credit to the freedpeople, hoping they would “take advantage of [the order] to
the full.” Edward Collins believed the policy furthered dependency. “Th
e main
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Violence, Frustration, Yellow Fever
object of the Bureau in my opinion [is] to enable the Freedmen to take care of
themselves as soon as possible,” he wrote. Informing superiors the “whole sys-
tem of contract labor” and the lien policy instituted by Griffi
n was “a complete
failure,” Collins wanted G. O. No. 11 revoked due to the many instances of
“breach of contract.” Collins considered the lien policy a “positive injury” to
them. “Th
ey depend upon the Government for protection where they ought to
protect themselves,” he wrote, “and are perfectly willing to remain in this state
of dependence so long as it eases the exercise of brain or muscle.” A few fi eld
personnel as well as Commissioner Howard were concerned with granting a
monopoly to A. Ruttkey & Co. Some may never have received the general orders.
Although explicitly addressed in the order, Edward W. Whittemore still wanted
to know if hands could voluntarily bind their crops as a lien. Superiors replied
so long as they would not be taken advantage of they could sign a contract
“binding their crops [as] payment for their debts, or for advance.” J. H. Bradford
at Centreville also expressed confusion about how to enforce Griffi
n’s lien order.
Realizing their own limitations, headquarters wanted subordinates to help
“police” the agency. Bureau men rarely shied from exposing those whom,
through their actions, failed the freedpeople. In fact, they had a vested interest
in purging troublesome or derelict men: they insulted those who took their
duties seriously. J. H. Bradford warned about H. S. Johnson, as “there are many
reports that he is corrupt in his offi
cial action.” Bradford’s report prompted an
investigation that discovered Johnson’s corruption (see Chapter 6). Anthony M.
Bryant helped expose William H. Horton at Dallas. Although suspicious of
accusations by whites, Bryant was “fully satisfi ed . . . [about] the source from
which the charge originated.” A few months earlier, he raised concerns about
Hardin Hart, a “scalawag” judge and SAC at Greenville, who he believed dere-
lict. “Hart is a truly loyal citizen,” he declared, “but I fear that he is not giving
the attention to the interest of the freed people that their interest[s] demand.”
An investigation confi rmed Hart, due to his advanced age, derelict and led to
his dismissal.
Of course, not all indictments were substantiated. Accusers sometimes
based their claims on hearsay. Agents like J. H. Bradford, Mortimer H. Goddin,
who could hardly be called a planter tool, and Fred W. Reinhard, who superiors
considered one of the best SACs in Texas, were all accused of misdeeds. Th
e
charges, aft er an investigation or use of common sense by offi
cials, were all
dismissed. As Bureau men became “whistleblowers,” quite naturally, disputes
and squabbles developed. For example, Liberty Bureau agent A. H. Mayer
feuded for many months with his predecessor, former agent J. Orville Shelby.
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Upon entering the post at Liberty in the summer of 1866, Mayer found condi-
tions he “deemed and styled a perfect chaos; order and discipline had left its
Th
rone. Freedmen were running wild, Contracts of all kinds without intent or
purpose afl oat, Employers dissatisfi ed, all wrong, all wrong, and I was called
upon & expected to make all wrong, Right.” Th
rough a frantic work schedule,
comprising tours and crop seizures, Mayer restored order where chaos once
existed. His problems with Shelby were far from over. Mayer soon discovered
his predecessor was still “acting” like a Bureau agent “making contacts for
himself and others.” Moreover, continued Mayer, Shelby tried “to convince the
freedmen that he is the man to whom [they] must look up to, and that I am only
subordinate to him.” He further stated Shelby had threatened his workers that
he would “drive them off ” if they “went near the offi
ce of the Bureau.”
When complaints that Shelby refused to settle with his hands reached his
offi
ce, Mayer issued a special order. Shelby ignored it. Th
is infuriated Mayer.
