úruti, whose sole purpose is to teach sentients
about dharma, law and doctrine. If the status of the jîva were not
changed by jñâna, deriving from úruti, then úruti and other âgama would be purposeless and irrelevant. Since all of the schools of Vedânta
presuppose the unquestionable relevance of úruti, such an outcome
would and could not be the case. Doubting the efficacy and relevance of
the âgama is impossible for the schools of Vedânta. Besides, jîvas learn about dharma from these texts and are seen to change their behavior
and beliefs thereby proving the efficacy and relevance of them.12 Jîvas, moreover, are also known to seek ways that are conducive to being
granted mokùa.13 Madhvâcârya holds that, given this awareness, it would appear that the jîva has agency, albeit limited. The jîva can and does act.
According to Madhvâcârya, although the jîva seems to possess some
agency, the agency is partial and not absolute. The jîva acts but does
not have the freedom to act. Just as jîvas, for example, do not have the
ability to know whatever they desire to know, similarly, they do not
have absolute agency to act however they wish. Why is this the case?
Madhvâcârya’s answer is that the jîva’s power is limited, while Viùõu’s
is not.14
Viùõu, moreover, grants the power of the jîva. Madhvâcârya likens
the jîva to a stone that is utterly dependent and cannot act on its own.15
Citing from the Mahâbhârata, Madhvâcârya draws another parallel
between the jîva and a marionette operated by a puppeteer, where
the puppeteer is, of course, Viùõu. Draupadi, the epic heroine explains:
12 jîvasya kartçtvâbhave úâtrasyâprayojakatvaprâpter jîvo ‘pi kart
â | BSB 2.3.33.
13 úâdhanâdyupâdânapratîteú ca | BSB 2.3.35.
14 yathâ jñâna idaü jñâsyâmîty aniyamaþ pratîyate evaü karmaõyâpi jîvasya | BSB
2.3.37. alpaúaktitvâj jîvasya | BSB 2.3.38.
15 cetanatve ‘py aúmâdivadasvatantratvât svataþ kartçtvânupapattirjîvasya | BSB
2.1.24. This passage is from the Mahâbhârata, âraõyakaparvan 3.31.22. Thanks to Arti Dhand for helping me to locate this passage.
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‘Creatures are like marionettes [who are] manipulated [by puppeteers].
[Similarly,] He causes the limbs and the body to move.’16 The jîva, then, is not an independent agent at all.
Madhvâcârya also compares the relationship between Viùõu and the
individual jîva to the interaction between a master and a carpenter: ‘Just
as the carpenter is caused to work [by] the master who [alone] has
agency, so too with the jîva. And that power to act [held by the jîva
derives] only from the Highest [One, that is, Viùõu] ... .’17 Viùõu does not arbitrarily assign ‘work’ to jîvas. Though Lord Viùõu governs the
actions of the individual jîva, He does so only according to the yogyatâ, innate capabilities of each. Viùõu is like a master carpenter who does not
assign difficult tasks to those who lack the capacity to do the work, but
instead assigns projects based on the abilities of the laborer. Viùõu is
aware of the limitations of the capacities and gifts of the individual jîvas
and propels the jîva in accordance to its effort and previous deeds. 18
The jîva can act, but, like a junior carpenter, can only perform prescribed activities.
Madhvâcârya’s citation from the Bhaviùyat Parvan is a concise
summary of his position on kartçtva, agency:
Lord [Viùõu] makes [the jîva] do everything only in accordance
with its previous actions, effort and capacity. That [action is known
to be] the Lord’s own [action]. There is no flaw [in Viùõu] and there
[remains without any complexity] the perfect power of Hari [that
is, Viùõu] due to the beginninglessness of the [innate capacity in the
jîvas].19
Madhvâcârya thus posits that the jîva acts in a predetermined way.
Summing up, Madhvâcârya offers a strict determinism. The jîva is
predestined and unable to alter her or his svarûpa, natural capacities, and
depends entirely on Viùõu to act at all.
16 yathâ dârûmayîü yoùâü naraþ stirasamâhitaþ | iïgatyaïgamaïgâni tathâ râjannimâþ prajâþ iti bhârate | BSB 2.1.24.
17 yathâ takùõaþ kârayitçniyatatvaü kartçtvaü ca vidyate evaü jîvasyâpi | BSB
2.3.40.
18 tato ‘prayojakatvaü úâstrasya nâpadyate | kçtaprayatnâpekùatvâttatprerakatvasya
| BSB 2.3.42.
19 pûrvakarma prayatnaü ca saüskâraü câpy apekùya tu | îúvaraþ kârayetsarva§
tacceúvarakçtaü svayam | anâditvâdadoùaú ca pûrõaúaktitvato hareþ iti
bhaviùyatparvaõi | BSB 2.3.42.
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Adhikâra, eligibility
According to Madhvâcârya, everyone does not possess adhikâra,
eligibility for acquiring knowledge of brahman and obtaining mokùa.20
Each and every jîva does not have full access to Mâdhva doctrine,
the source of the knowledge that is efficacious for learning about the
nature of brahman, for obtaining mokùa, release, and for learning
the intricacies of Mâdhva dialectics.21 Eligibility, like so much in the Mâdhva universe, is stratified. Some jîvas are more eligible than others.
