“Th
ey won’t have Negroes & they just as [soon] leave [than] have a Negro as a
man that can take the Oath ‘i.e.’ they don’t want & won’t have either.” To counter
local offi
cials’ moves, he issued an order releasing all prisoners who had been
held for more than three months in confi nement or those who had bonds of less
than fi ve hundred dollars. Gregory Barrett in Tyler had a case of a court clerk
refusing to impanel a jury with freedmen. J. U. Wright, the court clerk, who
“swore publicly that before he would swear a ‘nigger’ as a juryman he would leave
the Court,” further warned Barrett if he continued to insist he would get “his
head shot off .” Barrett desired to accommodate the incorrigible clerk’s wish “to
leave the court,” recommending J. K. P. Shelton be appointed in his place. Joshua
L. Randall in Robertson County was frustrated by one judge who “rendered it
[the order] impractical to empanel a jury” and simply ceased legal proceedings
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126
Bureau Agents, Politics, New Order
for the remainder of 1867. Even Byron Porter, very optimistic about the pros-
pects of the order in June, reported a month later Judge John Ireland, a staunch
Democrat, had blatantly violated the order by “preferring no doubt . . . a white
man. ”
Not all expressed complete happiness with this new course. Some orders
from superiors, particularly those transferring responsibility to local offi
cials,
worried a few. John H. Morrison suggested everything “pertaining to Freedmen
ought to be entirely in the jurisdiction of the Bureau,” admitting “I have to be
. . . leniant [sic] on Rebellious people . . . [T]wo or three come to my offi
ce and
rase [sic] a row at a time and the crowd refuses to obey any summons of offi
cers
to qell [sic] disturbances.” J. P. Richardson predicted civil authorities would
shirk their responsibilities, while James Oakes, although noting “a disposition
to do justice to the freedperson in all cases . . . referred to them by this offi
ce,”
worried whites would believe “the Bureau has no authority except through the
civil courts.” Oakes was not alone. Walter B. Pease at Houston noticed a “greater
diffi
culty in settling . . . claims” against planters for wages due, as they now
“seem to think that the power of the Bureau is gone, and have openly defi ed its
agents.” Even Commissioner Howard expressed concern, until Griffi
n assuaged
his mind.
When fi eld personnel confl icted with local offi
cials, they attributed it partly
to ignorance and confusion with the orders from headquarters. Local offi
cials
believed Griffi
n’s orders transferred all responsibility to them, abrogating the
agency’s power. James C. Devine at Huntsville, for example, who a month ear-
lier noted the whites’ better disposition, had problems with local courts illegally
apprenticing freed children. He informed a justice of the peace that he could
bind out children only “under cover of vagrant laws and even then the stretch of
authority is so great that an investigation by your superiors would pronounce
your conduct not only false in the eyes of the laws, but reprehensible in morals.”
Devine reminded him nothing had stripped “the agent of the Bureau of all pow-
ers” but simply redefi ned them “to be supervisory, except when fl agrant cases of
injustice occur when it becomes his duty to act.” Others had few complaints
with Griffi
n’s orders. According to them, the new policy, along with the Recon-
struction Act of 1867, greatly reduced problems in their subdistricts. Consider
two examples. Enon M. Harris admitted conditions “are good [and] very few
disturbances have occurred during the month.” Later that summer, he again
reported the same, with a few “trifl ing civil cases.” He attributed it to the “fear
of removal,” which had “stricken almost all offi
cials.” In June 1867 Patrick F.
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The Charles Griffin Era, Early 1867
127
diffi
culties as possible, treating [the freedmen] in a manner best calculated to
create a greater degree of harmony.” Th
at same month, aft er seeing conditions
in another section in his subdistrict, he admitted the recent bill from Congress
and the orders from headquarters seemed “to have a soothing eff ect upon the
most turbulent spirits.
