If I were Afghan, especially in Helmand, I certainly wouldn’t be picking sides. Certainly not if the American Marines or British soldiers who were asking me to are replaced every six months, and will be gone altogether within two to three years. If someone built me a school or repaired my mosque, I would undoubtedly smile, shake their hand, maybe even make them a cup of tea or pose for a photograph. But this would be simple pragmatism. It would not mean I offered them my loyalty, much less that I had rejected the Taliban. The nature and detail of this pragmatism is entirely lost on idealistic foreign commanders.
The relationships that exist almost always exist because they have been paid for, which leads to yet another even if. Even if somewhere is cleared, held, built on and transferred to the Afghan security forces, what happens next? Currently ninety-seven per cent of Afghanistan’s GDP comes from foreign aid and military spending, according to the World Bank. If the Afghan government is unable or unwilling to provide for its citizens when they are receiving such largesse, imagine what it will be like when the foreign money dries up. Until then, there is little incentive for the Afghan government to perform, or even behave, if that will hasten the foreigners’ departure and stop the gravy train.
In the years to come, I dread to think what I might read in tiny, two-paragraph stories buried in the middle pages of my newspaper. I fear that as long as we have a few secure and isolated bases from which to strike Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and (mostly) Pakistan – I suspect that this is the only policy to which we are still committed – the Afghans will be left to suffer.
Three years after the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, the Communist government fell to the Mujahadeen. They went on to fight each other, reducing much of Kabul to dust and killing an estimated twenty-five thousand people. As dreadful as it sounds, as things now stand, that could be a better outcome than we have any right to hope for. For western policy-makers, desperate to avoid humiliation, a repeat of the Soviet defeat looks desirable, but unlikely. In huge swathes of the country, the government will not stand for twenty-four hours, much less three years, without foreign support. Every Afghan I have spoken to is convinced there will be another round of civil war as soon as we leave, with no rules of engagement or courageous restraint. They also think that the Taliban may well win. Perhaps the most damning indictment of our intervention is that there are also many Afghans who will think that if there is such a victory, the good guys will have won.
September 2011
I turned regularly to four books for inspiration while writing this one: Jason Elliot’s An Unexpected Light is not only one of the most beautifully-written books I’ve ever read, it also offers an essential portrait of the Afghanistan we never hear about. Jon Lee Anderson’s The Lion’s Grave is such a pleasure to read that it’s easy to forget how informative it is. David Finkel’s The Good Soldiers and Evan Wright’s Generation Kill are set in Iraq but are both brilliant chronicles of modern warfare. When I was in need of a boost, a small amount of time with one of these books got me straight back in front of my laptop. George Orwell’s Homage to Catalonia had the same effect.
For a meticulous account of recent western intervention in Afghanistan before 9/11, Steve Coll’s Ghost Wars is essential reading, as are Lawrence Wright’s The Looming Tower (a history of Al-Qaeda) and Peter Hopkirk’s The Great Game (Britain and Russia in Afghanistan from the nineteenth century). These three heavyweights are such masterpieces that I doubt they will ever be surpassed. For comprehensive accounts of the Taliban, I recommend Ahmed Rashid’s Taliban, Antonio Giustozzi’s Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop and Decoding the New Taliban (as editor), and Abdul Salam Zaeef’s My Life with the Taliban. Alex Strick van Linschoten and Felix Kuehn’s An Enemy We Created and Giles Dorronsoro’s Revolution Unending are also essential. We have no excuse not to have known better. For forensic insider accounts of western policy since 9/11, I commend Ahmed Rashid’s Descent into Chaos, Sherard Cowper-Coles’s Cables from Kabul and Bob Woodward’s Obama’s Wars. To understand how counter-insurgency is supposed to work, I recommend David Kilcullen’s An Accidental Guerilla. Finally, Kate Brooks’s In the Light of Darkness: A Photographer’s Journey after 9/11, contains pictures that say more than all these words combined.
For the ultimate reading list go to http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/09/08/the_ultimate_afghan_reading_list, where you can also subscribe to the excellent AfPak Daily Brief.
I would never have set foot in Afghanistan if it weren’t for the support of several broadcasters. I’d like to thank Karen O’Connor, Paul Woolwich, Sandy Smith, Danny Cohen, Kevin Sutcliffe, Nancy Abraham, Sheila Nevins, Shane Smith, Suroosh Alvi, Spike Jonze, Tom Giles, and Daniel Pearl.
Rupert Chetwynd, Goran Tomasevic, Abe Sipe, and Bill Pelletier all helped me far more than I ever expected. Ismael Sadaat has not only been a brilliant translator, but also a trusted guide. Melissa Pimental stuck with me, even when yet another book on Afghanistan looked like an impossible sell. Mike Harpley and Oneworld decided to back me, even though the market was overcrowded. As copy-editor, Ann Grand gave this book a polish that I could never have managed on my own. My writing was often ugly before she scrubbed it up.