Some have access to knowledge that speeds their attainment of mokùa,
while others are privy only to partial or incomplete knowledge. Who
has adhikâra, eligibility, to learn about brahman and prepare herself or himself for mokùa? Who has partial knowledge?22
Madhvâcârya directly addresses eligibility requirements in his gloss
of the first pada, complete word, of the first sûtra, decree, of the Brahma Sûtras of Bâdarâyaõa: ‘Then, therefore, the inquiry into brahman.’23
Taking Madhvâcârya’s commentary into consideration, the expanded
passage reads, ‘Therefore, after having met the requirements for
eligibility, the inquiry into brahman is to be undertaken.’24 Madhvâcârya examines these issues in his BSB and thereby establishes rules and
regulations as to who can and cannot study the nature of brahman.
Madhvâcârya’s rich and complex ontology requires that he determine
the eligibility for a wide variety of cetanas, sentient beings, both human
and non-human. Not surprisingly, he restricts eligibility to a select group
of sentient beings based on gender and varõa, class. In the human realm,
males of the highest three classes who have undergone the upanayana
rite, also known as the dvijas, the twice born, namely the brahmins, priests, kùatriyas, warriors, and vaiùyas, merchants, and a select group of women are eligible to access texts and doctrines.25 The sacred initiation rite is, arguably, the most important eligibility prerequisite for
20 na sarveúâm adhikâraþ | BSB 3.4.10.
21 See Sarma’s Epistemologies and the Limitations of Philosophical Inquiry: Doctrine in Mâdhva Vedânta (forthcoming) for more on the extent to which
Madhvâcârya posited an insider epistemology.
22 For detailed analyses of these categories and issues see Sarma, Exclusivist Strategies in Mâdhva Vedânta, Sarma, ‘Regulating Religious Reading: Access to Texts in Mâdhva Vedânta’ and Sarma’s Epistemologies.
23 athâto brahmajijñâsâ | BS 1.1.1.
24 athaúabdo maïgalârtho ‘dhikârânantaryârthaú ca | ataþsabdo hetvarthaþ | BSB
1.1.1.
25 traivarõikânâü vedokte samyag bhatimatâü harau | âhur apy uttamastrîõâm adhikâraü tu vaidike | BSB 1.1.1. See Klostermaier, Introduction to Hinduism, and Dumont, Homo Hierarchicus, for more on varõa and jâti.
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the majority of sentients who seek religious training. The upanayana
ceremony, investiture with a sacred thread, is regarded as a second birth.
Hence those who undergo the ceremony are described as dvija, twice
born. Along with a number of women, dvijas are accorded the most
complete knowledge necessary for attaining mokùa.
Male members of the úûdra, serf, class and women from all classes
only have limited access to summaries of Mâdhva doctrine that are
conveyed orally and summarily by âpta-gurus, authoritative teachers,
and are unable to pursue a deep study of texts. Madhvâcârya writes:
For women, úûdras and unworthy Brahmins, there is eligibility
with regard to the knowledge [that is found] in the tantras.
However, [they are eligible to hear only] a portion [of the text when
it] is narrated [to them] and [they are] not [eligible] with regard to
[direct] study from a [ úruti] text. 26
What are the tantras? According to Jayatîrtha the term tantra refers to the Pañcarâtrâgamas and other texts.27 These contain different kinds of information about the nature of brahman than the restricted úruti
texts. The members of this group thus require âpta-gurus, authoritative
teachers, for only limited instruction of sections of the Mâdhva canon.
Are these limitations eternal? If one cannot gain liberating
knowledge in this lifetime, ca
n one gain it in subsequent ones?
Madhvâcârya holds that these limitations may not exist for a jîva in
subsequent births. Some jîvas may take more time to gain accessibility
to brahma-jñâna than others and this depends upon their svarûpas,
innate abilities, and previous karma, actions. These abilities and karma can result in a birth as either male or female, in any of the four varõas. A úûdra-woman, for example, who is a mukti-yogya, may eventually be
reborn as a male brahmin, thereby joining the elite few who have access
to brahma-jñâna, knowledge of brahman. On the other hand, a male
brahmin who is a tamo-yogya and acts like a brahmabandhu, wicked brahmin, may eventually be reborn as a úûdra!28
Still, the mobility described here is a matter of debate among
contemporary Mâdhva scholars who argue that the jîva itself has a
26 strîúûdrabrahmabandhûnâü tantrajñâne ‘dhikâritâ | ekadeúe parokte tu na tu granthapurassare | BSB 1.1.1.
27 tantraü pañcarâtrâdi | TP 1.1.1.
28 See Sarma, ‘When is a brahmin a brahmabandhu, Wicked Brahmin?’ for more on this unusual and liminal status. See also Ananthamurthy’s Saüskâra for a fictional account of the consternation and crisis the death of a brahmabandhu incites in a Mâdhva community.
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gender. Some argue that a male cannot have a female jîva while a female
can have a male jîva. The example given above of a female úûdra will only be possible if her jîva is male.29
If one is an adhikâri and can eventually be granted mokùa, what must one do to accelerate advancement? Although one cannot be certain that
one is a mukti-yogya, one can certainly choose to act as if one were. This
is reminiscent of Pascal’s Wager. Pascal argued that it was better to wage
that God exists than not. If one bets and loses, then there is no loss. On
the other hand, if one bets against the existence of God and loses there is
a lot more at stake!30 Similarly, acting as if one were a mukti-yogya is certainly more advantageous than acting as if one were not! What
kinds of actions, dispositions and beliefs must one have? How do mukti-
yogyas behave in their pursuit of mokùa? Can one be granted this highest goal simply through performing the right rituals or by possessing the
right knowledge?
The path to mokùa, liberation