Aft er the order, those in the fi eld throughout Texas reported race relations
that ranged from “very bitter,” “indiff erent,” and “apathetic” to “as good as
could be expected,” “honest,” “well disposed,” and “quiet,” if not completely
“amicable.” In a few places, it was nothing short of “good.” To be sure, it was so
“good” in some places they admitted not needing troops. Th
ose stationed along
the Mexican border and the Texas frontier reported such occurrences (mainly
due to so few freedpeople), but more than a few in the interior, especially coastal
counties, reported the same. Seventeen counties were quiet enough that those
stationed there reported no need for troops. Certainty is diffi
cult, primarily
because so many things, such as the eff ect of the Reconstruction Act of 1867 to
the white community’s need for labor to the ability of the Bureau man, infl u-
ence the conditions. But a generalization can be made. Of the seventeen coun-
ties, all but four were located near or on the coast (Upshur, Kaufman, Leon, and
Bosque were exceptions). Th
ese generally had either higher percentages of
freedpeople or much lower percentages compared to noncoastal counties and
the state as a whole. For example, in Wharton and Refugio Counties freedpeople
represented 84 percent and 10 percent of the total population in these counties,
respectively. Nearly two- thirds of the counties in which the agent reported not
needing troops had freed populations either below 30 percent or above 50
percent.
A former U.S.C.T. offi
cer and one of the most respected and longest tenured
agents in Texas, William H. Rock had no troops in his district. Th
roughout the
spring and summer of 1867 and continuing into 1868, the Richmond agent
claimed their presence was unnecessary as long as local offi
cials were coopera-
tive. An Ohioan and offi
cer in the 35th Infantry Regiment, J. R. Fitch observed
white attitudes toward the freedpeople that ranged from “indiff erent” to “kindly
disposed” and “friendly” in Refugio, a costal county north of Corpus Christi.
Although he encountered little diffi
culty during re
gistration, he believed the
presence of troops necessary as a show of force. With voter registration’s con-
clusion in the late summer of 1867, Fitch no longer thought them necessary: “I
do not think there would be any diffi
culty.” He now believed the only thing the
county needed was a good magistrate. Should superiors appoint one, he sug-
gested, the man “should also be the Sub Asst Comm.” and that “would be all
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128
Bureau Agents, Politics, New Order
that is necessary and be much more effi
cacious than a military comdr.” A. H.
Mayer noticed “Slave on the brain.” Th
us, he did not need troops until perhaps
when registration began.
In mid- 1867 Hiram Clark, a “carpetbagger” from Illinois, had little trouble in
his coastal subdistrict. “I have no troops and think none are necessary,” he
reported that July. “Th
e people seem to realize the condition they are in and
promptly comply with all requests and obey all orders.” Th
is continued for the
rest of the year. In La Grange, Isaac Johnson, a native Pennsylvanian and late
captain in the 114th U.S.C.T., had no troops at his post. Despite acknowledging
white’s hostile disposition (words not actions) toward the freedpeople, Johnson
could “get along without them until the settlement [time].” To Johnson, the situ-
ation was due to “the present system of procuring juries.” Edward Miller, a man
who impressed superiors enough to be reappointed aft er his muster out, cred-
ited the calm situation in Bryan City, Brazos County, to the Reconstruction Act
of 1867. A “carpetbagger” from New York and VRC offi
cer, he believed “there is
no necessity” for troops in Bryan City, oft en repeating in subsequent reports
that local offi
cials “are always willing to assist me in the execution of my
duties. ”
At Huntsville, James P. Butler was surprised by the good race relations.
Th
roughout the spring and early summer, he reported local offi
cials doing their
job. He believed his presence in the district was all that was required to keep the
situation calm. Troops were needed only for the “unavoidable pleasure” of
arresting those who refused to settle with their hands. A similar situation
existed in Beaumont. John H. Archer, an Englishman, saw no need for troops in
mid- to late 1867. When he applied to the Bureau, he confi dentially informed
Commissioner Howard he wished to “make my home in the South.” Archer was
adamant that he would go anywhere “except in the State of Texas.” Apparently
no longer fearful of the Lone Star State, he attributed the situation to coopera-
tive civil offi
cials and that most freedpeople in the area worked in the lumber
business, not on plantations. “I can say they [would be better to] never have
been freed than to remove the troops,” reported Philip Howard at Meridian in
June 1867. Th
e “scalawag” agent was considered by one Texas AC one of the
best civilian agents in the state. By year’s end, aft er the troops left , Howard had
changed his tune. With one exception in October (due to registration), he
reported good race relations and few complaints by freedmen. So good were
relations, he reported he did not “kneed [sic]” any troops.
Instances of not needing troops continued until the agency’s end in late 1868.