I would especially like to thank the following people, who offered me access to what they were doing long before they had any idea what I would do with it. The British, American, and Afghan fighters didn’t volunteer to enter the Big Brother house, but, with very few exceptions, never stopped me filming or made me feel that there was a question I couldn’t ask. In particular I’d like to thank Martin David, Jack Mizon, Carew Hatherley, Richard Westley, Simon Butt, Christian Cabaniss, Ryan Sparks, Mark Greenlief, Tim Coderre, Ben Willson, Wesley Hillis, and Matthew Peterson. Lastly, I’d like to thank my Mum and Dad, who I know hated to hear that I was going back again, but never said it.
101st Airborne Division, US Army
ABVs (Assault Breacher Vehicles)
Accidental Guerrilla, The (Kilcullen)
Adin Zai
Afghan Development Zone
Afghan Intelligence Service see NDS
Afghan soldiers see ANA
air grenades
air strikes
approval
restrictions
Alexander, Sergeant Simon
Ali Shah, Dur Said, mayor of Gereshk
ALP (Afghan Local Police)
Alpha Company
American Marines see US Marine Corps
amputations
ANA
at Adin Zai
attack on Kakaran
clash with marines
finding IEDs
infiltration by opponents
at Marjah
problem loading rifle
in Sangin
and Taliban weapons
training
transfer of power
ANAL (ammonium nitrate and aluminum)
ANCOP (Afghan National Civil Order Police)
ANP (Afghan National Police)
A-POB explosives
arbaki
assassinations
Baki, Abdul
bazaars
Berwa, Sergeant
Billmyer, Lance Corporal
Black, Sergeant
helping wounded
hit by rocket
shrapnel wound
Blancett, Lance Corporal
bombers, suicide see suicide bombers
bombings
Bosgul, Commander
Bravo Company
bribery
bridges, blowing up
briefings before invasions
British Army
civilian casualties
buildings, clearing
bulldozers
Bunch, Lance Corporal Brady
Butchers of Fallujah, the
Butt, Simon, Company Commander
Cabaniss, Lieutenant Colonel Christian
Camp Bastion
Camp Dwyer
Carter, General
casualties
civilians
soldiers
Charlie Company
chickens
children
in houses used by marines
used by Taliban
Christmas
civilians
Afghans on Americans
bombing
marines interacting with
marines using house
Taliban use of
see also casualties
Coderre, Tim
COIN (counter-insurgency)
compensation
for bombing civilians
for damaging property
compounds, clearing
comprehensive approach
condolence payments
see also compensation
convoys
corruption
Corzine, Lance Corporal
Dark Horse II
David, Major Martin
at Adin Zai
and attack on Kakaran
Dawson, Staff Sergeant Robert
deaths
policemen
Taliban
see also casualties
desertion rate, Afghan soldiers
DFC (Directional Fragment Charge)
dickers
Dickinson, Weapons Platoon Sergeant Brandon (“Gunny D”)
drugs
and the ANA
see also heroin; opium; weed
Echo Company
Edgell, Company Sergeant Major Simon
EOD (Explosive Ordnance Disposal) team
flag, Afghan
flechettes
Freedom Park
Funke, Staff Sergeant
Gates, Robert, US Secretary of Defense
GDP
Gereshk
Gereshk, mayor see Ali Shah, Dur Said, mayor of Gereshk
Gereshk valley
Giles, Sergeant
Godwin, Lance Corporal
Gomez, Lance Corporal
Goolie, Lance Sergeant Adam Ball
Greenlief, Lieutenant Mark
Green Zone
Gregrow, Staff Sergeant
Grell, Lieutenant
grenades, air
Grenadier Guards
Gunny D see Dickinson, Weapons Platoon Sergeant Brandon (“Gunny D”)
Haditha
Hancock, Lance Corporal
hearts and minds
see also COIN
Hellfire missile
helmet
Hennessey, Captain Patrick
heroin
Hickey, Guardsman Daryl
Hillis, Corporal Wesley
homes, demolished by marines
homosexual behaviour
IEDs (Improvised Explosive Devices)
in Kandahar
in Marjah
material of
in Mushtaraq
in Sangin
in Wishtan
infantry see British Army; US Marine Corps
injuries in combat
see also amputations
invisibility of Taliban
ISAF operations
ISCI (Interim Security of Critical Infrastructure)
