Somatophylakes (‘personal bodyguards’). Despite their name, the latter
were not only to physically protect their king but also serve as officers
carefully selected from the king’s most trusted men to carry out special
missions. The king, who wore no unique garments or head covering
distinguishing him from his wellborn subjects, was probably addressed by
name. Indeed, the ancient authors draw our attention to the fact that there
was generally little social distance between Macedonian kings and their
subjects, who in the Classical and Hellenistic periods still had easy access
to their monarch and relative freedom to speak out ( parrhesia) in his
presence. The abilities of riding a horse, using weapons and hunting were
an essential part of every young Macedonian aristocrat’s education. The
hunting down of the first wild boar and the killing of the first enemy in
battle were elements of the Macedonian ‘rites of passage’. It was only then
that a young aristocrat was entitled to wear a belt and feast, as was the
fashion in the ancient world, in a half reclined position. The Greeks were
shocked by a peculiar form of pederasty practiced by Philip II’s hetairoi in
which the adult could be the passive partner in a homosexual
relationship.23 Macedonian aristocrats loved breeding horses which
originated from the famous Median Nesaian breed brought over to
Macedonia during the Persian rule.24
Little is known about Macedonia’s lower social orders before the
Hellenistic period as they were not an object of interest to ancient authors.
The usual custom in the Balkan states was for the aristocracy to rule over a
serf majority, who in Thessaly were called the penestai. And such was no
23 Theopomp., FGrH, 115 F225. Flower 1994, pp. 109-119.
24 Errington 1990, pp. 152-154, 219-220; Billows 1990, pp. 19-22; Borza 1990, pp.
85-88; Badian 1996, pp. 11-12; Heckel 2003, pp. 206-208.
Childhood, Family, Macedonia
11
doubt also the social structure in aristocratically dominated Macedonia.25
This social structure probably determined the composition of the
Macedonian army, whose only valuable element was the aristocratic
cavalry. This would have been so on account of the fact that in most
ancient states the army was composed of citizens or subjects who were
obliged to equip themselves for war at their own cost. Therefore lacking
their own adequately protective (and expensive) armour, proper training
and no doubt motivation, serfs were a lightly armed infantry of virtually
no military value, especially when pitched against the phalanx: the basic
Greek formation of classical times which had for centuries dominated
battlefields in the Mediterranean zone. The phalanx was also a product of
the given social structure and mentality of the polis, inhabited as it was by
a predominantly free and relatively well-off peasantry. The polis citizen
would acquire his own hoplite equipment, which included a breastplate,
helmet, greaves, a large circular shield, a spear and a sword. It is estimated
that in all such equipment would have cost approximately 300 drachmas,
which was more or less as much as a hired worker could earn in a year.
This meant that genuinely poor landless people who had to support
themselves by working for others could not become hoplites. On the other
hand, hoplite armour was considerably cheaper than the purchase of a
warhorse, which could cost from 500 to 6,000 drachmas. Moreover the
feeding and care of such a horse could be compared to the annual
expenditure of a family of six. The fact that riders were expected to cover
all these costs meant that only the very richest could afford to serve in the
cavalry, which traditionally remained the preserve of aristocracy.26
Therefore the predominance in Greek armies of hoplites, i.e. middle-class
soldiers, reflects the egalitarian and democratic aspect of the polis.