Even as the Bureau wound down and violence increased throughout the state in
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The Charles Griffin Era, Early 1867
129
1868, there were districts that remained orderly enough not to necessitate
troops. In the summer of 1868 A. K. Foster had a very eff ective sheriff in Hal-
lettsville. Foster repeatedly informed superiors he had no troops, “nor can I say
that there is a necessity for any.” According to Fred W. Reinhard, no troops were
desired because the “civil authorities in [the county] do their duty.” In Colum-
bus, New Yorker Louis W. Stevenson described white attitudes toward the
emancipated “generally as expressed, the feelings [were] good.” He thus did not
need troops. At Lockhart, Th
omas H. Baker, throughout the summer and fall of
1868, informed superiors he thought troops unnecessary in his district, while
Hamilton C. Peterson, Baker’s predecessor at Lockhart, also believed protec-
tion by soldiers was unnecessary: the “feeling between white & freedpeople is
pretty good,” he wrote. Th
omas C. Griffi
n experienced some problems with
rowdies in Kaufman in late summer 1868. By year’s end, he had a competent
sheriff and things had calmed down enough that he could do without troops.
Hiram Clark had few troubles in 1868: “I have no troops” and “none are desired
for the protection of the Freedpeople.” Th
ough he had no troops in late 1868,
William Holt believed the freedpeople in La Grange were “as safe as other men.”
For much of 1868, the SACs at Victoria and Goliad admitted no troops were
needed to perform their duties.
Some historians would dismiss this as evidence of shirking: painting an
overly optimistic picture to hide their misdeeds. For example, historian John A.
Carpenter concluded “monthly reports provide the best way of sizing up the
offi
cer, what his prejudices and reactions were, what kind of job he was doing.”
But when the reports contain virtually no information or when the agent
month aft er month wrote briefl y that all was going very well, then it must be
concluded either that the agent was careless in making out his reports, or,
more likely, was not doing a conscientious job. It is always possible that their
reports refl ected the true situation, yet, with other agents reporting atroci-
ties, unfair treatment, and other forms of hostility to the freedmen, the
objective observer can only assume that some of these agents were lax in the
performance of their duty.
Not wanting to be accused of incompetence if conditions changed for the worse,
these men also could have believed it better to report all was good. In his study
of an agent in Virginia, William F. Mugelston found such discrepancies when
he compared the man’s monthly reports to his private diary. So it is possible that
all who stated they did not need troops were “exaggerating” or “lying.” But this
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130
Bureau Agents, Politics, New Order
does not hold up upon scrutiny. Just as historians have begun to discover that
“the South,” “Southerners,” and “Confederates” are narrow defi nitions imply-
ing consensus, with little diff erence and diversity, so too perhaps are the claims
about violence within all subdistricts and experienced by all agents. Many fac-
tors infl uenced violence: such as political events from Austin and Washington,
D.C.; economic forces, like a bad crop; the number of freedpeople in the district;
presence of U.S. troops; the planters’ acceptance of the freedpeople’s changed
political status; and even the actions of the Bureau agent toward the citizens in
his district. As reasons diff ered over time, it should be expected so too would
the level of violence and resistance reported by agents during the Freedmen’s
Bureau’s existence in Texas.
Furthermore, such claims do not consider the attitudes of many at head-
quarters in Galveston: suspicion toward the former Rebel community and
state’s reputation. It would not make sense to report something diff erent. A
report contrasting what superiors believed or greatly diff ering from other
agents, who reported chaotic conditions and repeatedly requested troops, would
defi nitely have raised superiors’ eyebrows. In the agency’s voluminous records
there exist no instances of superiors questioning these reports. Nor do dis-
patches reminding of the importance of accurately reporting conditions exist.
No inspectors were ever sent to confi rm or refute claims of not needing troops.
By all accounts, superiors unsuspiciously accepted these assertions. Agents
were proud, taking off ense at any suggestion of dereliction of duty. Shirking
their responsibilities was not an option and very diffi
cult to accept when com-
pared to their reactions when their performance was, in their judgment, unfairly
questioned. To claim such reports as false indicts the organization as a whole: it
requires a leap to conclusion that the Bureau was a conspiracy against those
under their protection—the freedpeople.
In the fi rst half of 1867, as Congressional Reconstruction commenced, SACs
entered politics. Th
e Reconstruction Act of 1867 made Th
rockmorton’s govern-
ment provisional and called for registration to elect delegates to draft a new
state constitution. Agents had to ensure an orderly process and protect freed-
men’s suff rage rights. Further, they became Republican “foot soldiers,” because
a strong Republican party in Texas would ease their job and protect the freed-
people. Griffi
n transferred much responsibility to local offi
cials to reduce fric-