Jacko, Platoon Sergeant
Janofsky, Second Lieutenant Rich
Javelin missiles
Kabul, attack
Kakaran
Kandahar
Kareem, Abdel
Karzai, President
Khanjar, Operation see Operation Khanjar
Kilcullen, David
Koenig, Lance Corporal
Kuru Charai
under Bravo Company’s control
and Charlie Company
Lashkar Gar
LAW (Light Anti-tank Weapon) rockets
Lima Company
Lindig, Second Lieutenant Martin
Lityinski, Lance Corporal (“Tinks”)
Lloyd, Ryan
LTTs
Lucky (terp)
Lutz, PFC Janos
MacLean, First Lieutenant Aaron
Mahayadin, General
Marines see US Marine Corps
Marjah
marijuana see weed
Massoud, Ahmed Shah
Mastiffs
McChrystal, General
McDonald, Lance Sergeant Jason
McLean, Lieutenant Aaron
Meador, Captain Eric
Mian Poshteh
MIC-LICs (Mine Clearing Line Charges)
military police
militias, local see arbaki
Ministry of Defence (MoD)
missiles
Mizon, Lance Corporal Jack
impact of war
Mohammad
Morrison, Doc
mosques, demolishing
MRAPs (Mine Resistant Ambush Protected)
MREs (Meals Ready to Eat)
Mujahadeen
mullah in Sangin
Mushtaraq, Operation see Operation Mushtaraq
Nascar see Willson, Forward Air Controller Ben (“Nascar”)
NDS (National Directorate of Security)
New Year
Nicholson, General Larry
Niemasz, Marine
Northern Alliance
Obama, President
OMLT (Operational Mentor and Liaison Team)
Operation Khanjar
Operation Mushtaraq
opium
Owen, Lieutenant Mike
Paserelli, Private
Pashtuns
patrol bases
patrols
Payne, Lance Corporal
Paz, Staff Sergeant
Peterson, Captain Matthew
Petraeus, General
Pharmacy Road, Wishtan
Piccioni, Marine Anthony (“Picc”)
PID (Positive Identification)
police
corruption
fear of
military
recruitment
see also ALP; ANCOP; ANP
politics, tribal
pork chop
controlled by Bravo Company
prayer
before battle
call to
PRT (Provincial Reconstruction Team)
Psychological Operations (Psy-Ops) Team
Qadeer
QRF (Quick Reaction Force)
Queen’s Company, the Grenadier Guards see Grenadier Guards
Rahim Kalay
Rambo
reconnaissance patrol
Rios, Lance Corporal
riots see Taliban
rocket man
rockets
Rock (terp)
and compensation
Rocky, ANA Captain
Romo
RPGs (Rocket-Propelled Grenades)
Saed, Captain
Saifullah
Salaam, Lieutenant Colonel Awal Abdul
Samad, ANA Sergeant
Sanders, Corporal
Sangin
Schmid, Olaf
security under Taliban
shalwar kameez
shipyard confetti see flechettes
shuras
in Sangin
Silva, Joao
Ski see Stachurski, Rich (“Ski”)
Slynn, David
Snazle, Company Sergeant Major Glenn
sniper hole, finding
snipers
Soviet withdrawal
Sparks, Captain Ryan
on ANCOP
blowing up bridges
clash with ANA
and Freedom Park
interacting with civilians
Special Forces
stabilisation advisors
Stachurski, Rich (“Ski”)
surge see troops increase
suicide bombers
Sword strike
Syed, Sergeant
Taliban
ambush by marines
attacking EOD team
attack in Zumbelay
attack on Adin Zai
attack on Kakaran
and bombing of civilians
challenge from Psy-Ops
deaths
and drugs
helped by imam
and incident with Charlie Company
life under
marines’ opinion of
at Marjah
and Northern Alliance
organising riots
poor shooting skills
reducing influence of
in Sangin
using children
weapons find
Thomas, Marine (“Big T”)
Tinks see Lityinski, Lance Corporal (“Tinks”)
tourniquets
translations, deliberately misleading
tribal politics see politics, tribal
troops
decrease
increase
Turbott, Corporal Jacob
US Marine Corps
1st Battalion, 6th Marines
2nd Battalion, 8th Marines
2nd Battalion, 9th Marines
3rd Battalion, 5th Marines
weed
see also drugs
welfare packages
Westley, Lieutenant Colonel Richard
Wikileaks
Wilkinson, Sergeant Dave
Williams, Tom
Willis, Lance Corporal
Willson, Forward Air Controller Ben (“Nascar”)
Wishtan
WMIK (Weapons Mount Installation Kit)
Worcestershire and Sherwood Foresters
see also Westley, Lieutenant Colonel Richard
Young, Staff Sergeant
Zeimus, Sergeant
Zumbelay