Apart from being relatively well trained, the hoplites were noted for
their courage, determination, ability to maintain discipline on the
battlefield and solidarity among brothers in arms. These were
characteristics associated with the civic nature of the polis, where the
decision to wage war was decided at public gatherings by the votes of
citizens after open and free debates. The amateur composition of the
resolve a war with one rapid hoplite attack. The phalanx was usually eight
ranks deep and would advance on the enemy by breaking into a run in an
attempt to break his lines with a massed full frontal assault, i.e. without
any complicated manoeuvres or use of tactical reserves. The only
25 Billows 1994, pp. 9-10.
26 Figures after Hanson 1999, especially pp. 104-105, 226-227.
12
Chapter I
contemporary formation capable of withstanding such an attack was
another phalanx. Greek city-state armies were, however, reluctant to fight
protracted wars far from their polis. Such was the prestige of the phalanx
as the most important formation in the Greek army that for a long time
some of the wealthier citizens chose to serve in the heavily armed infantry
rather than the traditional preserve of the aristocracy, the cavalry. This
exceptional prestige stemmed not only from the fact that the infantry
decided the outcomes of battles and therefore also the fate of the city-state,
but also because being a hoplite required particular courage and physical
prowess. What is more, in some states, such as Sparta, weaker men served
in the cavalry, whereas the phalanx was reserved for the very best
warriors. This image of Greek city-state armies started to change in the 4th
century when the cavalry regained importance and highly trained
mercenary light infantry ( peltastai) units were introduced. Nevertheless,
up to the Battle of Chaeronea or even later faith in the citizen hoplite
army’s ability to deliver the decisive blow was upheld in Greek military
doctrine.27
Ancient sources provide no convincing evidence of the permanent
existence of a fully battle worthy infantry in the Macedonian army before
the reign of Philip II and Diodorus actually claims that Philip was the
creator of the Macedonian phalanx.28 Some historians even claim that on
account of the social conditions the creation of such a hoplite infantry
would have been impossible. Contemporary states lacking appropriate
social or cultural conditions to have their own citizens’ hoplite army
usually hired mercenaries. Such a course of action was taken up by the
Great King and satraps of the western provinces of Persia, the rulers of
Egypt as well as the tyrants of Thessaly, though in the last of these
countries attempts to form its own heavy infantry had been made since at
least the 6th century. The primitive level of agriculture combined with the
aristocratic character of the state meant that Macedonian kings lacked the
financial resources to hire very well trained but expensive Greek
mercenaries. Before the reign of Philip II Macedonia’s army was usually
limited to the aris
tocratic cavalry and primitive light infantry, both of
which stood little chance against the Greek phalanx on the battlefield. That
is why throughout most of the Classical period Macedonian was a
militarily weak state on whose territories the armies of stronger Greek
states frequently intervened.29 This situation changed radically under
27 Hanson 1999, pp. 84-141; van Wees 2000, pp. 87-88; Lendon 2005, pp. 102-
105.
28 Diod., 16.3.1-3.
29 Greenwalt 1999, p. 171; Archibald 2000, p. 230.
Childhood, Family, Macedonia
13
Philip II and his reorganisation of the Macedonian army will be discussed
later in this chapter.
3. The Argead Dynasty
Macedonian tradition, preserved by Herodotus and Thucydides, speaks of
wanderings of the ancestors of the Macedonians, their conquest of Pieria
and other lands in Lower Macedonia as well as of the expulsion or
subjugation of the original inhabitants. Modern research has confirmed
that such events indeed took place around 650. It was then that the
Makedones conquered Lower Macedonia or at least the part of it in the
vicinity of Aegae, which today is associated with the archaeological
remains near the village of Vergina. Aegae became a Macedonian bastion
and the first capital of the Macedonian state, if at this early stage one can
use such a term.30 Other Macedonian tribes occupied the lands of the
Elimeia and Lyncestis in Upper Macedonia. In all probability while these
tribes were still moving the Makedon warriors were led by the Argeads,
the first Macedonian royal dynasty. It was under their leadership that over
the last 100 or 150 years the tribes went on to conquer the whole of Lower
Macedonia.
According to Herodotus, the Macedonian dynasty was descended from
Temenos of the Heraclids, the refugee from Argos. Scholars who accept
this version call it the Temenid dynasty and explain the relative stability of
their position in Macedonia as a result of their external origins.31 However,
Herodotus’s version is not confirmed by other ancient sources, whereas
the key elements – origins traced back to the Greek heroes, especially
Heracles – are a bit too typical of the genealogical tales deliberately made
up for Greek or Hellenised aristocrats to be believed. Presumably it was
invented no earlier than after the Persian wars at the court of Alexander I,
which was then trying to use Hellenophile propaganda to sway Greek
public opinion and improve relations with Athens. Philip II and Alexander
III, on the other hand, had specific political motives to stress their
genealogical affinity with Heracles in particular.32
Alexander I was the actual founder of the Macedonian state and
historically its first ruler. As a very talented political player he was
consummately able to exploit not only the Persian occupation of Thrace
30 Hdt., 8.136-138; Th., 2.99. Borza 1990, pp. 84-85.
31 Hdt., 8.137-139. Hammond 1979, pp. 3-14, 152.
32 Badian 1982, pp. 34-36; Borza 1982, pp. 7-13; Huttner 1997, pp. 65-85; Hall
2000, p. 64.
14
Chapter I
and Macedonia but also their subsequent defeats at Salamis (480) and
Plataea (479) by the league of Greek states. During the time of Persian
dominance Alexander I was a loyal vassal of Darius I and Xerxes I. He
gave away his sister Gygaia to the Persian aristocrat Bubares and adopted
the Persian system of administration as well as elements of Persian culture.