“Now what am I to do?” he cried out, “make it a personal matter, go out & slap
Shelby’s face, then shoot him [in order to] accomplish the object in view.” Mayer
wanted to fi ne and arrest the delinquent former agent. Aft er that, he would
make him pay his workers, fi ne him again for violating their contracts, and send
him to prison for a year. Mayer’s troubles soon increased as voter registration
commenced. When Mayer recommended their removal, one of the registrars
who was removed, Ira P. Pedigo, a friend of Shelby and a former SAC in Texas,
wrote a letter to military offi
cials. He claimed Mayer was angry he “was not
consulted in regard to the formation of the Board.” With information provided
by Shelby, Pedigo further claimed the agent had received “a large amount of
money as bribes. . . .” Superiors wanted Mayer’s explanation. Th
e “accusations
are false in every particular,” he responded. “I am respected throughout my
District (and out of it) by both Black & white from the fact that no man has it in
his power to say that he ever paid or gave me money or anything else directly or
indirectly.” To underscore his point, he requested a military commission to
clear his name. Offi
cials must have been satisfi ed since no further mention of
the incident can be found in the records. Mayer remained in service until early
1868. Upon leaving, superiors personally thanked him “for [the way] he has
discharged his duties.”
Th
e usual relationship between Bureau men was much better than Shelby’s
and Mayer’s. Far more examples exist of cooperation than to the contrary. Th
ey
had a commonality, a shared experience. Th
eir experience diff erentiated them
from headquarters personnel. Agents never hesitated to call on a fellow agent,
whether in searching for freedpeople’s family members separated during slavery
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Violence, Frustration, Yellow Fever
or in fi nding whites who fl ed to another county to evade justice. Cooperation
even extended beyond state boundaries. Th
ose stationed along the Louisiana
and Arkansas borders cooperated to bring to justice the man
y outlaws in the
area. “I returned from [Arkansas] last evening,” wrote William G. Kirkman at
Boston, “when I went to . . . consult with Lt. [Hiram F.] Willis the Bureau Agent
at Rocky Comfort . . . to secure his co- operation in endeavors to arrest the des-
peradoes that infest [this region].”
In 1867 one of the trials that bonded those in the fi eld was “Yellow Jack.”
Th
roughout the nineteenth century, yellow fever routinely ravaged Texas
coastal communities. A particularly bad epidemic occurred in late 1867 that
greatly disrupted Bureau operations. In the summer and fall of 1867, Bureau
schools had to close for fear of spreading the epidemic. Th
e disease also dis-
rupted fi eld operations. George Lancaster in Hempstead had to cease operations
from September through November of 1867, while Edward Miller reported dis-
ruption of everything in Bryan City, Brazos County. Th
ings got so bad that
Miller had to send his wife out of the county, fearing for her safety. With dozens
dying, Miller dubbed it the village of the dead. Field agents in Walker, Ander-
son, and Galveston counties also reported chaotic conditions because of the
epidemic. In all, one in twenty residents of Galveston would die from the dis-
ease. Th
e SAC at Columbus wrote the disease had left Galveston a virtual ghost
town. William M. Van Horn in Harris County reported that citizens refused to
leave their homes. “I have considerable diffi
culty in performing my duty on
account of the prevailing epidemic,” he reported. “In most instances the parties
who have been ordered to appear before me have refused to do so, unless com-
pelled by force.” In his report for September 1867, Isaac Johnson stated his only
diffi
culty was the epidemic. During the scourge, fi eld agents discovered how it
paralyzed military operations, as post commanders oft en declined to send any
troops fearful of transmitting the disease. Because of the disease, Bureau men
incurred great personal expense. Th
ey had to pay for their own medical treat-
ment when army doctors contracted the illness. On several occasions they even
had to pay for the medical treatment of civilians, including the burial expenses
of freedpeople. Regardless of the circumstances, agents had to protect those in
their districts from all threats.
In the chaos of late 1867, however, some shirked this responsibility. Enon M.
Harris, the agent at Columbus, for example, left a trail of corruption and neglect
in his wake not uncovered until late 1868. His undoing involved the death of a
freedmen’s teacher. While on an inspection tour in southeast Texas, William H.
Sinclair interviewed the widow of James J. Jameson, a freedmen’s teacher who
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145
had died of yellow fever. Mrs. Jameson, also a former freedmen’s teacher who
now lived in Galveston on public charity, claimed Harris had murdered her
husband. She wanted him brought to justice. She told Sinclair that Harris
refused them medical assistance or to call for a doctor when they contracted
yellow fever. According to Mrs. Jameson, her husband died a slow, agonizing
death because of his neglect. But for the actions of a few freedpeople, the widow
further recounted, she too would have died. Still “delirious” with the disease,
Mrs. Jameson claimed her caretakers had loaded her in a wagon and took her to
see Harris, who, she retold, took her to his house and put her in a room with a
pillow and blanket. Th
inking she was almost dead, she claimed, he removed the
pillow. Sinclair was moved to the point of anger. “I have not written one half [of
what] she told me,” he fumed, and if “one half [of the accusations] were true he
would be a disgrace to mankind. ”
Harris, who frequently clashed with Bureau teachers during his eighteen-
month tenure with the organization, vehemently denied the story. He claimed
he did all he could for the couple. Short of calling her a liar, he insinuated Mrs.
Jameson was an unstable and crazy woman. Th
is infuriated Sinclair, who, in
fact, came away from the conversation doubting the agent’s honesty and
stunned at how he had “traduced the [couple’s] character.” “I know them both
[the Jamesons],” he reported, “I would as unhesitatingly vouch for their chastity
as I would for my own sister.” Superiors ordered Sinclair to investigate. He dis-
covered a slew of problems. According to the inspector, Harris, instead of being
a “friend and defender,” was “the reverse.” He also stole Bureau school money
and was submitted false medical bills to defraud the government. Sinclair rec-
ommended his immediate removal, which headquarters offi
cials did.
Aft er his removal, Harris vowed revenge. Blaming Sinclair for his removal,
Harris began to spread rumors against him. In an article in the Galveston Repub-
lican, he accused Sinclair and his brother- in- law, E. C. Bartholomew, a head-
quarters clerk, of being “part of a cabal of evil men who . . . had worked to
destroy the Bureau’s image.” He basically accused the two of trying to under-
mine the Reconstruction process in Texas. According to the accusations, Grif-
fi n had discovered what Sinclair was doing, and but for his death from yellow
fever, he would have dismissed him from service. Th
ese accusations soon came
to the attention of Commissioner Howard, who wrote to Griffi
n’s successor, J. J.
that Sinclair is trying to defeat Reconstruction in the state.”
Th
e Bureau did not escape the epidemic unscathed. Agents paid with their
money; a few with their lives. Th
e disease prostrated many, killing six. J. D.
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Violence, Frustration, Yellow Fever
O’Connell and L. H. Warren at Houston, Sam W. Black at Hempstead, Augus-
tus B. Bonnaff on at Indianola, Patrick F. Duggan at Columbia, and James C.
Devine at Huntsville all died from the disease while on duty (the disease even
claimed William Garretson, although aft er his time with the agency). Some
moved to assist those who “shared the line of fi re with them.” For instance,
James P. Butler bonded with the supervising voter registrar in his district.
When the man died from yellow fever, Butler lobbied his salary be paid to his
widow. He “deserves credit for the fi delity manifested by him in remaining to
complete the report, aft er the balance of the [registration] board [had] deserted,”
Butler wrote. “He leaves a wife in poor pecuniary circumstances and it would be
a great favor for her to receive the amount due him for his services. ”
To ward off an even worse epidemic, certai
n agents sought to battle the dis-
ease directly. Offi
cials wanted subordinates to “render any assistance in your
power to prevent the entrance or spread of this disease.” Th
e agency had engaged
in health and sanitation measures before. During this epidemic, its attention to
disease prevention and sanitation greatly increased (at the time no one knew
that mosquitoes spread the disease). Field personnel, nonetheless, advised about
proper sanitary living and instituted measures to prevent unhealthy and dan-
gerous living situations, like overcrowding. Local offi
cials were more willing to
cooperate in support of sanitary and health measures than with any other
Bureau operations; but of course only to a point. For example, T. J. Krutz dealt
with unsanitary conditions in Galveston throughout August 1867. He buried
destitute freedpeople who died of yellow fever. Th
is was not only inhumane,
according to Krutz, but also a health hazard. He emphatically told local offi
cials
that funds needed to be provided to care for these people, and when they died,
it was “absolutely necessary that [their bodies] be removed.” Krutz reported
people burying the refuse of yellow fever victims anywhere they could. Locals
had deposited bedding from fever victims in a prairie near his offi
ce, and “he
has full benefi t of the infected air.” Besides being unsanitary, this caused a
“putrid and disagreeable” atmosphere. Krutz recommended that such persons,
who endangered public health, be punished. Unwilling to wait for superiors to
act, he sent out “a search for [the] parties guilty of such [coarse] conduct detri-
mental to the laws of humanity.” Meanwhile, he asked for “chloride of lime” as
a disinfectant.
Th
e onset of winter fi nally ended yellow fever’s “reign of terror.” Included in
the September death toll was Assistant Commissioner Charles Griffi
n. He
remained at his post in Galveston despite being warned to leave. For his com-
mitment, he paid with his life. His body was returned to Washington, D.C., and
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147
buried in historic Oak Hill Cemetery. At Griffi
n’s death there remained much