Thanks to his ties with Persia, Alexander I consolidated his control over
Lower Macedonia and subjugated the mini states of Upper Macedonia.33
But at the same time he also maintained contact with Athens, selling her
Macedonian timber to build a fleet. Although tales of the Macedonian king
helping the Greeks during the 480-479 wars with Persia, particularly just
before the Battle of Plataea, are most probably apocryphal, Alexander’s
loyalty to the Persian suzerain certainly did not survive Xerxes’ European
defeat. Alexander I’s adroitness in liaising with both the Persian invader
and the ultimately victorious Greeks, particularly Athens, enabled a
peripheral and backward Macedonia to become for a short while a regional
power in its part of the Balkans.34
The next attempt to build a strong Macedonian state was undertaken by
Archelaus (413-399). He was an ally of Athens in the final phase of the
Peloponnesian War and tried to reform his weak and peripheral state by
building roads and fortresses. It was presumably his decision make Pella
Macedonia’s capital because, according to Xenophon, in 382 it was the
most important city in the land and it is hard to imagine that the shifting of
the capital would have occurred in the years of chaos that followed
Archelaus’s death.35
Besides, the reasons for the move could only have been economic as in
military terms Pella was in a more vulnerable position than the old capital
at Aegae. Indeed, thanks to the river Ludias, Pella had access to the sea,
which allowed the king of Macedon to make additional profits from the
export of timber and other forest products (pitch and resin) as well as other
natural resources. Political stability as well as the external security
provided by Archelaus’ reign allowed Macedonia to become prosperous,
as is testified by the high quality of its silver in two-drachm coins that
were issued in that period. Thucydides also attributes Archelaus with
arming his soldiers with the ‘ hoplon’, which for a long time was
interpreted as evidence that he had created a heavy (hoplite) infantry.
Currently a more sceptical opinion prevails which notes the lack of any
33 Fol, Hammond 1988, p. 249; Borza 1990, pp.100-105; Brosius 2003a, pp. 230-
231.
34 Borza 1990, pp. 113-115, 123-131.
35 X., HG, 5.2.13. Hammond 1979, pp. 139-140; Borza 1990, pp. 166-171;
Greenwalt 1999, pp. 163-164.
Childhood, Family, Macedonia
15
trace in the sources that such weapons were used by Macedonians at the
time as well as the fact that the ancient authors suggest Macedonia’s
military weakness at the start of the 4th century. However, we know that
Archelaus conducted an aggressive foreign policy and towards the end of
his reign he ordered military intervention in Thessaly on the side of the
Aleuad aristocratic family. It was thanks to this intervention that
Macedonia gained the borderland region of Perrhaebia, which provided it
with an important link to Greece. Moreover, a Macedonian garrison was
briefly installed in Thessaly’s chief city – Larissa. However, Archelaus’
successes were short-lived as Macedonian troops had to withdraw from
Thessaly as Spartan forces, then imposing hegemony over the whole of
Greece after the Peloponnesian War, moved in. Nonetheless the
Thessalian expedition is noteworthy in that it showed the direction of
Macedonian expansion which became so important in the times of Philip
II and Alexander. Even if Archelaus had actually formed some hoplite
units, they would have in all certainty been disbanded in the years of chaos
that followed his death.36 This monarch had promoted the Hellenisation of
the Macedonian elites by organising theatre festivals in Dion and inviting
to his court numerous Greek artists, including Zeuxis, Agathon, Timotheos
and Euripides, who reportedly was torn apart by a pack of dogs in Pella.37
It was this policy of Hellenisation that would prove to be his lasting
legacy.38
Archelaus’ other achievements, administrative ones, came to nothing in
the anarchic early decades of the 4th century, when the Argead dynasty
was blighted by assassinations and political coups. Mini states broke away
from Argead control in Upper Macedonia and the whole country was
subjected to repeated invasions and looting by neighbouring nations,
particularly the Illyrians. At the time of the Theban hegemony over Greece
Macedonia became de facto a Boeotian fief. As a guarantee of his loyalty,
King Alexander II had to give to the Thebans hostages, including his own
brother Philip, who spent three years in Thebes and returned to Macedonia
in 364. Shortly afterwards war broke out between Macedonia and the
Illyria, which was then rising in power and whose king, Bardylis, defeated
in battle Philip’s brother, King Perdiccas III, killing him and some 4000 of
36 Th., 2.100.2; Polyaen., 2.1.17; X., HG, 5.2.40. Milns 1976, pp. 92-93; Markle
1978, p. 485; Cawkwell 1978, p. 31; Borza 1990, pp. 165-166; Snodgrass 1999, p.
116.
37 Satyr., Vit. Eur. , fr. 39.21; St.Byz., s.v. Borm∂skoj. Schorn 2004, pp. 310-311,
340.
38 Borza 1990, pp. 161-177.
16
Chapter I
his troops.39 Most history books state that the battle took place in 359,
though some historians believe that it happened somewhat earlier in 360.40
4. Philip II and the rebuilding of the Macedonian state
Born in 383 or 382, as the third son of King Amyntas III and Princess
Eurydice probably originally from the Upper Macedonian kingdom of
Lyncestis, Philip was a long way down the line of succession to the throne.
For this reason he was probably not regarded to be a particularly important